ΑΘ. μὴ τοίνυν τις τὰς βλάβας πάσας ἀδικίας τιθείς, οὕτως οἴηται καὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἐν αὐταῖσι ταύτῃ γίγνεσθαι διπλᾶ, τὰ μὲν ἑκούσια δή, τὰ δʼ ἀκούσια—βλάβαι γὰρ ἀκούσιοι τῶν πάντων οὔτʼ ἀριθμοῖς οὔτε μεγέθεσιν ἐλάττους εἰσὶ τῶν ἑκουσίων—σκοπεῖσθε δὲ εἴτε τι λέγω λέγων ἃ μέλλω λέγειν, εἴτε καὶ μηδὲν τὸ παράπαν. οὐ γάρ φημι ἔγωγε, ὦ Κλεινία καὶ Μέγιλλε, εἴ τίς τινά τι πημαίνει μὴ βουλόμενος ἀλλʼ ἄκων, ἀδικεῖν μέν, ἄκοντα μήν, καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν δὴ νομοθετήσω, τοῦτο ὡς ἀκούσιον ἀδίκημα νομοθετῶν, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ ἀδικίαν τὸ παράπαν θήσω τὴν τοιαύτην βλάβην, οὔτε ἂν μείζων οὔτε ἂν ἐλάττων τῳ γίγνηται· πολλάκις δὲ ὠφελίαν οὐκ ὀρθὴν γενομένην τὸν τῆς ὠφελίας αἴτιον ἀδικεῖν φήσομεν, ἐὰν ἥ γʼ ἐμὴ νικᾷ. σχεδὸν γάρ, ὦ φίλοι, οὔτʼ εἴ τίς τῳ δίδωσίν τι τῶν ὄντων οὔτʼ εἰ τοὐναντίον ἀφαιρεῖται, δίκαιον ἁπλῶς ἢ ἄδικον χρὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον οὕτω λέγειν, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ἤθει καὶ δικαίῳ τρόπῳ χρώμενός τις ὠφελῇ τινά τι καὶ βλάπτῃ, τοῦτό ἐστιν τῷ νομοθέτῃ θεατέον, καὶ πρὸς δύο ταῦτα δὴ βλεπτέον, πρός τε ἀδικίαν καὶ βλάβην, καὶ τὸ μὲν βλαβὲν ὑγιὲς τοῖς νόμοις εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ποιητέον, τό τε ἀπολόμενον σῴζοντα καὶ τὸ πεσὸν ὑπό του πάλιν ἐξορθοῦντα, καὶ τὸ θανατωθὲν ἢ τρωθέν, ὑγιές, τὸ δὲ ἀποίνοις ἐξιλασθὲν τοῖς δρῶσι καὶ πάσχουσιν ἑκάστας τῶν βλάψεων, ἐκ διαφορᾶς εἰς φιλίαν πειρατέον ἀεὶ καθιστάναι τοῖς νόμοις.
ΚΛ. καλῶς ταῦτά γε.
ΑΘ. τὰς τοίνυν ἀδίκους αὖ βλάβας καὶ κέρδη δέ, ἐάν τις ἀδικῶν τινα κερδαίνειν ποιῇ, τούτων ὁπόσα μὲν ἰατά, ὡς οὐσῶν ἐν ψυχῇ νόσων, ἰᾶσθαι· τὸ δὲ τῆς ἰάσεως ἡμῖν τῆς ἀδικίας τῇδε ῥέπειν χρὴ φάναι.
ΚΛ. πῇ;
ΑΘ. ὅπως ὅτι τις ἂν ἀδικήσῃ μέγα ἢ σμικρόν, ὁ νόμος αὐτὸν διδάξει καὶ ἀναγκάσει τὸ παράπαν εἰς αὖθις τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ μηδέποτε ἑκόντα τολμῆσαι ποιεῖν ἢ διαφερόντως ἧττον πολύ, πρὸς τῇ τῆς βλάβης ἐκτίσει. ταῦτα εἴτε ἔργοις ἢ λόγοις, ἢ μεθʼ ἡδονῶν ἢ λυπῶν, ἢ τιμῶν ἢ ἀτιμιῶν, καὶ χρημάτων ζημίας ἢ καὶ δώρων, ἢ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ᾧτινι τρόπῳ ποιήσει τις μισῆσαι μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν, στέρξαι δὲ ἢ μὴ μισεῖν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου φύσιν, αὐτό ἐστιν τοῦτο ἔργον τῶν καλλίστων νόμων. ὃν δʼ ἂν ἀνιάτως εἰς ταῦτα ἔχοντα αἴσθηται νομοθέτης, δίκην τούτοισι καὶ νόμον θήσει τίνα;
Ath. Let no one put down all injuries as acts of injustice and then regard the unjust acts involved as two-fold in the way described, namely, that they are partly voluntary and partly involuntary (for, of the total, the involuntary injuries are not less than the voluntary either in number or in magnitude); but consider whether in saying what I am now going to say I am speaking sense or absolute nonsense. For what I assert, Megillus and Clinias, is not that, if one man harms another involuntarily and without wishing it, he acts unjustly though involuntarily, nor shall I legislate in this way, pronouncing this to be an involuntary act of injustice, but I will pronounce that such an injury is not an injustice at all, whether it be a greater injury or a less. And, if my view prevails, we shall often say that the author of a benefit wrongly done commits an injustice; for as a rule, my friends, neither when a man gives some material object to another, nor when he takes it away, ought one to term such an act absolutely just or unjust, but only when a man of just character and disposition does any benefit or injury to another,—that is what the lawgiver must look at; he must consider these two things, injustice and injury, and the injury inflicted he must make good so far as possible by legal means; he must conserve what is lost, restore what has been broken down, make whole what is wounded or dead; and when the several injuries have been atoned for by compensation, he must endeavor always by means of the laws to convert the parties who have inflicted them and those who have suffered them from a state of discord to a state of amity.
Clin. He will be right in doing that.
Ath. As regards unjust injuries and gains, in case one man causes another to gain by acting unjustly towards him, all such cases as are curable we must cure, regarding them as diseases of the soul. And we should affirm that our cure for injustice lies in this direction—
Clin. What direction?
Ath. In this,—that whenever any man commits any unjust act, great or small, the law shall instruct him and absolutely compel him for the future either never willingly to dare to do such a deed, or else to do it ever so much less often, in addition to paying for the injury. To effect this, whether by action or speech, by means of pleasures and pains, honors and dishonors, money-fines and money-gifts, and in general by whatsoever means one can employ to make men hate injustice and love (or at any rate not hate) justice,—this is precisely the task of laws most noble. But for all those whom he perceives to be incurable in respect of these matters, what penalty shall the lawgiver enact, and what law?
ΑΘ. γιγνώσκων που τοῖς τοιούτοις πᾶσιν ὡς οὔτε αὐτοῖς ἔτι ζῆν ἄμεινον, τούς τε ἄλλους ἂν διπλῇ ὠφελοῖεν ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τοῦ βίου, παράδειγμα μὲν τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις γενόμενοι, ποιοῦντες δὲ ἀνδρῶν κακῶν ἔρημον τὴν πόλιν, οὕτω δὴ τῶν τοιούτων πέρι νομοθέτῃ κολαστὴν τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων θάνατον ἀνάγκη νέμειν, ἄλλως δὲ οὐδαμῶς.
ΚΛ. ἔοικε μέν πως λέγεσθαι τὰ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ μάλα μετρίως, ἥδιον δʼ ἂν ἔτι σαφέστερον ἀκούσαιμεν ταῦτα ῥηθέντα, τὸ τῆς ἀδικίας τε καὶ βλάβης διάφορον καὶ τὸ τῶν ἑκουσίων καὶ ἀκουσίων ὡς ἐν τούτοις διαπεποίκιλται.
ΑΘ. πειρατέον τοίνυν ὡς κελεύετε δρᾶν, καὶ λέγειν. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοσόνδε γε περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ λέγετε πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ἀκούετε, ὡς ἓν μὲν ἐν αὐτῇ τῆς φύσεως εἴτε τι πάθος εἴτε τι μέρος ὢν ὁ θυμός, δύσερι καὶ δύσμαχον κτῆμα ἐμπεφυκός, ἀλογίστῳ βίᾳ πολλὰ ἀνατρέπει.
ΚΛ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν ἡδονήν γε οὐ ταὐτὸν τῷ θυμῷ προσαγορεύομεν, ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ αὐτῷ φαμεν ῥώμης δυναστεύουσαν, πειθοῖ μετὰ ἀπάτης βιαίου πράττειν πᾶν ὅτιπερ ἂν αὐτῆς ἡ βούλησις ἐθελήσῃ.
ΚΛ. καὶ μάλα.
ΑΘ. τρίτον μὴν ἄγνοιαν λέγων ἄν τις τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων αἰτίαν οὐκ ἂν ψεύδοιτο· διχῇ μὴν διελόμενος αὐτὸ ὁ νομοθέτης ἂν βελτίων εἴη, τὸ μὲν ἁπλοῦν αὐτοῦ κούφων ἁμαρτημάτων αἴτιον ἡγούμενος, τὸ δὲ διπλοῦν, ὅταν ἀμαθαίνῃ τις μὴ μόνον ἀγνοίᾳ συνεχόμενος ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξῃ σοφίας, ὡς εἰδὼς παντελῶς περὶ ἃ μηδαμῶς οἶδεν, μετὰ μὲν ἰσχύος καὶ ῥώμης ἑπομένης μεγάλων καὶ ἀμούσων ἁμαρτημάτων τιθεὶς αἴτια τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀσθενείας δὲ ἑπομένης, παίδειά τε ἁμαρτήματα καὶ πρεσβυτέρων γιγνόμενα θήσει μὲν ἁμαρτήματα καὶ ὡς ἁμαρτάνουσιν νόμους τάξει, πρᾳοτάτους γε μὴν πάντων καὶ συγγνώμης πλείστης ἐχομένους.
ΚΛ. εἰκότα λέγεις.
ΑΘ. ἡδονῆς μὲν τοίνυν καὶ θυμοῦ λέγομεν σχεδὸν ἅπαντες ὡς ὁ μὲν κρείττων ἡμῶν, ὁ δὲ ἥττων ἐστίν· καὶ ἔχει ταύτῃ.
ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
ΑΘ. ἀγνοίας δέ γε ὡς ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν κρείττων, ὁ δὲ ἥττων, οὐκ ἠκούσαμεν πώποτε.
ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα.
ΑΘ. πάντα δέ γε προτρέπειν ταῦτά φαμεν εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ βούλησιν ἐπισπώμενον ἕκαστον εἰς τἀναντία πολλάκις ἅμα.
ΚΛ. πλειστάκις μὲν οὖν.
Ath. The lawgiver will realize that in all such cases not only is it better for the sinners themselves to live no longer, but also that they will prove of a double benefit to others by quitting life—since they will both serve as a warning to the rest not to act unjustly, and also rid the State of wicked men,—and thus he will of necessity inflict death as the chastisement for their sins, in cases of this kind, and of this kind only.
Clin. What you have said seems very reasonable; but we should be glad to hear a still clearer statement respecting the difference between injury and injustice, and how the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary applies in these cases.
Ath. I must endeavor to do as you bid me, and explain the matter. No doubt in conversing with one another you say and hear said at least thus much about the soul, that one element in its nature (be it affection or part) is “passion,” which is an inbred quality of a contentious and pugnacious kind, and one that overturns many things by its irrational force.
Clin. Of course.
Ath. Moreover, we distinguish “pleasure” from passion, and we assert that its mastering power is of an opposite kind, since it effects all that its intention desires by a mixture of persuasion and deceit.
Clin. Exactly.
Ath. Nor would it be untrue to say that the third cause of sins is ignorance. This cause, however, the lawgiver would do well to subdivide into two, counting ignorance in its simple form to be the cause of minor sins, and in its double form—where the folly is due to the man being gripped not by ignorance only, but also by a conceit of wisdom, as though he had full knowledge of things he knows nothing at all about,—counting this to be the cause of great and brutal sins when it is joined with strength and might, but the cause of childish and senile sins when it is joined with weakness; and these last he will count as sins and he will ordain laws, as for sinners, but laws that will be, above all others, of the most mild and merciful kind.
Clin. That is reasonable.
Ath. And pretty well everyone speaks of one man being “superior,” another “inferior,” to pleasure or to passion; and they are so.
Clin. Most certainly.
Ath. But we have never heard it said that one man is “superior,” another “inferior,” to ignorance.
Clin. Quite true.
Ath. And we assert that all these things urge each man often to go counter to the actual bent of his own inclination.
Clin. Very frequently.
ΑΘ. νῦν δή σοι τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον, ὅ γε ἐγὼ λέγω, σαφῶς ἂν διορισαίμην οὐδὲν ποικίλλων. τὴν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ φόβου καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης καὶ φθόνων καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐν ψυχῇ τυραννίδα, ἐάντε τι βλάπτῃ καὶ ἐὰν μή, πάντως ἀδικίαν προσαγορεύω· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀρίστου δόξαν, ὅπῃπερ ἂν ἔσεσθαι τούτων ἡγήσωνται πόλις εἴτε ἰδιῶταί τινες, ἐὰν αὕτη κρατοῦσα ἐν ψυχαῖς διακοσμῇ πάντα ἄνδρα, κἂν σφάλληταί τι, δίκαιον μὲν πᾶν εἶναι φατέον τὸ ταύτῃ πραχθὲν καὶ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς γιγνόμενον ὑπήκοον ἑκάστων, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ἅπαντα ἀνθρώπων βίον ἄριστον, δοξάζεσθαι δὲ ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀκούσιον ἀδικίαν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην βλάβην. ἡμῖν δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν τὰ νῦν ὀνομάτων πέρι δύσερις λόγος, ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ τῶν ἁμαρτανομένων τρία εἴδη δεδήλωται γιγνόμενα, ταῦτα εἰς μνήμην πρῶτον ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀναληπτέον. λύπης μὲν οὖν, ἣν θυμὸν καὶ φόβον ἐπονομάζομεν, ἓν εἶδος ἡμῖν ἐστιν.
ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΑΘ. ἡδονῆς δʼ αὖ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν δεύτερον, ἐλπίδων δὲ καὶ δόξης τῆς ἀληθοῦς περὶ τὸ ἄριστον ἔφεσις τρίτον ἕτερον. τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ τρία διχῇ τμηθέντος πέντε εἴδη γέγονεν, ὡς νῦν φαμεν· οἷς νόμους διαφέροντας ἀλλήλων πέντε εἴδεσιν θετέον ἐν δυοῖν γένεσιν.
ΚΛ. τίσιν τούτοις;
ΑΘ. τὸ μὲν διὰ βιαίων καὶ συμφανῶν πράξεων πραττόμενον ἑκάστοτε, τὸ δὲ μετὰ σκότους καὶ ἀπάτης λαθραίως γιγνόμενον, ἔστιν δʼ ὅτε καὶ διʼ ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν πραχθέν· ᾧ δὴ καὶ νόμοι τραχύτατοι γίγνοιντο ἄν, εἰ τὸ προσῆκον μέρος ἔχοιεν.
ΚΛ. εἰκὸς γοῦν.
ΑΘ. ἴωμεν δὴ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐκεῖσε ὁπόθεν ἐξέβημεν δεῦρο, περαίνοντες τὴν θέσιν τῶν νόμων. ἦν δὲ ἡμῖν κείμενα περί τε τῶν συλώντων, οἶμαι, τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὰ περὶ προδοτῶν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν τοὺς νόμους διαφθειρόντων ἐπὶ καταλύσει τῆς παρούσης πολιτείας. τούτων δή τις ἂν ἴσως πράξειέν τι μανείς, ἢ νόσοις ἢ γήρᾳ ὑπερμέτρῳ συνεχόμενος, ἢ παιδίᾳ χρώμενος, οὐδέν πω τῶν τοιούτων διαφέρων· ὧν ἂν γίγνηταί τι φανερὸν τοῖς ἐκλεχθεῖσιν ἑκάστοτε δικασταῖς, ἀναφέροντος τοῦ δράσαντος ἢ τοῦ σκηπτομένου ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, κριθῇ δὲ οὕτω διατεθεὶς παρανομῆσαι, τὴν μὲν βλάβην ἣν ἄν τινα καταβλάψῃ πάντως ἁπλῆν ἀποτινέτω, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων δικαιωμάτων ἀφείσθω, πλὴν ἂν ἄρα τινὰ ἀποκτείνας μὴ καθαρὸς ᾖ τὰς χεῖρας φόνου· οὕτω δʼ εἰς ἄλλην χώραν καὶ τόπον ἀπελθὼν οἰκείτω τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκδημῶν, πρότερον δὲ ἐλθὼν τοῦ χρόνου ὃν ὁ νόμος ὥρισεν, ἢ καὶ πάσης ἐπιβὰς τῆς οἰκείας χώρας, ἐν δημοσίῳ δεσμῷ δεθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν νομοφυλάκων δύο ἐνιαυτούς, οὕτως ἀπαλλαττέσθω τῶν δεσμῶν.
Ath. Now I will define for you, clearly and without complication, my notion of justice and injustice. The domination of passion and fear and pleasure and pain and envies and desires in the soul, whether they do any injury or not, I term generally “injustice”; but the belief in the highest good— in whatsoever way either States or individuals think they can attain to it,—if this prevails in their souls and regulates every man, even if some damage be done, we must assert that everything thus done is just, and that in each man the part subject to this governance is also just, and best for the whole life of mankind, although most men suppose that such damage is an involuntary injustice. But we are not now concerned with a verbal dispute. Since, however, it has been shown that there are three kinds of sinning, we must first of all recall these still more clearly to mind. Of these, one kind, as we know, is painful; and that we term passion and fear.
Clin. Quite so.
Ath. The second kind consists of pleasure and desires; the third, which is a distinct kind, consists of hopes and untrue belief regarding the attainment of the highest good. And when this last kind is subdivided into three, five classes are made, as we now assert; and for these five classes we must enact distinct laws, of two main types.
Clin. What are they?
Ath. The one concerns acts done on each occasion by violent and open means, the other acts done privily under cover of darkness and deceit, or sometimes acts done in both these ways,—and for acts of this last kind the laws will be most severe, if they are to prove adequate.
Clin. Naturally.
Ath. Let us revert next to that point from which we digressed, and proceed with our enactment of the laws. We had, I believe, laid down the laws dealing with those who plunder the gods and with traitors, and also with those who wreck the laws with intent to overthrow the existing constitution. An act of this kind a man might commit when mad, or when suffering from some disease or from excessive senility, or in a state of childishness, whereby he is no better than a madman. If any case of this kind is ever brought to the notice of the selected judges, either on the information of the doer of the act or on that of him who is pleading for the doer, and if it be judged that he was in this state of madness when he broke the law, then he shall certainly pay for the damage he has done, but only the exact sum, and he shall be acquitted of the other charges, unless it be that he has killed a man and has not purged his hands from blood: in this case he shall depart into another country and place, and dwell there as an exile for a year; and should he return within the time fixed by the law or set foot at all within his own country, he shall be put in the public jail by the Law-wardens for the space of two years, and not let out of jail until after that time.
ΑΘ. φόνου δὴ καθάπερ ἠρξάμεθα, πειρώμεθα διὰ τέλους παντὸς εἴδους πέρι φόνου θεῖναι τοὺς νόμους, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ βίαια καὶ ἀκούσια λέγωμεν. εἴ τις ἐν ἀγῶνι καὶ ἄθλοις δημοσίοις ἄκων, εἴτε παραχρῆμα εἴτε καὶ ἐν ὑστέροις χρόνοις ἐκ τῶν πληγῶν, ἀπέκτεινέν τινα φίλιον, ἢ κατὰ πόλεμον ὡσαύτως ἢ κατὰ μελέτην τὴν πρὸς πόλεμον, ποιουμένων ἄσκησιν [τῶν ἀρχόντων] ψιλοῖς σώμασιν ἢ μετά τινων ὅπλων ἀπομιμουμένων τὴν πολεμικὴν πρᾶξιν, καθαρθεὶς κατὰ τὸν ἐκ Δελφῶν κομισθέντα περὶ τούτων νόμον ἔστω καθαρός· ἰατρῶν δὲ πέρι πάντων, ἂν ὁ θεραπευόμενος ὑπʼ αὐτῶν ἀκόντων τελευτᾷ, καθαρὸς ἔστω κατὰ νόμον. ἐὰν δὲ αὐτόχειρ μέν, ἄκων δὲ ἀποκτείνῃ τις ἕτερος ἕτερον, εἴτε τῷ ἑαυτοῦ σώματι ψιλῷ εἴτε ὀργάνῳ ἢ βέλει ἢ πώματος ἢ σίτου δόσει ἢ πυρὸς ἢ χειμῶνος προσβολῇ ἢ στερήσει πνεύματος, αὐτὸς τῷ ἑαυτοῦ σώματι ἢ διʼ ἑτέρων σωμάτων, πάντως ἔστω μὲν ὡς αὐτόχειρ, δίκας δὲ τινέτω τὰς τοιάσδε· ἐὰν μὲν δοῦλον κτείνῃ, νομίζων τὸν ἑαυτοῦ διειργάσθαι τὸν τοῦ τελευτήσαντος δεσπότην ἀβλαβῆ παρεχέτω καὶ ἀζήμιον, ἢ δίκην εἰς τὴν ἀξίαν τοῦ τελευτήσαντος ὑπεχέτω διπλῆν, τῆς δὲ ἀξίας οἱ δικασταὶ διάγνωσιν ποιείσθωσαν, καθαρμοῖς δὲ χρήσασθαι μείζοσίν τε καὶ πλείοσι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἆθλα ἀποκτεινάντων, τούτων δʼ ἐξηγητὰς εἶναι κυρίους οὓς ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἀνέλῃ· ἐὰν δὲ αὑτοῦ δοῦλον, καθηράμενος ἀπαλλαττέσθω τοῦ φόνου κατὰ νόμον. ἐὰν δέ τις ἐλεύθερον ἄκων ἀποκτείνῃ, τοὺς μὲν καθαρμοὺς τοὺς αὐτοὺς καθαρθήτω τῷ τὸν δοῦλον ἀποκτείναντι, παλαιὸν δέ τινα τῶν ἀρχαίων μύθων λεγόμενον μὴ ἀτιμαζέτω. λέγεται δὲ ὡς ὁ θανατωθεὶς ἄρα βιαίως, ἐν ἐλευθέρῳ φρονήματι βεβιωκώς, θυμοῦταί τε τῷ δράσαντι νεοθνὴς ὤν, καὶ φόβου καὶ δείματος ἅμα διὰ τὴν βίαιον πάθην αὐτὸς πεπληρωμένος, ὁρῶν τε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ φονέα ἐν τοῖς ἤθεσι τοῖς τῆς ἑαυτοῦ συνηθείας ἀναστρεφόμενον, δειμαίνει, καὶ ταραττόμενος αὐτὸς ταράττει κατὰ δύναμιν πᾶσαν τὸν δράσαντα, μνήμην σύμμαχον ἔχων, αὐτόν τε καὶ τὰς πράξεις αὐτοῦ. διὸ δὴ χρεών ἐστιν ἄρα ὑπεξελθεῖν τῷ παθόντι τὸν δράσαντα τὰς ὥρας πάσας τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ καὶ ἐρημῶσαι πάντας τοὺς οἰκείους τόπους συμπάσης τῆς πατρίδος·
Ath. We need not hesitate to enact laws about every class of murder on similar lines, now that we have made a beginning. First we shall deal with the cases that are violent and involuntary. If a man has killed a friend in a contest or in public games—whether his death has been immediate or as the after-effect of wounds,—or similarly if he has killed him in war or in some action of training for war, either when practicing javelin-work without armor or when engaged in some warlike maneuver in heavy armor,—then, when he has been purified as the Delphic rule on this matter directs, he shall be accounted pure. So too with respect to all doctors, if the patient dies against the will of his doctor, the doctor shall be accounted legally pure. And if one man kills another of his own act, but involuntarily,—whether it be with his own unarmed body, or by a tool or a weapon, or by a dose of drink or of solid food, or by application of fire or of cold, or by deprivation of air, and whether he does it himself with his own body or by means of other bodies,— in all cases it shall be accounted to be his own personal act, and he shall pay the following penalties. If he kill a slave, he shall secure the master against damage and loss, reckoning as if it were a slave of his own that had been destroyed, or else he shall be liable to a penalty of double the value of the dead man,—and the judges shall make an assessment of his value,—and he must also employ means of purification greater and more numerous than those employed by persons who kill a man at games, and those interpreters whom the oracle names shall be in charge of these rites; but if it be a slave of his own that he has killed, he shall be set free after the legal purification. And if anyone kill a free man involuntarily, he shall undergo the same purifications as the man that has killed a slave; and there is an ancient tale, told of old, to which he must not fail to pay regard. The tale is this,—that the man slain by violence, who has lived in a free and proud spirit, is wroth with his slayer when newly slain, and being filled also with dread and horror on account of his own violent end, when he sees his murderer going about in the very haunts which he himself had frequented, he is horror-stricken; and being disquieted himself, he takes conscience as his ally, and with all his might disquiets his slayer—both the man himself and his doings. Wherefore it is right for the slayer to retire before his victim for a full year, in all its seasons, and to vacate all the spots he owned in all parts of his native land;
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