ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀποδείξεις τοὺς ῥήτορας νοῦν ἔχοντας καὶ τέχνην τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ κολακείαν, ἐμὲ ἐξελέγξας; εἰ δέ με ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, οἱ ῥήτορες οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ τύραννοι οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο κεκτήσονται, ἡ δὲ δύναμίς ἐστιν, ὡς σὺ φῄς, ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ἄνευ νοῦ ἃ δοκεῖ καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς κακὸν εἶναι· ἢ οὔ;
ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιντο ἢ οἱ τύραννοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελεγχθῇ ὑπὸ Πώλου ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;
ΠΩΛ. οὗτος ἀνήρ—
ΣΩ. οὔ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἃ βούλονται· ἀλλά μʼ ἔλεγχε.
ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἄρτι ὡμολόγεις ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι, [τούτου πρόσθεν];
ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ νῦν ὁμολογῶ.
ΠΩΛ. οὐκ οὖν ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;
ΣΩ. οὔ φημι.
ΠΩΛ. ποιοῦντες ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς;
ΣΩ. φημί.
ΠΩΛ. σχέτλιά γε λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. μὴ κακηγόρει, ὦ λῷστε Πῶλε, ἵνα προσείπω σε κατὰ σέ· ἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾶν, ἐπίδειξον ὅτι ψεύδομαι, εἰ δὲ μή, αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνου.
ΠΩΛ. ἀλλʼ ἐθέλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅτι λέγεις.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι ὃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἑκάστοτε, ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα πράττουσιν τοῦθʼ ὃ πράττουσιν; οἷον οἱ τὰ φάρμακα πίνοντες παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν τοῦτο βούλεσθαι ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ ἀλγεῖν, ἢ ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὗ ἕνεκα πίνουσιν;
ΠΩΛ. δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ πλέοντές τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονται, ὃ ποιοῦσιν ἑκάστοτε (τίς γὰρ βούλεται πλεῖν τε καὶ κινδυνεύειν καὶ πράγματʼ ἔχειν;) ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο οἶμαι οὗ ἕνεκα πλέουσιν, πλουτεῖν· πλούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα πλέουσιν.
ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι οὖν οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων; ἐάν τίς τι πράττῃ ἕνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται ὃ πράττει, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα πράττει;
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἔστιν τι τῶν ὄντων ὃ οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἀγαθόν γʼ ἐστὶν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν;
ΠΩΛ. πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τἀναντία τούτων;
ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.
you will have refuted me; but if you leave me unrefuted, why, the rhetoricians who do what they think best in states, and the tyrants, will have nothing upon which to congratulate themselves, if as you say, power be indeed a good, admitting at the same time that what is done without sense is an evil.
Polus. Yes; I admit that.
Socrates. How then can the rhetoricians or the tyrants have great power in states, unless Polus can refute Socrates, and prove to him that they do as they will?
Polus. This fellow—
Socrates. I say that they do not do as they will;—now refute me.
Polus. Why, have you not already said that they do as they think best?
Socrates. And I say so still.
Polus. Then surely they do as they will?
Socrates. I deny it.
Polus. But they do what they think best?
Socrates. Aye.
Polus. That, Socrates, is monstrous and absurd.
Socrates. Good words, good Polus, as I may say in your own peculiar style; but if you have any questions to ask of me, either prove that I am in error or give the answer yourself.
Polus. Very well, I am willing to answer that I may know what you mean.
Socrates. Do men appear to you to will that which they do, or to will that further end for the sake of which they do a thing? when they take medicine, for example, at the bidding of a physician, do they will the drinking of the medicine which is painful, or the health for the sake of which they drink?
Polus. Clearly, the health.
Socrates. And when men go on a voyage or engage in business, they do not will that which they are doing at the time; for who would desire to take the risk of a voyage or the trouble of business?—But they will, to have the wealth for the sake of which they go on a voyage.
Polus. Certainly.
Socrates. And is not this universally true? If a man does something for the sake of something else, he wills not that which he does, but that for the sake of which he does it.
Polus. Yes.
Socrates. And are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate and indifferent?
Polus. To be sure, Socrates.
Socrates. Wisdom and health and wealth and the like you would call goods, and their opposites evils?
Polus. I should.
Socrates. And the things which are neither good nor evil, and
ΣΩ. τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ ἆρα τοιάδε λέγεις, ἃ ἐνίοτε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον καθῆσθαι καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν, καὶ οἷον αὖ λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἢ ἄλλʼ ἄττα καλεῖς τὰ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακά;
ΠΩΛ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα ἕνεκα τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράττουσιν ὅταν πράττωσιν, ἢ τἀγαθὰ τῶν μεταξύ;
ΠΩΛ. τὰ μεταξὺ δήπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν.
ΣΩ. τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν ὅταν βαδίζωμεν, οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἕσταμεν ὅταν ἑστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ἢ οὔ;
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτείνυμεν, εἴ τινʼ ἀποκτείνυμεν, καὶ ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα χρήματα, οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον εἶναι ἡμῖν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ μή;
ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. ἕνεκʼ ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες.
ΠΩΛ. φημί.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἃ ἕνεκά του ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα ταῦτα ποιοῦμεν;
ΠΩΛ. μάλιστα.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδʼ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ᾖ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλαβερὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βουλόμεθα. τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα, ὡς φῂς σύ, τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ οὐ βουλόμεθα, οὐδὲ τὰ κακά. ἦ γάρ; ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἢ οὔ; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ;
ΠΩΛ. ἀληθῆ.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν, εἴ τις ἀποκτείνει τινὰ ἢ ἐκβάλλει ἐκ πόλεως ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα, εἴτε τύραννος ὢν εἴτε ῥήτωρ, οἰόμενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυγχάνει δὲ ὂν κάκιον, οὗτος δήπου ποιεῖ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἦ γάρ;
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ ἃ βούλεται, εἴπερ τυγχάνει ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ;
ΠΩΛ. ἀλλʼ οὔ μοι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.
ΣΩ. ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος μέγα δύναται ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἀγαθόν τι κατὰ τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν;
ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἔστιν.
ΣΩ. ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, λέγων ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπον ποιοῦντα ἐν πόλει ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ μὴ μέγα δύνασθαι μηδὲ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.
ΠΩΛ. ὡς δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ἐξεῖναί σοι ποιεῖν ὅτι δοκεῖ σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ μή, οὐδὲ ζηλοῖς ὅταν ἴδῃς τινὰ ἢ ἀποκτείναντα ὃν ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀφελόμενον χρήματα ἢ δήσαντα.
ΣΩ. δικαίως λέγεις ἢ ἀδίκως;
which partake sometimes of the nature of good and at other times of evil, or of neither, are such as sitting, walking, running, sailing; or, again, wood, stones, and the like:—these are the things which you call neither good nor evil?
Polus. Exactly so.
Socrates. Are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the indifferent?
Polus. Clearly, the indifferent for the sake of the good.
Socrates. When we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the idea that it is better to walk, and when we stand we stand equally for the sake of the good?
Polus. Yes.
Socrates. And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil him of his goods, because, as we think, it will conduce to our good?
Polus. Certainly.
Socrates. Men who do any of these things do them for the sake of the good?
Polus. Yes.
Socrates. And did we not admit that in doing something for the sake of something else, we do not will those things which we do, but that other thing for the sake of which we do them?
Polus. Most true.
Socrates. Then we do not will simply to kill a man or to exile him or to despoil him of his goods, but we will to do that which conduces to our good, and if the act is not conducive to our good we do not will it; for we will, as you say, that which is our good, but that which is neither good nor evil, or simply evil, we do not will. Why are you silent, Polus? Am I not right?
Polus. You are right.
Socrates. Hence we may infer, that if any one, whether he be a tyrant or a rhetorician, kills another or exiles another or deprives him of his property, under the idea that the act is for his own interests when really not for his own interests, he may be said to do what seems best to him?
Polus. Yes.
Socrates. But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil? Why do you not answer?
Polus. Well, I suppose not.
Socrates. Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such a one have great power in a state?
Polus. He will not.
Socrates. Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good to him in a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills?
Polus. As though you, Socrates, would not like to have the power of doing what seemed good to you in the state, rather than not; you would not be jealous when you saw any one killing or despoiling or imprisoning whom he pleased, Oh, no!
SOCRATES:
ΠΩΛ. ὁπότερʼ ἂν ποιῇ, οὐκ ἀμφοτέρως ζηλωτόν ἐστιν;
ΣΩ. εὐφήμει, ὦ Πῶλε.
ΠΩΛ. τί δή;
ΣΩ. ὅτι οὐ χρὴ οὔτε τοὺς ἀζηλώτους ζηλοῦν οὔτε τοὺς ἀθλίους, ἀλλʼ ἐλεεῖν.
ΠΩΛ. τί δέ; οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ λέγω τῶν ἀνθρώπων;
ΣΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ΠΩΛ. ὅστις οὖν ἀποκτείνυσιν ὃν ἂν δόξῃ αὐτῷ, δικαίως ἀποκτεινύς, ἄθλιος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ ἐλεινός;
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε, οὐδὲ μέντοι ζηλωτός.
ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἄρτι ἄθλιον ἔφησθα εἶναι;
ΣΩ. τὸν ἀδίκως γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀποκτείναντα, καὶ ἐλεινόν γε πρός· τὸν δὲ δικαίως ἀζήλωτον.
ΠΩΛ. ἦ που ὅ γε ἀποθνῄσκων ἀδίκως ἐλεινός τε καὶ ἄθλιός ἐστιν.
ΣΩ. ἧττον ἢ ὁ ἀποκτεινύς, ὦ Πῶλε, καὶ ἧττον ἢ ὁ δικαίως ἀποθνῄσκων.
ΠΩΛ. πῶς δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες;
ΣΩ. οὕτως, ὡς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὂν τὸ ἀδικεῖν.
ΠΩΛ. ἦ γὰρ τοῦτο μέγιστον; οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μεῖζον;
ΣΩ. ἥκιστά γε.
ΠΩΛ. σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν;
ΣΩ. βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δʼ ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἑλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν.
ΠΩΛ. σὺ ἄρα τυραννεῖν οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο;
ΣΩ. οὔκ, εἰ τὸ τυραννεῖν γε λέγεις ὅπερ ἐγώ.
ΠΩΛ. ἀλλʼ ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἐξεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, καὶ ἀποκτεινύντι καὶ ἐκβάλλοντι καὶ πάντα πράττοντι κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν.
ΣΩ. ὦ μακάριε, ἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ. εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ λαβὼν ὑπὸ μάλης ἐγχειρίδιον λέγοιμι πρὸς σὲ ὅτι «ὦ Πῶλε, ἐμοὶ δύναμίς τις καὶ τυραννὶς θαυμασία ἄρτι προσγέγονεν· ἐὰν γὰρ ἄρα ἐμοὶ δόξῃ τινὰ τουτωνὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧν σὺ ὁρᾷς αὐτίκα μάλα δεῖν τεθνάναι, τεθνήξει οὗτος ὃν ἂν δόξῃ· κἄν τινα δόξῃ μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν καταγῆναι δεῖν, κατεαγὼς ἔσται αὐτίκα μάλα, κἂν θοἰμάτιον διεσχίσθαι, διεσχισμένον ἔσται—οὕτω μέγα ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει,» εἰ οὖν ἀπιστοῦντί σοι δείξαιμι τὸ ἐγχειρίδιον, ἴσως ἂν εἴποις ἰδὼν ὅτι «ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μὲν πάντες ἂν μέγα δύναιντο, ἐπεὶ κἂν ἐμπρησθείη οἰκία τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἥντινά σοι δοκοῖ, καὶ τά γε Ἀθηναίων νεώρια καὶ αἱ τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τὰ δημόσια καὶ τὰ ἴδια·» ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτʼ ἔστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἢ δοκεῖ σοι;
ΠΩΛ. οὐ δῆτα οὕτω γε.
Justly or unjustly, do you mean?
Polus. In either case is he not equally to be envied?
Socrates. Forbear, Polus!
Polus. Why “forbear”?
Socrates. Because you ought not to envy wretches who are not to be envied, but only to pity them.
Polus. And are those of whom I spoke wretches?
Socrates. Yes, certainly they are.
Polus. And so you think that he who slays any one whom he pleases, and justly slays him, is pitiable and wretched?
Socrates. No, I do not say that of him: but neither do I think that he is to be envied.
Polus. Were you not saying just now that he is wretched?
Socrates. Yes, my friend, if he killed another unjustly, in which case he is also to be pitied; and he is not to be envied if he killed him justly.
Polus. At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death is wretched, and to be pitied?
Socrates. Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so much as he who is justly killed.
Polus. How can that be, Socrates?
Socrates. That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is the greatest of evils.
Polus. But is it the greatest? Is not suffering injustice a greater evil?
Socrates. Certainly not.
Polus. Then would you rather suffer than do injustice?
Socrates. I should not like either, but if I must choose between them, I would rather suffer than do.
Polus. Then you would not wish to be a tyrant?
Socrates. Not if you mean by tyranny what I mean.
Polus. I mean, as I said before, the power of doing whatever seems good to you in a state, killing, banishing, doing in all things as you like.
Socrates. Well then, illustrious friend, when I have said my say, do you reply to me. Suppose that I go into a crowded Agora, and take a dagger under my arm. Polus, I say to you, I have just acquired rare power, and become a tyrant; for if I think that any of these men whom you see ought to be put to death, the man whom I have a mind to kill is as good as dead; and if I am disposed to break his head or tear his garment, he will have his head broken or his garment torn in an instant. Such is my great power in this city. And if you do not believe me, and I show you the dagger, you would probably reply: Socrates, in that sort of way any one may have great power—he may burn any house which he pleases, and the docks and triremes of the Athenians, and all their other vessels, whether public or private—but can you believe that this mere doing as you think best is great power?
Polus. Certainly not such doing as this.
SOCRATES:
ΣΩ. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν διʼ ὅτι μέμφῃ τὴν τοιαύτην δύναμιν;
ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. τί δή; λέγε.
ΠΩΛ. ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὸν οὕτω πράττοντα ζημιοῦσθαί ἐστιν.
ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ ζημιοῦσθαι οὐ κακόν;
ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, [τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι] πάλιν αὖ σοι φαίνεται, ἐὰν μὲν πράττοντι ἃ δοκεῖ ἕπηται τὸ ὠφελίμως πράττειν, ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, κακὸν καὶ σμικρὸν δύνασθαι. σκεψώμεθα δὲ καὶ τόδε· ἄλλο τι ὁμολογοῦμεν ἐνίοτε μὲν ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀποκτεινύναι τε καὶ ἐξελαύνειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι χρήματα, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὔ;
ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. τοῦτο μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ παρʼ ἐμοῦ ὁμολογεῖται.
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. πότε οὖν σὺ φῂς ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν; εἰπὲ τίνα ὅρον ὁρίζῃ.
ΠΩΛ. σὺ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπόκριναι [ταὐτὸ] τοῦτο.
ΣΩ. ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν φημί, ὦ Πῶλε, εἴ σοι παρʼ ἐμοῦ ἥδιόν ἐστιν ἀκούειν, ὅταν μὲν δικαίως τις ταῦτα ποιῇ, ἄμεινον εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ ἀδίκως, κάκιον.
ΠΩΛ. χαλεπόν γέ σε ἐλέγξαι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλʼ οὐχὶ κἂν παῖς σε ἐλέγξειεν ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις;
ΣΩ. πολλὴν ἄρα ἐγὼ τῷ παιδὶ χάριν ἕξω, ἴσην δὲ καὶ σοί, ἐάν με ἐλέγξῃς καὶ ἀπαλλάξῃς φλυαρίας. ἀλλὰ μὴ κάμῃς φίλον ἄνδρα εὐεργετῶν, ἀλλʼ ἔλεγχε.
ΠΩΛ. ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέν γέ σε δεῖ παλαιοῖς πράγμασιν ἐλέγχειν· τὰ γὰρ ἐχθὲς καὶ πρώην γεγονότα ταῦτα ἱκανά σε ἐξελέγξαι ἐστὶν καὶ ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες ἄνθρωποι εὐδαίμονές εἰσιν.
ΣΩ. τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα;
ΠΩΛ. Ἀρχέλαον δήπου τοῦτον τὸν Περδίκκου ὁρᾷς ἄρχοντα Μακεδονίας;
ΣΩ. εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλʼ ἀκούω γε.
ΠΩΛ. εὐδαίμων οὖν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ ἄθλιος;
ΣΩ. οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐ γάρ πω συγγέγονα τῷ ἀνδρί.
ΠΩΛ. τί δέ; συγγενόμενος ἂν γνοίης, ἄλλως δὲ αὐτόθεν οὐ γιγνώσκεις ὅτι εὐδαιμονεῖ;
ΣΩ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐ δῆτα.
ΠΩΛ. δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα γιγνώσκειν φήσεις εὐδαίμονα ὄντα.
ΣΩ. καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἐρῶ· οὐ γὰρ οἶδα παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης.
ΠΩΛ. τί δέ; ἐν τούτῳ ἡ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν;
ΣΩ. ὥς γε ἐγὼ λέγω, ὦ Πῶλε· τὸν μὲν γὰρ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα εὐδαίμονα εἶναί φημι, τὸν δὲ ἄδικον καὶ πονηρὸν ἄθλιον.
But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power?
Polus. I can.
Socrates. Why then?
Polus. Why, because he who did as you say would be certain to be punished.
Socrates. And punishment is an evil?
Polus. Certainly.
Socrates. And you would admit once more, my good sir, that great power is a benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage, and that this is the meaning of great power; and if not, then his power is an evil and is no power. But let us look at the matter in another way:—do we not acknowledge that the things of which we were speaking, the infliction of death, and exile, and the deprivation of property are sometimes a good and sometimes not a good?
Polus. Certainly.
Socrates. About that you and I may be supposed to agree?
Polus. Yes.
Socrates. Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good and when that they are evil—what principle do you lay down?
Polus. I would rather, Socrates, that you should answer as well as ask that question.
Socrates. Well, Polus, since you would rather have the answer from me, I say that they are good when they are just, and evil when they are unjust.
Polus. You are hard of refutation, Socrates, but might not a child refute that statement?
Socrates. Then I shall be very grateful to the child, and equally grateful to you if you will refute me and deliver me from my foolishness. And I hope that refute me you will, and not weary of doing good to a friend.
Polus. Yes, Socrates, and I need not go far or appeal to antiquity; events which happened only a few days ago are enough to refute you, and to prove that many men who do wrong are happy.
Socrates. What events?
Polus. You see, I presume, that Archelaus the son of Perdiccas is now the ruler of Macedonia?
Socrates. At any rate I hear that he is.
Polus. And do you think that he is happy or miserable?
Socrates. I cannot say, Polus, for I have never had any acquaintance with him.
Polus. And cannot you tell at once, and without having an acquaintance with him, whether a man is happy?
Socrates. Most certainly not.
Polus. Then clearly, Socrates, you would say that you did not even know whether the great king was a happy man?
Socrates. And I should speak the truth; for I do not know how he stands in the matter of education and justice.
Polus. What! and does all happiness consist in this?
Socrates. Yes, indeed, Polus, that is my doctrine; the men and women who are gentle and good are also happy, as I maintain, and the unjust and evil are miserable.
Polus. Then, according to your doctrine, the said Archelaus
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