ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὡσαύτως;
ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε· καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὁρίζῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡδονῇ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ὁριζόμενος τὸ καλόν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, λύπῃ τε καὶ κακῷ;
ΠΩΛ. ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. ὅταν ἄρα δυοῖν καλοῖν θάτερον κάλλιον ᾖ, ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτοιν ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερβάλλον κάλλιόν ἐστιν, ἤτοι ἡδονῇ ἢ ὠφελίᾳ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις.
ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. καὶ ὅταν δὲ δὴ δυοῖν αἰσχροῖν τὸ ἕτερον αἴσχιον ᾖ, ἤτοι λύπῃ ἢ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἔσται· ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη;
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. φέρε δή, πῶς ἐλέγετο νυνδὴ περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι; οὐκ ἔλεγες τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον;
ΠΩΛ. ἔλεγον.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἤτοι λυπηρότερόν ἐστιν καὶ λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἂν εἴη ἢ κακῷ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις; οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη;
ΠΩΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀλγοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἀδικούμενοι;
ΠΩΛ. οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα λύπῃ γε ὑπερέχει.
ΠΩΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ λύπῃ, ἀμφοτέροις μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ὑπερβάλλοι.
ΠΩΛ. οὐ φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τῷ ἑτέρῳ λείπεται.
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. τῷ κακῷ.
ΠΩΛ. ἔοικεν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον τὸ ἀδικεῖν κάκιον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι.
ΠΩΛ. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι.
ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι οὖν ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὡμολογεῖτο ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ αἴσχιον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι;
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. νῦν δέ γε κάκιον ἐφάνη.
ΠΩΛ. ἔοικε.
ΣΩ. δέξαιο ἂν οὖν σὺ μᾶλλον τὸ κάκιον καὶ τὸ αἴσχιον ἀντὶ τοῦ ἧττον; μὴ ὄκνει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαβήσῃ· ἀλλὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ παρέχων ἀποκρίνου, καὶ ἢ φάθι ἢ μὴ ἃ ἐρωτῶ.
ΠΩΛ. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. ἄλλος δέ τις ἀνθρώπων;
ΠΩΛ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.
ΣΩ. ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὔτʼ ἂν ἐγὼ οὔτʼ ἂν σὺ οὔτʼ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων δέξαιτʼ ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι· κάκιον γὰρ τυγχάνει ὄν.
ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.
the standard of pleasure and utility.
Socrates. And deformity or disgrace may be equally measured by the opposite standard of pain and evil?
Polus. Certainly.
Socrates. Then when of two beautiful things one exceeds in beauty, the measure of the excess is to be taken in one or both of these; that is to say, in pleasure or utility or both?
Polus. Very true.
Socrates. And of two deformed things, that which exceeds in deformity or disgrace, exceeds either in pain or evil—must it not be so?
Polus. Yes.
Socrates. But then again, what was the observation which you just now made, about doing and suffering wrong? Did you not say, that suffering wrong was more evil, and doing wrong more disgraceful?
Polus. I did.
Socrates. Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering, the more disgraceful must be more painful and must exceed in pain or in evil or both: does not that also follow?
Polus. Of course.
Socrates. First, then, let us consider whether the doing of injustice exceeds the suffering in the consequent pain: Do the injurers suffer more than the injured?
Polus. No, Socrates; certainly not.
Socrates. Then they do not exceed in pain?
Polus. No.
Socrates. But if not in pain, then not in both?
Polus. Certainly not.
Socrates. Then they can only exceed in the other?
Polus. Yes.
Socrates. That is to say, in evil?
Polus. True.
Socrates. Then doing injustice will have an excess of evil, and will therefore be a greater evil than suffering injustice?
Polus. Clearly.
Socrates. But have not you and the world already agreed that to do injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer?
Polus. Yes.
Socrates. And that is now discovered to be more evil?
Polus. True.
Socrates. And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dishonour to a less one? Answer, Polus, and fear not; for you will come to no harm if you nobly resign yourself into the healing hand of the argument as to a physician without shrinking, and either say “Yes” or “No” to me.
Polus. I should say “No.”
Socrates. Would any other man prefer a greater to a less evil?
Polus. No, not according to this way of putting the case, Socrates.
Socrates. Then I said truly, Polus, that neither you, nor I, nor any man, would rather do than suffer injustice; for to do injustice is the greater evil of the two.
Polus. That is the conclusion.
Socrates. You see, Polus, when you compare the two kinds of refutations, how unlike they are. All men, with the exception of myself, are of your way of thinking; but your single assent and witness are enough for me,—I have no need of any
ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἔλεγχος παρὰ τὸν ἔλεγχον παραβαλλόμενος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ ἐξαρκεῖς εἷς ὢν μόνος καὶ ὁμολογῶν καὶ μαρτυρῶν, καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ μόνον ἐπιψηφίζων τοὺς ἄλλους ἐῶ χαίρειν. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτως ἐχέτω· μετὰ τοῦτο δὲ περὶ οὗ τὸ δεύτερον ἠμφεσβητήσαμεν σκεψώμεθα, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην ἆρα μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστιν, ὡς σὺ ᾤου, ἢ μεῖζον τὸ μὴ διδόναι, ὡς αὖ ἐγὼ ᾤμην.σκοπώμεθα δὲ τῇδε· τὸ διδόναι δίκην καὶ τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως ἀδικοῦντα ἆρα τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖς;
ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. ἔχεις οὖν λέγειν ὡς οὐχὶ τά γε δίκαια πάντα καλά ἐστιν, καθʼ ὅσον δίκαια; καὶ διασκεψάμενος εἰπέ.
ΠΩΛ. ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε· ἆρα εἴ τίς τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ποιοῦντος;
ΠΩΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. ἆρα τοῦτο πάσχον ὃ τὸ ποιοῦν ποιεῖ, καὶ τοιοῦτον οἷον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις τύπτει, ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι;
ΠΩΛ. ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει ἢ ταχὺ ὁ τύπτων, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτεσθαι;
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. τοιοῦτον ἄρα πάθος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἐστὶν οἷον ἂν τὸ τύπτον ποιῇ;
ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ κάει τις, ἀνάγκη τι κάεσθαι;
ΠΩΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ΣΩ. καὶ εἰ σφόδρα γε κάει ἢ ἀλγεινῶς, οὕτω κάεσθαι τὸ καόμενον ὡς ἂν τὸ κᾶον κάῃ;
ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ τέμνει τι, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος; τέμνεται γάρ τι.
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. καὶ εἰ μέγα γε ἢ βαθὺ τὸ τμῆμα ἢ ἀλγεινόν, τοιοῦτον τμῆμα τέμνεται τὸ τεμνόμενον οἷον τὸ τέμνον τέμνει;
ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. συλλήβδην δὴ ὅρα εἰ ὁμολογεῖς, ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, περὶ πάντων, οἷον ἂν ποιῇ τὸ ποιοῦν, τοιοῦτον τὸ πάσχον πάσχειν.
ΠΩΛ. ἀλλʼ ὁμολογῶ.
ΣΩ. τούτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων, τὸ δίκην διδόναι πότερον πάσχειν τί ἐστιν ἢ ποιεῖν;
ΠΩΛ. ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάσχειν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὑπό τινος ποιοῦντος;
ΠΩΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ὑπό γε τοῦ κολάζοντος.
ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ ὀρθῶς κολάζων δικαίως κολάζει;
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. δίκαια ποιῶν ἢ οὔ;
ΠΩΛ. δίκαια.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ κολαζόμενος δίκην διδοὺς δίκαια πάσχει;
ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. τὰ δὲ δίκαιά που καλὰ ὡμολόγηται;
ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. τούτων ἄρα ὁ μὲν ποιεῖ καλά, ὁ δὲ πάσχει, ὁ κολαζόμενος.
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
other, I take your suffrage, and am regardless of the rest. Enough of this, and now let us proceed to the next question; which is, Whether the greatest of evils to a guilty man is to suffer punishment, as you supposed, or whether to escape punishment is not a greater evil, as I supposed. Consider:—You would say that to suffer punishment is another name for being justly corrected when you do wrong?
Polus. I should.
Socrates. And would you not allow that all just things are honourable in so far as they are just? Please to reflect, and tell me your opinion.
Polus. Yes, Socrates, I think that they are.
Socrates. Consider again:—Where there is an agent, must there not also be a patient?
Polus. I should say so.
Socrates. And will not the patient suffer that which the agent does, and will not the suffering have the quality of the action? I mean, for example, that if a man strikes, there must be something which is stricken?
Polus. Yes.
Socrates. And if the striker strikes violently or quickly, that which is struck will be struck violently or quickly?
Polus. True.
Socrates. And the suffering to him who is stricken is of the same nature as the act of him who strikes?
Polus. Yes.
Socrates. And if a man burns, there is something which is burned?
Polus. Certainly.
Socrates. And if he burns in excess or so as to cause pain, the thing burned will be burned in the same way?
Polus. Truly.
Socrates. And if he cuts, the same argument holds—there will be something cut?
Polus. Yes.
Socrates. And if the cutting be great or deep or such as will cause pain, the cut will be of the same nature?
Polus. That is evident.
Socrates. Then you would agree generally to the universal proposition which I was just now asserting: that the affection of the patient answers to the affection of the agent?
Polus. I agree.
Socrates. Then, as this is admitted, let me ask whether being punished is suffering or acting?
Polus. Suffering, Socrates; there can be no doubt of that.
Socrates. And suffering implies an agent?
Polus. Certainly, Socrates; and he is the punisher.
Socrates. And he who punishes rightly, punishes justly?
Polus. Yes.
Socrates. And therefore he acts justly?
Polus. Justly.
Socrates. Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers justly?
Polus. That is evident.
Socrates. And that which is just has been admitted to be honourable?
Polus. Certainly.
Socrates. Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished suffers what is honourable?
Polus. True.
SOCRATES:
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλά, ἀγαθά; ἢ γὰρ ἡδέα ἢ ὠφέλιμα.
ΠΩΛ. ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. ἀγαθὰ ἄρα πάσχει ὁ δίκην διδούς;
ΠΩΛ. ἔοικεν.
ΣΩ. ὠφελεῖται ἄρα;
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ἆρα ἥνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφελίαν; βελτίων τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεται, εἴπερ δικαίως κολάζεται;
ΠΩΛ. εἰκός γε.
ΣΩ. κακίας ἄρα ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττεται ὁ δίκην διδούς;
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ἆρα οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου ἀπαλλάττεται κακοῦ; ὧδε δὲ σκόπει· ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευῇ ἀνθρώπου κακίαν ἄλλην τινὰ ἐνορᾷς ἢ πενίαν;
ΠΩΛ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ πενίαν.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ ἐν σώματος κατασκευῇ; κακίαν ἂν φήσαις ἀσθένειαν εἶναι καὶ νόσον καὶ αἶσχος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;
ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ πονηρίαν ἡγῇ τινα εἶναι;
ΠΩΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ΣΩ. ταύτην οὖν οὐκ ἀδικίαν καλεῖς καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;
ΠΩΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν χρημάτων καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τριῶν ὄντων, τριττὰς εἴρηκας πονηρίας, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀδικίαν;
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. τίς οὖν τούτων τῶν πονηριῶν αἰσχίστη; οὐχ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ συλλήβδην ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία;
ΠΩΛ. πολύ γε.
ΣΩ. εἰ δὴ αἰσχίστη, καὶ κακίστη;
ΠΩΛ. πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις;
ΣΩ. ὡδί· ἀεὶ τὸ αἴσχιστον ἤτοι λύπην μεγίστην παρέχον ἢ βλάβην ἢ ἀμφότερα αἴσχιστόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν.
ΠΩΛ. μάλιστα.
ΣΩ. αἴσχιστον δὲ ἀδικία καὶ σύμπασα ψυχῆς πονηρία νυνδὴ ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν;
ΠΩΛ. ὡμολόγηται γάρ.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἢ ἀνιαρότατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀνίᾳ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιστον τούτων ἐστὶν ἢ βλάβῃ ἢ ἀμφότερα;
ΠΩΛ. ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἀλγεινότερόν ἐστιν τοῦ πένεσθαι καὶ κάμνειν τὸ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἀμαθῆ;
ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπὸ τούτων γε.
ΣΩ. ὑπερφυεῖ τινι ἄρα ὡς μεγάλῃ βλάβῃ καὶ κακῷ θαυμασίῳ ὑπερβάλλουσα τἆλλα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία αἴσχιστόν ἐστι πάντων, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀλγηδόνι γε, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος.
ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μήν που τό γε μεγίστῃ βλάβῃ ὑπερβάλλον μέγιστον ἂν κακὸν εἴη τῶν ὄντων.
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ἡ ἀδικία ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ψυχῆς πονηρία μέγιστον τῶν ὄντων κακόν ἐστιν;
ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀπαλλάττει; οὐ χρηματιστική;
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. τίς δὲ νόσου; οὐκ ἰατρική;
And if what is honourable, then what is good, for the honourable is either pleasant or useful?
Polus. Certainly.
Socrates. Then he who is punished suffers what is good?
Polus. That is true.
Socrates. Then he is benefited?
Polus. Yes.
Socrates. Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term “benefited”? I mean, that if he be justly punished his soul is improved.
Polus. Surely.
Socrates. Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his soul?
Polus. Yes.
Socrates. And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil? Look at the matter in this way:—In respect of a man’s estate, do you see any greater evil than poverty?
Polus. There is no greater evil.
Socrates. Again, in a man’s bodily frame, you would say that the evil is weakness and disease and deformity?
Polus. I should.
Socrates. And do you not imagine that the soul likewise has some evil of her own?
Polus. Of course.
Socrates. And this you would call injustice and ignorance and cowardice, and the like?
Polus. Certainly.
Socrates. So then, in mind, body, and estate, which are three, you have pointed out three corresponding evils—injustice, disease, poverty?
Polus. True.
Socrates. And which of the evils is the most disgraceful?—Is not the most disgraceful of them injustice, and in general the evil of the soul?
Polus. By far the most.
Socrates. And if the most disgraceful, then also the worst?
Polus. What do you mean, Socrates?
Socrates. I mean to say, that is most disgraceful has been already admitted to be most painful or hurtful, or both.
Polus. Certainly.
Socrates. And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted by us to be most disgraceful?
Polus. It has been admitted.
Socrates. And most disgraceful either because most painful and causing excessive pain, or most hurtful, or both?
Polus. Certainly.
Socrates. And therefore to be unjust and intemperate, and cowardly and ignorant, is more painful than to be poor and sick?
Polus. Nay, Socrates; the painfulness does not appear to me to follow from your premises.
Socrates. Then, if, as you would argue, not more painful, the evil of the soul is of all evils the most disgraceful; and the excess of disgrace must be caused by some preternatural greatness, or extraordinary hurtfulness of the evil.
Polus. Clearly.
Socrates. And that which exceeds most in hurtfulness will be the greatest of evils?
Polus. Yes.
Socrates. Then injustice and intemperance, and in general the depravity of the soul, are the greatest of evils?
Polus. That is evident.
Socrates. Now, what art is there which delivers us from poverty? Does not the art of making money?
Polus. Yes.
Socrates. And what art frees us from disease? Does not the art of medicine?
POLUS:
ΠΩΛ. ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. τίς δὲ πονηρίας καὶ ἀδικίας; εἰ μὴ οὕτως εὐπορεῖς, ὧδε σκόπει· ποῖ ἄγομεν καὶ παρὰ τίνας τοὺς κάμνοντας τὰ σώματα;
ΠΩΛ. παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. ποῖ δὲ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολασταίνοντας;
ΠΩΛ. παρὰ τοὺς δικαστὰς λέγεις;
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν δίκην δώσοντας;
ΠΩΛ. φημί.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ δικαιοσύνῃ τινὶ χρώμενοι κολάζουσιν οἱ ὀρθῶς κολάζοντες;
ΠΩΛ. δῆλον δή.
ΣΩ. χρηματιστικὴ μὲν ἄρα πενίας ἀπαλλάττει, ἰατρικὴ δὲ νόσου, δίκη δὲ ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀδικίας.
ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν τούτων κάλλιστόν ἐστιν [ὧν λέγεις];
ΠΩΛ. τίνων λέγεις;
ΣΩ. χρηματιστικῆς, ἰατρικῆς, δίκης.
ΠΩΛ. πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ δίκη.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν αὖ ἤτοι ἡδονὴν πλείστην ποιεῖ ἢ ὠφελίαν ἢ ἀμφότερα, εἴπερ κάλλιστόν ἐστιν;
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν τὸ ἰατρεύεσθαι ἡδύ ἐστιν, καὶ χαίρουσιν οἱ ἰατρευόμενοι;
ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ὠφέλιμόν γε. ἦ γάρ;
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. μεγάλου γὰρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, ὥστε λυσιτελεῖ ὑπομεῖναι τὴν ἀλγηδόνα καὶ ὑγιῆ εἶναι.
ΠΩΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὕτως ἂν περὶ σῶμα εὐδαιμονέστατος ἄνθρωπος εἴη, ἰατρευόμενος, ἢ μηδὲ κάμνων ἀρχήν;
ΠΩΛ. δῆλον ὅτι μηδὲ κάμνων.
ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ τοῦτʼ ἦν εὐδαιμονία, ὡς ἔοικε, κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγή, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτῆσις.
ΠΩΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἀθλιώτερος πότερος δυοῖν ἐχόντοιν κακὸν εἴτʼ ἐν σώματι εἴτʼ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὁ ἰατρευόμενος καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενος τοῦ κακοῦ, ἢ ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος, ἔχων δέ;
ΠΩΛ. φαίνεταί μοι ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην διδόναι μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγὴ ἦν, πονηρίας;
ΠΩΛ. ἦν γάρ.
ΣΩ. σωφρονίζει γάρ που καὶ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ καὶ ἰατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἡ δίκη.
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. εὐδαιμονέστατος μὲν ἄρα ὁ μὴ ἔχων κακίαν ἐν ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐφάνη.
ΠΩΛ. δῆλον δή.
ΣΩ. δεύτερος δέ που ὁ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.
ΠΩΛ. ἔοικεν.
ΣΩ. οὗτος δʼ ἦν ὁ νουθετούμενός τε καὶ ἐπιπληττόμενος καὶ δίκην διδούς.
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. κάκιστα ἄρα ζῇ ὁ ἔχων [ἀδικίαν] καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.
ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.
Very true.
Socrates. And what from vice and injustice? If you are not able to answer at once, ask yourself whither we go with the sick, and to whom we take them.
Polus. To the physicians, Socrates.
Socrates. And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate?
Polus. To the judges, you mean.
Socrates. —Who are to punish them?
Polus. Yes.
Socrates. And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in accordance with a certain rule of justice?
Polus. Clearly.
Socrates. Then the art of money-making frees a man from poverty; medicine from disease; and justice from intemperance and injustice?
Polus. That is evident.
Socrates. Which, then, is the best of these three?
Polus. Will you enumerate them?
Socrates. Money-making, medicine, and justice.
Polus. Justice, Socrates, far excels the two others.
Socrates. And justice, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or advantage or both?
Polus. Yes.
Socrates. But is the being healed a pleasant thing, and are those who are being healed pleased?
Polus. I think not.
Socrates. A useful thing, then?
Polus. Yes.
Socrates. Yes, because the patient is delivered from a great evil; and this is the advantage of enduring the pain—that you get well?
Polus. Certainly.
Socrates. And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition, who is healed, or who never was out of health?
Polus. Clearly he who was never out of health.
Socrates. Yes; for happiness surely does not consist in being delivered from evils, but in never having had them.
Polus. True.
Socrates. And suppose the case of two persons who have some evil in their bodies, and that one of them is healed and delivered from evil, and another is not healed, but retains the evil—which of them is the most miserable?
Polus. Clearly he who is not healed.
Socrates. And was not punishment said by us to be a deliverance from the greatest of evils, which is vice?
Polus. True.
Socrates. And justice punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the medicine of our vice?
Polus. True.
Socrates. He, then, has the first place in the scale of happiness who has never had vice in his soul; for this has been shown to be the greatest of evils.
Polus. Clearly.
Socrates. And he has the second place, who is delivered from vice?
Polus. True.
Socrates. That is to say, he who receives admonition and rebuke and punishment?
Polus. Yes.
Socrates. Then he lives worst, who, having been unjust, has no deliverance from injustice?
Polus. Certainly.
Socrates. That is, he lives worst who commits the greatest crimes, and who, being the most unjust of men, succeeds in escaping rebuke o
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὗτος τυγχάνει ὢν ὃς ἂν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικῶν καὶ χρώμενος μεγίστῃ ἀδικίᾳ διαπράξηται ὥστε μήτε νουθετεῖσθαι μήτε κολάζεσθαι μήτε δίκην διδόναι, ὥσπερ σὺ φῂς Ἀρχέλαον παρεσκευάσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τυράννους καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ δυνάστας;
ΠΩΛ. ἔοικε.
ΣΩ. σχεδὸν γάρ που οὗτοι, ὦ ἄριστε, τὸ αὐτὸ διαπεπραγμένοι εἰσὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τοῖς μεγίστοις νοσήμασιν συνισχόμενος διαπράξαιτο μὴ διδόναι δίκην τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἁμαρτημάτων τοῖς ἰατροῖς μηδὲ ἰατρεύεσθαι, φοβούμενος ὡσπερανεὶ παῖς τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ τέμνεσθαι, ὅτι ἀλγεινόν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ σοὶ οὕτω;
ΠΩΛ. ἔμοιγε.
ΣΩ. ἀγνοῶν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἷόν ἐστιν ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ἀρετὴ σώματος. κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ὡμολογημένων τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες, ὦ Πῶλε, τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυφλῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἀγνοεῖν ὅσῳ ἀθλιώτερόν ἐστι μὴ ὑγιοῦς σώματος μὴ ὑγιεῖ ψυχῇ συνοικεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαθρᾷ καὶ ἀδίκῳ καὶ ἀνοσίῳ, ὅθεν καὶ πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὥστε δίκην μὴ διδόναι μηδʼ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, καὶ χρήματα παρασκευαζόμενοι καὶ φίλους καὶ ὅπως ἂν ὦσιν ὡς πιθανώτατοι λέγειν· εἰ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀληθῆ ὡμολογήκαμεν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἆρʼ αἰσθάνῃ τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου; ἢ βούλει συλλογισώμεθα αὐτά;
ΠΩΛ. εἰ σοί γε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακὸν ἡ ἀδικία καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν;
ΠΩΛ. φαίνεταί γε.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἀπαλλαγή γε ἐφάνη τούτου τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ δίκην διδόναι;
ΠΩΛ. κινδυνεύει.
ΣΩ. τὸ δέ γε μὴ διδόναι ἐμμονὴ τοῦ κακοῦ;
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. δεύτερον ἄρα ἐστὶν τῶν κακῶν μεγέθει τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ δὲ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην πάντων μέγιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον κακῶν πέφυκεν.
ΠΩΛ. ἔοικεν.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ περὶ τούτου, ὦ φίλε, ἠμφεσβητήσαμεν, σὺ μὲν τὸν Ἀρχέλαον εὐδαιμονίζων τὸν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα δίκην οὐδεμίαν διδόντα, ἐγὼ δὲ τοὐναντίον οἰόμενος, εἴτε Ἀρχέλαος εἴτʼ ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων ὁστισοῦν μὴ δίδωσι δίκην ἀδικῶν, τούτῳ προσήκειν ἀθλίῳ εἶναι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀεὶ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα τοῦ ἀδικουμένου ἀθλιώτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὴ διδόντα δίκην τοῦ διδόντος; οὐ ταῦτʼ ἦν τὰ ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ λεγόμενα;
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀποδέδεικται ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐλέγετο;
ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.
r correction or punishment; and this, as you say, has been accomplished by Archelaus and other tyrants and rhetoricians and potentates?
Polus. True.
Socrates. May not their way of proceeding, my friend, be compared to the conduct of a person who is afflicted with the worst of diseases and yet contrives not to pay the penalty to the physician for his sins against his constitution, and will not be cured, because, like a child, he is afraid of the pain of being burned or cut:—Is not that a parallel case?
Polus. Yes, truly.
Socrates. He would seem as if he did not know the nature of health and bodily vigour; and if we are right, Polus, in our previous conclusions, they are in a like case who strive to evade justice, which they see to be painful, but are blind to the advantage which ensues from it, not knowing how far more miserable a companion a diseased soul is than a diseased body; a soul, I say, which is corrupt and unrighteous and unholy. And hence they do all that they can to avoid punishment and to avoid being released from the greatest of evils; they provide themselves with money and friends, and cultivate to the utmost their powers of persuasion. But if we, Polus, are right, do you see what follows, or shall we draw out the consequences in form?
Polus. If you please.
Socrates. Is it not a fact that injustice, and the doing of injustice, is the greatest of evils?
Polus. That is quite clear.
Socrates. And further, that to suffer punishment is the way to be released from this evil?
Polus. True.
Socrates. And not to suffer, is to perpetuate the evil?
Polus. Yes.
Socrates. To do wrong, then, is second only in the scale of evils; but to do wrong and not to be punished, is first and greatest of all?
Polus. That is true.
Socrates. Well, and was not this the point in dispute, my friend? You deemed Archelaus happy, because he was a very great criminal and unpunished: I, on the other hand, maintained that he or any other who like him has done wrong and has not been punished, is, and ought to be, the most miserable of all men; and that the doer of injustice is more miserable than the sufferer; and he who escapes punishment, more miserable than he who suffers.—Was not that what I said?
Polus. Yes.
Socrates. And it has been proved to be true?
Polus. Certainly.
Socrates. Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use
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