ΣΩ. οἷον περὶ ὅτου βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβὼν σκόπει. νοσεῖ που ἄνθρωπος ὀφθαλμούς, ᾧ ὄνομα ὀφθαλμία;
ΚΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ΣΩ. οὐ δήπου καὶ ὑγιαίνει γε ἅμα τοὺς αὐτούς;
ΚΑΛ. οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ ὅταν τῆς ὀφθαλμίας ἀπαλλάττηται; ἆρα τότε καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ἀπαλλάττεται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ τελευτῶν ἅμα ἀμφοτέρων ἀπήλλακται;
ΚΑΛ. ἥκιστά γε.
ΣΩ. θαυμάσιον γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ ἄλογον γίγνεται· ἦ γάρ;
ΚΑΛ. σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐν μέρει οἶμαι ἑκάτερον καὶ λαμβάνει καὶ ἀπολλύει;
ΚΑΛ. φημί.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ ἀσθένειαν ὡσαύτως;
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. καὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτῆτα;
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τἀναντία τούτων, κακά τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα, ἐν μέρει λαμβάνει καὶ ἐν μέρει ἀπαλλάττεται ἑκατέρου;
ΚΑΛ. πάντως δήπου.
ΣΩ. ἐὰν εὕρωμεν ἄρα ἄττα ὧν ἅμα τε ἀπαλλάττεται ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἅμα ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε οὐκ ἂν εἴη τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν. ὁμολογοῦμεν ταῦτα; καὶ εὖ μάλα σκεψάμενος ἀποκρίνου.
ΚΑΛ. ἀλλʼ ὑπερφυῶς ὡς ὁμολογῶ.
ΣΩ. ἴθι δὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὡμολογημένα. τὸ πεινῆν ἔλεγες πότερον ἡδὺ ἢ ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι; αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν.
ΚΑΛ. ἀνιαρὸν ἔγωγε· τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἡδὺ λέγω.
ΣΩ. μανθάνω· ἀλλʼ οὖν τό γε πεινῆν αὐτὸ ἀνιαρόν. ἢ οὐχί;
ΚΑΛ. φημί.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ διψῆν;
ΚΑΛ. σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ, ἢ ὁμολογεῖς ἅπασαν ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι;
ΚΑΛ. ὁμολογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα.
ΣΩ. εἶεν· διψῶντα δὲ δὴ πίνειν ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡδὺ φῂς εἶναι;
ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τούτου οὗ λέγεις τὸ μὲν διψῶντα λυπούμενον δήπου ἐστίν;
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ πίνειν πλήρωσίς τε τῆς ἐνδείας καὶ ἡδονή;
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις;
ΚΑΛ. μάλιστα.
ΣΩ. διψῶντά γε.
ΚΑΛ. φημί.
ΣΩ. λυπούμενον;
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. αἰσθάνῃ οὖν τὸ συμβαῖνον, ὅτι λυπούμενον χαίρειν λέγεις ἅμα, ὅταν διψῶντα πίνειν λέγῃς; ἢ οὐχ ἅμα τοῦτο γίγνεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον καὶ χρόνον εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος βούλει; οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι διαφέρει. ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὔ;
ΚΑΛ. ἔστιν.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν εὖ γε πράττοντα κακῶς πράττειν ἅμα ἀδύνατον φῂς εἶναι.
have the complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia?
Callicles. To be sure.
Socrates. But he surely cannot have the same eyes well and sound at the same time?
Callicles. Certainly not.
Socrates. And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of the health of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid of them both together?
Callicles. Certainly not.
Socrates. That would surely be marvellous and absurd?
Callicles. Very.
Socrates. I suppose that he is affected by them, and gets rid of them in turns?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. And he may have strength and weakness in the same way, by fits?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. Or swiftness and slowness?
Callicles. Certainly.
Socrates. And does he have and not have good and happiness, and their opposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation?
Callicles. Certainly he has.
Socrates. If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the same time, clearly that cannot be good and evil—do we agree? Please not to answer without consideration.
Callicles. I entirely agree.
Socrates. Go back now to our former admissions.—Did you say that to hunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or painful?
Callicles. I said painful, but that to eat when you are hungry is pleasant.
Socrates. I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: am I not right?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. And thirst, too, is painful?
Callicles. Yes, very.
Socrates. Need I adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all wants or desires are painful?
Callicles. I agree, and therefore you need not adduce any more instances.
Socrates. Very good. And you would admit that to drink, when you are thirsty, is pleasant?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word “thirsty” implies pain?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. And the word “drinking” is expressive of pleasure, and of the satisfaction of the want?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. There is pleasure in drinking?
Callicles. Certainly.
Socrates. When you are thirsty?
Socrates. And in pain?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. Do you see the inference:—that pleasure and pain are simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they not simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same part, whether of the soul or the body?—which of them is affected cannot be supposed to be of any consequence: Is not this true?
Callicles. It is.
Socrates. You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune at the same time?
Callicles. Yes, I did.
Socrates. But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also
ΚΑΛ. φημὶ γάρ.
ΣΩ. ἀνιώμενον δέ γε χαίρειν δυνατὸν ὡμολόγηκας.
ΚΑΛ. φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνιᾶσθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἕτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.
ΚΑΛ. οὐκ οἶδʼ ἅττα σοφίζῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ἀκκίζῃ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· καὶ πρόιθί γε ἔτι εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν, [ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς] ἵνα εἰδῇς ὡς σοφὸς ὤν με νουθετεῖς. οὐχ ἅμα διψῶν τε ἕκαστος ἡμῶν πέπαυται καὶ ἅμα ἡδόμενος διὰ τοῦ πίνειν;
ΚΑΛ. οὐκ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις.
ΓΟΡ. μηδαμῶς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλʼ ἀποκρίνου καὶ ἡμῶν ἕνεκα, ἵνα περανθῶσιν οἱ λόγοι.
ΚΑΛ. ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν Σωκράτης, ὦ Γοργία· σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια ἀνερωτᾷ καὶ ἐξελέγχει.
ΓΟΡ. ἀλλὰ τί σοὶ διαφέρει; πάντως οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ τιμή, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· ἀλλʼ ὑπόσχες Σωκράτει ἐξελέγξαι ὅπως ἂν βούληται.
ΚΑΛ. Ἐρώτα δὴ σὺ τὰ σμικρά τε καὶ στενὰ ταῦτα, ἐπείπερ Γοργίᾳ δοκεῖ οὕτως.
ΣΩ. εὐδαίμων εἶ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμικρά· ἐγὼ δʼ οὐκ ᾤμην θεμιτὸν εἶναι. ὅθεν οὖν ἀπέλιπες ἀποκρίνου, εἰ οὐχ ἅμα παύεται διψῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν καὶ ἡδόμενος.
ΚΑΛ. φημί.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ πεινῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται;
ΚΑΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται;
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν γε καὶ κακῶν οὐχ ἅμα παύεται, ὡς σὺ ὡμολόγεις· νῦν δὲ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς;
ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε· τί οὖν δή;
ΣΩ. ὅτι οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὦ φίλε, τἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἡδέσιν οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνιαροῖς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅμα παύεται, τῶν δὲ οὔ, ὡς ἑτέρων ὄντων· πῶς οὖν ταὐτὰ ἂν εἴη τὰ ἡδέα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ τοῖς κακοῖς; ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, καὶ τῇδε ἐπίσκεψαι (οἶμαι γάρ σοι οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ὁμολογεῖσθαι· ἄθρει δέ) τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῇ;
ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας καλεῖς ἄφρονας καὶ δειλούς; οὐ γὰρ ἄρτι γε, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους καὶ φρονίμους ἔλεγες· ἢ οὐ τούτους ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς;
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. τί δέ; παῖδα ἀνόητον χαίροντα ἤδη εἶδες;
ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. ἄνδρα δὲ οὔπω εἶδες ἀνόητον χαίροντα;
ΚΑΛ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο;
ΣΩ. οὐδέν· ἀλλʼ ἀποκρίνου.
ΚΑΛ. εἶδον.
have pleasure?
Callicles. Clearly.
Socrates. Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant?
Callicles. I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means.
Socrates. You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know.
Callicles. Well, get on, and don’t keep fooling: then you will know what a wiseacre you are in your admonition of me.
Socrates. Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in drinking at the same time?
Callicles. I do not understand what you are saying.
Gorgias. Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes;—we should like to hear the argument out.
Callicles. Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling of Socrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions.
Gorgias. What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let Socrates argue in his own fashion.
Callicles. Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these little peddling questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them.
Socrates. I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the great mysteries before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought that this was not allowable. But to return to our argument:—Does not a man cease from thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking at the same moment?
Callicles. True.
Socrates. And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not cease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment?
Callicles. Very true.
Socrates. Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, as you have admitted: do you still adhere to what you said?
Callicles. Yes, I do; but what is the inference?
Socrates. Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the same as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good and evil, for they are different. How then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil? And I would have you look at the matter in another light, which could hardly, I think, have been considered by you when you identified them: Are not the good good because they have good present with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present with them?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were saying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good—would you not say so?
Callicles. Certainly.
Socrates. And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing?
Callicles. Yes, I have.
Socrates. And a foolish man too?
Callicles. Yes, certainly; but what is your drift?
SOCRATES:
ΣΩ. τί δέ; νοῦν ἔχοντα λυπούμενον καὶ χαίροντα;
ΚΑΛ. φημί.
ΣΩ. πότεροι δὲ μᾶλλον χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται, οἱ φρόνιμοι ἢ οἱ ἄφρονες;
ΚΑΛ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε οὐ πολύ τι διαφέρειν.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἀρκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο. ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ ἤδη εἶδες ἄνδρα δειλόν;
ΚΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ἀπιόντων τῶν πολεμίων πότεροί σοι ἐδόκουν μᾶλλον χαίρειν, οἱ δειλοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;
ΚΑΛ. ἀμφότεροι ἔμοιγε [μᾶλλον]· εἰ δὲ μή, παραπλησίως γε.
ΣΩ. οὐδὲν διαφέρει. χαίρουσιν δʼ οὖν καὶ οἱ δειλοί;
ΚΑΛ. σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες, ὡς ἔοικεν.
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. προσιόντων δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ μόνον λυποῦνται ἢ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;
ΚΑΛ. ἀμφότεροι.
ΣΩ. ἆρα ὁμοίως;
ΚΑΛ. μᾶλλον ἴσως οἱ δειλοί.
ΣΩ. ἀπιόντων δʼ οὐ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν;
ΚΑΛ. ἴσως.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν λυποῦνται μὲν καὶ χαίρουσιν καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι παραπλησίως, ὡς σὺ φῄς, μᾶλλον δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ τῶν ἀνδρείων;
ΚΑΛ. φημί.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀγαθοί, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες κακοί;
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. παραπλησίως ἄρα χαίρουσιν καὶ λυποῦνται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί;
ΚΑΛ. φημί.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοί τε καὶ οἱ κακοί; ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ [οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί] εἰσιν οἱ κακοί;
ΚΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅτι λέγεις.
ΣΩ. οὐκ οἶσθʼ ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φῂς παρουσίᾳ εἶναι ἀγαθούς, καὶ κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν; τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τὰς ἡδονάς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἀνίας;
ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῖς χαίρουσιν πάρεστιν τἀγαθά, αἱ ἡδοναί, εἴπερ χαίρουσιν;
ΚΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων ἀγαθοί εἰσιν οἱ χαίροντες;
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. τί δέ; τοῖς ἀνιωμένοις οὐ πάρεστιν τὰ κακά, αἱ λῦπαι;
ΚΑΛ. πάρεστιν.
ΣΩ. κακῶν δέ γε παρουσίᾳ φῂς σὺ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς κακούς· ἢ οὐκέτι φῄς;
ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. ἀγαθοὶ ἄρα οἳ ἂν χαίρωσι, κακοὶ δὲ οἳ ἂν ἀνιῶνται;
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. οἳ μέν γε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον, οἳ δʼ ἧττον ἧττον, οἳ δὲ παραπλησίως παραπλησίως;
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν φῂς παραπλησίως χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τοὺς φρονίμους καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ τοὺς δειλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τοὺς δειλούς;
ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
Nothing particular, if you will only answer.
Callicles. Yes, I have.
Socrates. And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. Which rejoice and sorrow most—the wise or the foolish?
Callicles. They are much upon a par, I think, in that respect.
Socrates. Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle?
Callicles. To be sure.
Socrates. And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the coward or the brave?
Callicles. I should say “most” of both; or at any rate, they rejoiced about equally.
Socrates. No matter; then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice?
Callicles. Greatly.
Socrates. And the foolish; so it would seem?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their enemies, or are the brave also pained?
Callicles. Both are pained.
Socrates. And are they equally pained?
Callicles. I should imagine that the cowards are more pained.
Socrates. And are they not better pleased at the enemy’s departure?
Callicles. I dare say.
Socrates. Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the brave all pleased and pained, as you were saying, in nearly equal degree; but are the cowards more pleased and pained than the brave?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and the cowardly are the bad?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly equal degree?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal degree, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? (i.e. in having more pleasure and more pain.)
Callicles. I really do not know what you mean.
Socrates. Why, do you not remember saying that the good were good because good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that pleasures were goods and pains evils?
Callicles. Yes, I remember.
Socrates. And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who rejoice—if they do rejoice?
Callicles. Certainly.
Socrates. Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with them?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with them?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of the presence of evil?
Callicles. I should.
Socrates. Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain evil?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of pleasure and of pain?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy and pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has more?
Callicles. I should say that he has.
Socrates. Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from our admissions; for it is good to repeat and review wh
ΣΩ. συλλόγισαι δὴ κοινῇ μετʼ ἐμοῦ τί ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων· καὶ δὶς γάρ τοι καὶ τρίς φασιν καλὸν εἶναι τὰ καλὰ λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν φαμεν. ἦ γάρ;
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἄφρονα καὶ δειλόν;
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. ἀγαθὸν δὲ αὖ τὸν χαίροντα;
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἀνιώμενον;
ΚΑΛ. ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. ἀνιᾶσθαι δὲ καὶ χαίρειν τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ὁμοίως, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον τὸν κακόν;
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁμοίως γίγνεται κακὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸς ὁ κακός; οὐ ταῦτα συμβαίνει καὶ τὰ πρότερα ἐκεῖνα, ἐάν τις ταὐτὰ φῇ ἡδέα τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι; οὐ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;
ΚΑΛ. πάλαι τοί σου ἀκροῶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καθομολογῶν, ἐνθυμούμενος ὅτι, κἂν παίζων τίς σοι ἐνδῷ ὁτιοῦν, τούτου ἅσμενος ἔχῃ ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια. ὡς δὴ σὺ οἴει ἐμὲ ἢ καὶ ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους.
ΣΩ. ἰοῦ ἰοῦ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς πανοῦργος εἶ καί μοι ὥσπερ παιδὶ χρῇ, τοτὲ μὲν τὰ αὐτὰ φάσκων οὕτως ἔχειν, τοτὲ δὲ ἑτέρως, ἐξαπατῶν με. καίτοι οὐκ ᾤμην γε κατʼ ἀρχὰς ὑπὸ σοῦ ἑκόντος εἶναι ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι, ὡς ὄντος φίλου· νῦν δὲ ἐψεύσθην, καὶ ὡς ἔοικεν ἀνάγκη μοι κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦτο δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον παρὰ σοῦ. ἔστιν δὲ δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ νῦν λέγεις, ὅτι ἡδοναί τινές εἰσιν αἱ μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ κακαί· ἦ γάρ;
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἀγαθαὶ μὲν αἱ ὠφέλιμοι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ βλαβεραί;
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. ὠφέλιμοι δέ γε αἱ ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦσαι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ κακόν τι;
ΚΑΛ. φημί.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν τὰς τοιάσδε λέγεις, οἷον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἃς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἡδονάς, ἦ ἄρα τούτων αἱ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιοῦσαι ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἢ ἰσχὺν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ἀρετὴν τοῦ σώματος, αὗται μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ τἀναντία τούτων κακαί;
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ λῦπαι ὡσαύτως αἱ μὲν χρησταί εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πονηραί;
ΚΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ αἱρετέον ἐστὶν καὶ πρακτέον;
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς οὔ;
ΚΑΛ. δῆλον δή.
at is good twice and thrice over, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave man we allow to be good?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. And the foolish man and the coward to be evil?
Callicles. Certainly.
Socrates. And he who has joy is good?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. And he who is in pain is evil?
Callicles. Certainly.
Socrates. The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the evil has more of them?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad as the good, or, perhaps, even better?—is not this a further inference which follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the good and the pleasant are the same:—can this be denied, Callicles?
Callicles. I have been listening and making admissions to you, Socrates; and I remark that if a person grants you anything in play, you, like a child, want to keep hold and will not give it back. But do you really suppose that I or any other human being denies that some pleasures are good and others bad?
Socrates. Alas, Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me as if I were a child, sometimes saying one thing, and then another, as if you were meaning to deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you were my friend, and would not have deceived me if you could have helped. But I see that I was mistaken; and now I suppose that I must make the best of a bad business, as they said of old, and take what I can get out of you.—Well, then, as I understand you to say, I may assume that some pleasures are good and others evil?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil?
Callicles. To be sure.
Socrates. And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the hurtful are those which do some evil?
Callicles. Yes.
Socrates. Take, for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and drinking, which we were just now mentioning—you mean to say that those which promote health, or any other bodily excellence, are good, and their opposites evil?
Callicles. Certainly.
Socrates. And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil pains?
Callicles. To be sure.
Socrates. And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and pains?
Callicles. Certainly.
Socrates. But not the evil?
Callicles. Clearly.
Socrates. Because, if you remember, Polus and I have agreed that all our actions are to be done for the sake of
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