ΣΩ. κατὰ τὴν αὑτῶν ἄρα φύσιν καὶ αἱ πράξεις πράττονται, οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν δόξαν. οἷον ἐάν τι ἐπιχειρήσωμεν ἡμεῖς τῶν ὄντων τέμνειν, πότερον ἡμῖν τμητέον [ἐστὶν] ἕκαστον ὡς ἂν ἡμεῖς βουλώμεθα καὶ ᾧ ἂν βουληθῶμεν, ἢ ἐὰν μὲν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν βουληθῶμεν ἕκαστον τέμνειν τοῦ τέμνειν τε καὶ τέμνεσθαι καὶ ᾧ πέφυκε, τεμοῦμέν τε καὶ πλέον τι ἡμῖν ἔσται καὶ ὀρθῶς πράξομεν τοῦτο, ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ φύσιν, ἐξαμαρτησόμεθά τε καὶ οὐδὲν πράξομεν;
ΕΡΜ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτω.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐὰν κάειν τι ἐπιχειρήσωμεν, οὐ κατὰ πᾶσαν δόξαν δεῖ κάειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὀρθήν; αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶν ᾗ ἐπεφύκει ἕκαστον κάεσθαί τε καὶ κάειν καὶ ᾧ ἐπεφύκει;
ΕΡΜ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω;
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ καὶ τὸ λέγειν μία τις τῶν πράξεών ἐστιν;
ΕΡΜ. ναί.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν ᾗ ἄν τῳ δοκῇ λεκτέον εἶναι, ταύτῃ λέγων ὀρθῶς λέξει, ἢ ἐὰν μὲν ᾗ πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα λέγειν τε καὶ λέγεσθαι καὶ ᾧ, ταύτῃ καὶ τούτῳ λέγῃ, πλέον τέ τι ποιήσει καὶ ἐρεῖ· ἂν δὲ μή, ἐξαμαρτήσεταί τε καὶ οὐδὲν ποιήσει;
ΕΡΜ. οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ ὡς λέγεις.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦ λέγειν μόριον τὸ ὀνομάζειν; διονομάζοντες γάρ που λέγουσι τοὺς λόγους.
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὀνομάζειν πρᾶξίς [τίς] ἐστιν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ λέγειν πρᾶξίς τις ἦν περὶ τὰ πράγματα;
ΕΡΜ. ναί.
ΣΩ. αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἐφάνησαν ἡμῖν οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὖσαι, ἀλλʼ αὑτῶν τινα ἰδίαν φύσιν ἔχουσαι;
ΕΡΜ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὀνομαστέον [ἐστὶν] ᾗ πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα ὀνομάζειν τε καὶ ὀνομάζεσθαι καὶ ᾧ, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ᾗ ἂν ἡμεῖς βουληθῶμεν, εἴπερ τι τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν μέλλει ὁμολογούμενον εἶναι; καὶ οὕτω μὲν ἂν πλέον τι ποιοῖμεν καὶ ὀνομάζοιμεν, ἄλλως δὲ οὔ;
ΕΡΜ. φαίνεταί μοι.
ΣΩ. φέρε δή, ὃ ἔδει τέμνειν, ἔδει τῳ, φαμέν, τέμνειν;
ΕΡΜ. ναί.
ΣΩ. καὶ ὃ ἔδει κερκίζειν, ἔδει τῳ κερκίζειν; καὶ ὃ ἔδει τρυπᾶν, ἔδει τῳ τρυπᾶν;
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. καὶ ὃ ἔδει δὴ ὀνομάζειν, ἔδει τῳ ὀνομάζειν;
Socrates. Then actions also are performed according to their own nature, not according to our opinion. For instance, if we undertake to cut anything, ought we to cut it as we wish, and with whatever instrument we wish, or shall we, if we are willing to cut each thing in accordance with the nature of cutting and being cut, and with the natural instrument, succeed in cutting it, and do it rightly, whereas if we try to do it contrary to nature we shall fail and accomplish nothing?
Hermogenes. I think the way is as you suggest.
Socrates. Then, too, if we undertake to burn anything, we must burn not according to every opinion, but according to the right one? And that is as each thing naturally burns or is burned and with the natural instrument?
Hermogenes. True.
Socrates. And all other actions are to be performed In like manner?
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. And speaking is an action, is it not?
Hermogenes. Yes.
Socrates. Then if a man speaks as he fancies he ought to speak, will he speak rightly, or will he succeed in speaking if he speaks in the way and with the instrument in which and with which it is natural for us to speak and for things to be spoken, whereas otherwise he will fail and accomplish nothing?
Hermogenes. I think the way you suggest is the right one.
Socrates. Now naming is a part of speaking, for in naming I suppose people utter speech.
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. Then is not naming also a kind of action, if speaking is a kind of action concerned with things?
Hermogenes. Yes.
Socrates. But we saw that actions are not merely relative to us, but possess a separate nature of their own?
Hermogenes. True.
Socrates. Then in naming also, if we are to be consistent with our previous conclusions, we cannot follow our own will, but the way and the instrument which the nature of things prescribes must be employed, must they not? And if we pursue this course we shall be successful in our naming, but otherwise we shall fail.
Hermogenes. I think you are right.
Socrates. And again, what has to be cut, we said, has to be cut with something.
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. And what has to be woven, has to be woven with something, and what has to be bored, has to be bored with something?
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. And then what has to be named, has to be named with something?
ΕΡΜ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ ἦν ἐκεῖνο ᾧ ἔδει τρυπᾶν;
ΕΡΜ. τρύπανον.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ ᾧ κερκίζειν;
ΕΡΜ. κερκίς.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ ᾧ ὀνομάζειν;
ΕΡΜ. ὄνομα.
ΣΩ. εὖ λέγεις. ὄργανον ἄρα τί ἐστι καὶ τὸ ὄνομα.
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ ἐροίμην «τί ἦν ὄργανον ἡ κερκίς;» οὐχ ᾧ κερκίζομεν;
ΕΡΜ. ναί.
ΣΩ. κερκίζοντες δὲ τί δρῶμεν; οὐ τὴν κρόκην καὶ τοὺς στήμονας συγκεχυμένους διακρίνομεν;
ΕΡΜ. ναί.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τρυπάνου ἕξεις οὕτως εἰπεῖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων;
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. ἔχεις δὴ καὶ περὶ ὀνόματος οὕτως εἰπεῖν; ὀργάνῳ ὄντι τῷ ὀνόματι ὀνομάζοντες τί ποιοῦμεν;
ΕΡΜ. οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὐ διδάσκομέν τι ἀλλήλους καὶ τὰ πράγματα διακρίνομεν ᾗ ἔχει;
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. ὄνομα ἄρα διδασκαλικόν τί ἐστιν ὄργανον καὶ διακριτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας ὥσπερ κερκὶς ὑφάσματος.
ΕΡΜ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ὑφαντικὸν δέ γε ἡ κερκίς;
ΕΡΜ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ΣΩ. ὑφαντικὸς μὲν ἄρα κερκίδι καλῶς χρήσεται, καλῶς δʼ ἐστὶν ὑφαντικῶς· διδασκαλικὸς δὲ ὀνόματι, καλῶς δʼ ἐστὶ διδασκαλικῶς.
ΕΡΜ. ναί.
ΣΩ. τῷ τίνος οὖν ἔργῳ ὁ ὑφάντης καλῶς χρήσεται ὅταν τῇ κερκίδι χρῆται;
ΕΡΜ. τῷ τοῦ τέκτονος.
ΣΩ. πᾶς δὲ τέκτων ἢ ὁ τὴν τέχνην ἔχων;
ΕΡΜ. ὁ τὴν τέχνην.
ΣΩ. τῷ τίνος δὲ ἔργῳ ὁ τρυπητὴς καλῶς χρήσεται ὅταν τῷ τρυπάνῳ χρῆται;
ΕΡΜ. τῷ τοῦ χαλκέως.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν πᾶς χαλκεὺς ἢ ὁ τὴν τέχνην ἔχων;
ΕΡΜ. ὁ τὴν τέχνην.
ΣΩ. εἶεν. τῷ δὲ τίνος ἔργῳ ὁ διδασκαλικὸς χρήσεται ὅταν τῷ ὀνόματι χρῆται;
ΕΡΜ. οὐδὲ τοῦτʼ ἔχω.
ΣΩ. οὐδὲ τοῦτό γʼ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν, τίς παραδίδωσιν ἡμῖν τὰ ὀνόματα οἷς χρώμεθα;
ΕΡΜ. οὐ δῆτα.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὐχὶ ὁ νόμος δοκεῖ σοι [εἶναι] ὁ παραδιδοὺς αὐτά;
ΕΡΜ. ἔοικεν.
ΣΩ. νομοθέτου ἄρα ἔργῳ χρήσεται ὁ διδασκαλικὸς ὅταν ὀνόματι χρῆται;
ΕΡΜ. δοκεῖ μοι.
ΣΩ. νομοθέτης δέ σοι δοκεῖ πᾶς εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἢ ὁ τὴν τέχνην ἔχων;
ΕΡΜ. ὁ τὴν τέχνην.
Hermogenes. True.
Socrates. And what is that with which we have to bore?
Hermogenes. A borer.
Socrates. And that with which we weave?
Hermogenes. A shuttle.
Socrates. And that with which we must name?
Hermogenes. A name.
Socrates. Right. A name also, then, is a kind of instrument.
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. Then if I were to ask “What instrument is the shuttle?” Is it not that with which we weave?
Hermogenes. Yes.
Socrates. And what do we do when we weave? Do we not separate the mingled threads of warp and woof?
Hermogenes. Yes.
Socrates. And you could give a similar answer about the borer and the rest, could you not?
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. And can you say something of the same kind about a name? The name being an instrument, what do we do with it when we name?
Hermogenes. I cannot tell.
Socrates. Do we not teach one another something, and separate things according to their natures?
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. A name is, then, an instrument of teaching and of separating reality, as a shuttle is an instrument of separating the web?
Hermogenes. Yes.
Socrates. But the shuttle is an instrument of weaving?
Hermogenes. Of course.
Socrates. The weaver, then, will use the shuttle well, and well means like a weaver; and a teacher will use a name well, and well means like a teacher.
Hermogenes. Yes.
Socrates. Whose work will the weaver use well when he uses the shuttle?
Hermogenes. The carpenter’s.
Socrates. Is every one a carpenter, or he who has the skill?
Hermogenes. He who has the skill.
Socrates. And whose work will the hole-maker use when he uses the borer?
Hermogenes. The smith’s.
Socrates. And is every one a smith, or he who has the skill?
Hermogenes. He who has the skill.
Socrates. And whose work will the teacher use when he uses the name?
Hermogenes. I cannot tell that, either.
Socrates. And can you not tell this, either, who gives us the names we use?
Hermogenes. No.
Socrates. Do you not think it is the law that gives them to us?
Hermogenes. Very likely.
Socrates. Then the teacher, when he uses a name, will be using the work of a lawgiver?
Hermogenes. I think so.
Socrates. Do you think every man is a lawgiver, or only he who has the skill?
Hermogenes. He who has the skill.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα παντὸς ἀνδρός, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, ὄνομα θέσθαι [ἐστὶν] ἀλλά τινος ὀνοματουργοῦ· οὗτος δʼ ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ νομοθέτης, ὃς δὴ τῶν δημιουργῶν σπανιώτατος ἐν ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται.
ΕΡΜ. ἔοικεν.
ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, ἐπίσκεψαι ποῖ βλέπων ὁ νομοθέτης τὰ ὀνόματα τίθεται· ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν δὲ ἀνάσκεψαι. ποῖ βλέπων ὁ τέκτων τὴν κερκίδα ποιεῖ; ἆρʼ οὐ πρὸς τοιοῦτόν τι ὃ ἐπεφύκει κερκίζειν;
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἂν καταγῇ αὐτῷ ἡ κερκὶς ποιοῦντι, πότερον πάλιν ποιήσει ἄλλην πρὸς τὴν κατεαγυῖαν βλέπων, ἢ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος πρὸς ὅπερ καὶ ἣν κατέαξεν ἐποίει;
ΕΡΜ. πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖνο δικαιότατʼ ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν κερκὶς καλέσαιμεν;
ΕΡΜ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὰν δέῃ λεπτῷ ἱματίῳ ἢ παχεῖ ἢ λινῷ ἢ ἐρεῷ ἢ ὁποιῳοῦν τινι κερκίδα ποιεῖν, πάσας μὲν δεῖ τὸ τῆς κερκίδος ἔχειν εἶδος, οἵα δʼ ἑκάστῳ καλλίστη ἐπεφύκει, ταύτην ἀποδιδόναι τὴν φύσιν εἰς τὸ ἔργον ἕκαστον;
ΕΡΜ. ναί.
ΣΩ. καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ ὀργάνων ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος· τὸ φύσει ἑκάστῳ πεφυκὸς ὄργανον ἐξευρόντα δεῖ ἀποδοῦναι εἰς ἐκεῖνο ἐξ οὗ ἂν ποιῇ [τὸ ἔργον], οὐχ οἷον ἂν αὐτὸς βουληθῇ, ἀλλʼ οἷον ἐπεφύκει. τὸ φύσει γὰρ ἑκάστῳ, ὡς ἔοικε, τρύπανον πεφυκὸς εἰς τὸν σίδηρον δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι τιθέναι.
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. καὶ τὴν φύσει κερκίδα ἑκάστῳ πεφυκυῖαν εἰς ξύλον.
ΕΡΜ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. φύσει γὰρ ἦν ἑκάστῳ εἴδει ὑφάσματος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἑκάστη κερκίς, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως.
ΕΡΜ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν, ὦ βέλτιστε, καὶ τὸ ἑκάστῳ φύσει πεφυκὸς ὄνομα τὸν νομοθέτην ἐκεῖνον εἰς τοὺς φθόγγους καὶ τὰς συλλαβὰς δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι τιθέναι, καὶ βλέποντα πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἔστιν ὄνομα, πάντα τὰ ὀνόματα ποιεῖν τε καὶ τίθεσθαι, εἰ μέλλει κύριος εἶναι ὀνομάτων θέτης; εἰ δὲ μὴ εἰς τὰς αὐτὰς συλλαβὰς ἕκαστος ὁ νομοθέτης τίθησιν, οὐδὲν δεῖ τοῦτο ἀμφιγνοεῖν· οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν σίδηρον ἅπας χαλκεὺς τίθησιν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα ποιῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ὄργανον· ἀλλʼ ὅμως, ἕως ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν ἰδέαν ἀποδιδῷ, ἐάντε ἐν ἄλλῳ σιδήρῳ, ὅμως ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὸ ὄργανον, ἐάντε ἐνθάδε ἐάντε ἐν βαρβάροις τις ποιῇ. ἦ γάρ;
Socrates. Then it is not for every man, Hermogenes, to give names, but for him who may be called the name-maker; and he, it appears, is the lawgiver, who is of all the artisans among men the rarest.
Hermogenes. So it appears.
Socrates. See now what the lawgiver has in view in giving names. Look at it in the light of what has gone before. What has the carpenter in view when he makes a shuttle? Is it not something the nature of which is to weave?
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. Well, then, if the shuttle breaks while he making it, will he make another with his mind fixed on that which is broken, or on that form with reference to which he was making the one which he broke?
Hermogenes. On that form, in my opinion.
Socrates. Then we should very properly call that the absolute or real shuttle?
Hermogenes. Yes, I think so.
Socrates. Then whenever he has to make a shuttle for a light or a thick garment, or for one of linen or of wool or of any kind whatsoever, all of them must contain the form or ideal of shuttle, and in each of his products he must embody the nature which is naturally best for each?
Hermogenes. Yes.
Socrates. And the same applies to all other instruments. The artisan must discover the instrument naturally fitted for each purpose and must embody that in the material of which he makes the instrument, not in accordance with his own will, but in accordance with its nature. He must, it appears, know how to embody in the iron the borer fitted by nature for each special use.
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. And he must embody in the wood the shuttle fitted by nature for each kind of weaving.
Hermogenes. True.
Socrates. For each kind of shuttle is, it appears, fitted by nature for its particular kind of weaving, and the like is true of other instruments.
Hermogenes. Yes.
Socrates. Then, my dear friend, must not the law-giver also know how to embody in the sounds and syllables that name which is fitted by nature for each object? Must he not make and give all his names with his eye fixed upon the absolute or ideal name, if he is to be an authoritative giver of names? And if different lawgivers do not embody it in the same syllables, we must not forget this ideal name on that account; for different smiths do not embody the form in the same iron, though making the same instrument for the same purpose, but so long as they reproduce the same ideal, though it be in different iron, still the instrument is as it should be, whether it be made here or in foreign lands, is it not?
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀξιώσεις καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην τόν τε ἐνθάδε καὶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις, ἕως ἂν τὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος εἶδος ἀποδιδῷ τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστῳ ἐν ὁποιαισοῦν συλλαβαῖς, οὐδὲν χείρω νομοθέτην εἶναι τὸν ἐνθάδε ἢ τὸν ὁπουοῦν ἄλλοθι;
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. τίς οὖν ὁ γνωσόμενος εἰ τὸ προσῆκον εἶδος κερκίδος ἐν ὁποιῳοῦν ξύλῳ κεῖται; ὁ ποιήσας, ὁ τέκτων, ἢ ὁ χρησόμενος [ὁ] ὑφάντης;
ΕΡΜ. εἰκὸς μὲν μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν χρησόμενον.
ΣΩ. τίς οὖν ὁ τῷ τοῦ λυροποιοῦ ἔργῳ χρησόμενος; ἆρʼ οὐχ οὗτος ὃς ἐπίσταιτο ἂν ἐργαζομένῳ κάλλιστα ἐπιστατεῖν καὶ εἰργασμένον γνοίη εἴτʼ εὖ εἴργασται εἴτε μή;
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. τίς;
ΕΡΜ. ὁ κιθαριστής.
ΣΩ. τίς δὲ ὁ τῷ τοῦ ναυπηγοῦ;
ΕΡΜ. κυβερνήτης.
ΣΩ. τίς δὲ τῷ τοῦ νομοθέτου ἔργῳ ἐπιστατήσειέ τʼ ἂν κάλλιστα καὶ εἰργασμένον κρίνειε καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις; ἆρʼ οὐχ ὅσπερ χρήσεται;
ΕΡΜ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐχ ὁ ἐρωτᾶν ἐπιστάμενος οὗτός ἐστιν;
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι;
ΕΡΜ. ναί.
ΣΩ. τὸν δὲ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον ἄλλο τι σὺ καλεῖς ἢ διαλεκτικόν;
ΕΡΜ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο.
ΣΩ. τέκτονος μὲν ἄρα ἔργον ἐστὶν ποιῆσαι πηδάλιον ἐπιστατοῦντος κυβερνήτου, εἰ μέλλει καλὸν εἶναι τὸ πηδάλιον.
ΕΡΜ. φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. νομοθέτου δέ γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὄνομα, ἐπιστάτην ἔχοντος διαλεκτικὸν ἄνδρα, εἰ μέλλει καλῶς ὀνόματα θήσεσθαι.
ΕΡΜ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. κινδυνεύει ἄρα, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, εἶναι οὐ φαῦλον, ὡς σὺ οἴει, ἡ τοῦ ὀνόματος θέσις, οὐδὲ φαύλων ἀνδρῶν οὐδὲ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων. καὶ Κρατύλος ἀληθῆ λέγει λέγων φύσει τὰ ὀνόματα εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασι, καὶ οὐ πάντα δημιουργὸν ὀνομάτων εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐκεῖνον τὸν ἀποβλέποντα εἰς τὸ τῇ φύσει ὄνομα ὂν ἑκάστῳ καὶ δυνάμενον αὐτοῦ τὸ εἶδος τιθέναι εἴς τε τὰ γράμματα καὶ τὰς συλλαβάς.
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. On this basis, then, you will judge the law-giver, whether he be here or in a foreign land, so long as he gives to each thing the proper form of the name, in whatsoever syllables, to be no worse lawgiver, whether here or anywhere else, will you not?
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. Now who is likely to know whether the proper form of shuttle is embodied in any piece of wood? The carpenter who made it, or the weaver who is to use it ?
Hermogenes. Probably the one who is to use it, Socrates.
Socrates. Then who is to use the work of the lyre-maker? Is not he the man who would know best how to superintend the making of the lyre and would also know whether it is well made or not when it is finished?
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. Who is he?
Hermogenes. The lyre-player.
Socrates. And who would know best about the work of the ship-builder?
Hermogenes. The navigator.
Socrates. And who can best superintend the work of the lawgiver and judge of it when it is finished, both here and in foreign countries? The user, is it not?
Hermogenes. Yes.
Socrates. And is not this he who knows how to ask questions?
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. And the same one knows also how to make replies?
Hermogenes. Yes.
Socrates. And the man who knows how to ask and answer questions you call a dialectician?
Hermogenes. Yes, that is what I call him.
Socrates. The work of the carpenter, then, is to make a rudder under the supervision of the steersman, if he rudder is to be a good one.
Hermogenes. Evidently.
Socrates. And the work of the lawgiver, as it seems, is to make a name, with the dialectician as his supervisor, if names are to be well given.
Hermogenes. True.
Socrates. Then, Hermogenes, the giving of names can hardly be, as you imagine, a trifling matter, or a task for trifling or casual persons: and Cratylus is right in saying that names belong to things by nature and that not every one is an artisan of names, but only he who keeps in view the name which belongs by nature to each particular thing and is able to embody its form in the letters and syllables.
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