ΕΡΜ. ἐρωτῶ δὴ τὰ μέγιστα καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα, τήν τε «ἀλήθειαν» καὶ τὸ «ψεῦδος» καὶ τὸ «ὂν» καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐστιν, «ὄνομα,» διʼ ὅτι τὸ ὄνομα ἔχει.
ΣΩ. μαίεσθαι οὖν καλεῖς τι;
ΕΡΜ. ἔγωγε, τό γε ζητεῖν.
ΣΩ. ἔοικε τοίνυν ἐκ λόγου ὀνόματι συγκεκροτημένῳ, λέγοντος ὅτι τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ὄν, οὗ τυγχάνει ζήτημα ὄν, [τὸ] «ὄνομα.» μᾶλλον δὲ ἂν αὐτὸ γνοίης ἐν ᾧ λέγομεν τὸ «ὀνομαστόν»· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ σαφῶς λέγει τοῦτο εἶναι ὂν οὗ μάσμα ἐστίν. ἡ δʼ «ἀλήθεια,» καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔοικε [συγκεκροτῆσθαι]· ἡ γὰρ θεία τοῦ ὄντος φορὰ ἔοικε προσειρῆσθαι τούτῳ τῷ ῥήματι, τῇ «ἀληθείᾳ,» ὡς θεία οὖσα ἄλη. τὸ δὲ «ψεῦδος» τοὐναντίον τῇ φορᾷ· πάλιν γὰρ αὖ λοιδορούμενον ἥκει τὸ ἰσχόμενον καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαζόμενον ἡσυχάζειν, ἀπείκασται δὲ τοῖς καθεύδουσι· τὸ ψεῖ δὲ προσγενόμενον ἐπικρύπτει τὴν βούλησιν τοῦ ὀνόματος. τὸ δὲ «ὂν» καὶ ἡ «οὐσία» ὁμολογεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ, τὸ ἰῶτα ἀπολαβόν· ἰὸν γὰρ σημαίνει, καὶ τὸ «οὐκ ὂν» αὖ, ὥς τινες καὶ ὀνομάζουσιν αὐτό, «οὐκ ἰόν.»
ΕΡΜ. ταῦτα μέν μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνδρείως πάνυ διακεκροτηκέναι· εἰ δέ τίς σε ἔροιτο τοῦτο τὸ «ἰὸν» καὶ τὸ «ῥέον» καὶ τὸ «δοῦν,» τίνα ἔχει ὀρθότητα ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα—
ΣΩ. «τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμεθα;» λέγεις; ἦ γάρ;
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. ἓν μὲν τοίνυν ἄρτι που ἐπορισάμεθα ὥστε δοκεῖν τὶ λέγειν ἀποκρινόμενοι.
ΕΡΜ. τὸ ποῖον τοῦτο;
ΣΩ. φάναι, ὃ ἂν μὴ γιγνώσκωμεν, βαρβαρικόν τι τοῦτʼ εἶναι. εἴη μὲν οὖν ἴσως ἄν τι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τοιοῦτον αὐτῶν, εἴη δὲ κἂν ὑπὸ παλαιότητος τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνεύρετα εἶναι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πανταχῇ στρέφεσθαι τὰ ὀνόματα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν [ἂν] εἰ ἡ παλαιὰ φωνὴ πρὸς τὴν νυνὶ βαρβαρικῆς μηδὲν διαφέρει.
ΕΡΜ. καὶ οὐδέν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου λέγεις.
ΣΩ. λέγω γὰρ οὖν εἰκότα. οὐ μέντοι μοι δοκεῖ προφάσεις ἀγὼν δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ προθυμητέον ταῦτα διασκέψασθαι. ἐνθυμηθῶμεν δέ, εἴ τις ἀεί, διʼ ὧν ἂν λέγηται τὸ ὄνομα, ἐκεῖνα ἀνερήσεται τὰ ῥήματα, καὶ αὖθις αὖ διʼ ὧν ἂν τὰ ῥήματα λεχθῇ, ἐκεῖνα πεύσεται, καὶ τοῦτο μὴ παύσεται ποιῶν, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα ἀπειπεῖν τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον;
Hermogenes. I ask, then, about the greatest and noblest words, truth (ἀλήθεια), falsehood (ψεῦδος), being (τὸ ὄν), and why name, the subject of our whole discourse, has the name ὄνομα.
Socrates. Does the word μαίσθαι (search) mean anything to you?
Hermogenes. Yes, it means seek.
Socrates. The word ὄνομα seems to be a word composed from a sentence signifying “this is a being about which our search is.” You can recognize that more readily in the adjective ὀνομαστόν, for that says clearly that this is ὄν οὗ μάσμα ἐστίν (being of which the search is). And ἀλήθεια (truth) is like the others; for the divine motion of the universe is, I think, called by this name, ἀλήθεια, because it is a divine wandering θεία ἄλη. But ψεῦδος (falsehood) is the opposite of motion; for once more that which is held back and forced to be quiet is found fault with, and it is compared to slumberers (εὕουσι); but the addition of the psi conceals the meaning of the word. The words τὸ ὄν (being) and οὐσία (existence) agree with ἀληθής with the loss of iota, for they mean going (ἰόν). And οὐκ ὄν (not being) means οὐκ ἰόν (not going), and indeed some people pronounce it so.
Hermogenes. I think you have knocked these words to pieces manfully, Socrates; but if anyone should ask you what propriety or correctness there was in these words that you have employed—ἰόν and ρἕον and δοῦν—
Socrates. What answer should I make? Is that your meaning?
Hermogenes. Yes, exactly.
Socrates. We acquired just now one way of making an answer with a semblance of sense in it.
Hermogenes. What way was that?
Socrates. Saying, if there is a word we do not know about, that it is of foreign origin. Now this may be true of some of them, and also on account of the lapse of time it may be impossible to find out about the earliest words; for since words get twisted in all sorts of ways, it would not be in the least wonderful if the ancient Greek word should be identical with the modern foreign one.
Hermogenes. That is not unlikely.
Socrates. It is indeed quite probable. However, we must play the game and investigate these questions vigorously. But let us bear in mind that if a person asks about the words by means of which names are formed, and again about those by means of which those words were formed, and keeps on doing this indefinitely, he who answers his questions will at last give up; will he not?
Hermogenes. Yes, I think so.
ΕΡΜ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. πότε οὖν ἀπειπὼν ὁ ἀπαγορεύων δικαίως παύοιτο ἄν; ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐπειδὰν ἐπʼ ἐκείνοις γένηται τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, ἃ ὡσπερεὶ στοιχεῖα τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ καὶ λόγων καὶ ὀνομάτων; ταῦτα γάρ που οὐκέτι δίκαιον φανῆναι ἐξ ἄλλων ὀνομάτων συγκείμενα, ἃν οὕτως ἔχῃ. οἷον νυνδὴ τὸ «ἀγαθὸν» ἔφαμεν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαστοῦ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ θοοῦ συγκεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ «θοὸν» ἴσως φαῖμεν ἂν ἐξ ἑτέρων, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἐξ ἄλλων· ἀλλʼ ἐάν ποτέ γε λάβωμεν ὃ οὐκέτι ἔκ τινων ἑτέρων σύγκειται ὀνομάτων, δικαίως ἂν φαῖμεν ἐπὶ στοιχείῳ τε ἤδη εἶναι καὶ οὐκέτι τοῦτο ἡμᾶς δεῖν εἰς ἄλλα ὀνόματα ἀναφέρειν.
ΕΡΜ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς ὀρθῶς λέγειν.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ νῦν ἅ γʼ ἐρωτᾷς τὰ ὀνόματα στοιχεῖα ὄντα τυγχάνει, καὶ δεῖ αὐτῶν ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ ἤδη τὴν ὀρθότητα ἐπισκέψασθαι ἥτις ἐστίν;
ΕΡΜ. εἰκός γε.
ΣΩ. εἰκὸς δῆτα, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες· πάντα γοῦν φαίνεται τὰ ἔμπροσθεν εἰς ταῦτα ἀνεληλυθέναι. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὥς μοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν, δεῦρο αὖ συνεπίσκεψαι μετʼ ἐμοῦ μή τι παραληρήσω λέγων οἵαν δεῖ τὴν τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητα εἶναι.
ΕΡΜ. λέγε μόνον, ὡς ὅσον γε δυνάμεως παρʼ ἐμοί ἐστιν συνεπισκέψομαι.
ΣΩ. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν μία γέ τις ἡ ὀρθότης παντὸς ὀνόματος καὶ πρώτου καὶ ὑστάτου, καὶ οὐδὲν διαφέρει τῷ ὄνομα εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν, οἶμαι καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ.
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὧν γε νυνδὴ διεληλύθαμεν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἡ ὀρθότης τοιαύτη τις ἐβούλετο εἶναι, οἵα δηλοῦν οἷον ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν ὄντων.
ΕΡΜ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ΣΩ. τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ τὰ πρῶτα δεῖ ἔχειν καὶ τὰ ὕστερα, εἴπερ ὀνόματα ἔσται.
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὕστερα, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ τῶν προτέρων οἷά τε ἦν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζεσθαι.
ΕΡΜ. φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. εἶεν· τὰ δὲ δὴ πρῶτα, οἷς οὔπω ἕτερα ὑπόκειται, τίνι τρόπῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ὅτι μάλιστα φανερὰ ἡμῖν ποιήσει τὰ ὄντα, εἴπερ μέλλει ὀνόματα εἶναι; ἀπόκριναι δέ μοι τόδε· εἰ φωνὴν μὴ εἴχομεν μηδὲ γλῶτταν, ἐβουλόμεθα δὲ δηλοῦν ἀλλήλοις τὰ πράγματα, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἄν, ὥσπερ νῦν οἱ ἐνεοί, ἐπεχειροῦμεν ἂν σημαίνειν ταῖς χερσὶ καὶ κεφαλῇ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι;
Socrates. Now at what point will he be right in giving up and stopping? Will it not be when he reaches the names which are the elements of the other names and words? For these, if they are the elements, can no longer rightly appear to be composed of other names. For instance, we said just now that ἀγαθόν was composed of ἀγαστόν and θοόν; and perhaps we might say that θοόν was composed of other words, and those of still others; but if we ever get hold of a word which is no longer composed of other words, we should be right ill saying that we had at last reached an element, and that we must no longer refer to other words for its derivation.
Hermogenes. I think you are right.
Socrates. Are, then, these words about which you are now asking elements, and must we henceforth investigate their correctness by some other method?
Hermogenes. Probably.
Socrates. Yes, probably, Hermogenes; at any rate, all the previous words were traced back to these. But if this be true, as I think it is, come to my aid again and help me in the investigation, that I may not say anything foolish in declaring what principle must underlie the correctness of the earliest names.
Hermogenes. Go on, and I will help you to the best of my ability.
Socrates. I think you agree with me that there is but one principle of correctness in all names, the earliest as well as the latest, and that none of them is any more a name than the rest.
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. Now the correctness of all the names we have discussed was based upon the intention of showing the nature of the things named.
Hermogenes. Yes, of course.
Socrates. And this principle of correctness must be present in all names, the earliest as well as the later ones, if they are really to be names.
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. But the later ones, apparently, were able to accomplish this by means of the earlier ones.
Hermogenes. Evidently.
Socrates. Well, then, how can the earliest names, which are not as yet based upon any others, make clear to us the nature of things, so far as that is possible, which they must do if they are to be names at all? Answer me this question: If we had no voice or tongue, and wished to make things clear to one another, should we not try, as dumb people actually do, to make signs with our hands and head and person generally?
Hermogenes. Yes. What other method is there, Socrates?
ΕΡΜ. πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως, ὦ Σώκρατες;
ΣΩ. εἰ μέν γʼ οἶμαι τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κοῦφον ἐβουλόμεθα δηλοῦν, ᾔρομεν ἂν πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν τὴν χεῖρα, μιμούμενοι αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος· εἰ δὲ τὰ κάτω καὶ τὰ βαρέα, πρὸς τὴν γῆν. καὶ εἰ ἵππον θέοντα ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν ζῴων ἐβουλόμεθα δηλοῦν, οἶσθα ὅτι ὡς ὁμοιότατʼ ἂν τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν σώματα καὶ σχήματα ἐποιοῦμεν ἐκείνοις.
ΕΡΜ. ἀνάγκη μοι δοκεῖ ὡς λέγεις ἔχειν.
ΣΩ. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι δήλωμά του [σώματος] ἐγίγνετο, μιμησαμένου, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἐβούλετο δηλῶσαι.
ΕΡΜ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ φωνῇ τε καὶ γλώττῃ καὶ στόματι βουλόμεθα δηλοῦν, ἆρʼ οὐ τότε ἑκάστου δήλωμα ἡμῖν ἔσται τὸ ἀπὸ τούτων γιγνόμενον, ὅταν μίμημα γένηται διὰ τούτων περὶ ὁτιοῦν;
ΕΡΜ. ἀνάγκη μοι δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. ὄνομʼ ἄρʼ ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικε, μίμημα φωνῇ ἐκείνου ὃ μιμεῖται, καὶ ὀνομάζει ὁ μιμούμενος τῇ φωνῇ ὃ ἂν μιμῆται
ΕΡΜ. δοκεῖ μοι.
ΣΩ. μὰ Δίʼ ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐμοί πω δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε.
ΕΡΜ. τί δή;
ΣΩ. τοὺς τὰ πρόβατα μιμουμένους τούτους καὶ τοὺς ἀλεκτρυόνας καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα ἀναγκαζοίμεθʼ ἂν ὁμολογεῖν ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα ἅπερ μιμοῦνται.
ΕΡΜ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ΣΩ. καλῶς οὖν ἔχειν δοκεῖ σοι;
ΕΡΜ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλὰ τίς ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μίμησις εἴη τὸ ὄνομα;
ΣΩ. πρῶτον μέν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ ἐὰν καθάπερ τῇ μουσικῇ μιμούμεθα τὰ πράγματα οὕτω μιμώμεθα, καίτοι φωνῇ γε καὶ τότε μιμούμεθα· ἔπειτα οὐκ ἐὰν ἅπερ ἡ μουσικὴ μιμεῖται καὶ ἡμεῖς μιμώμεθα, οὔ μοι δοκοῦμεν ὀνομάσειν. λέγω δέ τοι τοῦτο· ἔστι τοῖς πράγμασι φωνὴ καὶ σχῆμα ἑκάστῳ, καὶ χρῶμά γε πολλοῖς;
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. ἔοικε τοίνυν οὐκ ἐάν τις ταῦτα μιμῆται, οὐδὲ περὶ ταύτας τὰς μιμήσεις ἡ τέχνη ἡ ὀνομαστικὴ εἶναι. αὗται μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἡ μὲν μουσική, ἡ δὲ γραφική· ἦ γάρ;
ΕΡΜ. ναί.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ δὴ τόδε; οὐ καὶ οὐσία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ χρῶμα καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν; πρῶτον αὐτῷ τῷ χρώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία τις ἑκατέρῳ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὅσα ἠξίωται ταύτης τῆς προσρήσεως, τοῦ εἶναι;
ΕΡΜ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν; εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο μιμεῖσθαι δύναιτο ἑκάστου, τὴν οὐσίαν, γράμμασί τε καὶ συλλαβαῖς, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἂν δηλοῖ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν; ἢ οὔ;
Socrates. If we wished to designate that which is above and is light, we should, I fancy, raise our hand towards heaven in imitation of the nature of the thing in question; but if the things to be designated were below or heavy, we should extend our hands towards the ground; and if we wished to mention a galloping horse or any other animal, we should, of course, make our bodily attitudes as much like theirs as possible.
Hermogenes. I think you are quite right; there is no other way.
Socrates. For the expression of anything, I fancy, would be accomplished by bodily imitation of that which was to be expressed.
Hermogenes. Yes.
Socrates. And when we wish to express anything by voice or tongue or mouth, will not our expression by these means be accomplished in any given instance when an imitation of something is accomplished by them?
Hermogenes. I think that is inevitable.
Socrates. A name, then, it appears, is a vocal imitation of that which is imitated, and he who imitates with his voice names that which he imitates.
Hermogenes. I think that is correct.
Socrates. By Zeus, I do not think it is quite correct, yet, my friend.
Hermogenes. Why not?
Socrates. We should be obliged to agree that people who imitate sheep and cocks and other animals were naming those which they imitate.
Hermogenes. Yes, so we should.
Socrates. And do you think that is correct?
Hermogenes. No, I do not; but, Socrates, what sort of an imitation is a name?
Socrates. In the first place we shall not, in my opinion, be making names, if we imitate things as we do in music, although musical imitation also is vocal; and secondly we shall make no names by imitating that which music imitates. What I mean is this: all objects have sound and shape, and many have color, have they not?
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. Well then, the art of naming is not employed in the imitation of those qualities, and has nothing to do with them. The arts which are concerned with them are music and design, are they not?
Hermogenes. Yes.
Socrates. Here is another point. Has not each thing an essential nature, just as it has a color and the other qualities we just mentioned? Indeed, in the first place, have not color and sound and all other things which may properly be said to exist, each and all an essential nature?
Hermogenes. I think so.
Socrates. Well, then, if anyone could imitate this essential nature of each thing by means of letters and syllables, he would show what each thing really is, would he not?
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. καὶ τί ἂν φαίης τὸν τοῦτο δυνάμενον, ὥσπερ τοὺς προτέρους τὸν μὲν μουσικὸν ἔφησθα, τὸν δέ [τινα] γραφικόν. τοῦτον δὲ τίνα;
ΕΡΜ. τοῦτο ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅπερ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν, οὗτος ἂν εἶναι ὁ ὀνομαστικός.
ΣΩ. εἰ ἄρα τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἤδη ἔοικεν ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ ἐκείνων τῶν ὀνομάτων ὧν σὺ ἤρου, περὶ «ῥοῆς» τε καὶ τοῦ «ἰέναι» καὶ «σχέσεως,» εἰ τοῖς γράμμασι καὶ ταῖς συλλαβαῖς τοῦ ὄντος ἐπιλαμβάνεται αὐτῶν ὥστε ἀπομιμεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, εἴτε καὶ οὔ;
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ ἴδωμεν πότερον ἄρα ταῦτα μόνα ἐστὶ τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων ἢ καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.
ΕΡΜ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ ἄλλα.
ΣΩ. εἰκὸς γάρ. ἀλλὰ τίς ἂν εἴη ὁ τρόπος τῆς διαιρέσεως ὅθεν ἄρχεται μιμεῖσθαι ὁ μιμούμενος; ἆρα οὐκ ἐπείπερ συλλαβαῖς τε καὶ γράμμασιν ἡ μίμησις τυγχάνει οὖσα τῆς οὐσίας, ὀρθότατόν ἐστι διελέσθαι τὰ στοιχεῖα πρῶτον, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐπιχειροῦντες τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς τῶν στοιχείων πρῶτον τὰς δυνάμεις διείλοντο, ἔπειτα τῶν συλλαβῶν, καὶ οὕτως ἤδη ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς σκεψόμενοι, πρότερον δʼ οὔ;
ΕΡΜ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ ἡμᾶς οὕτω δεῖ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ φωνήεντα διελέσθαι, ἔπειτα τῶν ἑτέρων κατὰ εἴδη τά τε ἄφωνα καὶ ἄφθογγα—οὑτωσὶ γάρ που λέγουσιν οἱ δεινοὶ περὶ τούτων— καὶ τὰ αὖ φωνήεντα μὲν οὔ, οὐ μέντοι γε ἄφθογγα; καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν φωνηέντων ὅσα διάφορα εἴδη ἔχει ἀλλήλων; καὶ ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα διελώμεθα [τὰ ὄντα] εὖ πάντα αὖ οἷς δεῖ ὀνόματα ἐπιθεῖναι, εἰ ἔστιν εἰς ἃ ἀναφέρεται πάντα ὥσπερ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν ἰδεῖν αὐτά τε καὶ εἰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔνεστιν εἴδη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις· ταῦτα πάντα καλῶς διαθεασαμένους ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιφέρειν ἕκαστον κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα, ἐάντε ἓν ἑνὶ δέῃ ἐπιφέρειν, ἐάντε συγκεραννύντα πολλὰ [ἑνί], ὥσπερ οἱ ζωγράφοι βουλόμενοι ἀφομοιοῦν ἐνίοτε μὲν ὄστρεον μόνον ἐπήνεγκαν, ἐνίοτε δὲ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο τῶν φαρμάκων, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε πολλὰ συγκεράσαντες, οἷον ὅταν ἀνδρείκελον σκευάζωσιν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων—ὡς ἂν οἶμαι δοκῇ ἑκάστη ἡ εἰκὼν δεῖσθαι ἑκάστου φαρμάκου—οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐποίσομεν, καὶ ἓν ἐπὶ ἕν, οὗ ἂν δοκῇ δεῖν, καὶ σύμπολλα, ποιοῦντες ὃ δὴ συλλαβὰς καλοῦσιν, καὶ συλλαβὰς αὖ συντιθέντες, ἐξ ὧν τά τε ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα συντίθενται· καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων μέγα ἤδη τι καὶ καλὸν καὶ ὅλον συστήσομεν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ τὸ ζῷον τῇ γραφικῇ, ἐνταῦθα τὸν λόγον τῇ ὀνομαστικῇ ἢ ῥητορικῇ ἢ ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη.
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. And what will you call him who can do this, as you called the others musician and painter? What will you call this man?
Hermogenes. I think, Socrates, he is what we have been looking for all along, the name-maker.
Socrates. If that is the case, is it our next duty to consider whether in these names about which you were asking—flow, motion, and restraint—the namemaker grasps with his letters and syllables the reality of the things named and imitates their essential nature, or not?
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. Well now, let us see whether those are the only primary names, or there are others.
Hermogenes. I think there are others.
Socrates. Yes, most likely there are. Now what is the method of division with which the imitator begins his imitation? Since the imitation of the essential nature is made with letters and syllables, would not the most correct way be for us to separate the letters first, just as those who undertake the practice of rhythms separate first the qualities of the letters, then those of the syllables, and then, but not till then, come to the study of rhythms?
Hermogenes. Yes.
Socrates. Must not we, too, separate first the vowels, then in their several classes the consonants or mutes, as they are called by those who specialize in phonetics, and also the letters which are neither vowels nor mutes, as well as the various classes that exist among the vowels themselves? And when we have made all these divisions properly, we must in turn give names to the things which ought to have them, if there are any names to which they can all, like the letters, be referred, from which it is possible to see what their nature is and whether there are any classes among them, as there are among letters. When we have properly examined all these points, we must know how to apply each letter with reference to its fitness, whether one letter is to be applied to one thing or many are to be combined; just as painters, when they wish to produce an imitation, sometimes use only red, sometimes some other color, and sometimes mix many colors, as when they are making a picture of a man or something of that sort, employing each color, I suppose, as they think the particular picture demands it. In just this way we, too, shall apply letters to things, using one letter for one thing, when that seems to be required, or many letters together, forming syllables, as they are called, and in turn combining syllables, and by their combination forming nouns and verbs. And from nouns and verbs again we shall finally construct something great and fair and complete. Just as in our comparison we made the picture by the art of painting, so now we shall make language by the art of naming, or of rhetoric, or whatever it be.
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