ΣΩ. καί φασι μεγάλην τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκέναι αὐτούς· ὅτι δὲ οἰδεῖ καὶ ὕπουλός ἐστιν διʼ ἐκείνους τοὺς παλαιούς, οὐκ αἰσθάνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν ἐμπεπλήκασι τὴν πόλιν· ὅταν οὖν ἔλθῃ ἡ καταβολὴ αὕτη τῆς ἀσθενείας, τοὺς τότε παρόντας αἰτιάσονται συμβούλους, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Περικλέα ἐγκωμιάσουσιν, τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν· σοῦ δὲ ἴσως ἐπιλήψονται, ἐὰν μὴ εὐλαβῇ, καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἑταίρου Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὅταν καὶ τὰ ἀρχαῖα προσαπολλύωσι πρὸς οἷς ἐκτήσαντο, οὐκ αἰτίων ὄντων τῶν κακῶν ἀλλʼ ἴσως συναιτίων. καίτοι ἔγωγε ἀνόητον πρᾶγμα καὶ νῦν ὁρῶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀκούω τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν πέρι. αἰσθάνομαι γάρ, ὅταν ἡ πόλις τινὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν μεταχειρίζηται ὡς ἀδικοῦντα, ἀγανακτούντων καὶ σχετλιαζόντων ὡς δεινὰ πάσχουσι· πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκότες ἄρα ἀδίκως ὑπʼ αὐτῆς ἀπόλλυνται, ὡς ὁ τούτων λόγος. τὸ δὲ ὅλον ψεῦδός ἐστιν· προστάτης γὰρ πόλεως οὐδʼ ἂν εἷς ποτε ἀδίκως ἀπόλοιτο ὑπʼ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως ἧς προστατεῖ. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ταὐτὸν εἶναι, ὅσοι τε πολιτικοὶ προσποιοῦνται εἶναι καὶ ὅσοι σοφισταί. καὶ γὰρ οἱ σοφισταί, τἆλλα σοφοὶ ὄντες, τοῦτο ἄτοπον ἐργάζονται πρᾶγμα· φάσκοντες γὰρ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι εἶναι πολλάκις κατηγοροῦσιν τῶν μαθητῶν ὡς ἀδικοῦσι σφᾶς [αὑτούς], τούς τε μισθοὺς ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ ἄλλην χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντες, εὖ παθόντες ὑπʼ αὐτῶν. καὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγου τί ἂν ἀλογώτερον εἴη πρᾶγμα, ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους γενομένους, ἐξαιρεθέντας μὲν ἀδικίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου, σχόντας δὲ δικαιοσύνην, ἀδικεῖν τούτῳ ᾧ οὐκ ἔχουσιν; οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὦ ἑταῖρε; ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγορεῖν με ἠνάγκασας, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
ΚΑΛ. σὺ δʼ οὐκ ἂν οἷός τʼ εἴης λέγειν, εἰ μή τίς σοι ἀποκρίνοιτο;
ΣΩ. ἔοικά γε· νῦν γοῦν συχνοὺς τείνω τῶν λόγων, ἐπειδή μοι οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἀλλʼ, ὠγαθέ, εἰπὲ πρὸς Φιλίου, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἄλογον εἶναι ἀγαθὸν φάσκοντα πεποιηκέναι τινὰ μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ ὅτι ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθὸς γεγονώς τε καὶ ὢν ἔπειτα πονηρός ἐστιν;
ΚΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀκούεις τοιαῦτα λεγόντων τῶν φασκόντων παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετήν;
for they have filled the city full of harbours and docks and walls and revenues and all that, and have left no room for justice and temperance. And when the crisis of the disorder comes, the people will blame the advisers of the hour, and applaud Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, who are the real authors of their calamities; and if you are not careful they may assail you and my friend Alcibiades, when they are losing not only their new acquisitions, but also their original possessions; not that you are the authors of these misfortunes of theirs, although you may perhaps be accessories to them. A great piece of work is always being made, as I see and am told, now as of old; about our statesmen. When the State treats any of them as malefactors, I observe that there is a great uproar and indignation at the supposed wrong which is done to them; “after all their many services to the State, that they should unjustly perish,”—so the tale runs. But the cry is all a lie; for no statesman ever could be unjustly put to death by the city of which he is the head. The case of the professed statesman is, I believe, very much like that of the professed sophist; for the sophists, although they are wise men, are nevertheless guilty of a strange piece of folly; professing to be teachers of virtue, they will often accuse their disciples of wronging them, and defrauding them of their pay, and showing no gratitude for their services. Yet what can be more absurd than that men who have become just and good, and whose injustice has been taken away from them, and who have had justice implanted in them by their teachers, should act unjustly by reason of the injustice which is not in them? Can anything be more irrational, my friends, than this? You, Callicles, compel me to be a mob-orator, because you will not answer.
Callicles. And you are the man who cannot speak unless there is some one to answer?
Socrates. I suppose that I can; just now, at any rate, the speeches which I am making are long enough because you refuse to answer me. But I adjure you by the god of friendship, my good sir, do tell me whether there does not appear to you to be a great inconsistency in saying that you have made a man good, and then blaming him for being bad?
Callicles. Yes, it appears so to me.
Socrates. Do you never hear our professors of education speaking in this inconsistent manner?
CALLICLES:
ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων πέρι οὐδενὸς ἀξίων;
ΣΩ. τί δʼ ἂν περὶ ἐκείνων λέγοις, οἳ φάσκοντες προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, πάλιν αὐτῆς κατηγοροῦσιν, ὅταν τύχωσιν, ὡς πονηροτάτης; οἴει τι διαφέρειν τούτους ἐκείνων; ταὐτόν, ὦ μακάριʼ, ἐστὶν σοφιστὴς καὶ ῥήτωρ, ἢ ἐγγύς τι καὶ παραπλήσιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρὸς Πῶλον· σὺ δὲ διʼ ἄγνοιαν τὸ μὲν πάγκαλόν τι οἴει εἶναι, τὴν ῥητορικήν, τοῦ δὲ καταφρονεῖς. τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ κάλλιόν ἐστιν σοφιστικὴ ῥητορικῆς ὅσῳπερ νομοθετικὴ δικαστικῆς καὶ γυμναστικὴ ἰατρικῆς· μόνοις δʼ ἔγωγε καὶ ᾤμην τοῖς δημηγόροις τε καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι ὃ αὐτοὶ παιδεύουσιν, ὡς πονηρόν ἐστιν εἰς σφᾶς, ἢ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ ἅμα καὶ ἑαυτῶν κατηγορεῖν ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφελήκασιν οὕς φασιν ὠφελεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. καὶ προέσθαι γε δήπου τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μόνοις τούτοις ἐνεχώρει, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον. ἄλλην μὲν γὰρ εὐεργεσίαν τις εὐεργετηθείς, οἷον ταχὺς γενόμενος διὰ παιδοτρίβην, ἴσως ἂν ἀποστερήσειε τὴν χάριν, εἰ προοῖτο αὐτῷ ὁ παιδοτρίβης καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος αὐτῷ μισθὸν ὅτι μάλιστα ἅμα μεταδιδοὺς τοῦ τάχους λαμβάνοι τὸ ἀργύριον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῇ βραδυτῆτι οἶμαι ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλʼ ἀδικίᾳ· ἦ γάρ;
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν ἀδικίαν, οὐδὲν δεινὸν αὐτῷ μήποτε ἀδικηθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἀσφαλὲς ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν προέσθαι, εἴπερ τῷ ὄντι δύναιτό τις ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν. οὐχ οὕτω;
ΚΑΛ. φημί.
ΣΩ. διὰ ταῦτʼ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας συμβουλὰς συμβουλεύειν λαμβάνοντα ἀργύριον, οἷον οἰκοδομίας πέρι ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν.
ΚΑΛ. ἔοικέ γε.
ΣΩ. περὶ δέ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, ὅντινʼ ἄν τις τρόπον ὡς βέλτιστος εἴη καὶ ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ ἢ πόλιν, αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται μὴ φάναι συμβουλεύειν, ἐὰν μή τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον διδῷ. ἦ γάρ;
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο αἴτιόν ἐστιν, ὅτι μόνη αὕτη τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν τὸν εὖ παθόντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ ἀντʼ εὖ ποιεῖν, ὥστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀντʼ εὖ πείσεται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ. ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα;
Yes, but why talk of men who are good for nothing?
Socrates. I would rather say, why talk of men who profess to be rulers, and declare that they are devoted to the improvement of the city, and nevertheless upon occasion declaim against the utter vileness of the city:—do you think that there is any difference between one and the other? My good friend, the sophist and the rhetorician, as I was saying to Polus, are the same, or nearly the same; but you ignorantly fancy that rhetoric is a perfect thing, and sophistry a thing to be despised; whereas the truth is, that sophistry is as much superior to rhetoric as legislation is to the practice of law, or gymnastic to medicine. The orators and sophists, as I am inclined to think, are the only class who cannot complain of the mischief ensuing to themselves from that which they teach others, without in the same breath accusing themselves of having done no good to those whom they profess to benefit. Is not this a fact?
Callicles. Certainly it is.
Socrates. If they were right in saying that they make men better, then they are the only class who can afford to leave their remuneration to those who have been benefited by them. Whereas if a man has been benefited in any other way, if, for example, he has been taught to run by a trainer, he might possibly defraud him of his pay, if the trainer left the matter to him, and made no agreement with him that he should receive money as soon as he had given him the utmost speed; for not because of any deficiency of speed do men act unjustly, but by reason of injustice.
Callicles. Very true.
Socrates. And he who removes injustice can be in no danger of being treated unjustly: he alone can safely leave the honorarium to his pupils, if he be really able to make them good—am I not right?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. Then we have found the reason why there is no dishonour in a man receiving pay who is called in to advise about building or any other art?
Callicles. Yes, we have found the reason.
Socrates. But when the point is, how a man may become best himself, and best govern his family and state, then to say that you will give no advice gratis is held to be dishonourable?
Callicles. True.
Socrates. And why? Because only such benefits call forth a desire to requite them, and there is evidence that a benefit has been conferred when the benefactor receives a return; otherwise not. Is this true?
Callicles. It is.
Socrates. Then to which service of the State do you invite me? determine for me. Am I to be the physician of the
ΚΑΛ. ἔστιν.
ΣΩ. ἐπὶ ποτέραν οὖν με παρακαλεῖς τὴν θεραπείαν τῆς πόλεως, διόρισόν μοι· τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι Ἀθηναίοις ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται, ὡς ἰατρόν, ἢ ὡς διακονήσοντα καὶ πρὸς χάριν ὁμιλήσοντα; τἀληθῆ μοι εἰπέ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· δίκαιος γὰρ εἶ, ὥσπερ ἤρξω παρρησιάζεσθαι πρὸς ἐμέ, διατελεῖν ἃ νοεῖς λέγων. καὶ νῦν εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ.
ΚΑΛ. λέγω τοίνυν ὅτι ὡς διακονήσοντα.
ΣΩ. κολακεύσοντα ἄρα με, ὦ γενναιότατε, παρακαλεῖς.
ΚΑΛ. εἴ σοι Μυσόν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὡς εἰ μὴ ταῦτά γε ποιήσεις—
ΣΩ. μὴ εἴπῃς ὃ πολλάκις εἴρηκας, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ με ὁ βουλόμενος, ἵνα μὴ αὖ καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι Πονηρός γε ὢν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα· μηδʼ ὅτι ἀφαιρήσεται ἐάν τι ἔχω, ἵνα μὴ αὖ ἐγὼ εἴπω ὅτι ἀλλʼ ἀφελόμενος οὐχ ἕξει ὅτι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ με ἀδίκως ἀφείλετο, οὕτως καὶ λαβὼν ἀδίκως χρήσεται, εἰ δὲ ἀδίκως, αἰσχρῶς, εἰ δὲ αἰσχρῶς, κακῶς.
ΚΑΛ. ὥς μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πιστεύειν μηδʼ ἂν ἓν τούτων παθεῖν, ὡς οἰκῶν ἐκποδὼν καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰσαχθεὶς εἰς δικαστήριον ὑπὸ πάνυ ἴσως μοχθηροῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ φαύλου.
ΣΩ. ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μὴ οἴομαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ὁντινοῦν ἂν ὅτι τύχοι, τοῦτο παθεῖν. τόδε μέντοι εὖ οἶδʼ ὅτι, ἐάνπερ εἰσίω εἰς δικαστήριον περὶ τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων, ὃ σὺ λέγεις, πονηρός τίς μʼ ἔσται ὁ εἰσάγων—οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν χρηστὸς μὴ ἀδικοῦντʼ ἄνθρωπον εἰσαγάγοι—καὶ οὐδέν γε ἄτοπον εἰ ἀποθάνοιμι. βούλει σοι εἴπω διʼ ὅτι ταῦτα προσδοκῶ;
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. οἶμαι μετʼ ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν· ἅτε οὖν οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους οὓς λέγω ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων ποιεῖν ἃ σὺ παραινεῖς, τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα, οὐχ ἕξω ὅτι λέγω ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ. ὁ αὐτὸς δέ μοι ἥκει λόγος ὅνπερ πρὸς Πῶλον ἔλεγον· κρινοῦμαι γὰρ ὡς ἐν παιδίοις ἰατρὸς ἂν κρίνοιτο κατηγοροῦντος ὀψοποιοῦ.
State who will strive and struggle to make the Athenians as good as possible; or am I to be the servant and flatterer of the State? Speak out, my good friend, freely and fairly as you did at first and ought to do again, and tell me your entire mind.
Callicles. I say then that you should be the servant of the State.
Socrates. The flatterer? well, sir, that is a noble invitation.
Callicles. The Mysian, Socrates, or what you please. For if you refuse, the consequences will be—
Socrates. Do not repeat the old story—that he who likes will kill me and get my money; for then I shall have to repeat the old answer, that he will be a bad man and will kill the good, and that the money will be of no use to him, but that he will wrongly use that which he wrongly took, and if wrongly, basely, and if basely, hurtfully.
Callicles. How confident you are, Socrates, that you will never come to harm! you seem to think that you are living in another country, and can never be brought into a court of justice, as you very likely may be brought by some miserable and mean person.
Socrates. Then I must indeed be a fool, Callicles, if I do not know that in the Athenian State any man may suffer anything. And if I am brought to trial and incur the dangers of which you speak, he will be a villain who brings me to trial—of that I am very sure, for no good man would accuse the innocent. Nor shall I be surprised if I am put to death. Shall I tell you why I anticipate this?
Callicles. By all means.
Socrates. I think that I am the only or almost the only Athenian living who practises the true art of politics; I am the only politician of my time. Now, seeing that when I speak my words are not uttered with any view of gaining favour, and that I look to what is best and not to what is most pleasant, having no mind to use those arts and graces which you recommend, I shall have nothing to say in the justice court. And you might argue with me, as I was arguing with Polus:—I shall be tried just as a physician would be tried in a court of little boys at the indictment of the cook. What would he reply under such circumstances, if some one were to accuse him, saying, “O my boys, many evil things has this man done to you: he is the death of you, especially of the younger ones among you, cutting and burning and starving and suffocating you, until you know not what to do; he gives you the bitterest potions, and compels you to hunger and thirst. How unlike the variety of meats and
ΣΩ. σκόπει γάρ, τί ἂν ἀπολογοῖτο ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄνθρωπος ἐν τούτοις ληφθείς, εἰ αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῖ τις λέγων ὅτι «ὦ παῖδες, πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὅδε εἴργασται ἀνὴρ καὶ αὐτούς, καὶ τοὺς νεωτάτους ὑμῶν διαφθείρει τέμνων τε καὶ κάων, καὶ ἰσχναίνων καὶ πνίγων ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ, πικρότατα πώματα διδοὺς καὶ πεινῆν καὶ διψῆν ἀναγκάζων, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ πολλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ηὐώχουν ὑμᾶς·» τί ἂν οἴει ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κακῷ ἀποληφθέντα ἰατρὸν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν; ἢ εἰ εἴποι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὅτι «ταῦτα πάντα ἐγὼ ἐποίουν, ὦ παῖδες, ὑγιεινῶς,» πόσον τι οἴει ἂν ἀναβοῆσαι τοὺς τοιούτους δικαστάς; οὐ μέγα;
ΚΑΛ. ἴσως· οἴεσθαί γε χρή.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἴει ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορίᾳ ἂν αὐτὸν ἔχεσθαι ὅτι χρὴ εἰπεῖν;
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. τοιοῦτον μέντοι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδα ὅτι πάθος πάθοιμι ἂν εἰσελθὼν εἰς δικαστήριον. οὔτε γὰρ ἡδονὰς ἃς ἐκπεπόρικα ἕξω αὐτοῖς λέγειν, ἃς οὗτοι εὐεργεσίας καὶ ὠφελίας νομίζουσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὔτε τοὺς πορίζοντας ζηλῶ οὔτε οἷς πορίζεται· ἐάν τέ τίς με ἢ νεωτέρους φῇ διαφθείρειν ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα, ἢ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κακηγορεῖν λέγοντα πικροὺς λόγους ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ, οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἕξω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι δικαίως πάντα ταῦτα ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ πράττω τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τοῦτο, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν· ὥστε ἴσως, ὅτι ἂν τύχω, τοῦτο πείσομαι.
ΚΑΛ. δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς ἔχειν ἄνθρωπος ἐν πόλει οὕτως διακείμενος καὶ ἀδύνατος ὢν ἑαυτῷ βοηθεῖν;
ΣΩ. εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε ἓν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὃ σὺ πολλάκις ὡμολόγησας· εἰ βεβοηθηκὼς εἴη αὑτῷ, μήτε περὶ ἀνθρώπους μήτε περὶ θεοὺς ἄδικον μηδὲν μήτε εἰρηκὼς μήτε εἰργασμένος. αὕτη γὰρ τῆς βοηθείας ἑαυτῷ πολλάκις ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται κρατίστη εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐμέ τις ἐξελέγχοι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν ἀδύνατον ὄντα ἐμαυτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βοηθεῖν, αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις ἐξελεγχόμενος καὶ μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου, καὶ εἰ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ἀποθνῄσκοιμι, ἀγανακτοίην ἄν· εἰ δὲ κολακικῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐνδείᾳ τελευτῴην ἔγωγε, εὖ οἶδα ὅτι ῥᾳδίως ἴδοις ἄν με φέροντα τὸν θάνατον. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀποθνῄσκειν οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, ὅστις μὴ παντάπασιν ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἄνανδρός ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν φοβεῖται· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων γέμοντα τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς Ἅιδου ἀφικέσθαι πάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, σοὶ ἐγώ, ὡς τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἐθέλω λόγον λέξαι.
ΚΑΛ. ἀλλʼ ἐπείπερ γε καὶ τἆλλα ἐπέρανας, καὶ τοῦτο πέρανον.
sweets on which I feasted you!” What do you suppose that the physician would be able to reply when he found himself in such a predicament? If he told the truth he could only say, “All these evil things, my boys, I did for your health,” and then would there not just be a clamour among a jury like that? How they would cry out!
Callicles. I dare say.
Socrates. Would he not be utterly at a loss for a reply?
Callicles. He certainly would.
Socrates. And I too shall be treated in the same way, as I well know, if I am brought before the court. For I shall not be able to rehearse to the people the pleasures which I have procured for them, and which, although I am not disposed to envy either the procurers or enjoyers of them, are deemed by them to be benefits and advantages. And if any one says that I corrupt young men, and perplex their minds, or that I speak evil of old men, and use bitter words towards them, whether in private or public, it is useless for me to reply, as I truly might:—“All this I do for the sake of justice, and with a view to your interest, my judges, and to nothing else.” And therefore there is no saying what may happen to me.
Callicles. And do you think, Socrates, that a man who is thus defenceless is in a good position?
Socrates. Yes, Callicles, if he have that defence, which as you have often acknowledged he should have—if he be his own defence, and have never said or done anything wrong, either in respect of gods or men; and this has been repeatedly acknowledged by us to be the best sort of defence. And if any one could convict me of inability to defend myself or others after this sort, I should blush for shame, whether I was convicted before many, or before a few, or by myself alone; and if I died from want of ability to do so, that would indeed grieve me. But if I died because I have no powers of flattery or rhetoric, I am very sure that you would not find me repining at death. For no man who is not an utter fool and coward is afraid of death itself, but he is afraid of doing wrong. For to go to the world below having one’s soul full of injustice is the last and worst of all evils. And in proof of what I say, if you have no objection, I should like to tell you a story.
Callicles. Very well, proceed; and then we shall have done.
Socrates. Listen, then, as story-tellers say, to a very pretty
Cite This Text