ΑΘ. μὴ δὴ σκοτοδινίαν ἴλιγγόν τε ὑμῖν ἐμποιήσῃ παραφερόμενός τε καὶ ἐρωτῶν ἀήθεις ὄντας ἀποκρίσεων, εἶτʼ ἀσχημοσύνην ἀπρέπειάν τε ἐντέκῃ ἀηδῆ, δοκεῖ δή μοι χρῆναι ποιεῖν οὑτωσὶ τὰ νῦν ἐμέ, ἀνερωτᾶν πρῶτον ἐμαυτόν, ἀκουόντων ὑμῶν ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἀποκρίνασθαι πάλιν ἐμέ, καὶ τὸν λόγον ἅπαντα οὕτω διεξελθεῖν, μέχριπερ ἂν ψυχῆς πέρι διαπεράνηται καὶ δείξῃ πρότερον ὂν ψυχὴν σώματος.
ΚΛ. ἄριστʼ, ὦ ξένε, δοκεῖς ἡμῖν εἰρηκέναι, ποίει τε ὡς λέγεις.
ΑΘ. ἄγε δή, θεὸν εἴ ποτε παρακλητέον ἡμῖν, νῦν ἔστω τοῦτο οὕτω γενόμενον—ἐπί γε ἀπόδειξιν ὡς εἰσὶν τὴν αὑτῶν σπουδῇ πάσῃ παρακεκλήσθων—ἐχόμενοι δὲ ὥς τινος ἀσφαλοῦς πείσματος ἐπεισβαίνωμεν εἰς τὸν νῦν λόγον. καί μοι ἐλεγχομένῳ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτήσεσιν τοιαῖσδε ἀσφαλέστατα ἀποκρίνεσθαι φαίνεται κατὰ τάδε· ὦ ξένε, ὁπόταν φῇ τις, ἆρα ἕστηκε μὲν πάντα, κινεῖται δὲ οὐδέν; ἢ τούτῳ πᾶν τοὐναντίον; ἢ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν κινεῖται, τὰ δὲ μένει;— τὰ μὲν κινεῖταί που, φήσω, τὰ δὲ μένει.—μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἐν χώρᾳ τινὶ τά τε ἑστῶτα ἕστηκεν καὶ τὰ κινούμενα κινεῖται;—πῶς γὰρ οὔ;—καὶ τὰ μέν γε ἐν μιᾷ ἕδρᾳ που τοῦτο ἂν δρῴη, τὰ δὲ ἐν πλείοσιν.—τὰ τὴν τῶν ἑστώτων ἐν μέσῳ λαμβάνοντα δύναμιν λέγεις, φήσομεν, ἐν ἑνὶ κινεῖσθαι, καθάπερ ἡ τῶν ἑστάναι λεγομένων κύκλων στρέφεται περιφορά;—ναί. μανθάνομεν δέ γε ὡς ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ περιφορᾷ τὸν μέγιστον καὶ τὸν σμικρότατον κύκλον ἅμα περιάγουσα, ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις ἀνὰ λόγον ἑαυτὴν διανέμει σμικροῖς τε καὶ μείζοσιν, ἐλάττων τε οὖσα καὶ πλείων κατὰ λόγον· διὸ δὴ τῶν θαυμαστῶν ἁπάντων πηγὴ γέγονεν, ἅμα μεγάλοις καὶ σμικροῖς κύκλοις βραδυτῆτάς τε καὶ τάχη ὁμολογούμενα πορεύουσα, ἀδύνατον, ὡς ἄν τις ἐλπίσειε, γίγνεσθαι πάθος.—ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.—τὰ δέ γε κινούμενα ἐν πολλοῖς φαίνῃ μοι λέγειν ὅσα φορᾷ κινεῖται μεταβαίνοντα εἰς ἕτερον ἀεὶ τόπον, καὶ τοτὲ μὲν ἔστιν ὅτε βάσιν ἑνὸς κεκτημένα τινὸς κέντρου, τοτὲ δὲ πλείονα τῷ περικυλινδεῖσθαι. προστυγχάνοντα δʼ ἑκάστοτε ἑκάστοις, τοῖς ἑστῶσι μὲν διασχίζεται, τοῖς δʼ ἄλλοις ἐξ ἐναντίας ἀπαντῶσι καὶ φερομένοις εἰς ἓν γιγνόμενα μέσα τε καὶ μεταξὺ τῶν τοιούτων συγκρίνεται.—λέγω γὰρ οὖν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα, ὡς σὺ λέγεις.—
Ath. so, lest it make you faint and dizzy as it rushes past and poses you with questions you are unused to answering, and thus causes an unpleasing lack of shapeliness and seemliness, I think that I ought now to act in the way described—question myself first, while you remain listening in safety, and then return answer to myself, and in this way proceed through the whole argument until it has discussed in full the subject of soul, and demonstrated that soul is prior to body.
Clin. Your suggestion, Stranger, we think excellent; so do as you suggest.
Ath. Come then,—if ever we ought to invoke God’s aid, now is the time it ought to be done. Let the gods be invoked with all zeal to aid in the demonstration of their own existence. And let us hold fast, so to speak, to a safe cable as we embark on the present discussion. And it is safest, as it seems to me, to adopt the following method of reply when questions such as this are put on these subjects; for instance, when a man asks me—“Do all things stand still, Stranger, and nothing move? Or is the exact opposite the truth? Or do some things move and some remain at rest?” My answer will be, “Some things move, others remain at rest.” “Then do not the standing things stand, and the moving things move, in a certain place?” “Of course.” “And some will do this in one location, and others in several.” “You mean,” we will say, “that those which have the quality of being at rest at the center move in one location, as when the circumference of circles that are said to stand still revolves?” “Yes. And we perceive that motion of this kind, which simultaneously turns in this revolution both the largest circle and the smallest, distributes itself to small and great proportionally, altering in proportion its own quantity; whereby it functions as the source of all such marvels as result from its supplying great and small circles simultaneously with harmonizing rates of slow and fast speeds—a condition of things that one might suppose to be impossible.” “Quite true.” “And by things moving in several places you seem to me to mean all things that move by locomotion, continually passing from one spot to another, and sometimes resting on one axis and sometimes, by revolving, on several axes. And whenever one such object meets another, if the other is at rest, the moving object is split up; but if they collide with others moving to meet them from an opposite direction, they form a combination which is midway between the two.” “Yes, I affirm that these things are so, just as you describe.”
ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν καὶ συγκρινόμενα μὲν αὐξάνεται, διακρινόμενα δὲ φθίνει τότε, ὅταν ἡ καθεστηκυῖα ἑκάστων ἕξις διαμένῃ, μὴ μενούσης δὲ αὐτῆς, διʼ ἀμφότερα ἀπόλλυται. γίγνεται δὴ πάντων γένεσις, ἡνίκʼ ἂν τί πάθος ᾖ; δῆλον ὡς ὁπόταν ἀρχὴ λαβοῦσα αὔξην εἰς τὴν δευτέραν ἔλθῃ μετάβασιν καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης εἰς τὴν πλησίον, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ἐλθοῦσα αἴσθησιν σχῇ τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις. μεταβάλλον μὲν οὖν οὕτω καὶ μετακινούμενον γίγνεται πᾶν· ἔστιν δὲ ὄντως ὄν, ὁπόταν μένῃ, μεταβαλὸν δὲ εἰς ἄλλην ἕξιν διέφθαρται παντελῶς. ἆρʼ οὖν κινήσεις πάσας εἰρήκαμεν ὡς ἐν εἴδεσιν λαβεῖν μετʼ ἀριθμοῦ, πλήν γε, ὦ φίλοι, δυοῖν;
ΚΛ. ποίαιν δή;
ΑΘ. σχεδόν, ὠγαθέ, ἐκείναιν ὧν ἕνεκα πᾶσα ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἡ σκέψις τὰ νῦν.
ΚΛ. λέγε σαφέστερον.
ΑΘ. ψυχῆς ἦν ἕνεκά που;
ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΑΘ. ἔστω τοίνυν ἡ μὲν ἕτερα δυναμένη κινεῖν κίνησις, ἑαυτὴν δὲ ἀδυνατοῦσα, ἀεὶ μία τις, ἡ δὲ αὑτήν τʼ ἀεὶ καὶ ἕτερα δυναμένη κατά τε συγκρίσεις ἔν τε διακρίσεσιν αὔξαις τε καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ καὶ γενέσεσι καὶ φθοραῖς ἄλλη μία τις αὖ τῶν πασῶν κινήσεων.
ΚΛ. ἔστω γὰρ οὖν.
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν ἕτερον ἀεὶ κινοῦσαν καὶ μεταβαλλομένην ὑφʼ ἑτέρου θήσομεν ἐνάτην αὖ, τήν τε ἑαυτὴν κινοῦσαν καὶ ἕτερον, ἐναρμόττουσαν πᾶσιν μὲν ποιήμασι, πᾶσιν δὲ παθήμασι, καλουμένην δὲ ὄντως τῶν ὄντων πάντων μεταβολὴν καὶ κίνησιν, ταύτην δὲ δεκάτην σχεδὸν ἐροῦμεν.
ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
ΑΘ. τῶν δὴ δέκα μάλιστα ἡμῖν κινήσεων τίνʼ ἂν προκρίναιμεν ὀρθότατα πασῶν ἐρρωμενεστάτην τε εἶναι καὶ πρακτικὴν διαφερόντως;
ΚΛ. μυρίῳ ἀνάγκη που φάναι διαφέρειν τὴν αὐτὴν αὑτὴν δυναμένην κινεῖν, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας πάσας ὑστέρας.
ΑΘ. εὖ λέγεις. ἆρʼ οὖν ἡμῖν τῶν νῦν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ῥηθέντων μεταθετέον ἓν ἢ καὶ δύο;
ΚΛ. ποῖα φῄς;
ΑΘ. τὸ τῆς δεκάτης ῥηθὲν σχεδὸν οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται.
ΚΛ. πῇ;
ΑΘ. πρῶτον γενέσει τέ ἐστιν καὶ ῥώμῃ κατὰ λόγον· τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔχομεν τούτου δεύτερον, ἄρτι ῥηθὲν ἀτόπως ἔνατον.
ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;
ΑΘ. ὧδε. ὅταν ἕτερον ἄλλο ἡμῖν μεταβάλῃ καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλο ἕτερον ἀεί, τῶν τοιούτων ἆρα ἔσται ποτέ τι πρῶτον μεταβάλλον; καὶ πῶς, ὅταν ὑπʼ ἄλλου κινῆται, τοῦτʼ ἔσται ποτὲ τῶν ἀλλοιούντων πρῶτον; ἀδύνατον γάρ.
Ath. “Further, things increase when combined and decrease when separated in all cases where the regular constitution of each persists; but if this does not remain, then both these conditions cause them to perish. And what is the condition which must occur in everything to bring about generation? Obviously whenever a starting-principle receiving increase comes to the second change, and from this to the next, and on coming to the third admits of perception by percipients. Everything comes into being by this process of change and alteration; and a thing is really existent whenever it remains fixed, but when it changes into another constitution it is utterly destroyed.” Have we now, my friends, mentioned all the forms of motion, capable of numerical classification, save only two?
Clin. What two?
Ath. Those, my good sir, for the sake of which, one may say, the whole of our present enquiry was undertaken.
Clin. Explain more clearly.
Ath. It was undertaken, was it not, for the sake of soul?
Clin. Certainly.
Ath. As one of the two let us count that motion which is always able to move other things, but unable to move itself; and that motion which always is able to move both itself and other things,—by way of combination and separation, of increase and decrease, of generation and corruption,—let us count as another separate unit in the total number of motions.
Clin. Be it so.
Ath. Thus we shall reckon as ninth on the list that motion which always moves another object and is moved by another; while that motion which moves both itself and another, and which is harmoniously adapted to all forms of action and passion, and is termed the real change and motion of all that really exists,—it, I presume, we shall call the tenth.
Clin. Most certainly.
Ath. Of our total of ten motions, which shall we most correctly adjudge to be the most powerful of all and excelling in effectiveness?
Clin. We are bound to affirm that the motion which is able to move itself excels infinitely, and that all the rest come after it.
Ath. Well said. Must we, then, alter one or two of the wrong statements we have now made?
Clin. Which do you mean?
Ath. Our statement about the tenth seems wrong.
Clin. How?
Ath. Logically it is first in point of origin and power; and the next one is second to it, although we absurdly called it ninth a moment ago.
Clin. What do you mean?
Ath. This: when we find one thing changing another, and this in turn another, and so on,—of these things shall we ever find one that is the prime cause of change? How will a thing that is moved by another ever be itself the first of the things that cause change? It is impossible.
ΑΘ. ἀλλʼ ὅταν ἄρα αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινῆσαν ἕτερον ἀλλοιώσῃ, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον ἄλλο, καὶ οὕτω δὴ χίλια ἐπὶ μυρίοις γίγνηται τὰ κινηθέντα, μῶν ἀρχή τις αὐτῶν ἔσται τῆς κινήσεως ἁπάσης ἄλλη πλὴν ἡ τῆς αὐτῆς αὑτὴν κινησάσης μεταβολή;
ΚΛ. κάλλιστα εἶπες, συγχωρητέα τε τούτοις.
ΑΘ. ἔτι δὴ καὶ τῇδε εἴπωμεν, καὶ ἀποκρινώμεθα πάλιν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖσιν. εἰ σταίη πως τὰ πάντα ὁμοῦ γενόμενα, καθάπερ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τοιούτων τολμῶσι λέγειν, τίνʼ ἄρα ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκη πρώτην κίνησιν γενέσθαι τῶν εἰρημένων; τὴν αὐτὴν ἑαυτὴν δήπου κινοῦσαν· ὑπʼ ἄλλου γὰρ οὐ μήποτε ἔμπροσθεν μεταπέσῃ, μηδεμιᾶς γε ἐν αὐτοῖς οὔσης ἔμπροσθεν μεταπτώσεως. ἀρχὴν ἄρα κινήσεων πασῶν καὶ πρώτην ἔν τε ἑστῶσιν γενομένην καὶ ἐν κινουμένοις οὖσαν τὴν αὑτὴν κινοῦσαν φήσομεν ἀναγκαίως εἶναι πρεσβυτάτην καὶ κρατίστην μεταβολὴν πασῶν, τὴν δὲ ἀλλοιουμένην ὑφʼ ἑτέρου, κινοῦσαν δὲ ἕτερα δευτέραν.
ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
ΑΘ. ὁπότε δὴ τοίνυν ἐνταῦθά ἐσμεν τοῦ λόγου, τόδε ἀποκρινώμεθα.
ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;
ΑΘ. ἐὰν ἴδωμέν που ταύτην γενομένην ἐν τῷ γηίνῳ ἢ ἐνύδρῳ ἢ πυροειδεῖ, κεχωρισμένῳ ἢ καὶ συμμιγεῖ, τί ποτε φήσομεν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθος εἶναι;
ΚΛ. μῶν ἄρα με ἐρωτᾷς εἰ ζῆν αὐτὸ προσεροῦμεν, ὅταν αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινῇ;
ΑΘ. ναί.
ΚΛ. Ζῆν· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ΑΘ. τί δέ; ὁπόταν ψυχὴν ἔν τισιν ὁρῶμεν, μῶν ἄλλο ἢ ταὐτὸν τούτῳ; ζῆν ὁμολογητέον;
ΚΛ. οὐκ ἄλλο.
ΑΘ. ἔχε δὴ πρὸς Διός· ἆρʼ οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις περὶ ἕκαστον τρία νοεῖν;
ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;
ΑΘ. ἓν μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἓν δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον, ἓν δὲ ὄνομα· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐρωτήσεις εἶναι περὶ τὸ ὂν ἅπαν δύο.
ΚΛ. πῶς δύο;
ΑΘ. τοτὲ μὲν ἡμῶν ἕκαστον τοὔνομα προτεινόμενον αὐτὸ τὸν λόγον ἀπαιτεῖν, τοτὲ δὲ τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν προτεινόμενον ἐρωτᾶν αὖ τοὔνομα. ἆρά γε τὸ τοιόνδε αὖ βουλόμεθα νῦν λέγειν;
ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;
ΑΘ. ἔστιν που δίχα διαιρούμενον ἐν ἄλλοις τε καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ· τούτῳ δὴ τῷ κατʼ ἀριθμὸν ὄνομα μὲν ἄρτιον, λόγος δέ, ἀριθμὸς διαιρούμενος εἰς ἴσα δύο μέρη.
ΚΛ. ναί.
ΑΘ. τὸ τοιοῦτον φράζω. μῶν οὖν οὐ ταὐτὸν ἑκατέρως προσαγορεύομεν, ἄντε τὸν λόγον ἐρωτώμενοι τοὔνομα ἀποδιδῶμεν, ἄντε τοὔνομα τὸν λόγον, ἄρτιον ὀνόματι, καὶ λόγῳ δίχα διαιρούμενον ἀριθμόν, προσαγορεύοντες ταὐτὸν ὄν;
ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Ath. But when a thing that has moved itself changes another thing, and that other a third, and the motion thus spreads progressively through thousands upon thousands of things, will the primary source of all their motions be anything else than the movement of that which has moved itself?
Clin. Excellently put, and we must assent to your argument.
Ath. Further, let us question and answer ourselves thus:—Supposing that the Whole of things were to unite and stand still,—as most of these thinkers venture to maintain,—which of the motions mentioned would necessarily arise in it first? That motion, of course, which is self-moving; for it will never be shifted beforehand by another thing, since no shifting force exists in things beforehand. Therefore we shall assert that inasmuch as the self-moving motion is the starting-point of all motions and the first to arise in things at rest and to exist in things in motion, it is of necessity the most ancient and potent change of all, while the motion which is altered by another thing and itself moves others comes second.
Clin. Most true.
Ath. Now that we have come to this point in our discourse, here is a question we may answer.
Clin. What is it?
Ath. If we should see that this motion had arisen in a thing of earth or water or fire, whether separate or in combination, what condition should we say exists in such a thing?
Clin. What you ask me is, whether we are to speak of a thing as “alive” when it moves itself?
Ath. Yes.
Clin. It is alive, to be sure.
Ath. Well then, when we see soul in things, must we not equally agree that they are alive?
Clin. We must.
Ath. Now stop a moment, in Heaven’s name! Would you not desire to observe three points about every object?
Clin. What do you mean?
Ath. One point is the substance, one the definition of the substance, and one the name; and, moreover, about everything that exists there are two questions to be asked.
Clin. How two?
Ath. At one time each of us, propounding the name by itself, demands the definition; at another, propounding the definition by itself, he demands the name.
Clin. Is it something of this kind we mean now to convey?
Ath. Of what kind?
Clin. We have instances of a thing divisible into two halves, both in arithmetic and elsewhere; in arithmetic the name of this is “the even,” and the definition is “a number divisible into two equal parts.”
Ath. Yes, that is what I mean. So in either case it is the same object, is it not, which we describe, whether, when asked for the definition, we reply by giving the name, or, when asked for the name, we give the definition,—describing one and the same object by the name “even,” and by the definition “a number divisible into two halves”?
Clin. Most certainly.
ΑΘ. ὧι δὴ ψυχὴ τοὔνομα, τίς τούτου λόγος; ἔχομεν ἄλλον πλὴν τὸν νυνδὴ ῥηθέντα, τὴν δυναμένην αὐτὴν αὑτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν;
ΚΛ. τὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν φῂς λόγον ἔχειν τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν, ἥνπερ τοὔνομα ὃ δὴ πάντες ψυχὴν προσαγορεύομεν;
ΑΘ. φημί γε· εἰ δʼ ἔστι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον, ἆρα ἔτι ποθοῦμεν μὴ ἱκανῶς δεδεῖχθαι ψυχὴν ταὐτὸν ὂν καὶ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν καὶ κίνησιν τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ γεγονότων καὶ ἐσομένων καὶ πάντων αὖ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις, ἐπειδή γε ἀνεφάνη μεταβολῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως ἁπάσης αἰτία ἅπασιν;
ΚΛ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ ἱκανώτατα δέδεικται ψυχὴ τῶν πάντων πρεσβυτάτη, γενομένη γε ἀρχὴ κινήσεως.
ΑΘ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐχ ἡ διʼ ἕτερον ἐν ἄλλῳ γιγνομένη κίνησις, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐν αὑτῷ μηδέποτε παρέχουσα κινεῖσθαι μηδέν, δευτέρα τε, καὶ ὁπόσων ἀριθμῶν βούλοιτο ἄν τις ἀριθμεῖν αὐτὴν πολλοστήν, τοσούτων, σώματος οὖσα ὄντως ἀψύχου μεταβολή;
ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς.
ΑΘ. ὀρθῶς ἄρα καὶ κυρίως ἀληθέστατά τε καὶ τελεώτατα εἰρηκότες ἂν εἶμεν ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώματος ἡμῖν, σῶμα δὲ δεύτερόν τε καὶ ὕστερον, ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης, ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν.
ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν.
ΑΘ. μεμνήμεθά γε μὴν ὁμολογήσαντες ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὡς, εἰ ψυχὴ φανείη πρεσβυτέρα σώματος οὖσα, καὶ τὰ ψυχῆς τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔσοιτο πρεσβύτερα.
ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΑΘ. τρόποι δὲ καὶ ἤθη καὶ βουλήσεις καὶ λογισμοὶ καὶ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς ἐπιμέλειαί τε καὶ μνῆμαι πρότερα μήκους σωμάτων καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους καὶ ῥώμης εἴη γεγονότα ἄν, εἴπερ καὶ ψυχὴ σώματος.
ΚΛ. ἀνάγκη.
ΑΘ. ἆρʼ οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν εἶναι ψυχὴν καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων, εἴπερ τῶν πάντων γε αὐτὴν θήσομεν αἰτίαν;
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ΑΘ. ψυχὴν δὴ διοικοῦσαν καὶ ἐνοικοῦσαν ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς πάντῃ κινουμένοις μῶν οὐ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνάγκη διοικεῖν φάναι;
ΚΛ. τί μήν;
ΑΘ. μίαν ἢ πλείους; πλείους· ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σφῷν ἀποκρινοῦμαι. δυοῖν μέν γέ που ἔλαττον μηδὲν τιθῶμεν, τῆς τε εὐεργέτιδος καὶ τῆς τἀναντία δυναμένης ἐξεργάζεσθαι.
ΚΛ. σφόδρα ὀρθῶς εἴρηκας.
Ath. What is the definition of that object which has for its name “soul”? Can we give it any other definition than that stated just now—“the motion able to move itself”?
Clin. Do you assert that “self-movement” is the definition of that very same substance which has “soul” as the name we universally apply to it?
Ath. That is what I assert. And if this be really so, do we still complain that it has not been sufficiently proved that soul is identical with the prime origin and motion of what is, has been, and shall be, and of all that is opposite to these, seeing that it has been plainly shown to be the cause of all change and motion in all things?
Clin. We make no such complaint; on the contrary, it has been proved most sufficiently that soul is of all things the oldest, since it is the first principle of motion.
Ath. Then is not that motion which, when it arises in one object, is caused by another, and which never supplies self-motion to anything, second in order—or indeed as far down the list as one cares to put it,—it being the change of a really soulless body?
Clin. True.
Ath. Truly and finally, then, it would be a most veracious and complete statement to say that we find soul to be prior to body, and body secondary and posterior, soul governing and body being governed according to the ordinance of nature.
Clin. Yes, most veracious.
Ath. We recollect, of course, that we previously agreed that if soul could be shown to be older than body, then the things of soul also will be older than those of body.
Clin. Certainly we do.
Ath. Moods and dispositions and wishes and calculations and true opinions and considerations and memories will be prior to bodily length, breadth, depth and strength, if soul is prior to body.
Clin. Necessarily.
Ath. Must we then necessarily agree, in the next place, that soul is the cause of things good and bad, fair and foul, just and unjust, and all the opposites, if we are to assume it to be the cause of all things?
Clin. Of course we must.
Ath. And as soul thus controls and indwells in all things everywhere that are moved, must we not necessarily affirm that it controls Heaven also?
Clin. Yes.
Ath. One soul, is it, or several? I will answer for you—“several.” Anyhow, let us assume not less than two—the beneficent soul and that which is capable of effecting results of the opposite kind.
Clin. You are perfectly right.
ΑΘ. εἶεν. ἄγει μὲν δὴ ψυχὴ πάντα τὰ κατʼ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλατταν ταῖς αὑτῆς κινήσεσιν, αἷς ὀνόματά ἐστιν βούλεσθαι, σκοπεῖσθαι, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, βουλεύεσθαι, δοξάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐψευσμένως, χαίρουσαν λυπουμένην, θαρροῦσαν φοβουμένην, μισοῦσαν στέργουσαν, καὶ πάσαις ὅσαι τούτων συγγενεῖς ἢ πρωτουργοὶ κινήσεις τὰς δευτερουργοὺς αὖ παραλαμβάνουσαι κινήσεις σωμάτων ἄγουσι πάντα εἰς αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν καὶ διάκρισιν καὶ σύγκρισιν καὶ τούτοις ἑπομένας θερμότητας ψύξεις, βαρύτητας κουφότητας, σκληρὸν καὶ μαλακόν, λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν, αὐστηρὸν καὶ γλυκύ, καὶ πᾶσιν οἷς ψυχὴ χρωμένη, νοῦν μὲν προσλαβοῦσα ἀεὶ θεὸν ὀρθῶς θεοῖς, ὀρθὰ καὶ εὐδαίμονα παιδαγωγεῖ πάντα, ἀνοίᾳ δὲ συγγενομένη πάντα αὖ τἀναντία τούτοις ἀπεργάζεται. τιθῶμεν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν, ἢ ἔτι διστάζομεν εἰ ἑτέρως πως ἔχει;
ΚΛ. οὐδαμῶς.
ΑΘ. πότερον οὖν δὴ ψυχῆς γένος ἐγκρατὲς οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ πάσης τῆς περιόδου γεγονέναι φῶμεν; τὸ φρόνιμον καὶ ἀρετῆς πλῆρες, ἢ τὸ μηδέτερα κεκτημένον; βούλεσθε οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα ὧδε ἀποκρινώμεθα;
ΚΛ. πῶς;
ΑΘ. εἰ μέν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, φῶμεν, ἡ σύμπασα οὐρανοῦ ὁδὸς ἅμα καὶ φορὰ καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντων ἁπάντων νοῦ κινήσει καὶ περιφορᾷ καὶ λογισμοῖς ὁμοίαν φύσιν ἔχει καὶ συγγενῶς ἔρχεται, δῆλον ὡς τὴν ἀρίστην ψυχὴν φατέον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ κόσμου παντὸς καὶ ἄγειν αὐτὸν τὴν τοιαύτην ὁδὸν ἐκείνην.
ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς.
ΑΘ. εἰ δὲ μανικῶς τε καὶ ἀτάκτως ἔρχεται, τὴν κακήν.
ΚΛ. καὶ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς.
ΑΘ. τίνα οὖν δὴ νοῦ κίνησις φύσιν ἔχει; τοῦτο ἤδη χαλεπόν, ὦ φίλοι, ἐρώτημα ἀποκρινόμενον εἰπεῖν ἐμφρόνως· διὸ δὴ καὶ ἐμὲ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ὑμῖν δίκαιον τὰ νῦν προσλαμβάνειν.
ΚΛ. εὖ λέγεις.
ΑΘ. μὴ τοίνυν ἐξ ἐναντίας οἷον εἰς ἥλιον ἀποβλέποντες, νύκτα ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ ἐπαγόμενοι, ποιησώμεθα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὡς νοῦν ποτε θνητοῖς ὄμμασιν ὀψόμενοί τε καὶ γνωσόμενοι ἱκανῶς· πρὸς δὲ εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐρωτωμένου βλέποντας ἀσφαλέστερον ὁρᾶν.
ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;
ΑΘ. ἧι προσέοικεν κινήσει νοῦς τῶν δέκα ἐκείνων κινήσεων, τὴν εἰκόνα λάβωμεν· ἣν συναναμνησθεὶς ὑμῖν ἐγὼ κοινῇ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ποιήσομαι.
ΚΛ. κάλλιστα ἂν λέγοις.
ΑΘ. μεμνήμεθα τοίνυν τῶν τότε ἔτι τοῦτό γε, ὅτι τῶν πάντων τὰ μὲν κινεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ μένειν ἔθεμεν;
ΚΛ. ναί.
Ath. Very well, then. Soul drives all things in Heaven and earth and sea by its own motions, of which the names are wish, reflection, forethought, counsel, opinion true and false, joy, grief, confidence, fear, hate, love, and all the motions that are akin to these or are prime-working motions; these, when they take over the secondary motions of bodies, drive them all to increase and decrease and separation and combination, and, supervening on these, to heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hardness and softness, whiteness and blackness, bitterness and sweetness, and all those qualities which soul employs, both when it governs all things rightly and happily as a true goddess, in conjunction with reason, and when, in converse with unreason, it produces results which are in all respects the opposite. Shall we postulate that this is so, or do we still suspect that it may possibly be otherwise?
Clin. By no means.
Ath. Which kind of soul, then, shall we say is in control of Heaven and earth and the whole circle? That which is wise and full of goodness, or that which has neither quality? To this shall we make reply as follows?
Clin. How?
Ath. If, my good sir, we are to assert that the whole course and motion of Heaven and of all it contains have a motion like to the motion and revolution and reckonings of reason, and proceed in a kindred manner, then clearly we must assert that the best soul regulates the whole cosmos and drives it on its course, which is of the kind described.
Clin. You are right.
Ath. But the bad soul, if it proceeds in a mad and disorderly way.
Clin. That also is right.
Ath. Then what is the nature of the motion of reason? Here, my friends, we come to a question that is difficult to answer wisely; consequently, it is fitting that you should now call me in to assist you with the answer.
Clin. Very good.
Ath. In making our answer let us not bring on night, as it were, at midday, by looking right in the eye of the sun, as though with mortal eyes we could ever behold reason and know it fully; the safer way to behold the object with which our question is concerned is by looking at an image of it.
Clin. How do you mean?
Ath. Let us take as an image that one of the ten motions which reason resembles; reminding ourselves of which I, along with you, will make answer.
Clin. You will probably speak admirably.
Ath. Do we still recollect thus much about the things then described, that we assumed that, of the total, some were in motion, others at rest?
Clin. Yes.
ΑΘ. τῶν δʼ αὖ κινουμένων τὰ μὲν ἐν ἑνὶ τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι, τὰ δʼ ἐν πλείοσιν φερόμενα.
ΚΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
ΑΘ. τούτοιν δὴ τοῖν κινησέοιν τὴν ἐν ἑνὶ φερομένην ἀεὶ περί γέ τι μέσον ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι, τῶν ἐντόρνων οὖσαν μίμημά τι κύκλων, εἶναί τε αὐτὴν τῇ τοῦ νοῦ περιόδῳ πάντως ὡς δυνατὸν οἰκειοτάτην τε καὶ ὁμοίαν.
ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;
ΑΘ. τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ δήπου καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἕνα λόγον καὶ τάξιν μίαν ἄμφω κινεῖσθαι λέγοντες, νοῦν τήν τε ἐν ἑνὶ φερομένην κίνησιν, σφαίρας ἐντόρνου ἀπεικασμένα φοραῖς, οὐκ ἄν ποτε φανεῖμεν φαῦλοι δημιουργοὶ λόγῳ καλῶν εἰκόνων.
ΚΛ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν αὖ ἥ γε μηδέποτε ὡσαύτως μηδὲ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ μηδὲ ἐν ταὐτῷ μηδὲ περὶ ταὐτὰ μηδὲ πρὸς ταὐτὰ μηδʼ ἐν ἑνὶ φερομένη μηδʼ ἐν κόσμῳ μηδʼ ἐν τάξει μηδὲ ἔν τινι λόγῳ κίνησις ἀνοίας ἂν ἁπάσης εἴη συγγενής;
ΚΛ. εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἀληθέστατα.
ΑΘ. νῦν δὴ χαλεπὸν οὐδὲν ἔτι διαρρήδην εἰπεῖν ὡς, ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μέν ἐστιν ἡ περιάγουσα ἡμῖν πάντα, τὴν δὲ οὐρανοῦ περιφορὰν ἐξ ἀνάγκης περιάγειν φατέον ἐπιμελουμένην καὶ κοσμοῦσαν ἤτοι τὴν ἀρίστην ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν ἐναντίαν.
ΚΛ. ὦ ξένε, ἀλλὰ ἔκ γε τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων οὐδʼ ὅσιον ἄλλως λέγειν ἢ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν μίαν ἢ πλείους περιάγειν αὐτά.
ΑΘ. κάλλιστα, ὦ Κλεινία, ὑπήκουσας τοῖς λόγοις· τόδε δὲ προσυπάκουσον ἔτι.
ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;
ΑΘ. Ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα, εἴπερ ψυχὴ περιάγει πάντα, ἆρʼ οὐ καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον;
ΚΛ. τί μήν;
ΑΘ. περὶ ἑνὸς δὴ ποιησώμεθα λόγους, οἳ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα ἡμῖν ἄστρα ἁρμόττοντες φανοῦνται.
ΚΛ. τίνος;
ΑΘ. Ἡλίου πᾶς ἄνθρωπος σῶμα μὲν ὁρᾷ, ψυχὴν δὲ οὐδείς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλου σώματος οὐδενὸς οὔτε ζῶντος οὔτε ἀποθνῄσκοντος τῶν ζῴων, ἀλλὰ ἐλπὶς πολλὴ τὸ παράπαν τὸ γένος ἡμῖν τοῦτο ἀναίσθητον πάσαις ταῖς τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεσι περιπεφυκέναι, νοητὸν δʼ εἶναι. νῷ μόνῳ δὴ καὶ διανοήματι λάβωμεν αὐτοῦ πέρι τὸ τοιόνδε.
ΚΛ. ποῖον;
ΑΘ. Ἥλιον εἴπερ ἄγει ψυχή, τριῶν αὐτὴν ἓν λέγοντες δρᾶν σχεδὸν οὐκ ἀποτευξόμεθα.
ΚΛ. τίνων;
Ath. And further, that, of those in motion, some move in one place, others move in several places?
Clin. That is so.
Ath. And that, of these two motions, the motion which moves in one place must necessarily move always round some center, being a copy of the turned wheels; and that this has the nearest possible kinship and similarity to the revolution of reason?
Clin. How do you mean?
Ath. If we described them both as moving regularly and uniformly in the same spot, round the same things and in relation to the same things, according to one rule and system—reason, namely, and the motion that spins in one place (likened to the spinning of a turned globe),—we should never be in danger of being deemed unskillful in the construction of fair images by speech.
Clin. Most true.
Ath. On the other hand, will not the motion that is never uniform or regular or in the same place or around or in relation to the same things, not moving in one spot nor in any order or system or rule—will not this motion be akin to absolute unreason?
Clin. It will, in very truth.
Ath. So now there is no longer any difficulty in stating expressly that, inasmuch as soul is what we find driving everything round, we must affirm that this circumference of Heaven is of necessity driven round under the care and ordering of either the best soul or its opposite.
Clin. But, Stranger, judging by what has now been said, it is actually impious to make any other assertion than that these things are driven round by one or more souls endowed with all goodness.
Ath. You have attended to our argument admirably, Clinias. Now attend to this further point.
Clin. What is that?
Ath. If soul drives round the sum total of sun, moon and all other stars, does it not also drive each single one of them?
Clin. Certainly.
Ath. Then let us construct an argument about one of these stars which will evidently apply equally to them all.
Clin. About which one?
Ath. The sun’s body is seen by everyone, its soul by no one. And the same is true of the soul of any other body, whether alive or dead, of living beings. There is, however, a strong suspicion that this class of object, which is wholly imperceptible to sense, has grown round all the senses of the body, and is an object of reason alone. Therefore by reason and rational thought let us grasp this fact about it,—
Clin. What fact?
Ath. If soul drives round the sun, we shall be tolerably sure to be right in saying that it does one of three things.
Clin. What things?
Cite This Text