ΕΡΜ. οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅπως χρὴ πρὸς ἃ λέγεις ἐναντιοῦσθαι. ἴσως μέντοι οὐ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν οὕτως ἐξαίφνης πεισθῆναι, ἀλλὰ δοκῶ μοι ὧδε ἂν μᾶλλον πιθέσθαι σοι, εἴ μοι δείξειας ἥντινα φῂς εἶναι τὴν φύσει ὀρθότητα ὀνόματος.
ΣΩ. ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ μακάριε Ἑρμόγενες, οὐδεμίαν λέγω, ἀλλʼ ἐπελάθου γε ὧν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδείην ἀλλὰ σκεψοίμην μετὰ σοῦ. νῦν δὲ σκοπουμένοις ἡμῖν, ἐμοί τε καὶ σοί, τοσοῦτον μὲν ἤδη φαίνεται παρὰ τὰ πρότερα, φύσει τέ τινα ὀρθότητα ἔχον εἶναι τὸ ὄνομα καὶ οὐ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπίστασθαι [καλῶς] αὐτὸ πράγματι ὁτῳοῦν θέσθαι· ἢ οὔ;
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο χρὴ ζητεῖν, εἴπερ ἐπιθυμεῖς εἰδέναι, ἥτις ποτʼ αὖ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ ὀρθότης.
ΕΡΜ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπιθυμῶ γε εἰδέναι.
ΣΩ. σκόπει τοίνυν.
ΕΡΜ. πῶς οὖν χρὴ σκοπεῖν;
ΣΩ. ὀρθοτάτη μὲν τῆς σκέψεως, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μετὰ τῶν ἐπισταμένων, χρήματα ἐκείνοις τελοῦντα καὶ χάριτας κατατιθέμενον. εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι οἱ σοφισταί, οἷσπερ καὶ ὁ ἀδελφός σου Καλλίας πολλὰ τελέσας χρήματα σοφὸς δοκεῖ εἶναι. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἐγκρατὴς εἶ τῶν πατρῴων, λιπαρεῖν χρὴ τὸν ἀδελφὸν καὶ δεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ διδάξαι σε τὴν ὀρθότητα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἣν ἔμαθεν παρὰ Πρωταγόρου.
ΕΡΜ. ἄτοπος μεντἂν εἴη μου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ δέησις, εἰ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν τὴν Πρωταγόρου ὅλως οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι, τὰ δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀληθείᾳ ῥηθέντα ἀγαπῴην ὥς του ἄξια.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ εἰ μὴ αὖ σε ταῦτα ἀρέσκει, παρʼ Ὁμήρου χρὴ μανθάνειν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν.
ΕΡΜ. καὶ τί λέγει, ὦ Σώκρατες, Ὅμηρος περὶ ὀνομάτων, καὶ ποῦ;
ΣΩ. πολλαχοῦ· μέγιστα δὲ καὶ κάλλιστα ἐν οἷς διορίζει ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἅ τε οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὀνόματα καλοῦσι καὶ οἱ θεοί. ἢ οὐκ οἴει αὐτὸν μέγα τι καὶ θαυμάσιον λέγειν ἐν τούτοις περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος; δῆλον γὰρ δὴ ὅτι οἵ γε θεοὶ αὐτὰ καλοῦσιν πρὸς ὀρθότητα ἅπερ ἔστι φύσει ὀνόματα· ἢ σὺ οὐκ οἴει;
ΕΡΜ. εὖ οἶδα μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε, εἴπερ καλοῦσιν, ὅτι ὀρθῶς καλοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ ποῖα ταῦτα λέγεις;
ΣΩ. οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι περὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ τοῦ ἐν τῇ Τροίᾳ, ὃς ἐμονομάχει τῷ Ἡφαίστῳ, «ὃν Ξάνθον,» φησί, «καλέουσι θεοί, ἄνδρες δὲ Σκάμανδρον;»
ΕΡΜ. ἔγωγε.
Hermogenes. I do not know how to answer you, Socrates; nevertheless it is not easy to change my conviction suddenly. I think you would be more likely to convince me, if you were to show me just what it is that you say is the natural correctness of names.
Socrates. I, my dear Hermogenes, do not say that there is any. You forget what I said a while ago, that I did not know, but would join you in looking for the truth. And now, as we are looking, you and I, we already see one thing we did not know before, that names do possess a certain natural correctness, and that not every man knows how to give a name well to anything whatsoever. Is not that true?
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. Then our next task is to try to find out, if you care to know about it, what kind of correctness that is which belongs to names.
Hermogenes. To be sure I care to know.
Socrates. Then investigate.
Hermogenes. How shall I investigate?
Socrates. The best way to investigate, my friend, is with the help of those who know; and you make sure of their favour by paying them money. They are the sophists, of Protagoras altogether, should desire what is said in such a Truth, as if it were of any value.
Socrates. Then if you do not like that, you ought to learn from Homer and the other poets.
Hermogenes. Why, Socrates, what does Homer say about names, and where?
Socrates. In many passages; but chiefly and most admirably in those in which he distinguishes between the names by which gods and men call the same things. Do you not think he gives in those passages great and wonderful information about the correctness of names? For clearly the gods call things by the names that are naturally right. Do you not think so?
Hermogenes. Of course I know that if they call things, they call them rightly. But what are these instances to which you refer?
Socrates. Do you not know that he says about the river in Troy which had the single combat with Hephaestus, whom the gods call Xanthus, but men call Scamander / ?
Hermogenes. Oh yes.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν δή; οὐκ οἴει τοῦτο σεμνόν τι εἶναι γνῶναι, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐκεῖνον τὸν ποταμὸν Ξάνθον καλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ Σκάμανδρον; εἰ δὲ βούλει, περὶ τῆς ὄρνιθος ἣν λέγει ὅτι—χαλκίδα κικλῄσκουσι θεοί, ἄνδρες δὲ κύμινδιν, / φαῦλον ἡγῇ τὸ μάθημα ὅσῳ ὀρθότερόν ἐστι καλεῖσθαι χαλκὶς κυμίνδιδος τῷ αὐτῷ ὀρνέῳ; ἢ τὴν Βατίειάν τε καὶ Μυρίνην, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ τούτου τοῦ ποιητοῦ καὶ ἄλλων; ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως μείζω ἐστὶν ἢ κατʼ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ ἐξευρεῖν· ὁ δὲ Σκαμάνδριός τε καὶ ὁ Ἀστυάναξ ἀνθρωπινώτερον διασκέψασθαι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ῥᾷον, ἅ φησιν ὀνόματα εἶναι τῷ τοῦ Ἕκτορος ὑεῖ, τίνα ποτὲ λέγει τὴν ὀρθότητα αὐτῶν. οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω.
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν οἴει Ὅμηρον ὀρθότερον ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων κεῖσθαι τῷ παιδί, τὸν «Ἀστυάνακτα» ἢ τὸν «Σκαμάνδριον»;
ΕΡΜ. οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.
ΣΩ. ὧδε δὴ σκόπει. εἴ τις ἔροιτό σε πότερον οἴει ὀρθότερον καλεῖν τὰ ὀνόματα τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους ἢ τοὺς ἀφρονεστέρους;
ΕΡΜ. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους, φαίην ἄν.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν φρονιμώτεραί σοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἢ οἱ ἄνδρες, ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν γένος;
ΕΡΜ. οἱ ἄνδρες.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἶσθα ὅτι Ὅμηρος τὸ παιδίον τὸ τοῦ Ἕκτορος ὑπὸ τῶν Τρώων φησὶν καλεῖσθαι Ἀστυάνακτα, Σκαμάνδριον δὲ δῆλον ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, ἐπειδὴ οἵ γε ἄνδρες αὐτὸν Ἀστυάνακτα ἐκάλουν;
ΕΡΜ. ἔοικέ γε.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ Ὅμηρος τοὺς Τρῶας σοφωτέρους ἡγεῖτο ἢ τὰς γυναῖκας αὐτῶν;
ΕΡΜ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. τὸν «Ἀστυάνακτα» ἄρα ὀρθότερον ᾤετο κεῖσθαι τῷ παιδὶ ἢ τὸν «Σκαμάνδριον»;
ΕΡΜ. φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. σκοπῶμεν δὴ διὰ τί ποτε. ἢ αὐτὸς ἡμῖν κάλλιστα ὑφηγεῖται τὸ διότι; φησὶν γάρ— οἶος γάρ σφιν ἔρυτο πόλιν καὶ τείχεα μακρά. / διὰ ταῦτα δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὀρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖν τὸν τοῦ σωτῆρος ὑὸν Ἀστυάνακτα τούτου ὃ ἔσῳζεν ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, ὥς φησιν Ὅμηρος.
ΕΡΜ. φαίνεταί μοι.
ΣΩ. τί δή ποτε; οὐ γάρ πω οὐδʼ αὐτὸς ἔγωγε μανθάνω· ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, σὺ δὲ μανθάνεις;
ΕΡΜ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
Socrates. Well, do you not think this is a grand thing to know, that the name of that river is rightly Xanthus, rather than Scamander? Or, if you like, do you think it is a slight thing to learn about the bird which he says gods call chalcis, but men call cymindis, / that it is much more correct for the same bird to be called chalcis than cymindis? Or to learn that the hill men call Batieia is called by the gods Myrina’s tomb, and many other such statements by Homer and other poets? But perhaps these matters are too high for us to understand; it is, I think, more within human power to investigate the names Scamandrius and Astyanax, and understand what kind of correctness he ascribes to these, which he says are the names of Hector’s son. You recall, of course: the lines which contain the words to which I refer.
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. Which of the names of the boy do you imagine Homer thought was more correct, Astyanax or Scamandrius?
Hermogenes. I cannot say.
Socrates. Look at it in this way: suppose you were asked, “Do the wise or the unwise give names more correctly?”
Hermogenes. “The wise, obviously,” I should say.
Socrates. And do you think the women or the men of a city, regarded as a class in general, are the wiser?
Hermogenes. The men.
Socrates. And do you not know that Homer says the child of Hector was called Astyanax by the men of Troy; so he must have been called Scamandrius by the women, since the men called him Astyanax?
Hermogenes. Yes, probably.
Socrates. And Homer too thought the Trojan men were wiser than the women?
Hermogenes. I suppose he did.
Socrates. Then he thought Astyanax was more rightly the boy’s name than Scamandrius?
Hermogenes. So it appears.
Socrates. Let us, then, consider the reason for this. Does he not himself indicate the reason most admirably? For he says— He alone defended their city and long walls. / Therefore, as it seems, it is right to call the son of the defender Astyanax (Lord of the city), ruler of that which his father, as Homer says, defended.
Hermogenes. That is clear to me.
Socrates. Indeed? I do not yet understand about it myself, Hermogenes. Do you?
Hermogenes. No, by Zeus, I do not.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἆρα, ὠγαθέ, καὶ τῷ Ἕκτορι αὐτὸς ἔθετο τὸ ὄνομα Ὅμηρος;
ΕΡΜ. τί δή;
ΣΩ. ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο παραπλήσιόν τι εἶναι τῷ Ἀστυάνακτι, καὶ ἔοικεν Ἑλληνικοῖς ταῦτα [τὰ ὀνόματα]. ὁ γὰρ «ἄναξ» καὶ ὁ «Ἕκτωρ» σχεδόν τι ταὐτὸν σημαίνει, βασιλικὰ ἀμφότερα εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα· οὗ γὰρ ἄν τις «ἄναξ» ᾖ, καὶ «Ἕκτωρ» δήπου ἐστὶν τούτου· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι κρατεῖ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ κέκτηται καὶ ἔχει αὐτό. ἢ οὐδέν σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ λανθάνω καὶ ἐμαυτὸν οἰόμενός τινος ὥσπερ ἴχνους ἐφάπτεσθαι τῆς Ὁμήρου δόξης περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος;
ΕΡΜ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐ σύ γε, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, ἀλλὰ ἴσως τοῦ ἐφάπτῃ.
ΣΩ. δίκαιόν γέ τοί ἐστιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τὸν λέοντος ἔκγονον λέοντα καλεῖν καὶ τὸν ἵππου ἔκγονον ἵππον. οὔ τι λέγω ἐὰν ὥσπερ τέρας γένηται ἐξ ἵππου ἄλλο τι ἢ ἵππος, ἀλλʼ οὗ ἂν ᾖ τοῦ γένους ἔκγονον τὴν φύσιν, τοῦτο λέγω· ἐὰν βοὸς ἔκγονον φύσει ἵππος παρὰ φύσιν τέκῃ μόσχον, οὐ πῶλον κλητέον ἀλλὰ μόσχον· οὐδʼ ἂν ἐξ ἀνθρώπου οἶμαι μὴ τὸ ἀνθρώπου ἔκγονον γένηται, [ἀλλʼ ὃ ἂν] τὸ ἔκγονον ἄνθρωπος κλητέος· καὶ τὰ δένδρα ὡσαύτως καὶ τἆλλα ἅπαντα· ἢ οὐ συνδοκεῖ;
ΕΡΜ. συνδοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. καλῶς λέγεις· φύλαττε γάρ με μή πῃ παρακρούσωμαί σε. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον κἂν ἐκ βασιλέως γίγνηταί τι ἔκγονον, βασιλεὺς κλητέος· εἰ δὲ ἐν ἑτέραις συλλαβαῖς ἢ ἐν ἑτέραις τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνει, οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα· οὐδʼ εἰ πρόσκειταί τι γράμμα ἢ ἀφῄρηται, οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τοῦτο, ἕως ἂν ἐγκρατὴς ᾖ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ πράγματος δηλουμένη ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι.
ΕΡΜ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;
ΣΩ. οὐδὲν ποικίλον, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ τῶν στοιχείων οἶσθα ὅτι ὀνόματα λέγομεν ἀλλʼ οὐκ αὐτὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα, πλὴν τεττάρων, τοῦ Ε καὶ τοῦ Υ καὶ τοῦ Ο καὶ τοῦ Ω· τοῖς δʼ ἄλλοις φωνήεσί τε καὶ ἀφώνοις οἶσθα ὅτι περιτιθέντες ἄλλα γράμματα λέγομεν, ὀνόματα ποιοῦντες· ἀλλʼ ἕως ἂν αὐτοῦ δηλουμένην τὴν δύναμιν ἐντιθῶμεν, ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐκεῖνο τὸ ὄνομα καλεῖν ὃ αὐτὸ ἡμῖν δηλώσει. οἷον τὸ «βῆτα»· ὁρᾷς ὅτι τοῦ ἦτα καὶ τοῦ ταῦ καὶ τοῦ ἄλφα προστεθέντων οὐδὲν ἐλύπησεν, ὥστε μὴ οὐχὶ τὴν ἐκείνου τοῦ στοιχείου φύσιν δηλῶσαι ὅλῳ τῷ ὀνόματι οὗ ἐβούλετο ὁ νομοθέτης· οὕτως ἠπιστήθη καλῶς θέσθαι τοῖς γράμμασι τὰ ὀνόματα.
ΕΡΜ. ἀληθῆ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν.
Socrates. But, my good friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector his name?
Hermogenes. Why do you ask that?
Socrates. Because that name seems to me similar to Astyanax, and both names seem to be Greek. For lord (ἄναξ) and holder (ἕκτωρ) mean nearly the same thing, indicating that they are names of a king; for surely a man is holder of that of which he is lord; for it is clear that he rules it and possesses it and holds it. Or does it seem to you that there is nothing in what I am saying, and am I wrong in imagining that I have found a clue to Homer’s opinion about the correctness of names?
Hermogenes. No, by Zeus, you are not wrong, in my opinion; I think perhaps you have found a clue.
Socrates. It is right, I think, to call a lion’s offspring a lion and a horse’s offspring a horse. I am not speaking of prodigies, such as the birth of some other kind of creature from a horse, but of the natural offspring of each species after its kind. If a horse, contrary to nature, should bring forth a calf, the natural offspring of a cow, it should be called a calf, not a colt, nor if any offspring that is not human should be born from a human being, should that other offspring be called a human being; and the same applies to trees and all the rest. Do you not agree?
Hermogenes. Yes.
Socrates. Good; but keep watch of me, and do not let me trick you; for by the same argument any offspring of a king should be called a king; and whether the same meaning is expressed in one set of syllables or another makes no difference; and if a letter is added or subtracted, that does not matter either, so long as the essence of the thing named remains in force and is made plain in the name.
Hermogenes. What do you mean?
Socrates. Something quite simple. For instance, when we speak of the letters of the alphabet, you know, we speak their names, not merely the letters themselves, except in the case of four, ε, υ, ο, ω. We make names for all the other vowels and consonants by adding other letters to them; and so long as we include the letter in question and make its force plain, we may properly call it by that name, and that will designate it for us. Take beta, for instance, The addition of e(η), t(τ), a(a) does no harm and does not prevent the whole name from making clear the nature of that letter which the lawgiver wished to designate; he knew so well how to give names to letters.
Hermogenes. I think you are right.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ βασιλέως ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος; ἔσται γάρ ποτε ἐκ βασιλέως βασιλεύς, καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθός, καὶ ἐκ καλοῦ καλός, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὕτως, ἐξ ἑκάστου γένους ἕτερον τοιοῦτον ἔκγονον, ἐὰν μὴ τέρας γίγνηται· κλητέον δὴ ταὐτὰ ὀνόματα. ποικίλλειν δὲ ἔξεστι ταῖς συλλαβαῖς, ὥστε δόξαι ἂν τῷ ἰδιωτικῶς ἔχοντι ἕτερα εἶναι ἀλλήλων τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα· ὥσπερ ἡμῖν τὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν φάρμακα χρώμασιν καὶ ὀσμαῖς πεποικιλμένα ἄλλα φαίνεται τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα, τῷ δέ γε ἰατρῷ, ἅτε τὴν δύναμιν τῶν φαρμάκων σκοπουμένῳ, τὰ αὐτὰ φαίνεται, καὶ οὐκ ἐκπλήττεται ὑπὸ τῶν προσόντων. οὕτω δὲ ἴσως καὶ ὁ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὀνομάτων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν σκοπεῖ, καὶ οὐκ ἐκπλήττεται εἴ τι πρόσκειται γράμμα ἢ μετάκειται ἢ ἀφῄρηται, ἢ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις παντάπασιν γράμμασίν ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ ὀνόματος δύναμις. ὥσπερ ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, «Ἀστυάναξ» τε καὶ «Ἕκτωρ» οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν γραμμάτων ἔχει πλὴν τοῦ ταῦ, ἀλλʼ ὅμως ταὐτὸν σημαίνει. καὶ «Ἀρχέπολίς» γε τῶν μὲν γραμμάτων τί ἐπικοινωνεῖ; δηλοῖ δὲ ὅμως τὸ αὐτό· καὶ ἄλλα πολλά ἐστιν ἃ οὐδὲν ἀλλʼ ἢ βασιλέα σημαίνει· καὶ ἄλλα γε αὖ στρατηγόν, οἷον «Ἆγις» καὶ «Πολέμαρχος» καὶ «Εὐπόλεμος». καὶ ἰατρικά γε ἕτερα, «Ἰατροκλῆς» καὶ «Ἀκεσίμβροτος»· καὶ ἕτερα ἂν ἴσως συχνὰ εὕροιμεν ταῖς μὲν συλλαβαῖς καὶ τοῖς γράμμασι διαφωνοῦντα, τῇ δὲ δυνάμει ταὐτὸν φθεγγόμενα. φαίνεται οὕτως ἢ οὔ;
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. τοῖς μὲν δὴ κατὰ φύσιν γιγνομένοις τὰ αὐτὰ ἀποδοτέον ὀνόματα.
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν, οἳ ἂν ἐν τέρατος εἴδει γένωνται; οἷον ὅταν ἐξ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ θεοσεβοῦς ἀσεβὴς γένηται, ἆρʼ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, κἂν ἵππος βοὸς ἔκγονον τέκῃ, οὐ τοῦ τεκόντος δήπου ἔδει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ γένους οὗ εἴη;
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. καὶ τῷ ἐκ τοῦ εὐσεβοῦς ἄρα γενομένῳ ἀσεβεῖ τὸ τοῦ γένους ὄνομα ἀποδοτέον.
ΕΡΜ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. οὐ «Θεόφιλον,» ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδὲ «Μνησίθεον» οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν· ἀλλʼ ὅτι τἀναντία τούτοις σημαίνει, ἐάνπερ τῆς ὀρθότητος τυγχάνῃ τὰ ὀνόματα.
ΕΡΜ. παντός γε μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. ὥσπερ γε καὶ ὁ «Ὀρέστης,» ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, κινδυνεύει ὀρθῶς ἔχειν, εἴτε τις τύχη ἔθετο αὐτῷ τὸ ὄνομα εἴτε καὶ ποιητής τις, τὸ θηριῶδες τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὸ ἄγριον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ὀρεινὸν ἐνδεικνύμενος τῷ ὀνόματι.
Socrates. Does not the same reasoning apply to a king? A king’s son will probably be a king, a good man’s good, a handsome man’s handsome, and so forth; the offspring of each class will be of the same class, unless some unnatural birth takes place; so they should be called by the same names. But variety in the syllables is admissible, so that names which are the same appear different to the uninitiated, just as the physicians’ drugs, when prepared with various colors and perfumes, seem different to us, though they are the same, but to the physician, who considers only their medicinal value, they seem the same, and he is not confused by the additions. So perhaps the man who knows about names considers their value and is not confused if some letter is added, transposed, or subtracted, or even if the force of the name is expressed in entirely different letters. So, for instance, in the names we were just discussing, Astyanax and Hector, none of the letters is the same, except T, but nevertheless they have the same meaning. And what letters has Archepolis (ruler of the city) in common with them? Yet it means the same thing; and there are many other names which mean simply “king.” Others again mean “general,” such as Agis (leader), Polemarchus (war-lord), and Eupolemus (good warrior); and others indicate physicians, as Iatrocles (famous physician) and Acesimbrotus (healer of mortals); and we might perhaps find many others which differ in syllables and letters, but express the same meaning. Do you think that is true, or not?
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. To those, then, who are born in accordance with nature the same names should be given.
Hermogenes. Yes.
Socrates. And how about those who are born contrary to nature as prodigies? For instance, when an impious son is born to a good and pious man, ought he not, as in our former example when a mare brought forth a calf, to have the designation of the class to which he belongs, instead of that of his parent?
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. Then the impious son of a pious father ought to receive the name of his class.
Hermogenes. True.
Socrates. Not Theophilus (beloved of God) or Mnesitheus (mindful of God) or anything of that sort; but something of opposite meaning, if names are correct.
Hermogenes. Most assuredly, Socrates.
Socrates. As the name of Orestes (mountain man) is undoubtedly correct, Hermogenes, whether it was given him by chance or by some poet who indicated by the name the fierceness, rudeness, and mountain-wildness of his nature.
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