ΑΘ. θεὸς ἤ τις ἀνθρώπων ὑμῖν, ὦ ξένοι, εἴληφε τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν νόμων διαθέσεως;
ΚΛ. θεός, ὦ ξένε, θεός, ὥς γε τὸ δικαιότατον εἰπεῖν· παρὰ μὲν ἡμῖν Ζεύς, παρὰ δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις, ὅθεν ὅδε ἐστίν, οἶμαι φάναι τούτους Ἀπόλλωνα. ἦ γάρ;
ΜΕ. ναί.
ΑΘ. μῶν οὖν καθʼ Ὅμηρον λέγεις ὡς τοῦ Μίνω φοιτῶντος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἑκάστοτε συνουσίαν διʼ ἐνάτου ἔτους καὶ κατὰ τὰς παρʼ ἐκείνου φήμας ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑμῖν θέντος τοὺς νόμους;
Ath. To whom do you ascribe the authorship of your legal arrangements, Strangers? To a god or to some man?
Clin. To a god, Stranger, most rightfully to a god. We Cretans call Zeus our lawgiver; while in Lacedaemon, where our friend here has his home, I believe they claim Apollo as theirs. Is not that so, Megillus?
Meg. Yes.
Ath. Do you then, like Homer, say that Minos used to go every ninth year to hold converse with his father Zeus, and that he was guided by his divine oracles in laying down the laws for your cities?
ΚΛ. λέγεται γὰρ οὕτω παρʼ ἡμῖν· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἀδελφόν γε αὐτοῦ Ῥαδάμανθυν—ἀκούετε γὰρ τὸ ὄνομα—δικαιότατον γεγονέναι. τοῦτον οὖν φαῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς γε οἱ Κρῆτες, ἐκ τοῦ τότε διανέμειν τὰ περὶ τὰς δίκας, ὀρθῶς τοῦτον τὸν ἔπαινον αὐτὸν εἰληφέναι.
ΑΘ. καὶ καλόν γε τὸ κλέος ὑεῖ τε Διὸς μάλα πρέπον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τοιούτοις ἤθεσι τέθραφθε νομικοῖς σύ τε καὶ ὅδε, προσδοκῶ οὐκ ἂν ἀηδῶς περί τε πολιτείας τὰ νῦν καὶ νόμων τὴν διατριβήν, λέγοντάς τε καὶ ἀκούοντας ἅμα κατὰ τὴν πορείαν, ποιήσασθαι. πάντως δʼ ἥ γε ἐκ Κνωσοῦ ὁδὸς εἰς τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἄντρον καὶ ἱερόν, ὡς ἀκούομεν, ἱκανή, καὶ ἀνάπαυλαι κατὰ τὴν ὁδόν, ὡς εἰκός, πνίγους ὄντος τὰ νῦν, ἐν τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς δένδρεσίν εἰσι σκιαραί, καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις πρέπον ἂν ἡμῶν εἴη τὸ διαναπαύεσθαι πυκνὰ ἐν αὐταῖς, λόγοις τε ἀλλήλους παραμυθουμένους τὴν ὁδὸν ἅπασαν οὕτω μετὰ ῥᾳστώνης διαπερᾶναι.
ΚΛ. καὶ μὴν ἔστιν γε, ὦ ξένε, προϊόντι κυπαρίττων τε ἐν τοῖς ἄλσεσιν ὕψη καὶ κάλλη θαυμάσια, καὶ λειμῶνες ἐν οἷσιν ἀναπαυόμενοι διατρίβοιμεν ἄν.
ΑΘ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις.
ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· ἰδόντες δὲ μᾶλλον φήσομεν. ἀλλʼ ἴωμεν ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ.
ΑΘ. ταῦτʼ εἴη. καί μοι λέγε· κατὰ τί τὰ συσσίτιά τε ὑμῖν συντέταχεν ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων ἕξιν;
ΚΛ. οἶμαι μέν, ὦ ξένε, καὶ παντὶ ῥᾴδιον ὑπολαβεῖν εἶναι τά γε ἡμέτερα. τὴν γὰρ τῆς χώρας πάσης Κρήτης φύσιν ὁρᾶτε ὡς οὐκ ἔστι, καθάπερ ἡ τῶν Θετταλῶν, πεδιάς, διὸ δὴ καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἵπποις ἐκεῖνοι χρῶνται μᾶλλον, δρόμοισιν δὲ ἡμεῖς· ἥδε γὰρ ἀνώμαλος αὖ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν πεζῇ δρόμων ἄσκησιν μᾶλλον σύμμετρος. ἐλαφρὰ δὴ τὰ ὅπλα ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ μὴ βάρος ἔχοντα θεῖν· τῶν δὴ τόξων καὶ τοξευμάτων ἡ κουφότης ἁρμόττειν δοκεῖ. ταῦτʼ οὖν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἡμῖν ἅπαντα ἐξήρτυται, καὶ πάνθʼ ὁ νομοθέτης, ὥς γʼ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέπων συνετάττετο· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ συσσίτια κινδυνεύει συναγαγεῖν, ὁρῶν ὡς πάντες ὁπόταν στρατεύωνται, τόθʼ ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος ἀναγκάζονται φυλακῆς αὑτῶν ἕνεκα συσσιτεῖν τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον. ἄνοιαν δή μοι δοκεῖ καταγνῶναι τῶν πολλῶν ὡς οὐ μανθανόντων ὅτι πόλεμος ἀεὶ πᾶσιν διὰ βίου συνεχής ἐστι πρὸς ἁπάσας τὰς πόλεις·
Clin. So our people say. And they say also that his brother Rhadamanthys,—no doubt you have heard the name,—was exceedingly just. And certainly we Cretans would maintain that he won this title owing to his righteous administration of justice in those days.
Ath. Yes, his renown is indeed glorious and well befitting a son of Zeus. And, since you and our friend Megillus were both brought up in legal institutions of so noble a kind, you would, I imagine, have no aversion to our occupying ourselves as we go along in discussion on the subject of government and laws. Certainly, as I am told, the road from Cnosus to the cave and temple of Zeus is a long one, and we are sure to find, in this sultry weather, shady resting-places among the high trees along the road: in them we can rest ofttimes, as befits our age, beguiling the time with discourse, and thus complete our journey in comfort.
Clin. True, Stranger; and as one proceeds further one finds in the groves cypress-trees of wonderful height and beauty, and meadows too, where we may rest ourselves and talk.
Ath. You say well.
Clin. Yes, indeed: and when we set eyes on them we shall say so still more emphatically. So let us be going, and good luck attend us.
Ath. Amen! And tell me now, for what reason did your law ordain the common meals you have, and your gymnastic schools and military equipment?
Clin. Our Cretan customs, Stranger, are, as I think, such as anyone may grasp easily. As you may notice, Crete, as a whole, is not a level country, like Thessaly: consequently, whereas the Thessalians mostly go on horseback, we Cretans are runners, since this land of ours is rugged and more suitable for the practice of foot-running. Under these conditions we are obliged to have light armour for running and to avoid heavy equipment; so bows and arrows are adopted as suitable because of their lightness. Thus all these customs of ours are adapted for war, and, in my opinion, this was the object which the lawgiver had in view when he ordained them all. Probably this was his reason also for instituting common meals: he saw how soldiers, all the time they are on campaign, are obliged by force of circumstances to mess in common, for the sake of their own security. And herein, as I think, he condemned the stupidity of the mass of men in failing to perceive that all are involved ceaselessly in a lifelong war against all States.
ΚΛ. εἰ δὴ πολέμου γε ὄντος φυλακῆς ἕνεκα δεῖ συσσιτεῖν καί τινας ἄρχοντας καὶ ἀρχομένους διακεκοσμημένους εἶναι φύλακας αὐτῶν, τοῦτο καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ δραστέον. ἣν γὰρ καλοῦσιν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰρήνην, τοῦτʼ εἶναι μόνον ὄνομα, τῷ δʼ ἔργῳ πάσαις πρὸς πάσας τὰς πόλεις ἀεὶ πόλεμον ἀκήρυκτον κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι. καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνευρήσεις, οὕτω σκοπῶν, τὸν Κρητῶν νομοθέτην ὡς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἅπαντα δημοσίᾳ καὶ ἰδίᾳ τὰ νόμιμα ἡμῖν ἀποβλέπων συνετάξατο, καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτω φυλάττειν παρέδωκε τοὺς νόμους, ὡς τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὄφελος ὂν οὔτε κτημάτων οὔτʼ ἐπιτηδευμάτων, ἂν μὴ τῷ πολέμῳ ἄρα κρατῇ τις, πάντα δὲ τὰ τῶν νικωμένων ἀγαθὰ τῶν νικώντων γίγνεσθαι.
ΑΘ. καλῶς γε, ὦ ξένε, φαίνῃ μοι γεγυμνάσθαι πρὸς τὸ διειδέναι τὰ Κρητῶν νόμιμα. τόδε δέ μοι φράζε ἔτι σαφέστερον· ὃν γὰρ ὅρον ἔθου τῆς εὖ πολιτευομένης πόλεως, δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν οὕτω κεκοσμημένην οἰκεῖν δεῖν, ὥστε πολέμῳ νικᾶν τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις. ἦ γάρ;
ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τῷδε οὕτω συνδοκεῖν.
ΜΕ. πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἀποκρίναιτο, ὦ θεῖε, Λακεδαιμονίων γε ὁστισοῦν;
ΑΘ. πότερʼ οὖν δὴ πόλεσι μὲν πρὸς πόλεις ὀρθὸν τοῦτʼ ἐστί, κώμῃ δὲ πρὸς κώμην ἕτερον;
ΚΛ. οὐδαμῶς.
ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν;
ΚΛ. ναί.
ΑΘ. τί δέ; πρὸς οἰκίαν οἰκίᾳ τῶν ἐν τῇ κώμῃ, καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα ἀνδρὶ ἑνὶ πρὸς ἕνα, ταὐτὸν ἔτι;
ΚΛ. ταὐτόν.
ΑΘ. αὐτῷ δὲ πρὸς αὑτὸν πότερον ὡς πολεμίῳ πρὸς πολέμιον διανοητέον; ἢ πῶς ἔτι λέγομεν;
ΚΛ. ὦ ξένε Ἀθηναῖε—οὐ γάρ σε Ἀττικὸν ἐθέλοιμʼ ἂν προσαγορεύειν· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τῆς θεοῦ ἐπωνυμίας ἄξιος εἶναι μᾶλλον ἐπονομάζεσθαι· τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἐπʼ ἀρχὴν ὀρθῶς ἀναγαγὼν σαφέστερον ἐποίησας, ὥστε ῥᾷον ἀνευρήσεις ὅτι νυνδὴ ὑφʼ ἡμῶν ὀρθῶς ἐρρήθη τὸ πολεμίους εἶναι πάντας πᾶσιν δημοσίᾳ τε, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστους αὐτοὺς σφίσιν αὐτοῖς.
ΑΘ. πῶς εἴρηκας, ὦ θαυμάσιε;
ΚΛ. κἀνταῦθα, ὦ ξένε, τὸ νικᾶν αὐτὸν αὑτὸν πασῶν νικῶν πρώτη τε καὶ ἀρίστη, τὸ δὲ ἡττᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ πάντων αἴσχιστόν τε ἅμα καὶ κάκιστον. ταῦτα γὰρ ὡς πολέμου ἐν ἑκάστοις ἡμῶν ὄντος πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς σημαίνει.
Clin. If, then, these practices are necessary in war,—namely, messing in common for safety’s sake, and the appointment of relays of officers and privates to act as guards,— they must be carried out equally in time of peace. For (as he would say) “peace,” as the term is commonly employed, is nothing more than a name, the truth being that every State is, by a law of nature, engaged perpetually in an informal war with every other State. And if you look at the matter from this point of view you will find it practically true that our Cretan lawgiver ordained all our legal usages, both public and private, with an eye to war, and that he therefore charged us with the task of guarding our laws safely, in the conviction that without victory in war nothing else, whether possession or institution, is of the least value, but all the goods of the vanquished fall into the hands of the victors.
Ath. Your training, Stranger, has certainly, as it seems to me, given you an excellent understanding of the legal practices of Crete. But tell me this more clearly still: by the definition you have given of the well-constituted State you appear to me to imply that it ought to be organized in such a way as to be victorious in war over all other States. Is that so?
Clin. Certainly it is; and I think that our friend here shares my opinion.
Meg. No Lacedaemonian, my good sir, could possibly say otherwise.
Ath. If this, then, is the right attitude for a State to adopt towards a State, is the right attitude for village towards village different?
Clin. By no means.
Ath. It is the same, you say?
Clin. Yes.
Ath. Well then, is the same attitude right also for one house in the village towards another, and for each man towards every other?
Clin. It is.
Ath. And must each individual man regard himself as his own enemy? Or what do we say when we come to this point?
Clin. O Stranger of Athens, for I should be loth to call you a man of Attica, since methinks you deserve rather to be named after the goddess Athena, seeing that you have made the argument more clear by taking it back again to its starting-point; whereby you will the more easily discover the justice of our recent statement that, in the mass, all men are both publicly and privately the enemies of all, and individually also each man is his own enemy.
Ath. What is your meaning, my admirable sir?
Clin. It is just in this war, my friend, that the victory over self is of all victories the first and best while self-defeat is of all defeats at once the worst and the most shameful. For these phrases signify that a war against self exists within each of us.
ΑΘ. πάλιν τοίνυν τὸν λόγον ἀναστρέψωμεν. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ εἷς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ὁ μὲν κρείττων αὑτοῦ, ὁ δὲ ἥττων ἐστί, πότερα φῶμεν οἰκίαν τε καὶ κώμην καὶ πόλιν ἔχειν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἐν αὑταῖς ἢ μὴ φῶμεν;
ΚΛ. τὸ κρείττω τε ἑαυτῆς εἶναι λέγεις τινά, τὴν δʼ ἥττω;
ΑΘ. ναί.
ΚΛ. καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἤρου· πάνυ γὰρ ἔστι καὶ σφόδρα τὸ τοιοῦτον, οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν. ἐν ὁπόσαις μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἀμείνονες νικῶσιν τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τοὺς χείρους, ὀρθῶς ἂν αὕτη κρείττων τε ἑαυτῆς λέγοιθʼ ἡ πόλις, ἐπαινοῖτό τε ἂν δικαιότατα τῇ τοιαύτῃ νίκῃ· τοὐναντίον δέ, ὅπου τἀναντία.
ΑΘ. τὸ μὲν τοίνυν εἴ ποτέ ἐστίν που τὸ χεῖρον κρεῖττον τοῦ ἀμείνονος ἐάσωμεν—μακροτέρου γὰρ λόγου—τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενον μανθάνω νῦν, ὥς ποτε πολῖται, συγγενεῖς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς πόλεως γεγονότες, ἄδικοι καὶ πολλοὶ συνελθόντες, δικαίους ἐλάττους ὄντας βιάσονται δουλούμενοι, καὶ ὅταν μὲν κρατήσωσιν, ἥττων ἡ πόλις αὑτῆς ὀρθῶς αὕτη λέγοιτʼ ἂν ἅμα καὶ κακή, ὅπου δʼ ἂν ἡττῶνται, κρείττων τε καὶ ἀγαθή.
ΚΛ. καὶ μάλα ἄτοπον, ὦ ξένε, τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον· ὅμως δὲ ὁμολογεῖν οὕτως ἀναγκαιότατον.
ΑΘ. ἔχε δή. καὶ τόδε πάλιν ἐπισκεψώμεθα· πολλοὶ ἀδελφοί που γένοιντʼ ἂν ἑνὸς ἀνδρός τε καὶ μιᾶς ὑεῖς, καὶ δὴ καὶ θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν τοὺς πλείους μὲν ἀδίκους αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ ἐλάττους δικαίους.
ΚΛ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
ΑΘ. καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γε πρέπον ἐμοί τε καὶ ὑμῖν τοῦτο θηρεύειν, ὅτι νικώντων μὲν τῶν πονηρῶν ἥ τε οἰκία καὶ ἡ συγγένεια αὕτη πᾶσα ἥττων αὑτῆς λέγοιτʼ ἄν, κρείττων δὲ ἡττωμένων· οὐ γὰρ εὐσχημοσύνης τε καὶ ἀσχημοσύνης ῥημάτων ἕνεκα τὰ νῦν σκοπούμεθα πρὸς τὸν τῶν πολλῶν λόγον, ἀλλʼ ὀρθότητός τε καὶ ἁμαρτίας πέρι νόμων, ἥτις ποτʼ ἐστὶν φύσει.
ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις.
ΜΕ. καλῶς μὲν οὖν, ὥς γε ἐμοὶ συνδοκεῖν, τό γε τοσοῦτον, τὰ νῦν.
ΑΘ. ἴδωμεν δὴ καὶ τόδε· τούτοις τοῖς ἄρτι λεγομένοις ἀδελφοῖς γένοιτʼ ἄν πού τις δικαστής;
ΚΛ. πάνυ γε.
ΑΘ. πότερος οὖν ἀμείνων, ὅστις τοὺς μὲν ἀπολέσειεν αὐτῶν ὅσοι κακοί, τοὺς δὲ βελτίους ἄρχειν αὐτοὺς αὑτῶν προστάξειεν, ἢ ὅδε ὃς ἂν τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς ἄρχειν, τοὺς χείρους δʼ ἐάσας ζῆν ἄρχεσθαι ἑκόντας ποιήσειεν;
Ath. Now let us take the argument back in the reverse direction. Seeing that individually each of us is partly superior to himself and partly inferior, are we to affirm that the same condition of things exists in house and village and State, or are we to deny it?
Clin. Do you mean the condition of being partly self-superior and partly self-inferior?
Ath. Yes.
Clin. That, too, is a proper question; for such a condition does most certainly exist, and in States above all. Every State in which the better class is victorious over the populace and the lower classes would rightly be termed “self-superior,” and would be praised most justly for a victory of this kind; and conversely, when the reverse is the case.
Ath. Well then, leaving aside the question as to whether the worse element is ever superior to the better (a question which would demand a more lengthy discussion), what you assert, as I now perceive, is this,—that sometimes citizens of one stock and of one State who are unjust and numerous may combine together and try to enslave by force those who are just but fewer in number, and wherever they prevail such a State would rightly be termed “self-inferior” and bad, but “self-superior” and good wherever they are worsted.
Clin. This statement is indeed most extraordinary, Stranger; none the less we cannot possibly reject it.
Ath. Stay a moment: here too is a case we must further consider. Suppose there were a number of brothers, all sons of the same parents, it would not be at all surprising if most of them were unjust and but few just.
Clin. It would not.
Ath. And, moreover, it would ill beseem you and me to go a-chasing after this form of expression, that if the bad ones conquered the whole of this family and house should be called “self-inferior,” but “self-superior” if they were defeated; for our present reference to the usage of ordinary speech is not concerned with the propriety or impropriety of verbal phrases but with the essential rightness or wrongness of laws.
Clin. Very true, Stranger.
Meg. And finely spoken, too, up to this point, as I agree.
Ath. Let us also look at this point: the brothers we have just described would have, I suppose, a judge?
Clin. Certainly.
Ath. Which of the two would be the better—a judge who destroyed all the wicked among them and charged the good to govern themselves, or one who made the good members govern and, while allowing the bad to live, made them submit willingly to be governed?
ΑΘ. τρίτον δέ που δικαστὴν πρὸς ἀρετὴν εἴπωμεν, εἴ τις εἴη τοιοῦτος ὅστις παραλαβὼν συγγένειαν μίαν διαφερομένην, μήτε ἀπολέσειεν μηδένα, διαλλάξας δὲ εἰς τὸν ἐπίλοιπον χρόνον, νόμους αὐτοῖς θείς, πρὸς ἀλλήλους παραφυλάττειν δύναιτο ὥστε εἶναι φίλους.
ΚΛ. μακρῷ ἀμείνων γίγνοιτʼ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος δικαστής τε καὶ νομοθέτης.
ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν τοὐναντίον γε ἢ πρὸς πόλεμον ἂν βλέπων αὐτοῖς τοὺς νόμους διανομοθετοῖ.
ΚΛ. τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθές.
ΑΘ. τί δʼ ὁ τὴν πόλιν συναρμόττων; πρὸς πόλεμον αὐτῆς ἂν τὸν ἔξωθεν βλέπων τὸν βίον κοσμοῖ μᾶλλον, ἢ πρὸς πόλεμον τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ γιγνόμενον ἑκάστοτε, ἣ δὴ καλεῖται στάσις; ὃν μάλιστα μὲν ἅπας ἂν βούλοιτο μήτε γενέσθαι ποτὲ ἐν ἑαυτοῦ πόλει γενόμενόν τε ὡς τάχιστα ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.
ΚΛ. δῆλον ὅτι πρὸς τοῦτον.
ΑΘ. πότερα δὲ ἀπολομένων αὖ τῶν ἑτέρων εἰρήνην τῆς στάσεως γενέσθαι, νικησάντων δὲ ποτέρων, δέξαιτʼ ἄν τις, μᾶλλον ἢ φιλίας τε καὶ εἰρήνης ὑπὸ διαλλαγῶν γενομένης, οὕτω τοῖς ἔξωθεν πολεμίοις προσέχειν ἀνάγκην εἶναι τὸν νοῦν;
ΚΛ. οὕτω πᾶς ἂν ἐθέλοι πρότερον ἢ ʼκείνως περὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ γίγνεσθαι πόλιν.
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν καὶ νομοθέτης ὡσαύτως;
ΚΛ. τί μήν;
ΑΘ. ἆρα οὖν οὐ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἕνεκα πάντα ἂν τὰ νόμιμα τιθείη πᾶς;
ΚΛ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ΑΘ. τό γε μὴν ἄριστον οὔτε ὁ πόλεμος οὔτε ἡ στάσις, ἀπευκτὸν δὲ τὸ δεηθῆναι τούτων, εἰρήνη δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἅμα καὶ φιλοφροσύνη, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ νικᾶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτὴν αὑτὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἦν τῶν ἀρίστων ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων· ὅμοιον ὡς εἰ κάμνον σῶμα ἰατρικῆς καθάρσεως τυχὸν ἡγοῖτό τις ἄριστα πράττειν τότε, τῷ δὲ μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν δεηθέντι σώματι μηδὲ προσέχοι τὸν νοῦν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ πρὸς πόλεως εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ καὶ ἰδιώτου διανοούμενος οὕτω τις οὔτʼ ἄν ποτε πολιτικὸς γένοιτο ὀρθῶς, πρὸς τὰ ἔξωθεν πολεμικὰ ἀποβλέπων μόνον καὶ πρῶτον, οὔτʼ ἂν νομοθέτης ἀκριβής, εἰ μὴ χάριν εἰρήνης τὰ πολέμου νομοθετοῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἕνεκα τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης.
ΚΛ. φαίνεται μέν πως ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὦ ξένε, ὀρθῶς εἰρῆσθαι, θαυμάζω γε μὴν εἰ τά τε παρʼ ἡμῖν νόμιμα καὶ ἔτι τὰ περὶ Λακεδαίμονα μὴ πᾶσαν τὴν σπουδὴν τούτων ἕνεκα πεποίηται.
Ath. And there is a third judge we must mention (third and best in point of merit),—if indeed such a judge can be found,— who in dealing with a single divided family will destroy none of them but reconcile them and succeed, by enacting laws for them, in securing amongst them thenceforward permanent friendliness.
Clin. A judge and lawgiver of that kind would be by far the best.
Ath. But mark this: his aim, in the laws he enacted for them, would be the opposite of war.
Clin. That is true.
Ath. And what of him who brings the State into harmony? In ordering its life would he have regard to external warfare rather than to the internal war, whenever it occurs, which goes by the name of “civil” strife? For this is a war as to which it would be the desire of every man that, if possible, it should never occur in his own State, and that, if it did occur, it should come to as speedy an end as possible.
Clin. Evidently he would have regard to civil war.
Ath. And would anyone prefer that the citizens should be obliged to devote their attention to external enemies after internal concord had been secured by the destruction of one section and the victory of their opponents rather than after the establishment of friendship and peace by terms of conciliation?
Clin. Everyone would prefer the latter alternative for his own State rather than the former.
Ath. And would not the lawgiver do the same?
Clin. Of course.
Ath. Would not every lawgiver in all his legislation aim at the highest good?
Clin. Assuredly.
Ath. The highest good, however, is neither war nor civil strife—which things we should pray rather to be saved from—but peace one with another and friendly feeling. Moreover, it would seem that the victory we mentioned of a State over itself is not one of the best things but one of those which are necessary. For imagine a man supposing that a human body was best off when it was sick and aged with physic, while never giving a thought to the case of the body that needs no physic at all! Similarly, with regard to the well-being of a State or an individual, that man will never make genuine statesman who pays attention primarily solely to the needs of foreign warfare, nor will he make a finished lawgiver unless he designs his legislation for peace rather than his peace legislation for war.
Clin. This statement, Stranger, is apparently true; yet, unless I am much mistaken, our legal usages in Crete, and in Lacedaemon too, are wholly acted towards war.
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