ΑΘ. τούτων δὴ πάντων ὅσοι καταφρονήσαντες οὐδὲ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἱκανοῦ λόγου, ὡς φαῖεν ἂν ὅσοι καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦ κέκτηνται, νῦν ἀναγκάζουσιν ἡμᾶς λέγειν ἃ λέγομεν, πῶς τούτους ἄν τις ἐν πρᾳέσι λόγοις δύναιτο νουθετῶν ἅμα διδάσκειν περὶ θεῶν πρῶτον ὡς εἰσίν; τολμητέον δέ· οὐ γὰρ ἅμα γε δεῖ μανῆναι τοὺς μὲν ὑπὸ λαιμαργίας ἡδονῆς ἡμῶν, τοὺς δʼ ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοῦσθαι τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἴτω δὴ πρόρρησις τοιάδε τις ἄθυμος τοῖς οὕτω τὴν διάνοιαν διεφθαρμένοις, καὶ λέγωμεν πρᾴως, σβέσαντες τὸν θυμόν, ὡς ἑνὶ διαλεγόμενοι τῶν τοιούτων· ὦ παῖ, νέος εἶ, προϊὼν δέ σε ὁ χρόνος ποιήσει πολλὰ ὧν νῦν δοξάζεις μεταβαλόντα ἐπὶ τἀναντία τίθεσθαι· περίμεινον οὖν εἰς τότε κριτὴς περὶ τῶν μεγίστων γίγνεσθαι, μέγιστον δέ, ὃ νῦν οὐδὲν ἡγῇ σύ, τὸ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ὀρθῶς διανοηθέντα ζῆν καλῶς ἢ μή. πρῶτον δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἕν τι μέγα σοι μηνύων οὐκ ἄν ποτε φανείην ψευδής, τὸ τοιόνδε. οὐ σὺ μόνος οὐδὲ οἱ σοὶ φίλοι πρῶτοι καὶ πρῶτον ταύτην δόξαν περὶ θεῶν ἔσχετε, γίγνονται δὲ ἀεὶ πλείους ἢ ἐλάττους ταύτην τὴν νόσον ἔχοντες· τόδε τοίνυν σοι, παραγεγονὼς αὐτῶν πολλοῖσι, φράζοιμʼ ἄν, τὸ μηδένα πώποτε λαβόντα ἐκ νέου ταύτην τὴν δόξαν περὶ θεῶν, ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν, διατελέσαι πρὸς γῆρας μείναντα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διανοήσει, τὰ δύο μέντοι πάθη περὶ θεοὺς μεῖναι, πολλοῖσι μὲν οὔ, μεῖναι δὲ οὖν τισιν, τὸ τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι μέν, φροντίζειν δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, καὶ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς φροντίζουσι μέν, εὐπαραμύθητοι δʼ εἰσὶν θύμασιν καὶ εὐχαῖς. τὸ δὴ σαφὲς ἂν γενόμενόν σοι περὶ αὐτῶν κατὰ δύναμιν δόγμα, ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, περιμενεῖς, ἀνασκοπῶν εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει, πυνθανόμενος παρά τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα καὶ παρὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου· ἐν δὲ δὴ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ μὴ τολμήσῃς περὶ θεοὺς μηδὲν ἀσεβῆσαι. πειρατέον γὰρ τῷ τοὺς νόμους σοι τιθέντι νῦν καὶ εἰς αὖθις διδάσκειν περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ὡς ἔχει.
ΚΛ. κάλλισθʼ ἡμῖν, ὦ ξένε, μέχρι γε τοῦ νῦν εἴρηται.
ΑΘ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία· λελήθαμεν δʼ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς εἰς θαυμαστὸν λόγον ἐμπεπτωκότες.
ΚΛ. τὸν ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;
ΑΘ. τὸν παρὰ πολλοῖς δοξαζόμενον εἶναι σοφώτατον ἁπάντων λόγων.
ΚΛ. φράζʼ ἔτι σαφέστερον.
ΑΘ. λέγουσί πού τινες ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα γιγνόμενα καὶ γενόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα τὰ μὲν φύσει, τὰ δὲ τέχνῃ, τὰ δὲ διὰ τύχην.
ΚΛ. οὐκοῦν καλῶς;
Ath. all this evidence is contemned by these people, and that for no sufficient reason, as everyone endowed with a grain of sense would affirm; and so they are now forcing us to enter on our present argument. How, I ask, can one possibly use mild terms in admonishing such men, and at the same time teach them, to begin with, that the gods do exist? Yet one must bravely attempt the task; for it would never do for both parties to be enraged at once,—the one owing to greed for pleasure, the other with indignation at men like them. So let our prefatory address to the men thus corrupted in mind be dispassionate in tone, and, quenching our passion, let us speak mildly, as though we were conversing with one particular person of the kind described, in the following terms: “My child, you are still young, and time as it advances will cause you to reverse many of the opinions you now hold: so wait till then before pronouncing judgment on matters of most grave importance; and of these the gravest of all—though at present you regard it as naught—is the question of holding a right view about the gods and so living well, or the opposite. Now in the first place, I should be saying what is irrefutably true if I pointed out to you this signal fact, that neither you by yourself nor yet your friends are the first and foremost to adopt this opinion about the gods; rather is it true that people who suffer from this disease are always springing up, in greater or less numbers. But I, who have met with many of these people, would declare this to you, that not a single man who from his youth has adopted this opinion, that the gods have no existence, has ever yet continued till old age constant in the same view; but the other two false notions about the gods do remain—not, indeed, with many, but still with some,—the notion, namely, that the gods exist, but pay no heed to human affairs, and the other notion that they do pay heed, but are easily won over by prayers and offerings. For a doctrine about them that is to prove the truest you can possibly form you will, if you take my advice, wait, considering the while whether the truth stands thus or otherwise, and making enquiries not only from all other men, but especially from the lawgiver; and in the meantime do not dare to be guilty of any impiety in respect of the gods. For it must be the endeavor of him who is legislating for you both now and hereafter to instruct you in the truth of these matters.”
Clin. Our statement thus far, Stranger, is most excellent.
Ath. Very true, O Megillus and Clinias; but we have plunged unawares into a wondrous argument.
Clin. What is it you mean?
Ath. That which most people account to be the most scientific of all arguments.
Clin. Explain more clearly.
Ath. It is stated by some that all things which are coming into existence, or have or will come into existence, do so partly by nature, partly by art, and partly owing to chance.
Clin. Is it not a right statement?
ΑΘ. εἰκός γέ τοί που σοφοὺς ἄνδρας ὀρθῶς λέγειν· ἑπόμενοί γε μὴν αὐτοῖς σκεψώμεθα τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν τί ποτε καὶ τυγχάνουσι διανοούμενοι.
ΚΛ. πάντως.
ΑΘ. ἔοικε, φασίν, τὰ μὲν μέγιστα αὐτῶν καὶ κάλλιστα ἀπεργάζεσθαι φύσιν καὶ τύχην, τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα τέχνην, ἣν δὴ παρὰ φύσεως λαμβάνουσαν τὴν τῶν μεγάλων καὶ πρώτων γένεσιν ἔργων, πλάττειν καὶ τεκταίνεσθαι πάντα τὰ σμικρότερα, ἃ δὴ τεχνικὰ πάντες προσαγορεύομεν.
ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;
ΑΘ. ὧδʼ ἔτι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασίν, τέχνῃ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων, καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα αὖ σώματα, γῆς τε καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἄστρων τε πέρι, διὰ τούτων γεγονέναι παντελῶς ὄντων ἀψύχων· τύχῃ δὲ φερόμενα τῇ τῆς δυνάμεως ἕκαστα ἑκάστων, ᾗ συμπέπτωκεν ἁρμόττοντα οἰκείως πως, θερμὰ ψυχροῖς ἢ ξηρὰ πρὸς ὑγρὰ καὶ μαλακὰ πρὸς σκληρά, καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κράσει κατὰ τύχην ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεκεράσθη, ταύτῃ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτως γεγεννηκέναι τόν τε οὐρανὸν ὅλον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα κατʼ οὐρανόν, καὶ ζῷα αὖ καὶ φυτὰ σύμπαντα, ὡρῶν πασῶν ἐκ τούτων γενομένων, οὐ δὲ διὰ νοῦν, φασίν, οὐδὲ διά τινα θεὸν οὐδὲ διὰ τέχνην ἀλλά, ὃ λέγομεν, φύσει καὶ τύχῃ. τέχνην δὲ ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων ὑστέραν γενομένην, αὐτὴν θνητὴν ἐκ θνητῶν ὕστερα γεγεννηκέναι παιδιάς τινας, ἀληθείας οὐ σφόδρα μετεχούσας, ἀλλὰ εἴδωλʼ ἄττα συγγενῆ ἑαυτῶν, οἷʼ ἡ γραφικὴ γεννᾷ καὶ μουσικὴ καὶ ὅσαι ταύταις εἰσὶν συνέριθοι τέχναι· αἳ δέ τι καὶ σπουδαῖον ἄρα γεννῶσι τῶν τεχνῶν, εἶναι ταύτας ὁπόσαι τῇ φύσει ἐκοίνωσαν τὴν αὑτῶν δύναμιν, οἷον αὖ ἰατρικὴ καὶ γεωργικὴ καὶ γυμναστική. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν σμικρόν τι μέρος εἶναί φασιν κοινωνοῦν φύσει, τέχνῃ δὲ τὸ πολύ, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν πᾶσαν οὐ φύσει, τέχνῃ δέ, ἧς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς εἶναι τὰς θέσεις.
ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;
Ath. It is likely, to be sure, that what men of science say is true. Anyhow, let us follow them up, and consider what it is that the people in their camp really intend.
Clin. By all means let us do so.
Ath. It is evident, they assert, that the greatest and most beautiful things are the work of nature and of chance, and the lesser things that of art,—for art receives from nature the great and primary products as existing, and itself molds and shapes all the smaller ones, which we commonly call “artificial.”
Clin. How do you mean?
Ath. I will explain it more clearly. Fire and water and earth and air, they say, all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art; and by means of these, which are wholly inanimate, the bodies which come next—those, namely, of the earth, sun, moon and stars—have been brought into existence. It is by chance all these elements move, by the interplay of their respective forces, and according as they meet together and combine fittingly,—hot with cold, dry with moist, soft with hard, and all such necessary mixtures as result from the chance combination of these opposites,—in this way and by those means they have brought into being the whole Heaven and all that is in the Heaven, and all animals, too, and plants—after that all the seasons had arisen from these elements; and all this, as they assert, not owing to reason, nor to any god or art, but owing, as we have said, to nature and chance. As a later product of these, art comes later; and it, being mortal itself and of mortal birth, begets later playthings which share but little in truth, being images of a sort akin to the arts themselves—images such as painting begets, and music, and the arts which accompany these. Those arts which really produce something serious are such as share their effect with nature,—like medicine, agriculture, and gymnastic. Politics too, as they say, shares to a small extent in nature, but mostly in art; and in like manner all legislation which is based on untrue assumptions is due, not to nature, but to art.
Clin. What do you mean?
ΑΘ. θεούς, ὦ μακάριε, εἶναι πρῶτόν φασιν οὗτοι τέχνῃ, οὐ φύσει ἀλλά τισιν νόμοις, καὶ τούτους ἄλλους ἄλλῃ, ὅπῃ ἕκαστοι ἑαυτοῖσι συνωμολόγησαν νομοθετούμενοι· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ καλὰ φύσει μὲν ἄλλα εἶναι, νόμῳ δὲ ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ δὴ δίκαια οὐδʼ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν φύσει, ἀλλʼ ἀμφισβητοῦντας διατελεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ μετατιθεμένους ἀεὶ ταῦτα, ἃ δʼ ἂν μετάθωνται καὶ ὅταν, τότε κύρια ἕκαστα εἶναι, γιγνόμενα τέχνῃ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις ἀλλʼ οὐ δή τινι φύσει. ταῦτʼ ἐστίν, ὦ φίλοι, ἅπαντα ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν παρὰ νέοις ἀνθρώποις, ἰδιωτῶν τε καὶ ποιητῶν, φασκόντων εἶναι τὸ δικαιότατον ὅτι τις ἂν νικᾷ βιαζόμενος· ὅθεν ἀσέβειαί τε ἀνθρώποις ἐμπίπτουσιν νέοις, ὡς οὐκ ὄντων θεῶν οἵους ὁ νόμος προστάττει διανοεῖσθαι δεῖν, στάσεις τε διὰ ταῦτα ἑλκόντων πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν ὀρθὸν βίον, ὅς ἐστιν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ κρατοῦντα ζῆν τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μὴ δουλεύοντα ἑτέροισι κατὰ νόμον.
ΚΛ. οἷον διελήλυθας, ὦ ξένε, λόγον, καὶ ὅσην λώβην ἀνθρώπων νέων δημοσίᾳ πόλεσίν τε καὶ ἰδίοις οἴκοις.
ΑΘ. ἀληθῆ μέντοι λέγεις, ὦ Κλεινία. τί οὖν οἴει χρῆναι δρᾶν τὸν νομοθέτην, οὕτω τούτων πάλαι παρεσκευασμένων; ἢ μόνον ἀπειλεῖν στάντα ἐν τῇ πόλει σύμπασι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὡς εἰ μὴ φήσουσιν εἶναι θεοὺς καὶ διανοηθήσονται δοξάζοντες τοιούτους οἵους φησὶν ὁ νόμος—καὶ περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ περὶ ἁπάντων τῶν μεγίστων ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν τείνει καὶ κακίαν, ὡς δεῖ ταῦτα οὕτω πράττειν διανοουμένους ὅπῃπερ ἂν ὁ νομοθέτης ὑφηγήσηται γράφων—ὃς δʼ ἂν μὴ παρέχηται ἑαυτὸν τοῖς νόμοις εὐπειθῆ, τὸν μὲν δεῖν τεθνάναι, τὸν δέ τινα πληγαῖς καὶ δεσμοῖς, τὸν δὲ ἀτιμίαις, ἄλλους δὲ πενίαις κολάζεσθαι καὶ φυγαῖς· πειθὼ δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἅμα τιθέντα αὐτοῖς τοὺς νόμους, μηδεμίαν ἔχειν τοῖς λόγοις προσάπτοντα εἰς δύναμιν ἡμεροῦν;
ΚΛ. μηδαμῶς, ὦ ξένε, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ τυγχάνει γε οὖσα καὶ σμικρὰ πειθώ τις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, δεῖ μηδαμῇ κάμνειν τόν γε ἄξιον καὶ σμικροῦ νομοθέτην, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν, τὸ λεγόμενον, φωνὴν ἱέντα, τῷ παλαιῷ νόμῳ ἐπίκουρον γίγνεσθαι λόγῳ ὡς εἰσὶν θεοὶ καὶ ὅσα νυνδὴ διῆλθες σύ, καὶ δὴ καὶ νόμῳ αὐτῷ βοηθῆσαι καὶ τέχνῃ, ὡς ἐστὸν φύσει ἢ φύσεως οὐχ ἧττον, εἴπερ νοῦ γέ ἐστιν γεννήματα κατὰ λόγον ὀρθόν, ὃν σύ τε λέγειν μοι φαίνῃ καὶ ἐγώ σοι πιστεύω τὰ νῦν.
ΑΘ. ὦ προθυμότατε Κλεινία, τί δʼ; οὐ χαλεπά τέ ἐστι συνακολουθεῖν λόγοις οὕτως εἰς πλήθη λεγόμενα, μήκη τε αὖ κέκτηται διωλύγια;
Ath. The first statement, my dear sir, which these people make about the gods is that they exist by art and not by nature,—by certain legal conventions which differ from place to place, according as each tribe agreed when forming their laws. They assert, moreover, that there is one class of things beautiful by nature, and another class beautiful by convention; while as to things just, they do not exist at all by nature, but men are constantly in dispute about them and continually altering them, and whatever alteration they make at any time is at that time authoritative, though it owes its existence to art and the laws, and not in any way to nature. All these, my friends, are views which young people imbibe from men of science, both prose-writers and poets, who maintain that the height of justice is to succeed by force; whence it comes that the young people are afflicted with a plague of impiety, as though the gods were not such as the law commands us to conceive them; and, because of this, factions also arise, when these teachers attract them towards the life that is right “according to nature,” which consists in being master over the rest in reality, instead of being a slave to others according to legal convention.
Clin. What a horrible statement you have described, Stranger! And what widespread corruption of the young in private families as well as publicly in the States!
Ath. That is indeed true, Clinias. What, then, do you think the lawgiver ought to do, seeing that these people have been armed in this way for a long time past? Should he merely stand up in the city and threaten all the people that unless they affirm that the gods exist and conceive them in their minds to be such as the law maintains and so likewise with regard to the beautiful and the just and all the greatest things, as many as relate to virtue and vice, that they must regard and perform these in the way prescribed by the lawgiver in his writings; and that whosoever fails to show himself obedient to the laws must either be put to death or else be punished, in one case by stripes and imprisonment, in another by degradation, in others by poverty and exile? But as to persuasion, should the lawgiver, while enacting the people’s laws, refuse to blend any persuasion with his statements, and thus tame them so far as possible?
Clin. Certainly not, Stranger; on the contrary, if persuasion can be applied in such matters in even the smallest degree, no lawgiver who is of the slightest account must ever grow weary, but must (as they say) “leave no stone unturned” to reinforce the ancient saying that gods exist, and all else that you recounted just now; and law itself he must also defend and art, as things which exist by nature or by a cause not inferior to nature, since according to right reason they are the offspring of mind, even as you are now, as I think, asserting; and I agree with you.
Ath. What now, my most ardent Clinias? Are not statements thus made to the masses difficult for us to keep up with in argument, and do they not also involve us in arguments portentously long?
ΚΛ. τί δέ, ὦ ξένε; περὶ μέθης μὲν καὶ μουσικῆς οὕτω μακρὰ λέγοντας ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς περιεμείναμεν, περὶ θεῶν δὲ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων οὐχ ὑπομενοῦμεν; καὶ μὴν καὶ νομοθεσίᾳ γέ ἐστίν που τῇ μετὰ φρονήσεως μεγίστη βοήθεια, διότι τὰ περὶ νόμους προστάγματα ἐν γράμμασι τεθέντα, ὡς δώσοντα εἰς πάντα χρόνον ἔλεγχον, πάντως ἠρεμεῖ, ὥστε οὔτʼ εἰ χαλεπὰ κατʼ ἀρχὰς ἀκούειν ἐστὶν φοβητέον, ἅ γʼ ἔσται καὶ τῷ δυσμαθεῖ πολλάκις ἐπανιόντι σκοπεῖν, οὔτε εἰ μακρά, ὠφέλιμα δέ, διὰ ταῦτα λόγον οὐδαμῇ ἔχει οὐδὲ ὅσιον ἔμοιγε εἶναι φαίνεται τὸ μὴ οὐ βοηθεῖν τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις πάντα ἄνδρα κατὰ δύναμιν.
ΜΕ. ἄριστα, ὦ ξένε, δοκεῖ μοι λέγειν Κλεινίας.
ΑΘ. καὶ μάλα γε, ὦ Μέγιλλε, ποιητέον τε ὡς λέγει. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ κατεσπαρμένοι ἦσαν οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀνθρώποις, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τῶν ἐπαμυνούντων λόγων ὡς εἰσὶν θεοί· νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη. νόμοις οὖν διαφθειρομένοις τοῖς μεγίστοις ὑπὸ κακῶν ἀνθρώπων τίνα καὶ μᾶλλον προσήκει βοηθεῖν ἢ νομοθέτην;
ΜΕ. οὐκ ἔστιν.
ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ δὴ λέγε μοι πάλιν, Κλεινία, καὶ σύ—κοινωνὸν γὰρ δεῖ σε εἶναι τῶν λόγων—κινδυνεύει γὰρ ὁ λέγων ταῦτα πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα πρῶτα ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν πάντων εἶναι, καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα αὐτά, ψυχὴν δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὕστερον. ἔοικεν δὲ οὐ κινδυνεύειν ἀλλὰ ὄντως σημαίνειν ταῦτα ἡμῖν τῷ λόγῳ.
ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΑΘ. ἆρʼ οὖν πρὸς Διὸς οἷον πηγήν τινα ἀνοήτου δόξης ἀνηυρήκαμεν ἀνθρώπων ὁπόσοι πώποτε τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἐφήψαντο ζητημάτων; σκόπει πάντα λόγον ἐξετάζων· οὐ γὰρ δὴ σμικρόν γε τὸ διαφέρον, εἰ φανεῖεν οἱ λόγων ἁπτόμενοι ἀσεβῶν, ἄλλοις τε ἐξάρχοντες, μηδὲ εὖ τοῖς λόγοις ἀλλʼ ἐξημαρτημένως χρώμενοι. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν.
ΚΛ. εὖ λέγεις· ἀλλʼ ὅπῃ, πειρῶ φράζειν.
ΑΘ. ἔοικεν τοίνυν ἀηθεστέρων ἁπτέον εἶναι λόγων.
ΚΛ. οὐκ ὀκνητέον, ὦ ξένε. μανθάνω γὰρ ὡς νομοθεσίας ἐκτὸς οἰήσῃ βαίνειν, ἐὰν τῶν τοιούτων ἁπτώμεθα λόγων. εἰ δὲ ἔστι μηδαμῇ ἑτέρως συμφωνῆσαι τοῖς νῦν κατὰ νόμον λεγομένοις θεοῖς ὡς ὀρθῶς ἔχουσιν ἢ ταύτῃ, λεκτέον, ὦ θαυμάσιε, καὶ ταύτῃ.
ΑΘ. λέγοιμʼ ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἤδη σχεδὸν οὐκ εἰωθότα λόγον τινὰ τόνδε. ὃ πρῶτον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς αἴτιον ἁπάντων, τοῦτο οὐ πρῶτον ἀλλὰ ὕστερον ἀπεφήναντο εἶναι γεγονὸς οἱ τὴν τῶν ἀσεβῶν ψυχὴν ἀπεργασάμενοι λόγοι, ὃ δὲ ὕστερον, πρότερον· ὅθεν ἡμαρτήκασι περὶ θεῶν τῆς ὄντως οὐσίας.
Clin. Well now, Stranger, if we had patience with ourselves when we discoursed at such length on the subjects of drinking and music, shall we not exercise patience in dealing with the gods and similar subjects? Moreover, such a discourse is of the greatest help for intelligent legislation, since legal ordinances when put in writing remain wholly unchanged, as though ready to submit to examination for all time, so that one need have no fear even if they are hard to listen to at first, seeing that even the veriest dullard can come back frequently to examine them, nor yet if they are lengthy, provided that they are beneficial. Consequently, in my opinion, it could not possibly be either reasonable or pious for any man to refrain from lending his aid to such arguments to the best of his power.
Meg. What Clinias says, Stranger, is, I think, most excellent.
Ath. Most certainly it is, Megillus; and we must do as he says. For if the assertions mentioned had not been sown broadcast well-nigh over the whole world of men, there would have been no need of counter-arguments to defend the existence of the gods; but as it is, they are necessary. For when the greatest laws are being destroyed by wicked men, who is more bound to come to their rescue than the lawgiver?
Meg. No one.
Ath. Come now, Clinias, do you also answer me again, for you too must take a hand in the argument: it appears that the person who makes these statements holds fire, water, earth and air to be the first of all things, and that it is precisely to these things that he gives the name of “nature,” while soul he asserts to be a later product therefrom. Probably, indeed, he does not merely “appear” to do this, but actually makes it clear to us in his account.
Clin. Certainly.
Ath. Can it be then, in Heaven’s name, that now we have discovered, as it were, a very fountain-head of irrational opinion in all the men who have ever yet handled physical investigations? Consider, and examine each statement. For it is a matter of no small importance if it can be shown that those who handle impious arguments, and lead others after them, employ their arguments not only ill, but erroneously. And this seems to me to be the state of affairs.
Clin. Well said; but try to explain wherein the error lies.
Ath. We shall probably have to handle rather an unusual argument.
Clin. We must not shrink, Stranger. You think, I perceive, that we shall be traversing alien ground, outside legislation, if we handle such arguments. But if there is no other way in which it is possible for us to speak in concert with the truth, as now legally declared, except this way, then in this way, my good sir, we must speak.
Ath. It appears, then, that I may at once proceed with an argument that is somewhat unusual; it is this. That which is the first cause of becoming and perishing in all things, this is declared by the arguments which have produced the soul of the impious to be not first, but generated later, and that which is the later to be the earlier; and because of this they have fallen into error regarding the real nature of divine existence.
ΚΛ. οὔπω μανθάνω.
ΑΘ. ψυχήν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἠγνοηκέναι κινδυνεύουσι μὲν ὀλίγου σύμπαντες οἷόν τε ὂν τυγχάνει καὶ δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει, τῶν τε ἄλλων αὐτῆς πέρι καὶ δὴ καὶ γενέσεως, ὡς ἐν πρώτοις ἐστί, σωμάτων ἔμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη, καὶ μεταβολῆς τε αὐτῶν καὶ μετακοσμήσεως ἁπάσης ἄρχει παντὸς μᾶλλον· εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ταῦτα οὕτως, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ ψυχῆς συγγενῆ πρότερα ἂν εἴη γεγονότα τῶν σώματι προσηκόντων, οὔσης γʼ αὐτῆς πρεσβυτέρας ἢ σώματος;
ΚΛ. ἀνάγκη.
ΑΘ. δόξα δὴ καὶ ἐπιμέλεια καὶ νοῦς καὶ τέχνη καὶ νόμος σκληρῶν καὶ μαλακῶν καὶ βαρέων καὶ κούφων πρότερα ἂν εἴη· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ μεγάλα καὶ πρῶτα ἔργα καὶ πράξεις τέχνης ἂν γίγνοιτο, ὄντα ἐν πρώτοις, τὰ δὲ φύσει καὶ φύσις, ἣν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐπονομάζουσιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὕστερα καὶ ἀρχόμενα ἂν ἐκ τέχνης εἴη καὶ νοῦ.
ΚΛ. πῶς οὐκ ὀρθῶς;
ΑΘ. φύσιν βούλονται λέγειν γένεσιν τὴν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα· εἰ δὲ φανήσεται ψυχὴ πρῶτον, οὐ πῦρ οὐδὲ ἀήρ, ψυχὴ δʼ ἐν πρώτοις γεγενημένη, σχεδὸν ὀρθότατα λέγοιτʼ ἂν εἶναι διαφερόντως φύσει. ταῦτʼ ἔσθʼ οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἂν ψυχήν τις ἐπιδείξῃ πρεσβυτέραν οὖσαν σώματος, ἄλλως δὲ οὐδαμῶς.
ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπʼ αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο στελλώμεθα;
ΚΛ. τί μήν;
ΑΘ. φυλάττωμεν δὴ παντάπασιν ἀπατηλὸν λόγον, μή πῃ πρεσβύτας ἡμᾶς ὄντας νεοπρεπὴς ὢν παραπείσῃ καὶ διαφυγὼν καταγελάστους ποιήσῃ, καὶ δόξωμεν μείζονα ἐπιβαλλόμενοι καὶ τῶν σμικρῶν ἀποτυχεῖν. σκοπεῖτε οὖν. εἰ καθάπερ ποταμὸν ἡμᾶς ἔδει τρεῖς ὄντας διαβαίνειν ῥέοντα σφόδρα, νεώτατος δʼ ἐγὼ τυγχάνων ἡμῶν καὶ πολλῶν ἔμπειρος ῥευμάτων, εἶπον ὅτι πρῶτον ἐμὲ χρῆναι πειραθῆναι κατʼ ἐμαυτόν, καταλιπόντα ὑμᾶς ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ, σκέψασθαι εἰ διαβατός ἐστι πρεσβυτέροις οὖσι καὶ ὑμῖν, ἢ πῶς ἔχει, καὶ φανέντος μὲν ταύτῃ, καλεῖν ὑμᾶς τότε καὶ συνδιαβιβάζειν ἐμπειρίᾳ, εἰ δὲ ἄβατος ἦν ὡς ὑμῖν, ἐν ἐμοὶ τὸν κίνδυνον γεγονέναι, μετρίως ἂν ἐδόκουν λέγειν, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ὁ μέλλων ἐστὶ λόγος σφοδρότερος καὶ σχεδὸν ἴσως ἄβατος ὡς τῇ σφῷν ῥώμῃ·
Clin. I do not yet understand.
Ath. As regards the soul, my comrade, nearly all men appear to be ignorant of its real nature and its potency, and ignorant not only of other facts about it, but of its origin especially,—how that it is one of the first existences, and prior to all bodies, and that it more than anything else is what governs all the changes and modifications of bodies. And if this is really the state of the case, must not things which are akin to soul be necessarily prior in origin to things which belong to body, seeing that soul is older than body?
Clin. Necessarily.
Ath. Then opinion and reflection and thought and art and law will be prior to things hard and soft and heavy and light; and further, the works and actions that are great and primary will be those of art, while those that are natural, and nature itself which they wrongly call by this name—will be secondary, and will derive their origin from art and reason.
Clin. How are they wrong?
Ath. By “nature” they intend to indicate production of things primary; but if soul shall be shown to have been produced first (not fire or air), but soul first and foremost,—it would most truly be described as a superlatively “natural” existence. Such is the state of the case, provided that one can prove that soul is older than body, but not otherwise.
Clin. Most true.
Ath. Shall we then, in the next place, address ourselves to the task of proving this?
Clin. Certainly.
Ath. Let us guard against a wholly deceitful argument, lest haply it seduce us who are old with its specious youthfulness, and then elude us and make us a laughing-stock, and so we get the reputation of missing even little things while aiming at big things. Consider then. Suppose that we three had to cross a river that was in violent flood, and that I, being the youngest of the party and having often had experience of currents, were to suggest that the proper course is for me to make an attempt first by myself—leaving you two in safety—to see whether it is possible for you older men also to cross, or how the matter stands, and then, if the river proved to be clearly fordable, I were to call you, and, by my experience, help you across, while if it proved impassable for such as you, in that case the risk should be wholly mine,—such a suggestion on my part would have sounded reasonable. So too in the present instance; the argument now in front of us is too violent, and probably impassable, for such strength as you possess;
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