ΚΡ. οὕσπερ σὺ κατʼ ἀρχὰς ἔλεγες, τοὺς νομοθέτας.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν καὶ ταύτην φῶμεν τὴν τέχνην ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγίγνεσθαι ὥσπερ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἢ μή; βούλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιόνδε. ζωγράφοι εἰσίν που οἱ μὲν χείρους, οἱ δὲ ἀμείνους;
ΚΡ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἱ μὲν ἀμείνους τὰ αὑτῶν ἔργα καλλίω παρέχονται, τὰ ζῷα, οἱ δὲ φαυλότερα; καὶ οἰκοδόμοι ὡσαύτως οἱ μὲν καλλίους τὰς οἰκίας ἐργάζονται, οἱ δὲ αἰσχίους;
ΚΡ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ νομοθέται οἱ μὲν καλλίω τὰ [ἔργα] αὑτῶν παρέχονται, οἱ δὲ αἰσχίω;
ΚΡ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο ἔτι.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι νόμοι οἱ μὲν βελτίους, οἱ δὲ φαυλότεροι εἶναι;
ΚΡ. οὐ δῆτα.
ΣΩ. οὐδὲ δὴ ὄνομα, ὡς ἔοικε, δοκεῖ σοι κεῖσθαι τὸ μὲν χεῖρον, τὸ δὲ ἄμεινον;
ΚΡ. οὐ δῆτα.
ΣΩ. πάντα ἄρα τὰ ὀνόματα ὀρθῶς κεῖται;
ΚΡ. ὅσα γε ὀνόματά ἐστιν.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ὃ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο, Ἑρμογένει τῷδε πότερον μηδὲ ὄνομα τοῦτο κεῖσθαι φῶμεν, εἰ μή τι αὐτῷ Ἑρμοῦ γενέσεως προσήκει, ἢ κεῖσθαι μέν, οὐ μέντοι ὀρθῶς γε;
ΚΡ. οὐδὲ κεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν κεῖσθαι, εἶναι δὲ ἑτέρου τοῦτο τοὔνομα, οὗπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις [ἡ τὸ ὄνομα δηλοῦσα].
ΣΩ. πότερον οὐδὲ ψεύδεται ὅταν τις φῇ Ἑρμογένη αὐτὸν εἶναι; μὴ γὰρ οὐδὲ τοῦτο αὖ ᾖ, τὸ τοῦτον φάναι Ἑρμογένη εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν;
ΚΡ. πῶς λέγεις;
ΣΩ. ἆρα ὅτι ψευδῆ λέγειν τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἆρα τοῦτό σοι δύναται ὁ λόγος; συχνοὶ γάρ τινες οἱ λέγοντες, ὦ φίλε Κρατύλε, καὶ νῦν καὶ πάλαι.
ΚΡ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγων γέ τις τοῦτο ὃ λέγει, μὴ τὸ ὂν λέγοι; ἢ οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ψευδῆ λέγειν, τὸ μὴ τὰ ὄντα λέγειν;
ΣΩ. κομψότερος μὲν ὁ λόγος ἢ κατʼ ἐμὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ἡλικίαν, ὦ ἑταῖρε. ὅμως μέντοι εἰπέ μοι τοσόνδε· πότερον λέγειν μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ψευδῆ, φάναι δέ;
ΚΡ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ οὐδὲ φάναι.
ΣΩ. οὐδὲ εἰπεῖν οὐδὲ προσειπεῖν; οἷον εἴ τις ἀπαντήσας σοι ἐπὶ ξενίας, λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς εἴποι· «χαῖρε, ὦ ξένε Ἀθηναῖε, ὑὲ Σμικρίωνος Ἑρμόγενες,» οὗτος λέξειεν ἂν ταῦτα ἢ φαίη ἂν ταῦτα ἢ εἴποι ἂν ταῦτα ἢ προσείποι ἂν οὕτω σὲ μὲν οὔ, Ἑρμογένη δὲ τόνδε; ἢ οὐδένα;
ΚΡ. ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλως ἂν οὗτος ταῦτα φθέγξασθαι.
Cratylus. The lawgivers, as you said in the beginning.
Socrates. Shall we declare that this art arises in men like the other arts, or not? What I mean is this: Some painters are better, and others worse, are they not?
Cratylus. Certainly.
Socrates. And the better produce better works—that is, their paintings—and the others worse works? And likewise some builders build better houses and others worse?
Cratylus. Yes.
Socrates. Then do some lawgivers produce better, and others worse works?
Cratylus. No; at that point I cease to agree.
Socrates. Then you do not think that some laws are better, and some worse?
Cratylus. No, I do not.
Socrates. And you do not, it appears, think that one name is better, and another worse?
Cratylus. No, I do not.
Socrates. Then all names are correct?
Cratylus. All that are really names.
Socrates. How about the name of our friend Hermogenes, which was mentioned a while ago? Shall we say that it is not his name at all, unless he belongs to the race of Hermes, or that it is his name, but is incorrect?
Cratylus. I think, Socrates, that it is not his name at all; it appears to be his, but is really the name of some one else who possesses the nature that makes the name clear.
Socrates. And when anyone says that our friend is Hermogenes, is he not even speaking falsely? For perhaps it is not even possible to say that he is Hermogenes, if he is not.
Cratylus. What do you mean?
Socrates. Do you mean to say that it is impossible to speak falsehood at all? For there are, my dear Cratylus, many who do so, and who have done so in the past.
Cratylus. Why, Socrates, how could anyone who says that which he says, say that which is not? Is not falsehood saying that which is not?
Socrates. Your reasoning is too clever for me at my age, my friend. However, tell me this: Do you think it is possible to speak falsehood, but not to say it?
Cratylus. Neither to speak nor to say it.
Socrates. Nor utter it or use it as a form of address? For instance, if some one should meet you in hospitable fashion, should grasp your hand and say, “Well met, my friend from Athens, son of Smicrion, Hermogenes,” would he be saying or speaking or uttering or addressing these words not to you, but to Hermogenes—or to nobody?
Cratylus. I think, Socrates, the man would be producing sounds without sense.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἀγαπητὸν καὶ τοῦτο. πότερον γὰρ ἀληθῆ ἂν φθέγξαιτο ταῦτα ὁ φθεγξάμενος ἢ ψευδῆ; ἢ τὸ μέν τι αὐτῶν ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος; καὶ γὰρ ἂν καὶ τοῦτο ἐξαρκοῖ.
ΚΡ. ψοφεῖν ἔγωγʼ ἂν φαίην τὸν τοιοῦτον, μάτην αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν κινοῦντα, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις χαλκίον κινήσειε κρούσας.
ΣΩ. φέρε δή, ἐάν πῃ διαλλαχθῶμεν, ὦ Κρατύλε· ἆρʼ οὐκ ἄλλο μὲν ἂν φαίης τὸ ὄνομα εἶναι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο οὗ τὸ ὄνομά ἐστιν;
ΚΡ. ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ὁμολογεῖς μίμημά τι εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος;
ΚΡ. πάντων μάλιστα.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ζωγραφήματα τρόπον τινὰ ἄλλον λέγεις μιμήματα εἶναι πραγμάτων τινῶν;
ΚΡ. ναί.
ΣΩ. φέρε δή—ἴσως γὰρ ἐγὼ οὐ μανθάνω ἅττα ποτʼ ἔστιν ἃ λέγεις, σὺ δὲ τάχʼ ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγοις—ἔστι διανεῖμαι καὶ προσενεγκεῖν ταῦτα ἀμφότερα τὰ μιμήματα, τά τε ζωγραφήματα κἀκεῖνα τὰ ὀνόματα, τοῖς πράγμασιν ὧν μιμήματά ἐστιν, ἢ οὔ;
ΚΡ. ἔστιν.
ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκόπει τόδε. ἆρʼ ἄν τις τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἰκόνα τῷ ἀνδρὶ ἀποδοίη, τὴν δὲ τῆς γυναικὸς τῇ γυναικί, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως;
ΚΡ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὐναντίον τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τῇ γυναικί, τὴν δὲ τῆς γυναικὸς τῷ ἀνδρί;
ΚΡ. ἔστι καὶ ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν αὗται αἱ διανομαὶ ἀμφότεραι ὀρθαί, ἢ ἡ ἑτέρα;
ΚΡ. ἡ ἑτέρα.
ΣΩ. ἣ ἂν ἑκάστῳ οἶμαι τὸ προσῆκόν τε καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ἀποδιδῷ.
ΚΡ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. ἵνα τοίνυν μὴ μαχώμεθα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ φίλοι ὄντες, ἀπόδεξαί μου ὃ λέγω. τὴν τοιαύτην γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καλῶ ἔγωγε διανομὴν ἐπʼ ἀμφοτέροις μὲν τοῖς μιμήμασιν, τοῖς τε ζῴοις καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, ὀρθήν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὀνόμασι πρὸς τῷ ὀρθὴν καὶ ἀληθῆ· τὴν δʼ ἑτέραν, τὴν τοῦ ἀνομοίου δόσιν τε καὶ ἐπιφοράν, οὐκ ὀρθήν, καὶ ψευδῆ ὅταν ἐπʼ ὀνόμασιν ᾖ.
ΚΡ. ἀλλʼ ὅπως μή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν ᾖ τοῦτο, τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς διανέμειν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν οὔ, ἀλλʼ ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ ἀεὶ ὀρθῶς.
ΣΩ. πῶς λέγεις; τί τοῦτο ἐκείνου διαφέρει; ἆρʼ οὐκ ἔστι προσελθόντα ἀνδρί τῳ εἰπεῖν ὅτι «τουτί ἐστι σὸν γράμμα,» καὶ δεῖξαι αὐτῷ, ἂν μὲν τύχῃ, ἐκείνου εἰκόνα, ἂν δὲ τύχῃ, γυναικός; τὸ δὲ δεῖξαι λέγω εἰς τὴν τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν αἴσθησιν καταστῆσαι.
ΚΡ. πάνυ γε.
Socrates. Even that reply is welcome; for I can ask whether the words he produced would be true, or false, or partly true and partly false. Even that would suffice.
Cratylus. I should say that the man in such a case was merely making a noise, going through purposeless motions, as if he were beating a bronze pot.
Socrates. Let us see, Cratylus, if we cannot come to terms somehow. You would agree, would you not, that the name is one thing and the thing of which it is the name is another?
Cratylus. Yes, I should.
Socrates. And you agree that the name is an imitation of the thing named?
Cratylus. Most assuredly.
Socrates. And you agree that paintings also are imitations, though in a different way, of things?
Cratylus. Yes.
Socrates. Well then—for perhaps I do not understand, and you may be right—can both of these imitations, the paintings and the names, be assigned and applied to the things which they imitate, or not?
Cratylus. They can.
Socrates. First, then, consider this question: Can we assign the likeness of the man to the man and that of the woman to the woman, and so forth?
Cratylus. Certainly.
Socrates. And can we conversely attribute that of the man to the woman, and the woman’s to the man?
Cratylus. That is also possible.
Socrates. And are these assignments both correct, or only the former?
Cratylus. The former.
Socrates. The assignment, in short, which attributes to each that which belongs to it and is like it.
Cratylus. That is my view.
Socrates. To put an end to contentious argument between you and me, since we are friends, let me state my position. I call that kind of assignment in the case of both imitations paintings and names—correct, and in the case of names not only correct, but true; and the other kind, which gives and applies the unlike imitation, I call incorrect and, in the case of names, false.
Cratylus. But it may be, Socrates, that this incorrect assignment is possible in the case of paintings, and not in the case of names, which must be always correctly assigned.
Socrates. What do you mean? What difference is there between the two? Can I not step up to a man and say to him, “This is your portrait,” and show him perhaps his own likeness or, perhaps, that of a woman? And by “show” I mean bring before the sense of sight.
Cratylus. Certainly.
ΣΩ. τί δέ; πάλιν αὐτῷ τούτῳ προσελθόντα εἰπεῖν ὅτι «τουτί ἐστιν σὸν ὄνομα»; ἔστι δέ που καὶ τὸ ὄνομα μίμημα ὥσπερ τὸ ζωγράφημα. τοῦτο δὴ λέγω· ἆρʼ οὐκ ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν ὅτι «τουτί ἐστι σὸν ὄνομα,» καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς τὴν τῆς ἀκοῆς αὖ αἴσθησιν καταστῆσαι, ἂν μὲν τύχῃ, τὸ ἐκείνου μίμημα, εἰπόντα ὅτι ἀνήρ, ἂν δὲ τύχῃ, τὸ τοῦ θήλεος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου γένους, εἰπόντα ὅτι γυνή; οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο οἷόν τʼ εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐνίοτε;
ΚΡ. ἐθέλω σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, συγχωρῆσαι καὶ ἔστω οὕτως.
ΣΩ. καλῶς γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὦ φίλε, εἰ ἔστι τοῦτο οὕτως· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεῖ νῦν πάνυ διαμάχεσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ. εἰ δʼ οὖν ἔστι τοιαύτη τις διανομὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα, τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τούτων ἀληθεύειν βουλόμεθα καλεῖν, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον ψεύδεσθαι. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἔστι μὴ ὀρθῶς διανέμειν τὰ ὀνόματα μηδὲ ἀποδιδόναι τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάστῳ, ἀλλʼ ἐνίοτε τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα, εἴη ἂν καὶ ῥήματα ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ποιεῖν. εἰ δὲ ῥήματα καὶ ὀνόματα ἔστιν οὕτω τιθέναι, ἀνάγκη καὶ λόγους· λόγοι γάρ που, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἡ τούτων σύνθεσίς ἐστιν· ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Κρατύλε;
ΚΡ. οὕτω· καλῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ γράμμασιν αὖ τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα ἀπεικάζομεν, ἔστιν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν καὶ πάντα τὰ προσήκοντα χρώματά τε καὶ σχήματα ἀποδοῦναι, καὶ μὴ πάντα αὖ, ἀλλʼ ἔνια ἐλλείπειν, ἔνια δὲ καὶ προστιθέναι, καὶ πλείω καὶ μείζω· ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν;
ΚΡ. ἔστιν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν ἀποδιδοὺς πάντα καλὰ τὰ γράμματά τε καὶ τὰς εἰκόνας ἀποδίδωσιν, ὁ δὲ ἢ προστιθεὶς ἢ ἀφαιρῶν γράμματα μὲν καὶ εἰκόνας ἐργάζεται καὶ οὗτος, ἀλλὰ πονηράς;
ΚΡ. ναί.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ ὁ διὰ τῶν συλλαβῶν τε καὶ γραμμάτων τὴν οὐσίαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀπομιμούμενος; ἆρα οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ἂν μὲν πάντα ἀποδῷ τὰ προσήκοντα, καλὴ ἡ εἰκὼν ἔσται—τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ὄνομα—ἐὰν δὲ σμικρὰ ἐλλείπῃ ἢ προστιθῇ ἐνίοτε, εἰκὼν μὲν γενήσεται, καλὴ δὲ οὔ; ὥστε τὰ μὲν καλῶς εἰργασμένα ἔσται τῶν ὀνομάτων, τὰ δὲ κακῶς;
ΚΡ. ἴσως.
ΣΩ. ἴσως ἄρα ἔσται ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς δημιουργὸς ὀνομάτων, ὁ δὲ κακός;
ΚΡ. ναί.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τούτῳ ὁ «νομοθέτης» ἦν ὄνομα.
ΚΡ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ἴσως ἄρα νὴ Δίʼ ἔσται, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις, καὶ νομοθέτης ὁ μὲν ἀγαθός, ὁ δὲ κακός, ἐάνπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἐκεῖνα ὁμολογηθῇ ἡμῖν.
Socrates. Well, then, can I not step up to the same man again and say, “This is your name”? A name is an imitation, just as a picture is. Very well; can I not say to him, “This is your name,” and then bring before his sense of hearing perhaps the imitation of himself, saying that it is a man, or perhaps the imitation of the female of the human species, saying that it is a woman? Do you not believe that this is possible and sometimes happens?
Cratylus. I am willing to concede it, Socrates, and grant that you are right.
Socrates. That is a good thing for you to do, my friend, if I am right; for now we need no longer argue about the matter. If, then, some such assignment of names takes place, we will call one kind speaking truth, and the other speaking falsehood. But if this is accepted, and if it is possible to assign names incorrectly and to give to objects not the names that befit them, but sometimes those that are unfitting, it would be possible to treat verbs in the same way. And if verbs and nouns can be assigned in this way, the same must be true of sentences; for sentences are, I conceive, a combination of verbs and nouns. What do you say to that, Cratylus?
Cratylus. I agree; I think you are right.
Socrates. If, then, we compare the earliest words to sketches, it is possible in them, as in pictures, to reproduce all the colors and shapes, or not all; some may be wanting, and some may be added, and they may be too many or too large. Is not that true?
Cratylus. Yes, it is.
Socrates. Then he who reproduces all, produces good sketches and pictures, and he who adds or takes away produces also sketches and pictures, but bad ones?
Cratylus. Yes.
Socrates. And how about him who imitates the nature of things by means of letters and syllables? By the same principle, if he gives all that is appropriate, the image—that is to say, the name—will be good, and if he sometimes omits a little, it will be an image, but not a good one; and therefore some names are well and others badly made. Is that not true?
Cratylus. Perhaps.
Socrates. Perhaps, then, one artisan of names will be good, and another bad?
Cratylus. Yes.
Socrates. The name of such an artisan was lawgiver?
Cratylus. Yes.
Socrates. Perhaps, then, by Zeus, as is the case in the other arts, one lawgiver may be good and another bad, if we accept our previous conclusions.
ΚΡ. ἔστι ταῦτα. ἀλλʼ ὁρᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα, τό τε ἄλφα καὶ τὸ βῆτα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν στοιχείων, τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀποδιδῶμεν τῇ γραμματικῇ τέχνῃ, ἐάν τι ἀφέλωμεν ἢ προσθῶμεν ἢ μεταθῶμέν τι, οὐ γέγραπται μὲν ἡμῖν τὸ ὄνομα, οὐ μέντοι ὀρθῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ γέγραπται, ἀλλʼ εὐθὺς ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἐάν τι τούτων πάθῃ.
ΣΩ. μὴ γὰρ οὐ καλῶς σκοπῶμεν οὕτω σκοποῦντες, ὦ Κρατύλε.
ΚΡ. πῶς δή;
ΣΩ. ἴσως ὅσα ἔκ τινος ἀριθμοῦ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι πάσχοι ἂν τοῦτο ὃ σὺ λέγεις, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ δέκα ἢ ὅστις βούλει ἄλλος ἀριθμός, ἐὰν ἀφέλῃς τι ἢ προσθῇς, ἕτερος εὐθὺς γέγονε· τοῦ δὲ ποιοῦ τινος καὶ συμπάσης εἰκόνος μὴ οὐχ αὕτη ᾖ ἡ ὀρθότης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντίον οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν δέῃ πάντα ἀποδοῦναι οἷόν ἐστιν ᾧ εἰκάζει, εἰ μέλλει εἰκὼν εἶναι. σκόπει δὲ εἰ τὶ λέγω. ἆρʼ ἂν δύο πράγματα εἴη τοιάδε, οἷον Κρατύλος καὶ Κρατύλου εἰκών, εἴ τις θεῶν μὴ μόνον τὸ σὸν χρῶμα καὶ σχῆμα ἀπεικάσειεν ὥσπερ οἱ ζωγράφοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐντὸς πάντα τοιαῦτα ποιήσειεν οἷάπερ τὰ σά, καὶ μαλακότητας καὶ θερμότητας τὰς αὐτὰς ἀποδοίη, καὶ κίνησιν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν οἵαπερ ἡ παρὰ σοὶ ἐνθείη αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ πάντα ἅπερ σὺ ἔχεις, τοιαῦτα ἕτερα καταστήσειεν πλησίον σου; πότερον Κρατύλος ἂν καὶ εἰκὼν Κρατύλου τότʼ εἴη τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἢ δύο Κρατύλοι;
ΚΡ. δύο ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, Κρατύλοι.
ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ἄλλην χρὴ εἰκόνος ὀρθότητα ζητεῖν καὶ ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκάζειν, ἐάν τι ἀπῇ ἢ προσῇ, μηκέτι αὐτὴν εἰκόνα εἶναι; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ ὅσου ἐνδέουσιν αἱ εἰκόνες τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχειν ἐκείνοις ὧν εἰκόνες εἰσίν;
ΚΡ. ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. γελοῖα γοῦν, ὦ Κρατύλε, ὑπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων πάθοι ἂν ἐκεῖνα ὧν ὀνόματά ἐστιν τὰ ὀνόματα, εἰ πάντα πανταχῇ αὐτοῖς ὁμοιωθείη. διττὰ γὰρ ἄν που πάντα γένοιτο, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν οὐδεὶς οὐδέτερον ὁπότερόν ἐστι τὸ μὲν αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα.
ΚΡ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ΣΩ. θαρρῶν τοίνυν, ὦ γενναῖε, ἔα καὶ ὄνομα τὸ μὲν εὖ κεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ μή, καὶ μὴ ἀνάγκαζε πάντʼ ἔχειν τὰ γράμματα, ἵνα κομιδῇ ᾖ τοιοῦτον οἷόνπερ οὗ ὄνομά ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ ἔα καὶ τὸ μὴ προσῆκον γράμμα ἐπιφέρειν. εἰ δὲ γράμμα, καὶ ὄνομα ἐν λόγῳ· εἰ δὲ ὄνομα, καὶ λόγον ἐν λόγῳ μὴ προσήκοντα τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπιφέρεσθαι, καὶ μηδὲν ἧττον ὀνομάζεσθαι τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ λέγεσθαι, ἕως ἂν ὁ τύπος ἐνῇ τοῦ πράγματος περὶ οὗ ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τῶν στοιχείων ὀνόμασιν, εἰ μέμνησαι ἃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ καὶ Ἑρμογένης ἐλέγομεν.
Cratylus. That is true. But you see, Socrates, when by the science of grammar we assign these letters—alpha, beta, and the rest—to names, if we take away or add or transpose any letter, it is not true that the name is written, but written incorrectly; it is not written at all, but immediately becomes a different word, if any such thing happens to it.
Socrates. Perhaps we are not considering the matter in the right way.
Cratylus. Why not?
Socrates. It may be that what you say would be true of those things which must necessarily consist of a certain number or cease to exist at all, as ten, for instance, or any number you like, if you add or subtract anything is immediately another number; but this is not the kind of correctness which applies to quality or to images in general; on the contrary, the image must not by any means reproduce all the qualities of that which it imitates, if it is to be an image. See if I am not right. Would there be two things, Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, if some god should not merely imitate your color and form, as painters do, but should also make all the inner parts like yours, should reproduce the same flexibility and warmth, should put into them motion, life, and intellect, such as exist in you, and in short, should place beside you a duplicate of all your qualities? Would there be in such an event Cratylus and an image of Cratylus, or two Cratyluses?
Cratylus. I should say, Socrates, two Cratyluses.
Socrates. Then don’t you see, my friend, that we must look for some other principle of correctness in images and in names, of which we were speaking, and must not insist that they are no longer images if anything be wanting or be added? Do you not perceive how far images are from possessing the same qualities as the originals which they imitate?
Cratylus. Yes, I do.
Socrates. Surely, Cratylus, the effect produced by the names upon the things of which they are the names would be ridiculous, if they were to be entirely like them in every respect. For everything would be duplicated, and no one could tell in any case which was the real thing and which the name.
Cratylus. Quite true.
Socrates. Then do not be faint-hearted, but have the courage to admit that one name may be correctly and another incorrectly given; do not insist that it must have all the letters and be exactly the same as the thing named, but grant that an inappropriate letter may be employed. But if a letter, then grant that also a noun in a clause, and if a noun, then also a clause in a sentence may be employed which is not appropriate to the things in question, and the thing may none the less be named and described, so long as the intrinsic quality of the thing named is retained, as is the case in the names of the letters of the alphabet, if you remember what Hermogenes and I were saying a while ago.
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