Plato · Laws Νόμοι

Plato, Laws 709a–712e: Book IV: Chance, the lawgiver and the young tyrant

The Athenian says that no man ever makes laws, since chances and accidents of every kind make them: war overturns constitutions, poverty, disease and bad seasons force changes, and the lawgiver can do no more than add skill to fortune, as the pilot to the weather. He imagines the lawgiver asking for a city under a tyrant, young, with a good memory, quick intelligence, courage and nobility, and with temperance as his companion, and a famous lawgiver at his side, and says that this is the quickest and easiest condition for change. He says that the change takes place when nature supplies a true lawgiver, and when his policy is shared by the most powerful persons in the state, and that wherever the greatest power coincides in a man with wisdom and temperance, there the germ of the best polity is planted. He asks them to regard this as a myth oracularly uttered, and that the rise of a well-governed city is difficult but not impossible.

Sections 709a–712e · 1823 words · click a number to copy its link

ΑΘ. ἔμελλον λέγειν ὡς οὐδείς ποτε ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν νομοθετεῖ, τύχαι δὲ καὶ συμφοραὶ παντοῖαι πίπτουσαι παντοίως νομοθετοῦσι τὰ πάντα ἡμῖν. ἢ γὰρ πόλεμός τις βιασάμενος ἀνέτρεψε πολιτείας καὶ μετέβαλε νόμους, ἢ πενίας χαλεπῆς ἀπορία· πολλὰ δὲ καὶ νόσοι ἀναγκάζουσι καινοτομεῖν, λοιμῶν τε ἐμπιπτόντων, καὶ χρόνον ἐπὶ πολὺν ἐνιαυτῶν πολλῶν πολλάκις ἀκαιρίαι. ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προϊδών τις ᾄξειεν ἂν εἰπεῖν ὅπερ ἐγὼ νυνδή, τὸ θνητὸν μὲν μηδένα νομοθετεῖν μηδέν, τύχας δʼ εἶναι σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα· τὸ δʼ ἔστιν περί τε ναυτιλίαν καὶ κυβερνητικὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν καὶ στρατηγικὴν πάντα ταῦτʼ εἰπόντα δοκεῖν εὖ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὁμοίως αὖ καὶ τόδε ἔστιν λέγοντα εὖ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. ὡς θεὸς μὲν πάντα, καὶ μετὰ θεοῦ τύχη καὶ καιρός, τἀνθρώπινα διακυβερνῶσι σύμπαντα. ἡμερώτερον μὴν τρίτον συγχωρῆσαι τούτοις δεῖν ἕπεσθαι τέχνην· καιρῷ γὰρ χειμῶνος συλλαβέσθαι κυβερνητικὴν ἢ μή, μέγα πλεονέκτημα ἔγωγʼ ἂν θείην. ἢ πῶς;

ΚΛ. οὕτως.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡσαύτως κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἂν ἔχοι λόγον, καὶ δὴ καὶ νομοθεσίᾳ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο δοτέον· τῶν ἄλλων συμπιπτόντων, ὅσα δεῖ χώρᾳ συντυχεῖν, εἰ μέλλοι ποτὲ εὐδαιμόνως οἰκήσειν, τὸν νομοθέτην ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον τῇ τοιαύτῃ παραπεσεῖν ἑκάστοτε πόλει δεῖν.

ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ὅ γε πρὸς ἕκαστόν τι τῶν εἰρημένων ἔχων τὴν τέχνην κἂν εὔξασθαί που δύναιτο ὀρθῶς, τί παρὸν αὐτῷ διὰ τύχης, τῆς τέχνης ἂν μόνον ἐπιδέοι;

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. οἵ τε ἄλλοι γε δὴ πάντες οἱ νυνδὴ ῥηθέντες, κελευόμενοι τὴν αὑτῶν εὐχὴν εἰπεῖν, εἴποιεν ἄν. ἦ γάρ;

ΚΛ. τί μήν;

ΑΘ. ταὐτὸν δὴ καὶ νομοθέτης οἶμαι δράσειεν.

ΚΛ. ἔγωγʼ οἶμαι.

ΑΘ. «φέρε δή, νομοθέτα,» πρὸς αὐτὸν φῶμεν, «τί σοι καὶ πῶς πόλιν ἔχουσαν δῶμεν, ὃ λαβὼν ἕξεις ὥστʼ ἐκ τῶν λοιπῶν αὐτὸς τὴν πόλιν ἱκανῶς διοικῆσαι;»

ΚΛ. τί μετὰ τοῦτʼ εἰπεῖν ὀρθῶς ἔστιν ἄρα;

ΑΘ. τοῦ νομοθέτου φράζομεν τοῦτο, ἦ γάρ;

ΚΛ. ναί.

Ath. I was on the point of saying that no man ever makes laws, but chances and accidents of all kinds, occurring in all sorts of ways, make all our laws for us. For either it is a war that violently upsets polities and changes laws, or it is the distress due to grievous poverty. Diseases, too, often force on revolutions, owing to the inroads of pestilences and recurring bad seasons prolonged over many years. Foreseeing all this, one might deem it proper to say—as I said just now—that no mortal man frames any law, but human affairs are nearly all matters of pure chance. But the fact is that, although one may appear to be quite right in saying this about sea-faring and the arts of the pilot, the physician, and the general, yet there really is something else that we may say with equal truth about these same things.

Clin. What is that?

Ath. That God controls all that is, and that Chance and Occasion co-operate with God in the control of all human affairs. It is, however, less harsh to admit that these two must be accompanied by a third factor, which is Art. For that the pilots’ art should cooperate with Occasion—verily I, for one, should esteem that a great advantage. Is it not so?

Clin. It is.

Ath. Then we must grant that this is equally true in the other cases also, by parity of reasoning, including the case of legislation. When all the other conditions are present which a country needs to possess in the way of fortune if it is ever to be happily settled, then every such State needs to meet with a lawgiver who holds fast to truth.

Clin. Very true.

Ath. Would not, then, the man who possessed art in regard to each of the crafts mentioned be able to pray aright for that condition which, if it were given by Chance, would need only the supplement of his own art?

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. And if all the other craftsmen mentioned just now were bidden to state the object of their prayers, they could do so, could they not?

Clin. Of course.

Ath. And the lawgiver, I suppose, could do likewise?

Clin. I suppose so.

Ath. “Come now, O lawgiver,” let us say to him, “what are we to give you, and what condition of State, to enable you, when you receive it, thence-forward to manage the State by yourself satisfactorily?”

Clin. What is the next thing that can rightly be said?

Ath. You mean, do you not, on the side of the lawgiver?

Clin. Yes.

ΑΘ. τόδε· «τυραννουμένην μοι δότε τὴν πόλιν,» φήσει· «τύραννος δʼ ἔστω νέος καὶ μνήμων καὶ εὐμαθὴς καὶ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὴς φύσει· ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν δεῖν ἕπεσθαι σύμπασιν τοῖς τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρεσι, καὶ νῦν τῇ τυραννουμένῃ ψυχῇ τοῦτο συνεπέσθω, ἐὰν μέλλῃ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπαρχόντων ὄφελος εἶναί τι.»

ΚΛ. σωφροσύνην μοι δοκεῖ φράζειν, ὦ Μέγιλλε, δεῖν εἶναι τὴν συνεπομένην ὁ ξένος. ἦ γάρ;

ΑΘ. τὴν δημώδη γε, ὦ Κλεινία, καὶ οὐχ ἥν τις σεμνύνων ἂν λέγοι, φρόνησιν προσαναγκάζων εἶναι τὸ σωφρονεῖν, ἀλλʼ ὅπερ εὐθὺς παισὶν καὶ θηρίοις, τοῖς μὲν ἀκρατῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, σύμφυτον ἐπανθεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ἐγκρατῶς· ὃ καὶ μονούμενον ἔφαμεν τῶν πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν λεγομένων οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι λόγου. ἔχετε γὰρ ὃ λέγω που.

ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. ταύτην τοίνυν ἡμῖν ὁ τύραννος τὴν φύσιν ἐχέτω πρὸς ἐκείναις ταῖς φύσεσιν, εἰ μέλλει πόλις ὡς δυνατόν ἐστι τάχιστα καὶ ἄριστα σχήσειν πολιτείαν ἣν λαβοῦσα εὐδαιμονέστατα διάξει. θάττων γὰρ ταύτης καὶ ἀμείνων πολιτείας διάθεσις οὔτʼ ἔστιν οὔτʼ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο.

ΚΛ. πῶς δὴ καὶ τίνι λόγῳ τοῦτο, ὦ ξένε, λέγων ἄν τις ὀρθῶς λέγειν αὑτὸν πείθοι;

ΑΘ. ῥᾴδιόν που τοῦτό γε νοεῖν ἐστʼ, ὦ Κλεινία, κατὰ φύσιν ὡς ἔστι τοῦθʼ οὕτω.

ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις; εἰ τύραννος γένοιτο, φῄς, νέος, σώφρων, εὐμαθής, μνήμων, ἀνδρεῖος, μεγαλοπρεπής;

ΑΘ. εὐτυχής, πρόσθες, μὴ κατʼ ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ τὸ γενέσθαι τε ἐπʼ αὐτοῦ νομοθέτην ἄξιον ἐπαίνου, καί τινα τύχην εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀγαγεῖν αὐτῷ· γενομένου γὰρ τούτου, πάντα σχεδὸν ἀπείργασται τῷ θεῷ, ἅπερ ὅταν βουληθῇ διαφερόντως εὖ πρᾶξαί τινα πόλιν. δεύτερον δέ, ἐάν ποτέ τινες δύο ἄρχοντες γίγνωνται τοιοῦτοι, τρίτον δʼ αὖ καὶ κατὰ λόγον ὡσαύτως χαλεπώτερον ὅσῳ πλείους, ὅσῳ δʼ ἐναντίον, ἐναντίως.

ΚΛ. ἐκ τυραννίδος ἀρίστην φῂς γενέσθαι πόλιν ἄν, ὡς φαίνῃ, μετὰ νομοθέτου γε ἄκρου καὶ τυράννου κοσμίου, καὶ ῥᾷστά τε καὶ τάχιστʼ ἂν μεταβαλεῖν εἰς τοῦτο ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου, δεύτερον δὲ ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας—ἢ πῶς λέγεις;—καὶ τὸ τρίτον ἐκ δημοκρατίας.

ΑΘ. οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλʼ ἐκ τυραννίδος μὲν πρῶτον, δεύτερον δὲ ἐκ βασιλικῆς πολιτείας, τρίτον δὲ ἔκ τινος δημοκρατίας. τὸ δὲ τέταρτον, ὀλιγαρχία, τὴν τοῦ τοιούτου γένεσιν χαλεπώτατα δύναιτʼ ἂν προσδέξασθαι· πλεῖστοι γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ δυνάσται γίγνονται.

Ath. This is what he will say: “Give me the State under a monarchy; and let the monarch be young, and possessed by nature of a good memory, quick intelligence, courage and nobility of manner; and let that quality, which we formerly mentioned as the necessary accompaniment of all the parts of virtue, attend now also on our monarch’s soul, if the rest of his qualities are to be of any value.”

Clin. Temperance, as I think, Megillus, is what the Stranger indicates as the necessary accompaniment. Is it not?

Ath. Yes, Clinias; temperance, that is, of the ordinary kind not the kind men mean when they use academic language and identify temperance with wisdom, but that kind which by natural instinct springs up at birth in children and animals, so that some are not incontinent, others continent, in respect of pleasures; and of this we said that, when isolated from the numerous so-called “goods,” it was of no account. You understand, of course, what I mean.

Clin. Certainly.

Ath. Let our monarch, then, possess this natural quality in addition to the other qualities mentioned, if the State is to acquire in the quickest and best way possible the constitution it needs for the happiest kind of life. For there does not exist, nor could there ever arise, a quicker and better form of constitution than this.

Clin. How and by what argument, Stranger, could one convince oneself that to say this is to speak the truth?

Ath. It is quite easy to perceive at least this, Clinias, that the facts stand by nature’s ordinance in the way described.

Clin. In what way do you mean? On condition, do you say, that there should be a monarch who was young, temperate, quick at learning, with a good memory, brave and of a noble manner?

Ath. Add also “fortunate,”—not in other respects, but only in this, that in his time there should arise a praiseworthy lawgiver, and that, by a piece of good fortune, the two of them should meet; for if this were so, then God would have done nearly everything that he does when he desires that a State should be eminently prosperous. The second best condition is that there should arise two such rulers; then comes the third best, with three rulers; and so on, the difficulty increasing in proportion as the number becomes greater, and vice versa.

Clin. You mean, apparently, that the best State would arise from a monarchy, when it has a first-rate lawgiver and a virtuous monarch, and these are the conditions under which the change into such a State could be effected most easily and quickly; and, next to this, from an oligarchy— or what is it you mean?

Ath. Not at all: the easiest step is from a monarchy, the next easiest from a monarchic constitution, the third from some form of democracy. An oligarchy, which comes fourth in order, would admit of the growth of the best State only with the greatest difficulty, since it has the largest number of rulers.

ΑΘ. λέγομεν δὴ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι τότε, ὅταν ἀληθὴς μὲν νομοθέτης γένηται φύσει, κοινὴ δὲ αὐτῷ τις συμβῇ ῥώμη πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει μέγιστον δυναμένους· οὗ δʼ ἂν τοῦτο ἀριθμῷ μὲν βραχύτατον, ἰσχυρότατον δέ, καθάπερ ἐν τυραννίδι, γένηται, ταύτῃ καὶ τότε τάχος καὶ ῥᾳστώνη τῆς μεταβολῆς γίγνεσθαι φιλεῖ.

ΚΛ. πῶς; οὐ γὰρ μανθάνομεν.

ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν εἴρηταί γʼ ἡμῖν οὐχ ἅπαξ ἀλλʼ οἶμαι πολλάκις· ὑμεῖς δὲ τάχα οὐδὲ τεθέασθε τυραννουμένην πόλιν.

ΚΛ. οὐδέ γε ἐπιθυμητὴς ἔγωγʼ εἰμὶ τοῦ θεάματος.

ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γʼ ἂν ἴδοις ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ νυνδὴ λεγόμενον.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. οὐδὲν δεῖ πόνων οὐδέ τινος παμπόλλου χρόνου τῷ τυράννῳ μεταβαλεῖν βουληθέντι πόλεως ἤθη, πορεύεσθαι δὲ αὐτὸν δεῖ πρῶτον ταύτῃ, ὅπῃπερ ἂν ἐθελήσῃ, ἐάντε πρὸς ἀρετῆς ἐπιτηδεύματα, προτρέπεσθαι τοὺς πολίτας, ἐάντε ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον, αὐτὸν πρῶτον πάντα ὑπογράφοντα τῷ πράττειν, τὰ μὲν ἐπαινοῦντα καὶ τιμῶντα, τὰ δʼ αὖ πρὸς ψόγον ἄγοντα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον ἀτιμάζοντα καθʼ ἑκάστας τῶν πράξεων.

ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς οἰόμεθα ταχὺ συνακολουθήσειν τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας τῷ τὴν τοιαύτην πειθὼ καὶ ἅμα βίαν εἰληφότι;

ΑΘ. μηδεὶς ἡμᾶς πειθέτω, ὦ φίλοι, ἄλλῃ θᾶττον καὶ ῥᾷον μεταβάλλειν ἄν ποτε πόλιν τοὺς νόμους ἢ τῇ τῶν δυναστευόντων ἡγεμονίᾳ, μηδὲ νῦν γε ἄλλῃ γίγνεσθαι μηδʼ αὖθίς ποτε γενήσεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ οὖν ἡμῖν οὐ τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον οὐδὲ χαλεπῶς ἂν γενόμενον· ἀλλὰ τόδʼ ἐστὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ ὀλίγον δὴ τὸ γεγονὸς ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, ὅταν δὲ συμβῇ, μυρία καὶ πάντʼ ἐν πόλει ἀγαθὰ ἀπεργάζεται, ἐν ᾗ ποτʼ ἂν ἐγγένηται.

ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΑΘ. ὅταν ἔρως θεῖος τῶν σωφρόνων τε καὶ δικαίων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐγγένηται μεγάλαις τισὶν δυναστείαις, ἢ κατὰ μοναρχίαν δυναστευούσαις ἢ κατὰ πλούτων ὑπεροχὰς διαφερούσαις ἢ γενῶν, ἢ τὴν Νέστορος ἐάν ποτέ τις ἐπανενέγκῃ φύσιν, ὃν τῇ τοῦ λέγειν ῥώμῃ φασὶ πάντων διενεγκόντα ἀνθρώπων πλέον ἔτι τῷ σωφρονεῖν διαφέρειν. τοῦτʼ οὖν ἐπὶ μὲν Τροίας, ὥς φασι, γέγονεν, ἐφʼ ἡμῶν δὲ οὐδαμῶς, εἰ δʼ οὖν γέγονεν ἢ καὶ γενήσεται τοιοῦτος ἢ νῦν ἡμῶν ἔστιν τις, μακαρίως μὲν αὐτὸς ζῇ, μακάριοι δὲ οἱ συνήκοοι τῶν ἐκ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος στόματος ἰόντων λόγων.

Ath. What I say is that the change takes place when nature supplies a true lawgiver, and when it happens that his policy is shared by the most powerful persons in the State; and wherever the State authorities are at once strongest and fewest in number, then and there the changes are usually carried out with speed and facility.

Clin. How so? We do not understand.

Ath. Yet surely it has been stated not once, I imagine, but many times over. But you, very likely, have never so much as set eyes on a monarchical State.

Clin. No, nor have I any craving for such a sight.

Ath. You would, however, see in it an illustration of what we spoke of just now.

Clin. What was that?

Ath. The fact that a monarch, when he decides to change the moral habits of a State, needs no great efforts nor a vast length of time, but what he does need is to lead the way himself first along the desired path, whether it be to urge the citizens towards virtue’s practices or the contrary; by his personal example he should first trace out the right lines, giving praise and honor to these things, blame to those, and degrading the disobedient according to their several deeds.

Clin. Yes, we may perhaps suppose that the rest of the citizens will quickly follow the ruler who adopts such a combination of persuasion and force.

Ath. Let none, my friends, persuade us that a State could ever change its laws more quickly or more easily by any other way than by the personal guidance of the rulers: no such thing could ever occur, either now or hereafter. Indeed, that is not the result which we find it difficult or impossible to bring about; what is difficult to bring about is rather that result which has taken place but rarely throughout long ages, and which, whenever it does take place in a State, produces in that State countless blessings of every kind.

Clin. What result do you mean?

Ath. Whenever a heaven-sent desire for temperate and just institutions arises in those who hold high positions,—whether as monarchs, or because of conspicuous eminence of wealth or birth, or, haply, as displaying the character of Nestor, of whom it is said that, while he surpassed all men in the force of his eloquence, still more did he surpass them in temperance. That was, as they say, in the Trojan age, certainly not in our time; still, if any such man existed, or shall exist, or exists among us now, blessed is the life he leads, and blessed are they who join in listening to the words of temperance that proceed out of his mouth.

ΑΘ. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ συμπάσης δυνάμεως ὁ αὐτὸς πέρι λόγος, ὡς ὅταν εἰς ταὐτὸν τῷ φρονεῖν τε καὶ σωφρονεῖν ἡ μεγίστη δύναμις ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ συμπέσῃ, τότε πολιτείας τῆς ἀρίστης καὶ νόμων τῶν τοιούτων φύεται γένεσις, ἄλλως δὲ οὐ μή ποτε γένηται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καθαπερεὶ μῦθός τις λεχθεὶς κεχρησμῳδήσθω, καὶ ἐπιδεδείχθω τῇ μὲν χαλεπὸν ὂν τὸ πόλιν εὔνομον γίγνεσθαι, τῇ δʼ, εἴπερ γένοιτο ὃ λέγομεν, πάντων τάχιστόν τε καὶ ῥᾷστον μακρῷ.

ΚΛ. πῶς;

ΑΘ. πειρώμεθα προσαρμόττοντες τῇ πόλει σοι, καθάπερ παῖδες πρεσβῦται, πλάττειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς νόμους.

ΚΛ. ἴωμεν δὴ καὶ μὴ μέλλωμεν ἔτι.

ΑΘ. θεὸν δὴ πρὸς τὴν τῆς πόλεως κατασκευὴν ἐπικαλώμεθα· ὁ δὲ ἀκούσειέν τε, καὶ ἀκούσας ἵλεως εὐμενής τε ἡμῖν ἔλθοι συνδιακοσμήσων τήν τε πόλιν καὶ τοὺς νόμους.

ΚΛ. ἔλθοι γὰρ οὖν.

ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ τίνα δή ποτε πολιτείαν ἔχομεν ἐν νῷ τῇ πόλει προστάττειν;

ΚΛ. οἷον δὴ τί λέγεις βουληθείς; φράζʼ ἔτι σαφέστερον. οἷον δημοκρατίαν τινὰ ἢ ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ ἀριστοκρατίαν ἢ βασιλικήν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τυραννίδα γέ που λέγοις ἄν, ὥς γʼ ἡμεῖς ἂν οἰηθεῖμεν.

ΑΘ. φέρε δὴ τοίνυν, πότερος ὑμῶν ἀποκρίνασθαι πρότερος ἂν ἐθέλοι, τὴν οἴκοι πολιτείαν εἰπὼν τίς τούτων ἐστίν;

ΜΕ. μῶν οὖν τὸν πρεσβύτερον ἐμὲ δικαιότερον εἰπεῖν πρότερον;

ΚΛ. ἴσως.

ΜΕ. καὶ μὴν συννοῶν γε, ὦ ξένε, τὴν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι πολιτείαν οὐκ ἔχω σοι φράζειν οὕτως ἥντινα προσαγορεύειν αὐτὴν δεῖ. καὶ γὰρ τυραννίδι δοκεῖ μοι προσεοικέναι—τὸ γὰρ τῶν ἐφόρων θαυμαστὸν ὡς τυραννικὸν ἐν αὐτῇ γέγονε —καί τις ἐνίοτέ μοι φαίνεται πασῶν τῶν πόλεων δημοκρατουμένη μάλιστʼ ἐοικέναι. τὸ δʼ αὖ μὴ φάναι ἀριστοκρατίαν αὐτὴν εἶναι παντάπασιν ἄτοπον· καὶ μὲν δὴ βασιλεία γε διὰ βίου τʼ ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτη πασῶν καὶ πρὸς πάντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν λεγομένη. ἐγὼ δὲ οὕτω νῦν ἐξαίφνης ἂν ἐρωτηθείς, ὄντως, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὐκ ἔχω διορισάμενος εἰπεῖν τίς τούτων ἐστὶν τῶν πολιτειῶν.

ΚΛ. ταὐτόν σοι πάθος, ὦ Μέγιλλε, καταφαίνομαι πεπονθέναι· πάνυ γὰρ ἀπορῶ τὴν ἐν Κνωσῷ πολιτείαν τούτων τινὰ διισχυριζόμενος εἰπεῖν.

Ath. So likewise of power in general, the same rule holds good: whenever the greatest power coincides in man with wisdom and temperance, then the germ of the best polity is planted; but in no other way will it ever come about. Regard this as a myth oracularly uttered, and let us take it as proved that the rise of a well-governed State is in one way difficult, but in another way—given, that is, the condition we mention—it is easier by far and quicker than anything else.

Clin. No doubt.

Ath. Let us apply the oracle to your State, and so try, like greybeard boys, to model its laws by our discourse.

Clin. Yes, let us proceed, and delay no longer.

Ath. Let us invoke the presence of the God at the establishment of the State; and may he hearken, and hearkening may he come, propitious and kindly to us-ward, to help us in the fashioning of the State and its laws.

Clin. Yes, may he come!

Ath. Well, what form of polity is it that we intend to impose upon the State?

Clin. What, in particular, do you refer to? Explain still more clearly. I mean, is it a democracy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, or a monarchy? For certainly you cannot mean a tyranny: that we can never suppose.

Ath. Come now, which of you two would like to answer me first and tell me to which of these kinds his own polity at home belongs?

Meg. Is it not proper that I, as the elder, should answer first?

Clin. No doubt.

Meg. In truth, Stranger, when I reflect on the Lacedaemonian polity, I am at a loss to tell you by what name one should describe it. It seems to me to resemble a tyranny, since the board of ephors it contains is a marvellously tyrannical feature; yet sometimes it strikes me as, of all States, the nearest to a democracy. Still, it would be totally absurd to deny that it is an aristocracy; while it includes, moreover, a life monarchy, and that the most ancient of monarchies, as is affirmed, not only by ourselves, but by all the world. But now that I am questioned thus suddenly, I am really, as I said, at a loss to say definitely to which of these polities it belongs.

Clin. And I, Megillus, find myself equally perplexed; for I find it very difficult to affirm that our Cnosian polity is any one of these.

English translation by Robert Gregg Bury (1926). Original text: Robert Gregg Bury (trans.), Plato X-XI: Laws, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, 1926; Greek text: John Burnet, Platonis Opera, Oxford Classical Texts (as digitised by Perseus).

Greek text and translation from the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0 (Perseus Digital Library); translation public domain. Introductions, summaries and notes © GreekMythology.com.

Laws 709a–712e: Book IV: Chance, the lawgiver and the young…