ΑΘ. ὡς ἢ ἐνοῦσα ἐντὸς τῷ περιφερεῖ τούτῳ φαινομένῳ σώματι πάντῃ διακομίζει τὸ τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς ἡ παρʼ ἡμῖν ψυχὴ πάντῃ περιφέρει· ἤ ποθεν ἔξωθεν σῶμα αὑτῇ πορισαμένη πυρὸς ἤ τινος ἀέρος, ὡς λόγος ἐστί τινων, ὠθεῖ βίᾳ σώματι σῶμα· ἢ τρίτον αὐτὴ ψιλὴ σώματος οὖσα, ἔχουσα δὲ δυνάμεις ἄλλας τινὰς ὑπερβαλλούσας θαύματι, ποδηγεῖ.
ΚΛ. ναί, τοῦτο μὲν ἀνάγκη, τούτων ἕν γέ τι δρῶσαν ψυχὴν πάντα διάγειν.
ΑΘ. αὐτοῦ δὴ ἄμεινον ταύτην τὴν ψυχήν, εἴτε ἐν ἅρμασιν ἔχουσα ἡμῖν ἥλιον ἄγει φῶς τοῖς ἅπασιν, εἴτε ἔξωθεν, εἴθʼ ὅπως εἴθʼ ὅπῃ, θεὸν ἡγεῖσθαι χρεὼν πάντα ἄνδρα. ἢ πῶς;
ΚΛ. ναί, τόν γέ που μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἀφιγμένον ἀνοίας.
ΑΘ. ἄστρων δὴ πέρι πάντων καὶ σελήνης, ἐνιαυτῶν τε καὶ μηνῶν καὶ πασῶν ὡρῶν πέρι, τίνα ἄλλον λόγον ἐροῦμεν ἢ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον, ὡς ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μὲν ἢ ψυχαὶ πάντων τούτων αἴτιαι ἐφάνησαν, ἀγαθαὶ δὲ πᾶσαν ἀρετήν, θεοὺς αὐτὰς εἶναι φήσομεν, εἴτε ἐν σώμασιν ἐνοῦσαι, ζῷα ὄντα, κοσμοῦσιν πάντα οὐρανόν, εἴτε ὅπῃ τε καὶ ὅπως; ἔσθʼ ὅστις ταῦτα ὁμολογῶν ὑπομενεῖ μὴ θεῶν εἶναι πλήρη πάντα;
ΚΛ. οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως, ὦ ξένε, παραφρονῶν οὐδείς.
ΑΘ. τῷ μὲν τοίνυν μὴ νομίζοντι θεοὺς ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία, εἰπόντες ὅρους ἀπαλλαττώμεθα.
ΚΛ. τίνας;
ΑΘ. ἢ διδάσκειν ἡμᾶς ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγομεν τιθέμενοι ψυχὴν γένεσιν ἁπάντων εἶναι πρώτην, καὶ τἆλλα ὁπόσα τούτων συνεπόμενα εἴπομεν, ἢ μὴ δυνάμενον βέλτιον λέγειν ἡμῶν, ἡμῖν πείθεσθαι καὶ ζῆν θεοὺς ἡγούμενον εἰς τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον. ὁρῶμεν οὖν εἴτε ἱκανῶς ἤδη τοῖς οὐχ ἡγουμένοις θεοὺς εἰρήκαμεν ὡς εἰσὶν θεοί, εἴτε ἐπιδεῶς.
ΚΛ. ἥκιστά γε, ὦ ξένε, πάντων ἐπιδεῶς.
ΑΘ. τούτοις μὲν τοίνυν ἡμῖν τὸ λόγων τέλος ἐχέτω· τὸν δὲ ἡγούμενον μὲν θεοὺς εἶναι, μὴ φροντίζειν δὲ αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων, παραμυθητέον. ὦ ἄριστε δὴ φῶμεν, ὅτι μὲν ἡγῇ θεούς, συγγένειά τις ἴσως σε θεία πρὸς τὸ σύμφυτον ἄγει τιμᾶν καὶ νομίζειν εἶναι· κακῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀδίκων τύχαι ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἀληθείᾳ μὲν οὐκ εὐδαίμονες, δόξαις δὲ εὐδαιμονιζόμεναι σφόδρα ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐμμελῶς, ἄγουσί σε πρὸς ἀσέβειαν, ἔν τε μούσαις οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑμνούμεναι ἅμα καὶ ἐν παντοίοις λόγοις.
Ath. That either it exists everywhere inside of this apparent globular body and directs it, such as it is, just as the soul in us moves us about in all ways; or, having procured itself a body of fire or air (as some argue), it in the form of body pushes forcibly on the body from outside; or, thirdly, being itself void of body, but endowed with other surpassingly marvellous potencies, it conducts the body.
Clin. Yes, it must necessarily be the case that soul acts in one of these ways when it propels all things.
Ath. Here, I pray you, pause. This soul,—whether it is by riding in the car of the sun, or from outside, or otherwise, that it brings light to us all—every man is bound to regard as a god. Is not that so?
Clin. Yes; everyone at least who has not reached the uttermost verge of folly.
Ath. Concerning all the stars and the moon, and concerning the years and months and all seasons, what other account shall we give than this very same,—namely, that, inasmuch as it has been shown that they are all caused by one or more souls, which are good also with all goodness, we shall declare these souls to be gods, whether it be that they order the whole heaven by residing in bodies, as living creatures, or whatever the mode and method? Is there any man that agrees with this view who will stand hearing it denied that all things are full of gods?
Clin. There is not a man, Stranger, so wrong-headed as that.
Ath. Let us, then, lay down limiting conditions for the man who up till now disbelieves in gods, O Megillus and Clinias, and so be quit of him.
Clin. What conditions?
Ath. That either he must teach us that we are wrong in laying down that soul is of all things the first production, together with all the consequential statements we made,—or, if he is unable to improve on our account, he must believe us, and for the rest of his life live in veneration of the gods. Let us, then, consider whether our argument for the existence of the gods addressed to those who disbelieve in them has been stated adequately or defectively.
Clin. Anything rather than defectively, Stranger.
Ath. Then let our argument have an end, in so far as it is addressed to these men. But the man who holds that gods exist, but pay no regard to human affairs,—him we must admonish. “My good sir,” let us say, “the fact that you believe in gods is due probably to a divine kinship drawing you to what is of like nature, to honor it and recognize its existence; but the fortunes of evil and unjust men, both private and public,—which, though not really happy, are excessively and improperly lauded as happy by public opinion,—drive you to impiety by the wrong way in which they are celebrated, not only in poetry, but in tales of every kind. ”
ΑΘ. ἢ καὶ πρὸς τέλος ἴσως ἀνθρώπους ὁρῶν ἐλθόντας γηραιούς, παῖδας παίδων καταλιπόντας ἐν τιμαῖς ταῖς μεγίσταις, ταράττῃ τὸ νῦν ἐν ἅπασι τούτοις ἰδών, ἢ διʼ ἀκοῆς αἰσθόμενος ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν αὐτὸς αὐτόπτης, προστυχὴς πολλῶν ἀσεβημάτων καὶ δεινῶν γενομένων τισίν, διʼ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐκ σμικρῶν εἰς τυραννίδας τε καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀφικομένους· τότε διὰ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα δῆλος εἶ μέμφεσθαι μὲν θεοὺς ὡς αἰτίους ὄντας τῶν τοιούτων διὰ συγγένειαν οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλων, ἀγόμενος δὲ ὑπό τε ἀλογίας ἅμα καὶ οὐ δυνάμενος δυσχεραίνειν θεούς, εἰς τοῦτο νῦν τὸ πάθος ἐλήλυθας, ὥστʼ εἶναι μὲν δοκεῖν αὐτούς, τῶν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνων καταφρονεῖν καὶ ἀμελεῖν πραγμάτων. ἵνα οὖν μὴ ἐπὶ μεῖζον ἔλθῃ σοι πάθος πρὸς ἀσέβειαν τὸ νῦν παρὸν δόγμα, ἀλλʼ ἐάν πως οἷον ἀποδιοπομπήσασθαι λόγοις αὐτὸ προσιὸν γενώμεθα δυνατοί, πειρώμεθα, συνάψαντες τὸν ἑξῆς λόγον ᾧ πρὸς τὸν τὸ παράπαν οὐχ ἡγούμενον θεοὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς διεπερανάμεθα, τούτῳ τὰ νῦν προσχρήσασθαι. σὺ δʼ, ὦ Κλεινία τε καὶ Μέγιλλε, ὑπὲρ τοῦ νέου καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἀποκρινόμενοι διαδέχεσθε· ἂν δέ τι δύσκολον ἐμπίπτῃ τοῖς λόγοις, ἐγὼ σφῷν ὥσπερ νυνδὴ δεξάμενος διαβιβῶ τὸν ποταμόν.
ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις· καὶ σύ τε οὕτω ταῦτα δρᾶ, ποιήσομέν τε ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἃ λέγεις.
ΑΘ. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν τάχʼ ἂν ἴσως εἴη χαλεπὸν ἐνδείξασθαι τοῦτό γε, ὡς ἐπιμελεῖς σμικρῶν εἰσιν θεοὶ οὐχ ἧττον, μᾶλλον δέ, ἢ τῶν μεγέθει διαφερόντων. ἤκουε γάρ που καὶ παρῆν τοῖς νυνδὴ λεγομένοις, ὡς ἀγαθοί γε ὄντες πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν τὴν τῶν πάντων ἐπιμέλειαν οἰκειοτάτην αὑτῶν οὖσαν κέκτηνται.
ΚΛ. καὶ σφόδρα γε ἐπήκουεν.
ΑΘ. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τοίνυν κοινῇ συνεξεταζόντων τίνα λέγοντες ἀρετὴν αὐτῶν ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. φέρε, τὸ σωφρονεῖν νοῦν τε κεκτῆσθαί φαμεν ἀρετῆς, τὰ δʼ ἐναντία κακίας;
ΚΛ. φαμέν.
ΑΘ. τί δέ; ἀρετῆς μὲν ἀνδρείαν εἶναι, δειλίαν δὲ κακίας;
ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΑΘ. καὶ τὰ μὲν αἰσχρὰ τούτων, τὰ δὲ καλὰ φήσομεν;
ΚΛ. ἀνάγκη.
ΑΘ. καὶ τῶν μὲν προσήκειν ἡμῖν, εἴπερ, ὁπόσα φλαῦρα, θεοῖς δὲ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν τῶν τοιούτων μετὸν ἐροῦμεν;
ΚΛ. καὶ ταῦθʼ οὕτως ὁμολογοῖ πᾶς ἄν.
ΑΘ. τί δέ; ἀμέλειάν τε καὶ ἀργίαν καὶ τρυφὴν εἰς ἀρετὴν ψυχῆς θήσομεν, ἢ πῶς λέγεις;
ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς;
ΑΘ. ἀλλʼ εἰς τοὐναντίον;
ΚΛ. ναί.
Ath. “Or again, when you see men attaining the goal of old age, and leaving behind them children’s children in the highest offices, very likely you are disturbed, when amongst the number of these you discover—whether from hearsay or from your own personal observation—some who have been guilty of many dreadful impieties, and who, just because of these, have risen from a small position to royalty and the highest rank; then the consequence of all this clearly is that, since on the one hand you are unwilling to hold the gods responsible for such things because of your kinship to them, and since on the other hand you are driven by lack of logic and inability to repudiate the gods, you have come to your present morbid state of mind, in which you opine that the gods exist, but scorn and neglect human affairs. In order, therefore, that your present opinion may not grow to a greater height of morbid impiety, but that we may succeed in repelling the onset of its pollution (if haply we are able) by argument, let us endeavor to attach our next argument to that which we set forth in full to him who utterly disbelieves gods, and thereby to employ the latter as well.” And do you, Clinias and Megillus, take the part of the young man in answering, as you did before; and should anything untoward occur in the course of the argument, I will make answer for you, as I did just now, and convey you across the stream.
Clin. A good suggestion! We will do our best to carry it out; and do you do likewise.
Ath. Well, there will probably be no difficulty in proving to this man that the gods care for small things no less than for things superlatively great. For, of course, he was present at our recent argument, and heard that the gods, being good with all goodness, possess such care of the whole as is most proper to themselves.
Clin. Most certainly he heard that.
Ath. Let us join next in enquiring what is that goodness of theirs in respect of which we agree that they are good. Come now, do we say that prudence and the possession of reason are parts of goodness, and the opposites of these of badness?
Clin. We do say so.
Ath. And further, that courage is part of goodness, and cowardice of badness?
Clin. Certainly.
Ath. And shall we say that some of these are foul, others fair?
Clin. Necessarily.
Ath. And shall we say that all such as are mean belong to us, if to anyone, whereas the gods have no share in any such things, great or small?
Clin. To this, too, everyone would assent.
Ath. Well then, shall we reckon neglect, idleness and indolence as goodness of soul? Or how say you?
Clin. How could we?
Ath. As the opposite, then?
Clin. Yes.
ΑΘ. τἀναντία ἄρα τούτοις εἰς τοὐναντίον;
ΚΛ. τοὐναντίον.
ΑΘ. τί οὖν δή; τρυφῶν καὶ ἀμελὴς ἀργός τε, ὃν ὁ ποιητὴς κηφῆσι κοθούροισι μάλιστα εἴκελον ἔφασκεν εἶναι, γίγνοιτʼ ἂν [ὁ] τοιοῦτος πᾶς ἡμῖν;
ΚΛ. ὀρθότατά γε εἰπών.
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν τόν γε θεὸν οὐ ῥητέον ἔχειν ἦθος τοιοῦτον, ὅ γέ τοι αὐτὸς μισεῖ, τῷ τέ τι τοιοῦτον φθέγγεσθαι πειρωμένῳ οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον.
ΚΛ. οὐ μὲν δή· πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
ΑΘ. ὧι δὴ προσήκει μὲν πράττειν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι διαφερόντως τινός, ὁ δὲ τούτου γε νοῦς τῶν μὲν μεγάλων ἐπιμελεῖται, τῶν σμικρῶν δὲ ἀμελεῖ, κατὰ τίνα ἐπαινοῦντες τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον οὐκ ἂν παντάπασι πλημμελοῖμεν; σκοπῶμεν δὲ ὧδε. ἆρʼ οὐ κατὰ δύο εἴδη τὸ τοιοῦτον πράττει ὁ πράττων, εἴτε θεὸς εἴτʼ ἄνθρωπος;
ΚΛ. ποίω δὴ λέγομεν;
ΑΘ. ἢ διαφέρον οὐδὲν οἰόμενος εἶναι τῷ ὅλῳ ἀμελουμένων τῶν σμικρῶν, ἢ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ καὶ τρυφῇ, εἰ διαφέρει, ὁ δὲ ἀμελεῖ. ἢ ἔστιν ἄλλως πως γιγνομένη ἀμέλεια; οὐ γάρ που ὅταν γε ἀδύνατον ᾖ τῶν ἁπάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τότε ἀμέλεια ἔσται τῶν σμικρῶν ἢ μεγάλων, μὴ ἐπιμελουμένῳ ὧν ἂν δυνάμει θεὸς ἢ φαῦλός τις ὢν ἐλλιπὴς καὶ μὴ δυνατὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι γίγνηται.
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
ΑΘ. νῦν δὴ δύʼ ὄντες τρισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν ἀποκρινάσθωσαν οἱ θεοὺς μὲν ἀμφότεροι ὁμολογοῦντες εἶναι, παραιτητοὺς δὲ ἅτερος, ὁ δὲ ἀμελεῖς τῶν σμικρῶν. πρῶτον μὲν θεοὺς ἀμφότεροί φατε γιγνώσκειν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν πάντα, λαθεῖν δὲ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲν δυνατὸν εἶναι τῶν ὁπόσων εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι· ταύτῃ λέγετε ἔχειν ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς;
ΚΛ. οὕτως.
ΑΘ. τί δέ; δύνασθαι πάντα ὁπόσων αὖ δύναμίς ἐστιν θνητοῖς τε καὶ ἀθανάτοις;
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ συγχωρήσονται καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν;
ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν ἀγαθούς γε καὶ ἀρίστους ὡμολογήκαμεν αὐτοὺς εἶναι πέντε ὄντες.
ΚΛ. σφόδρα γε.
ΑΘ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ μὲν καὶ τρυφῇ ἀδύνατον αὐτοὺς ὁμολογεῖν πράττειν ὁτιοῦν τὸ παράπαν, ὄντας γε οἵους ὁμολογοῦμεν; δειλίας γὰρ ἔκγονος ἔν γε ἡμῖν ἀργία, ῥᾳθυμία δὲ ἀργίας καὶ τρυφῆς.
ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
ΑΘ. ἀργίᾳ μὲν δὴ καὶ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ οὐδεὶς ἀμελεῖ θεῶν· οὐ γὰρ μέτεστιν αὐτῷ που δειλίας.
ΚΛ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.
Ath. And the opposites of these as of the opposite quality of soul?
Clin. Of the opposite quality.
Ath. What then? He who is indolent, careless and idle will be in our eyes what the poet described—a man most like to sting-less drones?
Clin. A most true description.
Ath. That God has such a character we must certainly deny, seeing that he hates it; nor must we allow anyone to attempt to say so.
Clin. We could not possibly allow that.
Ath. When a person whose duty it is especially to act and care for some object has a mind that cares for great things, but neglects small things, on what principle could we praise such a person without the utmost impropriety? Let us consider the matter in this way: the action of him who acts thus, be he god or man, takes one of two forms, does it not?
Clin. What forms?
Ath. Either because he thinks that neglect of the small things makes no difference to the whole, or else, owing to laziness and indolence, he neglects them, though he thinks they do make a difference. Or is there any other way in which neglect occurs? For when it is impossible to care for all things, it will not in that case be neglect of great things or small when a person—be he god or common man—fails to care for things which he lacks the power and capacity to care for.
Clin. Of course not.
Ath. Now to us three let these two men make answer, of whom both agree that gods exist, but the one asserts that they can be bribed, and the other that they neglect the small. First, you both assert that the gods know and hear and see all things, and that nothing of all that is apprehended by senses or sciences can escape their notice; do you assert that this is so, or what?
Clin. That is what we assert.
Ath. And further, that they can do all that can be done by mortal or immortal?
Clin. They will, of course, admit that this also is the case.
Ath. And it is undeniable that all five of us agreed that the gods are good, yea, exceeding good.
Clin. Most certainly.
Ath. Being, then, such as we agree, is it not impossible to allow that they do anything at all in a lazy and indolent way? For certainly amongst us mortals idleness is the child of cowardice, and laziness of idleness and indolence.
Clin. Very true.
Ath. None, then, of the gods is neglectful owing to idleness and laziness, seeing that none has any part in cowardice.
Clin. You are very right.
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν τὸ λοιπόν, εἴπερ ἀμελοῦσι τῶν σμικρῶν καὶ ὀλίγων τῶν περὶ τὸ πᾶν, ἢ γιγνώσκοντες ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ, δρῷεν ἂν τοῦτο, ἢ τί τὸ λοιπὸν πλὴν τῷ γιγνώσκειν τοὐναντίον;
ΚΛ. οὐδέν.
ΑΘ. πότερον οὖν, ὦ ἄριστε καὶ βέλτιστε, θῶμέν σε λέγοντα ὡς ἀγνοοῦντάς τε καὶ δέον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι διʼ ἄγνοιαν ἀμελοῦντας, ἢ γιγνώσκοντας ὅτι δεῖ, καθάπερ οἱ φαυλότατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγονται ποιεῖν, εἰδότες ἄλλα εἶναι βελτίω πράττειν ὧν δὴ πράττουσιν, διά τινας ἥττας ἡδονῶν ἢ λυπῶν οὐ ποιεῖν;
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν δὴ τά γε ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα τῆς τε ἐμψύχου μετέχει φύσεως ἅμα, καὶ θεοσεβέστατον αὐτό ἐστι πάντων ζῴων ἄνθρωπος;
ΚΛ. ἔοικε γοῦν.
ΑΘ. θεῶν γε μὴν κτήματά φαμεν εἶναι πάντα ὁπόσα θνητὰ ζῷα, ὧνπερ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον.
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ΑΘ. ἤδη τοίνυν σμικρὰ ἢ μεγάλα τις φάτω ταῦτα εἶναι τοῖς θεοῖς· οὐδετέρως γὰρ τοῖς κεκτημένοις ἡμᾶς ἀμελεῖν ἂν εἴη προσῆκον, ἐπιμελεστάτοις γε οὖσι καὶ ἀρίστοις. σκοπῶμεν γὰρ δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις.
ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;
ΑΘ. τὸ περί τε αἰσθήσεως καὶ δυνάμεως, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐναντίως ἀλλήλοιν πρὸς ῥᾳστώνην καὶ χαλεπότητά ἐστον πεφυκότε;
ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;
ΑΘ. ὁρᾶν μέν που καὶ ἀκούειν τὰ σμικρὰ χαλεπώτερον ἢ τὰ μεγάλα, φέρειν δὲ αὖ καὶ κρατεῖν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν σμικρῶν καὶ ὀλίγων παντὶ ῥᾷον ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων.
ΚΛ. καὶ πολύ γε.
ΑΘ. ἰατρῷ δὲ προστεταγμένον ὅλον τι θεραπεύειν, βουλομένῳ καὶ δυναμένῳ τῶν μὲν μεγάλων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τῶν μορίων δὲ καὶ σμικρῶν ἀμελοῦντι, ἕξει ποτὲ καλῶς αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶν;
ΚΛ. οὐδαμῶς.
ΑΘ. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ κυβερνήταις οὐδὲ στρατηγοῖς οὐδʼ οἰκονόμοις, οὐδʼ αὖ τισὶν πολιτικοῖς οὐδʼ ἄλλῳ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενί, χωρὶς τῶν ὀλίγων καὶ σμικρῶν πολλὰ ἢ μεγάλα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ σμικρῶν τοὺς μεγάλους φασὶν λιθολόγοι λίθους εὖ κεῖσθαι.
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
Ath. Further, if they do neglect the small and scant things of the All, they will do so either because they know that there is no need at all to care for any such things or—well, what other alternative is there except the opposite of knowing?
Clin. There is none.
Ath. Shall we then assume, my worthy and excellent sir, that you assert that the gods are ignorant, and that it is through ignorance that they are neglectful when they ought to be showing care,—or that they know indeed what is needful, yet act as the worst of men are said to do, who, though they know that other things are better to do than what they are doing, yet do them not, owing to their being somehow defeated by pleasures or pains?
Clin. Impossible.
Ath. Do not human affairs share in animate nature, and is not man himself, too, the most god-fearing of all living creatures?
Clin. That is certainly probable.
Ath. We affirm that all mortal creatures are possessions of the gods, to whom belongs also the whole heaven.
Clin. Of course.
Ath. That being so, it matters not whether a man says that these things are small or great in the eyes of the gods; for in neither case would it behove those who are our owners to be neglectful, seeing that they are most careful and most good. For let us notice this further fact—
Clin. What is it?
Ath. In regard to perception and power,—are not these two naturally opposed in respect of ease and difficulty?
Clin. How do you mean?
Ath. It is more difficult to see and hear small things than great; but everyone finds it more easy to move, control and care for things small and few than their opposites.
Clin. Much more.
Ath. When a physician is charged with the curing of a whole body, if, while he is willing and able to care for the large parts, he neglects the small parts and members, will he ever find the whole in good condition?
Clin. Certainly not.
Ath. No more will pilots or generals or house-managers, nor yet statesmen or any other such persons, find that the many and great thrive apart from the few and small; for even masons say that big stones are not well laid without little stones.
Clin. They cannot be.
Cite This Text