ΣΩ. μέχρι μὲν οὖν ἐνταῦθα, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, παρὰ πολλῶν ὁμολογεῖται τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον· ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, ἅτε λιπαρὴς ὢν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ταῦτα μὲν πάντα διαπέπυσμαι ἐν ἀπορρήτοις, ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ αἴτιον—διʼ ὃ γὰρ γίγνεται, τοῦτʼ ἔστι τὸ αἴτιον—καὶ «Δία» καλεῖν ἔφη τις τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἔχειν διὰ ταῦτα. ἐπειδὰν δʼ ἠρέμα αὐτοὺς ἐπανερωτῶ ἀκούσας ταῦτα μηδὲν ἧττον· «τί οὖν ποτʼ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε, δίκαιον, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει;» δοκῶ τε ἤδη μακρότερα τοῦ προσήκοντος ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐσκαμμένα ἅλλεσθαι. ἱκανῶς γάρ μέ φασι πεπύσθαι [ἀκηκοέναι] καὶ ἐπιχειροῦσιν, βουλόμενοι ἀποπιμπλάναι με, ἄλλος ἄλλα ἤδη λέγειν, καὶ οὐκέτι συμφωνοῦσιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τίς φησιν τοῦτο εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸν ἥλιον· τοῦτον γὰρ μόνον διαϊόντα καὶ κάοντα ἐπιτροπεύειν τὰ ὄντα. ἐπειδὰν οὖν τῳ λέγω αὐτὸ ἅσμενος ὡς καλόν τι ἀκηκοώς, καταγελᾷ μου οὗτος ἀκούσας καὶ ἐρωτᾷ εἰ οὐδὲν δίκαιον οἶμαι εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπειδὰν ὁ ἥλιος δύῃ. λιπαροῦντος οὖν ἐμοῦ ὅτι αὖ ἐκεῖνος λέγει αὐτό, τὸ πῦρ φησιν· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν εἰδέναι. ὁ δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φησιν, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸν τὸ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ ἐνόν. ὁ δὲ τούτων μὲν πάντων καταγελᾶν φησιν, εἶναι δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ὃ λέγει Ἀναξαγόρας, νοῦν εἶναι τοῦτο· αὐτοκράτορα γὰρ αὐτὸν ὄντα καὶ οὐδενὶ μεμειγμένον πάντα φησὶν αὐτὸν κοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων ἰόντα. ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, πολὺ ἐν πλείονι ἀπορίᾳ εἰμὶ ἢ πρὶν ἐπιχειρῆσαι μανθάνειν περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστιν. ἀλλʼ οὖν οὗπερ ἕνεκα ἐσκοποῦμεν, τό γε ὄνομα τοῦτο φαίνεται αὐτῷ διὰ ταῦτα κεῖσθαι.
ΕΡΜ. φαίνῃ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα μὲν ἀκηκοέναι του καὶ οὐκ αὐτοσχεδιάζειν.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ τἆλλα;
ΕΡΜ. οὐ πάνυ.
ΣΩ. ἄκουε δή· ἴσως γὰρ ἄν σε καὶ τὰ ἐπίλοιπα ἐξαπατήσαιμι ὡς οὐκ ἀκηκοὼς λέγω. μετὰ γὰρ δικαιοσύνην τί ἡμῖν λείπεται; ἀνδρείαν οἶμαι οὔπω διήλθομεν. ἀδικία μὲν γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἐστὶν ὄντος ἐμπόδισμα τοῦ διαϊόντος, ἀνδρεία δὲ σημαίνει ὡς ἐν μάχῃ ἐπονομαζομένης τῆς ἀνδρείας—μάχην δʼ εἶναι ἐν τῷ ὄντι, εἴπερ ῥεῖ, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν ἐναντίαν ῥοήν—ἐὰν οὖν τις ἐξέλῃ τὸ δέλτα τοῦ ὀνόματος τῆς ἀνδρείας, αὐτὸ μηνύει τὸ ἔργον τὸ ὄνομα ἡ «ἀνρεία.»
Socrates. Up to this point, as I said just now, many men agree about justice (δίκαιον); and I, Hermogenes, being very much in earnest about it, have persistently asked questions and have been told in secret teachings that this is justice, or the cause—for that through which creation takes place is a cause—and some one told me that it was for this reason rightly called Zeus (Δία). But when, after hearing this, I nevertheless ask them quietly, “What then, my most excellent friend, if this is true, is justice?” they think I am asking too many questions and am leaping over the trenches. They say I have been told enough; they try to satisfy me by saying all sorts of different things, and they no longer agree. For one says the sun is justice, for the sun alone superintends all things, passing through and burning (διαϊόντα καὶ καίοντα) them. Then when I am pleased and tell this to some one, thinking it is a fine answer, he laughs at me and asks if I think there is no justice among men when the sun has set. So I beg him to tell me what he thinks it is, and he says “Fire.” But this is not easy to understand. He says it is not actual fire, but heat in the abstract that is in the fire. Another man says he laughs at all these notions, and that justice is what Anaxagoras says it is, mind; for mind, he says, is ruled only by itself, is mixed with nothing, orders all things, and passes through them. Then, my friend, I am far more perplexed than before I undertook to learn about the nature of justice. But I think the name—and that was the subject of our investigation—was given for the reasons I have mentioned.
Hermogenes. I think, Socrates, you must have heard this from some one and are not inventing it yourself.
Socrates. And how about the rest of my talk?
Hermogenes. I do not at all think you had heard that.
Socrates. Listen then; perhaps I may deceive you into thinking that all I am going to say is my own. What remains to consider after justice? I think we have not yet discussed courage. It is plain enough that injustice (ἀδικία) is really a mere hindrance of that which passes through (τοῦ διαϊόντος, but the word ἀδρεία (courage) implies that courage got its name in battle, and if the universe is flowing, a battle in the universe can be nothing else than an opposite current or flow (ῥοή). Now if we remove the delta from the word ἀνδρεία, the word ἀνρεία signifies exactly that activity.
ΣΩ. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι οὐ πάσῃ ῥοῇ ἡ ἐναντία ῥοὴ ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῇ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ῥεούσῃ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐπῃνεῖτο ἡ ἀνδρεία. καὶ τὸ «ἄρρεν» καὶ ὁ «ἀνὴρ» ἐπὶ παραπλησίῳ τινὶ τούτῳ ἐστί, τῇ ἄνῳ ῥοῇ. «γυνὴ» δὲ γονή μοι φαίνεται βούλεσθαι εἶναι. τὸ δὲ «θῆλυ» ἀπὸ τῆς θηλῆς τι φαίνεται ἐπωνομάσθαι· ἡ δὲ «θηλὴ» ἆρά γε, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, ὅτι τεθηλέναι ποιεῖ ὥσπερ τὰ ἀρδόμενα;
ΕΡΜ. ἔοικέν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν αὐτό γε τὸ «θάλλειν» τὴν αὔξην μοι δοκεῖ ἀπεικάζειν τὴν τῶν νέων, ὅτι ταχεῖα καὶ ἐξαιφνιδία γίγνεται. οἷόνπερ οὖν μεμίμηται τῷ ὀνόματι, συναρμόσας ἀπὸ τοῦ θεῖν καὶ ἅλλεσθαι τὸ ὄνομα. ἀλλʼ οὐ γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖς με ὥσπερ ἐκτὸς δρόμου φερόμενον ἐπειδὰν λείου ἐπιλάβωμαι· ἐπίλοιπα δὲ ἡμῖν ἔτι συχνὰ τῶν δοκούντων σπουδαίων εἶναι.
ΕΡΜ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ΣΩ. ὧν γʼ ἔστιν ἓν καὶ «τέχνην» ἰδεῖν ὅτι ποτὲ βούλεται εἶναι.
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε ἕξιν νοῦ σημαίνει, τὸ μὲν ταῦ ἀφελόντι, ἐμβαλόντι δὲ οὖ μεταξὺ τοῦ χεῖ καὶ τοῦ νῦ καὶ τοῦ νῦ καὶ τοῦ ἦτα;
ΕΡΜ. καὶ μάλα γε γλίσχρως, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. ὦ μακάριε, οὐκ οἶσθʼ ὅτι τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τεθέντα κατακέχωσται ἤδη ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τραγῳδεῖν αὐτά, περιτιθέντων γράμματα καὶ ἐξαιρούντων εὐστομίας ἕνεκα καὶ πανταχῇ στρεφόντων, καὶ ὑπὸ καλλωπισμοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ χρόνου. ἐπεὶ ἐν τῷ «κατόπτρῳ» οὐ δοκεῖ [σοι] ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ ἐμβεβλῆσθαι τὸ ῥῶ; ἀλλὰ τοιαῦτα οἶμαι ποιοῦσιν οἱ τῆς μὲν ἀληθείας οὐδὲν φροντίζοντες, τὸ δὲ στόμα πλάττοντες, ὥστʼ ἐπεμβάλλοντες πολλὰ ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τελευτῶντες ποιοῦσιν μηδʼ ἂν ἕνα ἀνθρώπων συνεῖναι ὅτι ποτὲ βούλεται τὸ ὄνομα· ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν Σφίγγα ἀντὶ «φικὸς» «σφίγγα» καλοῦσιν, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.
ΕΡΜ. ταῦτα μὲν ἔστιν οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. εἰ δʼ αὖ τις ἐάσει καὶ ἐντιθέναι καὶ ἐξαιρεῖν ἅττʼ ἂν βούληταί τις εἰς τὰ ὀνόματα, πολλὴ εὐπορία ἔσται καὶ πᾶν ἂν παντί τις ὄνομα πράγματι προσαρμόσειεν.
ΕΡΜ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ΣΩ. ἀληθῆ μέντοι. ἀλλὰ τὸ μέτριον οἶμαι δεῖ φυλάττειν καὶ τὸ εἰκὸς σὲ τὸν σοφὸν ἐπιστάτην.
ΕΡΜ. βουλοίμην ἄν.
Socrates. Of course it is clear that not the current opposed to every current is courage, but only that opposed to the current which is contrary to justice; for otherwise courage would not be praised. The words ἄρρεν (male) and ἀνήρ (man) refer, like ἀνδρεία, to the upward (ἄνω) current or flow. The word γυνή (woman) seems to me to be much the same as γονή (birth). I think θῆλυ (female) is derived from θηλή (teat); and is not θηλή, Hermogenes, so called because it makes things flourish (τεθηλέναι), like plants wet with showers?
Hermogenes. Very likely, Socrates.
Socrates. And again, the word θάλλειν (flourish) seems to me to figure the rapid and sudden growth of the young. Something of that sort the namegiver has reproduced in the name, which he compounded of θεῖν (run) and ἅλλεσθαι (jump). You do not seem to notice how I rush along outside of the race-course, when I get on smooth ground. But we still have plenty of subjects left which seem to be serious.
Hermogenes. True.
Socrates. One of which is to see what the word τέχνη (art, science) means.
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. Does not this denote possession of mind, if you remove the tau and insert omicron between the chi and the nu and the nu and the eta (making ἐχονόη)?
Hermogenes. It does it very poorly, Socrates.
Socrates. My friend, you do not bear in mind that the original words have before now been completely buried by those who wished to dress them up, for they have added and subtracted letters for the sake of euphony and have distorted the words in every way for ornamentation or merely in the lapse of time. Do you not, for instance, think it absurd that the letter rho is inserted in the word κάαπτρον (mirror)? I think that sort of thing is the work of people who care nothing for truth, but only for the shape of their mouths; so they keep adding to the original words until finally no human being can understand what in the world the word means. So the sphinx, for instance, is called sphinx, instead of phix, and there are many other examples.
Hermogenes. Yes, that is true, Socrates.
Socrates. And if we are permitted to insert and remove any letters we please in words, it will be perfectly easy to fit any name to anything.
Hermogenes. True.
Socrates. Yes, quite true. But I think you, as a wise director, must observe the rule of moderation and probability.
Hermogenes. I should like to do so.
ΣΩ. καὶ ἐγώ σοι συμβούλομαι, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες. ἀλλὰ μὴ λίαν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ἀκριβολογοῦ,«μή μʼ ἀπογυιώσῃς μένεος.»ἔρχομαι γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν κορυφὴν ὧν εἴρηκα, ἐπειδὰν μετὰ τέχνην μηχανὴν ἐπισκεψώμεθα. «μηχανὴ» γάρ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦ ἄνειν ἐπὶ πολὺ σημεῖον εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ «μῆκός» πως τὸ πολὺ σημαίνει· ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὖν τούτοιν σύγκειται, «μήκους» τε καὶ τοῦ «ἄνειν,» τὸ ὄνομα ἡ «μηχανή.» ἀλλʼ, ὅπερ νυνδὴ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τὴν κορυφὴν δεῖ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐλθεῖν· «ἀρετὴ» γὰρ καὶ «κακία» ὅτι βούλεται τὰ ὀνόματα ζητητέα. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἕτερον οὔπω καθορῶ, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον δοκεῖ μοι κατάδηλον εἶναι. συμφωνεῖ γὰρ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν πᾶσιν. ἅτε γὰρ ἰόντων τῶν πραγμάτων, πᾶν τὸ κακῶς ἰὸν «κακία» ἂν εἴη· τοῦτο δὲ ὅταν ἐν ψυχῇ ᾖ, τὸ κακῶς ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα, μάλιστα τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει τῆς κακίας. τὸ δὲ κακῶς ἰέναι ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστιν, δοκεῖ μοι δηλοῦν καὶ ἐν τῇ «δειλίᾳ,» ὃ οὔπω διήλθομεν ἀλλʼ ὑπερέβημεν, δέον αὐτὸ μετὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν σκέψασθαι· δοκοῦμεν δέ μοι καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ὑπερβεβηκέναι. ἡ δʼ οὖν δειλία τῆς ψυχῆς σημαίνει δεσμὸν εἶναι ἰσχυρόν· τὸ γὰρ «λίαν» ἰσχύς τίς ἐστιν. δεσμὸς οὖν ὁ λίαν καὶ ὁ μέγιστος τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ δειλία ἂν εἴη· ὥσπερ γε καὶ ἡ ἀπορία κακόν, καὶ πᾶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι ἂν ἐμποδὼν ᾖ τῷ ἰέναι καὶ πορεύεσθαι. τοῦτʼ οὖν φαίνεται τὸ κακῶς ἰέναι δηλοῦν, τὸ ἰσχομένως τε καὶ ἐμποδιζομένως πορεύεσθαι, ὃ δὴ ψυχὴ ὅταν ἔχῃ, κακίᾳ μεστὴ γίγνεται. εἰ δʼ ἐπὶ τοιούτοις ἡ «κακία» ἐστὶν τοὔνομα, τοὐναντίον τούτου ἡ «ἀρετὴ» ἂν εἴη, σημαῖνον πρῶτον μὲν εὐπορίαν, ἔπειτα δὲ λελυμένην τὴν ῥοὴν τῆς ἀγαθῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι ἀεί, ὥστε τὸ ἀσχέτως καὶ τὸ ἀκωλύτως ἀεὶ ῥέον ἐπωνυμίαν εἴληφεν, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦτο τοὔνομα, ὃ ὀρθῶς μὲν ἔχει «ἀειρείτην» καλεῖν, [ἴσως δὲ αἱρετὴν λέγει, ὡς οὔσης ταύτης τῆς ἕξεως αἱρετωτάτης,] συγκεκρότηται δὲ καὶ καλεῖται «ἀρετή.» καὶ ἴσως με αὖ φήσεις πλάττειν· ἐγὼ δέ φημι, εἴπερ ὃ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ἡ «κακία,» καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα τὴν «ἀρετὴν» ὀρθῶς ἔχειν.
Socrates. And I, too, Hermogenes. But do not, my friend, demand too much precision, lest you enfeeble me of my sight. For now that τέχνη (art) is disposed of, I am nearing the loftiest height of my subject, when once we have investigated μηχανή(contrivance). For I think μηχανή signifies ἄνειν ἐπὶ πολύ (much accomplishment); for μῆκος (length) has about the same meaning as τὸ πολύ (much), and the name μηχανή is composed of these two, μῆκος and ἄνειν. But, as I was just saying, we must go on to the loftiest height of our subject; we must search for the meaning of the words ἀρετή (virtue) and κακία (wickedness). Now one of them I cannot yet see; but the other seems to be quite clear, since it agrees with everything we have said before. For inasmuch as all things are in motion, everything that moves badly (κακῶς ἰόν) would be evil (κακία); and when this evil motion in relation to its environment exists in the soul, it receives the general name κακία (evil) in the special sense of wickedness. But the nature of evil motion (κακῶς ἰέναι) is made clear, I think, also in the word δειλία (cowardice), which we have not yet discussed. We passed it by, when we ought to have examined it after ἀνδρεία (courage); and I fancy we passed over a good many other words. Now the meaning of δειλία is a strong bond of the soul; for λίαν (excessively) is, in a way, expressive of strength; so δειλία would be the excessive or greatest bond (δεσμός, δεῖν) of the soul; and so, too, ἀπορία (perplexity) is an evil, as is everything, apparently, which hinders motion and progress (πορεύεσθαι). This, then, seems to be the meaning of evil motion (κακῶς ἰέναι), that advance is halting and impeded; and the soul that is infected by it becomes filled with wickedness (κακία). If these are the reasons for the name of wickedness, virtue (ἀρετή) would be the opposite of this; it would signify first ease of motion, and secondly that the flow of the good soul is always unimpeded, and therefore it has received this name, which designates that which always flows (ἀεὶ ῥέον) without let or hindrance. It is properly called ἀειρειτή, or perhaps also αἱρετή, indicating that this condition is especially to be chosen; but it has been compressed and is pronounced ἀρετή. Perhaps you will say this is another invention of mine; but I say if what I said just now about κακία is right, this about the name of ἀρετή is right too.
ΕΡΜ. τὸ δὲ δὴ «κακόν,» διʼ οὗ πολλὰ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἴρηκας, τί ἂν νοοῖ τοὔνομα;
ΣΩ. ἄτοπόν τι νὴ Δία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ χαλεπὸν συμβαλεῖν. ἐπάγω οὖν καὶ τούτῳ ἐκείνην τὴν μηχανήν.
ΕΡΜ. ποίαν ταύτην;
ΣΩ. τὴν τοῦ βαρβαρικόν τι καὶ τοῦτο φάναι εἶναι.
ΕΡΜ. καὶ ἔοικάς γε ὀρθῶς λέγοντι. ἀλλʼ εἰ δοκεῖ, ταῦτα μὲν ἐῶμεν, τὸ δὲ «καλὸν» καὶ [τὸ] «αἰσχρὸν» πειρώμεθα ἰδεῖν πῇ εὐλόγως ἔχει.
ΣΩ. τὸ μὲν τοίνυν «αἰσχρὸν» καὶ δὴ κατάδηλόν μοι φαίνεται ὃ νοεῖ· καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογεῖται. τὸ γὰρ ἐμποδίζον καὶ ἴσχον τῆς ῥοῆς τὰ ὄντα λοιδορεῖν μοι φαίνεται διὰ παντὸς ὁ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθείς, καὶ νῦν τῷ ἀεὶ ἴσχοντι τὸν ῥοῦν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔθετο τὸ «ἀεισχοροῦν»· νῦν δὲ συγκροτήσαντες «αἰσχρὸν» καλοῦσιν.
ΕΡΜ. τί δὲ τὸ «καλόν»;
ΣΩ. τοῦτο χαλεπώτερον κατανοῆσαι. καίτοι λέγει γε αὐτό· ἁρμονίᾳ μόνον καὶ μήκει τοῦ οὖ παρῆκται.
ΕΡΜ. πῶς δή;
ΣΩ. τῆς διανοίας τις ἔοικεν ἐπωνυμία εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα.
ΕΡΜ. πῶς λέγεις;
ΣΩ. φέρε, τί οἴει σὺ εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον κληθῆναι ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων; ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τὸ τὰ ὀνόματα θέμενον;
ΕΡΜ. πάντως που.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν διάνοια ἂν εἴη τοῦτο ἤτοι θεῶν ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἀμφότερα;
ΕΡΜ. ναί.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ καλέσαν τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὸ καλοῦν ταὐτόν ἐστιν τοῦτο, διάνοια;
ΕΡΜ. φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσα μὲν ἂν νοῦς τε καὶ διάνοια ἐργάσηται, ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ ἐπαινετά, ἃ δὲ μή, ψεκτά;
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. τὸ οὖν ἰατρικὸν ἰατρικὰ ἐργάζεται καὶ τὸ τεκτονικὸν τεκτονικά; ἢ πῶς λέγεις;
ΕΡΜ. οὕτως ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. καὶ τὸ καλοῦν ἄρα καλά;
ΕΡΜ. δεῖ γέ τοι.
ΣΩ. ἔστι δέ γε τοῦτο, ὥς φαμεν, διάνοια;
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς ἄρα φρονήσεως αὕτη ἡ ἐπωνυμία ἐστὶν τὸ «καλὸν» τῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπεργαζομένης, ἃ δὴ καλὰ φάσκοντες εἶναι ἀσπαζόμεθα.
ΕΡΜ. φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν ἔτι ἡμῖν λοιπὸν τῶν τοιούτων;
Hermogenes. But what is the meaning of the word κακόν which you used in many of your derivations?
Socrates. By Zeus, I think it is a strange word and hard to understand; so I apply to it that contrivance of mine.
Hermogenes. What contrivance?
Socrates. The claim of foreign origin, which I advance in this case as in those others.
Hermogenes. Well, probably you are right. But, if you please, let us drop these words and try to discover the reasons for the words καλόν (beautiful, noble) and αἰσχρόν (base).
Socrates. I think the meaning of αἰσχρόν is clear, and this also agrees with what has been said before. For the giver of names appears to me throughout to denounce that which hinders and restrains things from flowing, and in this instance he gave to that which always restrains the flow (ἀεὶ ἴσχει τὸν ῥοῦν) this name ἀεισχοροῦν, which is now compressed and pronounced αἰσχρόν.
Hermogenes. What about καλόν?
Socrates. That is harder to understand, and yet it expresses its meaning: it has been altered merely in accent and in the length of the O.
Hermogenes. How is that?
Socrates. I think this word denotes intellect.
Hermogenes. What do you mean?
Socrates. Why, what do you think is the cause why anything is called by a name? Is it not the power which gave the name?
Hermogenes. Why, certainly.
Socrates. And is not that power the intellect either of gods or of men or both?
Hermogenes. Yes.
Socrates. Are not that which called things by name and that which calls them by name (τὸ καλοῦν) the same thing, namely intellect?
Hermogenes. Yes, clearly.
Socrates. And are not all works which are done by mind and intelligence worthy of praise, and those that are not done by them worthy of blame?
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. Does not the medical power perform medical works and the power of carpentry works of carpentry? Do you agree to that?
Hermogenes. I agree.
Socrates. And the beautiful performs beautiful works?
Hermogenes. It must do so.
Socrates. And the beautiful is, we say, intellect?
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. Then this name, the beautiful, is rightly given to mind, since it accomplishes the works which we call beautiful and in which we delight.
Hermogenes. Evidently.
Socrates. What further words of this sort are left for us?
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