ΚΛ. τότʼ οὖν ἐξενώθησαν ὑμῖν οἱ πρόγονοι ἡμῶν, καὶ εὔνοιαν ἐκ τόσου ἔγωγε ὑμῖν καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἔχουσιν γονῆς.
ΑΘ. τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ὑμέτερα ἀκούειν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἕτοιμʼ ἂν εἴη· τὰ δʼ ἐμὰ βούλεσθαι μὲν ἕτοιμα, δύνασθαι δὲ οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδια, ὅμως δὲ πειρατέον. πρῶτον δὴ οὖν πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὁρισώμεθα παιδείαν τί ποτʼ ἐστὶν καὶ τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει· διὰ γὰρ ταύτης φαμὲν ἰτέον εἶναι τὸν προκεχειρισμένον ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγον ὑφʼ ἡμῶν, μέχριπερ ἂν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀφίκηται.
ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν δρῶμεν ταῦτα, εἴπερ σοί γε ἡδύ.
ΑΘ. λέγοντος τοίνυν ἐμοῦ τί ποτε χρὴ φάναι παιδείαν εἶναι, σκέψασθε ἂν ἀρέσκῃ τὸ λεχθέν.
ΚΛ. λέγοις ἄν.
ΑΘ. λέγω δή, καί φημι τὸν ὁτιοῦν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐκ παίδων εὐθὺς μελετᾶν δεῖν, παίζοντά τε καὶ σπουδάζοντα ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πράγματος ἑκάστοις προσήκουσιν. οἷον τὸν μέλλοντα ἀγαθὸν ἔσεσθαι γεωργὸν ἤ τινα οἰκοδόμον, τὸν μὲν οἰκοδομοῦντά τι τῶν παιδείων οἰκοδομημάτων παίζειν χρή, τὸν δʼ αὖ γεωργοῦντα, καὶ ὄργανα ἑκατέρῳ σμικρά, τῶν ἀληθινῶν μιμήματα, παρασκευάζειν τὸν τρέφοντα αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα προμεμαθηκέναι προμανθάνειν, οἷον τέκτονα μετρεῖν ἢ σταθμᾶσθαι καὶ πολεμικὸν ἱππεύειν παίζοντα ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων ἄλλο ποιοῦντα, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι διὰ τῶν παιδιῶν ἐκεῖσε τρέπειν τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τῶν παίδων, οἷ ἀφικομένους αὐτοὺς δεῖ τέλος ἔχειν. κεφάλαιον δὴ παιδείας λέγομεν τὴν ὀρθὴν τροφήν, ἣ τοῦ παίζοντος τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς ἔρωτα μάλιστα ἄξει τούτου ὃ δεήσει γενόμενον ἄνδρʼ αὐτὸν τέλειον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρετῆς· ὁρᾶτε οὖν εἰ μέχρι τούτου γε, ὅπερ εἶπον, ὑμῖν ἀρέσκει τὸ λεχθέν.
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ΑΘ. μὴ τοίνυν μηδʼ ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι παιδείαν ἀόριστον γένηται. νῦν γὰρ ὀνειδίζοντες ἐπαινοῦντές θʼ ἑκάστων τὰς τροφάς, λέγομεν ὡς τὸν μὲν πεπαιδευμένον ἡμῶν ὄντα τινά, τὸν δὲ ἀπαίδευτον ἐνίοτε εἴς τε καπηλείας καὶ ναυκληρίας καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων μάλα πεπαιδευμένων σφόδρα ἀνθρώπων· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ἡγουμένων, ὡς ἔοικʼ, εἶναι παιδείαν ὁ νῦν λόγος ἂν εἴη, τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παίδων παιδείαν, ποιοῦσαν ἐπιθυμητήν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης.
Clin. Then our forefathers became guest-friends of yours, and ever since both my fathers and I myself have cherished an affection for Athens.
Ath. Evidently, then, you are both ready to play your part as listeners. But as for my part, though the will is there, to compass the task is hard: still, I must try. In the first place, then, our argument requires that we should define education and describe its effects: that is the path on which our present discourse must proceed until it finally arrives at the god of Wine.
Clin. By all means let us do so, since it is your wish.
Ath. Then while I am stating how education ought to be defined, you must be considering whether you are satisfied with my statement.
Clin. Proceed with your statement.
Ath. I will. What I assert is that every man who is going to be good at any pursuit must practice that special pursuit from infancy, by using all the implements of his pursuit both in his play and in his work. For example, the man who is to make a good builder must play at building toy houses, and to make a good farmer he must play at tilling land; and those who are rearing them must provide each child with toy tools modelled on real ones. Besides this, they ought to have elementary instruction in all the necessary subjects,—the carpenter, for instance, being taught in play the use of rule and measure, the soldier taught riding or some similar accomplishment. So, by means of their games, we should endeavor to turn the tastes and desires of the children in the direction of that object which forms their ultimate goal. First and foremost, education, we say, consists in that right nurture which most strongly draws the soul of the child when at play to a love for that pursuit of which, when he becomes a man, he must possess a perfect mastery. Now consider, as I said before, whether, up to this point, you are satisfied with this statement of mine.
Clin. Certainly we are.
Ath. But we must not allow our description of education to remain indefinite. For at present, when censuring or commending a man’s upbringing, we describe one man as educated and another as uneducated, though the latter may often be uncommonly well educated in the trade of a pedlar or a skipper, or some other similar occupation. But we, naturally, in our present discourse are not taking the view that such things as these make up education: the education we speak of is training from childhood in goodness, which makes a man eagerly desirous of becoming a perfect citizen, understanding how both to rule and be ruled righteously.
ΑΘ. ταύτην τὴν τροφὴν ἀφορισάμενος ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, νῦν βούλοιτʼ ἂν μόνην παιδείαν προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δὲ εἰς χρήματα τείνουσαν ἤ τινα πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἢ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ σοφίαν ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ δίκης, βάναυσόν τʼ εἶναι καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐκ ἀξίαν τὸ παράπαν παιδείαν καλεῖσθαι. ἡμεῖς δὴ μηδὲν ὀνόματι διαφερώμεθʼ αὑτοῖς, ἀλλʼ ὁ νυνδὴ λόγος ἡμῖν ὁμολογηθεὶς μενέτω, ὡς οἵ γε ὀρθῶς πεπαιδευμένοι σχεδὸν ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται, καὶ δεῖ δὴ τὴν παιδείαν μηδαμοῦ ἀτιμάζειν, ὡς πρῶτον τῶν καλλίστων τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἀνδράσιν παραγιγνόμενον· καὶ εἴ ποτε ἐξέρχεται, δυνατὸν δʼ ἐστὶν ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, τοῦτʼ ἀεὶ δραστέον διὰ βίου παντὶ κατὰ δύναμιν.
ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς, καὶ συγχωροῦμεν ἃ λέγεις.
ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν πάλαι γε συνεχωρήσαμεν ὡς ἀγαθῶν μὲν ὄντων τῶν δυναμένων ἄρχειν αὑτῶν, κακῶν δὲ τῶν μή.
ΚΛ. λέγεις ὀρθότατα.
ΑΘ. σαφέστερον ἔτι τοίνυν ἀναλάβωμεν τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ ὅτι ποτὲ λέγομεν. καί μοι διʼ εἰκόνος ἀποδέξασθε ἐάν πως δυνατὸς ὑμῖν γένωμαι δηλῶσαι τὸ τοιοῦτον.
ΚΛ. λέγε μόνον.
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ἕνα μὲν ἡμῶν ἕκαστον αὐτὸν τιθῶμεν;
ΚΛ. ναί.
ΑΘ. δύο δὲ κεκτημένον ἐν αὑτῷ συμβούλω ἐναντίω τε καὶ ἄφρονε, ὣ προσαγορεύομεν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην;
ΚΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
ΑΘ. πρὸς δὲ τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν αὖ δόξας μελλόντων, οἷν κοινὸν μὲν ὄνομα ἐλπίς, ἴδιον δέ, φόβος μὲν ἡ πρὸ λύπης ἐλπίς, θάρρος δὲ ἡ πρὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου· ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις λογισμὸς ὅτι ποτʼ αὐτῶν ἄμεινον ἢ χεῖρον, ὃς γενόμενος δόγμα πόλεως κοινὸν νόμος ἐπωνόμασται.
ΚΛ. μόγις μέν πως ἐφέπομαι, λέγε μὴν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα ὡς ἑπομένου.
ΜΕ. καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ μὴν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πάθος ἔνι.
ΑΘ. περὶ δὴ τούτων διανοηθῶμεν οὑτωσί. θαῦμα μὲν ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ἡγησώμεθα τῶν ζῴων θεῖον, εἴτε ὡς παίγνιον ἐκείνων εἴτε ὡς σπουδῇ τινι συνεστηκός· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γε γιγνώσκομεν, τόδε δὲ ἴσμεν, ὅτι ταῦτα τὰ πάθη ἐν ἡμῖν οἷον νεῦρα ἢ σμήρινθοί τινες ἐνοῦσαι σπῶσίν τε ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἀνθέλκουσιν ἐναντίαι οὖσαι ἐπʼ ἐναντίας πράξεις, οὗ δὴ διωρισμένη ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία κεῖται.
Ath. This is the special form of nurture to which, as I suppose, our present argument would confine the term “education” whereas an upbringing which aims only at money-making or physical strength, or even some mental accomplishment devoid of reason and justice, it would term vulgar and illiberal and utterly unworthy of the name “education.” Let us not, however, quarrel over a name, but let us abide by the statement we agreed upon just now, that those who are rightly educated become, as a rule, good, and that one should in no case disparage education, since it stands first among the finest gifts that are given to the best men; and if ever it errs from the right path, but can be put straight again, to this task every man, so long as he lives, must address himself with all his might.
Clin. You are right, and we agree with what you say.
Ath. Further, we agreed long ago that if men are capable of ruling themselves, they are good, but if incapable, bad.
Clin. Quite true.
Ath. Let us, then, re-state more clearly what we meant by this. With your permission, I will make use of an illustration in the hope of explaining the matter.
Clin. Go ahead.
Ath. May we assume that each of us by himself is a single unit?
Clin. Yes.
Ath. And that each possesses within himself two antagonistic and foolish counsellors, whom we call by the names of pleasure and pain?
Clin. That is so.
Ath. And that, besides these two, each man possesses opinions about the future, which go by the general name of “expectations”; and of these, that which precedes pain bears the special name of “fear,” and that which precedes pleasure the special name of “confidence”; and in addition to all these there is “calculation,” pronouncing which of them is good, which bad; and “calculation,” when it has become the public decree of the State, is named “law.”
Clin. I have some difficulty in keeping pace with you: assume, however, that I do so, and proceed.
Meg. I am in exactly the same predicament.
Ath. Let us conceive of the matter in this way. Let us suppose that each of us living creatures is an ingenious puppet of the gods, whether contrived by way of a toy of theirs or for some serious purpose—for as to that we know nothing; but this we do know, that these inward affections of ours, like sinews or cords, drag us along and, being opposed to each other, pull one against the other to opposite actions; and herein lies the dividing line between goodness and badness.
ΑΘ. μιᾷ γάρ φησιν ὁ λόγος δεῖν τῶν ἕλξεων συνεπόμενον ἀεὶ καὶ μηδαμῇ ἀπολειπόμενον ἐκείνης, ἀνθέλκειν τοῖς ἄλλοις νεύροις ἕκαστον, ταύτην δʼ εἶναι τὴν τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἀγωγὴν χρυσῆν καὶ ἱεράν, τῆς πόλεως κοινὸν νόμον ἐπικαλουμένην, ἄλλας δὲ σκληρὰς καὶ σιδηρᾶς, τὴν δὲ μαλακὴν ἅτε χρυσῆν οὖσαν, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας παντοδαποῖς εἴδεσιν ὁμοίας. δεῖν δὴ τῇ καλλίστῃ ἀγωγῇ τῇ τοῦ νόμου ἀεὶ συλλαμβάνειν· ἅτε γὰρ τοῦ λογισμοῦ καλοῦ μὲν ὄντος, πρᾴου δὲ καὶ οὐ βιαίου, δεῖσθαι ὑπηρετῶν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀγωγήν, ὅπως ἂν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ χρυσοῦν γένος νικᾷ τὰ ἄλλα γένη. καὶ οὕτω δὴ περὶ θαυμάτων ὡς ὄντων ἡμῶν ὁ μῦθος ἀρετῆς σεσωμένος ἂν εἴη, καὶ τὸ κρείττω ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἥττω εἶναι τρόπον τινὰ φανερὸν ἂν γίγνοιτο μᾶλλον ὃ νοεῖ, καὶ ὅτι πόλιν καὶ ἰδιώτην, τὸν μὲν λόγον ἀληθῆ λαβόντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ περὶ τῶν ἕλξεων τούτων, τούτῳ ἑπόμενον δεῖ ζῆν, πόλιν δὲ ἢ παρὰ θεῶν τινος ἢ παρὰ τούτου τοῦ γνόντος ταῦτα λόγον παραλαβοῦσαν, νόμον θεμένην, αὑτῇ τε ὁμιλεῖν καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν. οὕτω καὶ κακία δὴ καὶ ἀρετὴ σαφέστερον ἡμῖν διηρθρωμένον ἂν εἴη· ἐναργεστέρου δʼ αὐτοῦ γενομένου καὶ παιδεία καὶ τἆλλα ἐπιτηδεύματα ἴσως ἔσται μᾶλλον καταφανῆ, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς οἴνοις διατριβῆς, ὃ δοξασθείη μὲν ἂν εἶναι φαύλου πέρι μῆκος πολὺ λόγων περιττὸν εἰρημένον, φανείη δὲ τάχʼ ἂν ἴσως τοῦ μήκους γʼ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀπάξιον.
ΚΛ. εὖ λέγεις, καὶ περαίνωμεν ὅτιπερ ἂν τῆς γε νῦν διατριβῆς ἄξιον γίγνηται.
ΑΘ. λέγε δή· προσφέροντες τῷ θαύματι τούτῳ τὴν μέθην, ποῖόν τί ποτε αὐτὸ ἀπεργαζόμεθα;
ΚΛ. πρὸς τί δὲ σκοπούμενος αὐτὸ ἐπανερωτᾷς;
ΑΘ. οὐδέν πω πρὸς ὅτι, τοῦτο δὲ ὅλως κοινωνῆσαν τούτῳ ποῖόν τι συμπίπτει γίγνεσθαι. ἔτι δὲ σαφέστερον ὃ βούλομαι πειράσομαι φράζειν. ἐρωτῶ γὰρ τὸ τοιόνδε· ἆρα σφοδροτέρας τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ θυμοὺς καὶ ἔρωτας ἡ τῶν οἴνων πόσις ἐπιτείνει;
ΚΛ. πολύ γε.
ΑΘ. τί δʼ αὖ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ μνήμας καὶ δόξας καὶ φρονήσεις; πότερον ὡσαύτως σφοδροτέρας; ἢ πάμπαν ἀπολείπει ταῦτα αὐτόν, ἂν κατακορής τις τῇ μέθῃ γίγνηται;
ΚΛ. ναί, πάμπαν ἀπολείπει.
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀφικνεῖται τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξιν τῇ τότε ὅτε νέος ἦν παῖς;
ΚΛ. τί μήν;
ΑΘ. ἥκιστα δὴ τότʼ ἂν αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ γίγνοιτο ἐγκρατής.
Ath. For, as our argument declares, there is one of these pulling forces which every man should always follow and nohow leave hold of, counteracting thereby the pull of the other sinews: it is the leading-string, golden and holy, of “calculation,” entitled the public law of the State; and whereas the other cords are hard and steely and of every possible shape and semblance, this one is flexible and uniform, since it is of gold. With that most excellent leading-string of the law we must needs co-operate always; for since calculation is excellent, but gentle rather than forceful, its leading-string needs helpers to ensure that the golden kind within us may vanquish the other kinds. In this way our story comparing ourselves to puppets will not fall flat, and the meaning of the terms “self-superior” and “self-inferior” will become somewhat more clear, and also how necessary it is for the individual man to grasp the true account of these inward pulling forces and to live in accordance therewith, and how necessary for the State (when it has received such an account either from a god or from a man who knows) to make this into a law for itself and be guided thereby in its intercourse both with itself and with all other States. Thus both badness and goodness would be differentiated for us more clearly; and these having become more evident, probably education also and the other institutions will appear less obscure; and about the institution of the wine-party in particular it may very likely be shown that it is by no means, as might be thought, a paltry matter which it is absurd to discuss at great length but rather a matter which folly merits prolonged discussion.
Clin. Quite right: let us go through with every topic that seems important for the present discussion.
Ath. Tell me now: if we give strong drink to this puppet of ours, what effect will it have on its character?
Clin. In reference to what particular do you ask this question?
Ath. To no particular, for the moment: I am putting the question in general terms—“when this shares in that, what sort of thing does it become in consequence?” I will try to convey my meaning still more clearly: what I ask is this—does the drinking of wine intensify pleasures and pains and passions and lusts?
Clin. Yes, greatly.
Ath. And how about sensations and recollections and opinions and thoughts? Does it make them likewise more intense? Or rather, do not these quit a man entirely if he becomes surfeited with drink?
Clin. Yes, they quit him entirely.
Ath. He then arrives at the same condition of soul as when he was a young child?
Clin. He does.
Ath. So at that moment he will have very little control of himself?
ΚΛ. ἥκιστα.
ΑΘ. ἆρʼ οὖν πονηρότατος, φαμέν, ὁ τοιοῦτος;
ΚΛ. πολύ γε.
ΑΘ. οὐ μόνον ἄρʼ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ γέρων δὶς παῖς γίγνοιτʼ ἄν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ μεθυσθείς.
ΚΛ. ἄριστα εἶπες, ὦ ξένε.
ΑΘ. τούτου δὴ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος ἔσθʼ ὅστις λόγος ἐπιχειρήσει πείθειν ἡμᾶς ὡς χρὴ γεύεσθαι καὶ μὴ φεύγειν παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν;
ΚΛ. ἔοικʼ εἶναι· σὺ γοῦν φῂς καὶ ἕτοιμος ἦσθα νυνδὴ λέγειν.
ΑΘ. ἀληθῆ μέντοι μνημονεύεις· καὶ νῦν γʼ εἴμʼ ἕτοιμος, ἐπειδήπερ σφώ γε ἐθελήσειν προθύμως ἔφατον ἀκούειν.
ΚΛ. πῶς δʼ οὐκ ἀκουσόμεθα; κἂν εἰ μηδενὸς ἄλλου χάριν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ θαυμαστοῦ τε καὶ ἀτόπου, εἰ δεῖ ἑκόντα ποτὲ ἄνθρωπον εἰς ἅπασαν φαυλότητα ἑαυτὸν ἐμβάλλειν.
ΑΘ. ψυχῆς λέγεις· ἦ γάρ;
ΚΛ. ναί.
ΑΘ. τί δέ; σώματος, ὦ ἑταῖρε, εἰς πονηρίαν, λεπτότητά τε καὶ αἶσχος καὶ ἀδυναμίαν, θαυμάζοιμεν ἂν εἴ ποτέ τις ἑκὼν ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικνεῖται;
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ΑΘ. τί οὖν; τοὺς εἰς τὰ ἰατρεῖα αὐτοὺς βαδίζοντας ἐπὶ φαρμακοποσίᾳ ἀγνοεῖν οἰόμεθα ὅτι μετʼ ὀλίγον ὕστερον καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰς ἡμέρας ἕξουσιν τοιοῦτον τὸ σῶμα, οἷον εἰ διὰ τέλους ἔχειν μέλλοιεν, ζῆν οὐκ ἂν δέξαιντο; ἢ τοὺς ἐπὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ πόνους ἰόντας οὐκ ἴσμεν ὡς ἀσθενεῖς εἰς τὸ παραχρῆμα γίγνονται;
ΚΛ. πάντα ταῦτα ἴσμεν.
ΑΘ. καὶ ὅτι τῆς μετὰ ταῦτα ὠφελίας ἕνεκα ἑκόντες πορεύονται;
ΚΛ. κάλλιστα.
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν χρὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων πέρι διανοεῖσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον;
ΚΛ. πάνυ γε.
ΑΘ. καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν οἶνον ἄρα διατριβῆς ὡσαύτως διανοητέον, εἴπερ ἔνι τοῦτο ἐν τούτοις ὀρθῶς διανοηθῆναι.
ΚΛ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ΑΘ. ἂν ἄρα τινὰ ἡμῖν ὠφελίαν ἔχουσα φαίνηται μηδὲν τῆς περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐλάττω, τῇ γε ἀρχῇ τὴν σωμασκίαν νικᾷ τῷ τὴν μὲν μετʼ ἀλγηδόνων εἶναι, τὴν δὲ μή.
ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις, θαυμάζοιμι δʼ ἂν εἴ τι δυναίμεθα τοιοῦτον ἐν αὐτῷ καταμαθεῖν.
ΑΘ. τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ δὴ νῦν, ὡς ἔοιχʼ, ἡμῖν ἤδη πειρατέον φράζειν. καί μοι λέγε· δύο φόβων εἴδη σχεδὸν ἐναντία δυνάμεθα κατανοῆσαι;
ΚΛ. ποῖα δή;
ΑΘ. τὰ τοιάδε· φοβούμεθα μέν που τὰ κακά, προσδοκῶντες γενήσεσθαι.
ΚΛ. ναί.
Clin. Very little.
Ath. And such a man is, we say, very bad?
Clin. Very, indeed.
Ath. It appears, then, that not the grey-beard only may be in his “second childhood,” but the drunkard as well.
Clin. An admirable observation, Stranger.
Ath. Is there any argument which will undertake to persuade us that this is a practice we ought to indulge in, instead of shunning it with all our might so far as we possibly can?
Clin. It appears that there is: at any rate you assert this, and you were ready just now to argue it.
Ath. You are right in your reminder, and I am still ready to do so, now that you and Megillus have both expressed your willingness to listen to me.
Clin. Of course we shall listen, if only on account of the surprising paradox that, of his own free will, a man ought to plunge into the depths of depravity.
Ath. Depravity of soul, you mean, do you not?
Clin. Yes.
Ath. And how about plunging into a bad state of body, such as leanness or ugliness or impotence? Should we be surprised if a man of his own free will ever got into such a state?
Clin. Of course we should.
Ath. Well then, do we suppose that persons who go of themselves to dispensaries to drink medicines are not aware that soon afterwards, and for many days to come, they will find themselves in a bodily condition such as would make life intolerable if it were to last for ever? And we know, do we not, that men who go to the gymnasia for hard training commence by becoming weaker?
Clin. All this we know.
Ath. We know also that they go there voluntarily for the sake of the subsequent benefit ?
Clin. Quite true.
Ath. Should one not take the same view of the other institutions also?
Clin. Certainly.
Ath. Then one must also take the same view of the practice of wine-drinking, if one can rightly class it amongst the others.
Clin. Of course one must.
Ath. If then this practice should be shown to be quite as beneficial for us as bodily training, certainly at the outset it is superior to it, in so far as it is not, like bodily training, accompanied by pain.
Clin. That is true; but I should be surprised if we succeeded in discovering in it any benefit.
Ath. That is precisely the point which we must at once try to make plain. Tell me now: can we discern two kinds of fear, of which the one is nearly the opposite of the other?
Clin. What kinds do you mean?
Ath. These: when we expect evils to occur, we fear them.
Clin. Yes.
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