Plutarch · Table Talk (Quaestiones convivales) Συμποσιακά (Συμποσιακῶν προβλημάτων βιβλία)

Plutarch, Table Talk (Quaestiones convivales) 1.0.1–1.1.5: Book 1, Preface and Question 1: whether to philosophize at table

In the preface to Sossius Senecio Plutarch discusses the saying 'I hate a drinking companion with a memory' and argues that merry gatherings need not forget all learned talk. The first question asks whether philosophical discussion is fit for a drinking party. Aristo and Crato object, and Plutarch answers that it depends on the company and that Bacchus may be joined to the Muses, with only easy, familiar subjects set before those who are not learned.

Sections 1.0.1–1.1.5 · 1980 words · click a number to copy its link

τὸ μισέω μνάμονα συμπόταν ὦ Σόσσιε Σενεκίων, ἔνιοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιστάθμους εἰρῆσθαι λέγουσι, φορτικοὺς ἐπιεικῶς καὶ ἀναγώγους ἐν τῷ πίνειν ὄντας· οἱ γὰρ ἐν Σικελίᾳ Δωριεῖς ὡς ἔοικε τὸν ἐπίσταθμον μνάμονα προσηγόρευον. ἔνιοι δὲ τὴν παροιμίαν οἴονται τοῖς παρὰ πότον λεγομένοις καὶ πραττομένοις ἀμνηστίαν ἐπάγειν διὸ τήν τε λήθην οἱ πάτριοι λόγοι καὶ τὸν νάρθηκα τῷ θεῷ συγκαθιεροῦσιν, ὡς ἢ μηδενὸς δέον μνημονεύειν τῶν ἐν οἴνῳ πλημμεληθέντων ἢ παντελῶς ἐλαφρᾶς καὶ παιδικῆς νουθεσίας δεομένων. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ τῶν μὲν ἀτόπων ἡ λήθη τῷ ὄντι σοφὴ κατʼ Εὐριπίδην εἶναι· τὸ δʼ ὅλως ἀμνημονεῖν τῶν ἐν οἴνῳ μὴ μόνον τῷ φιλοποιῷ λεγομένῳ μάχεσθαι τῆς τραπέζης, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων τοὺς ἐλλογιμωτάτους ἀντιμαρτυροῦντας ἔχειν, Πλάτωνα καὶ Ξενοφῶντα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ Σπεύσιππον, Ἐπίκουρόν τε καὶ Πρύτανιν καὶ Ἱερώνυμον καὶ Δίωνα τὸν ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας, ὡς ἄξιόν τινος σπουδῆς πεποιημένους ἔργον ἀναγράψασθαι λόγους παρὰ πότον γενομένους· ᾠήθης τε δεῖν ἡμᾶς τῶν σποράδην πολλάκις ἔν τε Ῥώμῃ μεθʼ ὑμῶν καὶ παρʼ ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι, παρούσης ἅμα τραπέζης καὶ κύλικος, φιλολογηθέντων συναγαγεῖν τἀπιτήδεια· πρὸς τοῦτο γενόμενος τρία μὲν ἢδη σοι πέπομφα τῶν βιβλίων, ἑκάστου δέκα προβλήματα περιέχοντος· πέμψω δὲ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ταχέως, ἂν ταῦτα δόξῃ μὴ παντελῶς ἄμουσα μηδʼ ἀπροσδιόνυσʼ εἶναι.

Some, my dear Sossius Senecio, imagine that this sentence, μισέω μνάμονα συμπόταω, was principally designed against the stewards of a feast, who are usually troublesome and press liquor too much upon the guests. For the Dorians in Sicily (as I am informed) called the steward μνάμονα, a remembrancer. Others think that this proverb admonisheth the guests to forget every thing that is spoken or done in company; and agreeably to this, the ancients used to consecrate forgetfulness with a ferula to Bacchus, thereby intimating that we should either not remember any irregularity committed in mirth and company, or apply a gentle and childish correction to the faults. But because you are of opinion that to forget absurdities is indeed (as Euripides says) a piece of wisdom, but to deliver over to oblivion all sort of discourse that merry meetings do usually produce is not only repugnant to that endearing quality that most allow to an entertainment, but against the known practice of the greatest philosophers (for Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, Speusippus, Epicurus, Prytanis, Hieronymus, Dion the Academic, have thought it a worthy and noble employment to deliver down to us those discourses they had at table), and since it is your pleasure that I should gather up the chiefest of those scattered topics which both at Rome and Greece amidst our cups and feasting we have disputed on, in obedience to your commands I have sent three books, each containing ten problems; and the rest shall quickly follow, if these find good acceptance and do not seem altogether foolish and impertinent.

πρῶτον δὲ πάντων τέτακται τὸ περὶ τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν παρὰ πότον. μέμνησαι γὰρ ὅτι, ζητήσεως Ἀθήνησι μετὰ δεῖπνον γενομένης εἰ χρηστέον ἐν οἴνῳ φιλοσόφοις λόγοις καὶ τί μέτρον ἔστι χρωμένοις, ἀρίστων παρών εἰσὶ γάρ ἔφησε πρὸς τῶν θεῶν οἱ φιλοσόφοις χώραν ἐπʼ οἴνῳ μὴ διδόντες; ἐγὼ δʼ εἶπον ἀλλ οὐ γὰρ εἰσίν, ὦ ἑταῖῤ, οἳ καὶ πάνυ γε σεμνῶς κατειρωνευόμενοι λέγουσι μὴ δεῖν ὥσπερ οἰκοδέσποιναν ἐν οἴνῳ φθέγγεσθαι φιλοσοφίαν· καὶ τοὺς Πέρσας ὀρθῶς φασι μὴ ταῖς γαμεταῖς ἀλλὰ ταῖς παλλακίσι συμμεθύσκεσθαι καὶ συνορχεῖσθαι; ταὐτὸ δὴ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀξιοῦσι ποιεῖν εἰς τὰ συμπόσια τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ τὴν ὑποκριτικὴν ἐπεισάγοντας φιλοσοφίαν δὲ μὴ κινοῦντας, ὡς οὔτε συμπαίζειν ἐκείνην ἐπιτήδειον οὖσαν οὔθʼ ἡμᾶς τηνικαῦτα σπουδαστικῶς ἔχοντας· οὐδὲ γὰρ Ἰσοκράτη τὸν σοφιστὴν ὑπομεῖναι δεομένων εἰπεῖν τι παρʼ οἶνον ἀλλʼ ἢ τοσοῦτον ἐν οἷς μὲν ἐγὼ δεινός, οὐχ ὁ νῦν καιρός· ἐν οἷς δʼ ὁ νῦν καιρός, οὐκ ἐγὼ δεινός.

THE first question is, Whether at table it is allowable to philosophize? For I remember at a supper at Athens this doubt was started, whether at a merry meeting it was fit to use philosophical discourse, and how far it might be used? And Aristo presently cried out: What then, for heaven’s sake, are there any that banish philosophy from company and wine? And I replied: Yes, sir, there are, and such as with a grave scoff tell us that philosophy, like the matron of the house, should never be heard at a merry entertainment; and commend the custom of the Persians, who never let their wives appear, but drink, dance, and wanton with their whores. This they propose for us to imitate; they permit us to have mimics and music at our feasts, but forbid philosophy; she, forsooth, being very unfit to be wanton with us, and we in a bad condition to be serious. Isocrates the rhetorician, when at a drinking bout some begged him to make a speech, only returned: With those things in which I have skill the time doth not suit; and in those things with which the time suits I have no skill.

καὶ ὁ Κράτων ἀνακραγών εὖ γʼ εἶπε νὴ τὸν Διόνυσον ἐξώμνυτο τὸν λόγον, εἰ τοιαύτας ἔμελλε περαίνειν περιόδους, αἷς ἔμελλε Χαρίτων ἀνάστατον γενήσεσθαι συμπόσιον. οὐχ ὅμοιον δʼ οἶμαι ῥητορικὸν ἐξαιρεῖν συμποσίου λόγον καὶ φιλόσοφον· ἀλλʼ ἕτερόν ἐστι τὸ φιλοσοφίας, ἣν τέχνην περὶ βίον οὖσαν οὔτε τινὸς παιδιᾶς οὔτε τινὸς ἡδονῆς διαγωγὴν ἐχούσης ἀποστατεῖν εἰκὸς ἀλλὰ πᾶσι παρεῖναι τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸν καιρὸν ἐπιφέρουσαν· ἢ μηδὲ σωφροσύνην μηδὲ δικαιοσύνην οἰώμεθα δεῖν εἰς τοὺς πότους δέχεσθαι, κατειρωνευόμενοι τὸ σεμνὸν αὐτῶν. εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ οἱ τὸν Ὀρέστην ἑστιῶντες, ἐν Θεσμοθετείῳ σιωπῇ τρώγειν καὶ πίνειν ἐμέλλομεν, ἦν τι τοῦτο τῆς ἀμαθίας οὐκ ἀτυχὲς παραμύθιον· εἰ δὲ πάντων μὲν ὁ Διόνυσος Λύσιός ἐστι καὶ Λυαῖος, μάλιστα δὲ τῆς γλώττης ἀφαιρεῖται τὰ χαλινὰ καὶ πλείστην ἐλευθερίαν τῇ φωνῇ δίδωσιν, ἀβέλτερον οἶμαι καὶ ἀνόητον ἐν λόγοις πλεονάζοντα καιρὸν ἀποστερεῖν τῶν ἀρίστων λόγων, καὶ ζητεῖν μὲν ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς περὶ συμποτικῶν καθηκόντων καὶ τίς ἀρετὴ συμπότου καὶ πῶς οἴνῳ χρηστέον, ἐξ αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν συμποσίων ἀναιρεῖν φιλοσοφίαν ὡς ἔργῳ βεβαιοῦν ἃ διδάσκει λόγῳ μὴ δυναμένην.

And Crato cried out: By Bacchus, he was right in forswearing talk, if he designed to make such long-winded discourses as would have spoiled all mirth and conversation; but I do not think there is the same reason to forbid philosophy as to take away rhetoric from our feasts. For philosophy is quite of another nature; it is an art of living, and therefore must be admitted into every part of our conversation, into all our gay humors and our pleasures, to regulate and adjust them, to proportion the time, and keep them from excess; unless, perchance, upon the same scoffing pretence of gravity, they would banish temperance, justice, and moderation. It is true, were we to feast in a court-room, as those that entertained Orestes, and were silence enjoined by law, that might prove a not unlucky cloak of our ignorance; but if Bacchus is really λύσιος (a looser of every thing), and chiefly takes off all restraints and bridles from the tongue, and gives the voice the greatest freedom, I think it is foolish and absurd to deprive that time in which we are usually most talkative of the most useful and profitable discourse; and in our schools to dispute of the offices of company, in what consists the excellence of a guest, how mirth, feasting, and wine are to be used, and yet deny philosophy a place in these feasts, as if not able to confirm by practice what by precepts it instructs.

σοῦ δʼ εἰπόντος οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι Κράτωνι περὶ τούτων ἀντιλέγειν, ὅρον δέ τινα καὶ χαρακτῆρα τῶν παρὰ πότον φιλοσοφουμένων ζητεῖν ἐκφεύγοντα τοῦτο δὴ τὸ παιζόμενον οὐκ ἀηδῶς πρὸς τοὺς ἐρίζοντας καὶ σοφιστιῶντας νῦν δʼ ἔρχεσθʼ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἵνα ξυνάγωμεν Ἄρηα, ηομ. β 381 καὶ παρακαλοῦντος ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον· ἔφην ἐγὼ πρῶτον ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ σκεπτέον εἶναι τὸ τῶν παρόντων· ἂν μὲν γὰρ πλείονας ἔχῃ φιλολόγους τὸ συμπόσιον, ὡς τὸ Ἀγάθωνος Σωκράτας Φαίδρους Παυσανίας Ἐρυξιμάχους, καὶ τὸ Καλλίου Χαρμίδας Ἀντισθένας Ἑρμογένας, ἑτέρους τούτοις παραπλησίους, ἀφήσομεν αὐτοὺς μύθῳ φιλοσοφεῖν, οὐχ ἧττον ταῖς Μούσαις τὸν Διόνυσον ἢ ταῖς Νύμφαις κεραννύντας ἐκεῖναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν τοῖς σώμασιν ἵλεων καὶ πρᾶον, αὗται δὲ ταῖς ψυχαῖς μειλίχιον ὄντως καὶ χαριδώτην ἐπεισάγουσι. καὶ γὰρ ἂν ὀλίγοι τινὲς ἰδιῶται παρῶσιν, ὥσπερ ἄφωνα γράμματα φωνηέντων ἐν μέσῳ πολλῶν τῶν πεπαιδευμένων ἐμπεριλαμβανόμενοι, φθογγῆς τινος οὐ παντελῶς ἀνάρθρου καὶ συνέσεως κοινωνήσουσιν. ἂν δὲ πλῆθος ᾖ τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων, οἳ παντὸς μὲν ὀρνέου παντὸς δὲ νεύρου καὶ ξύλου μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοσόφου φωνὴν ὑπομένουσι, τὸ τοῦ Πεισιστράτου χρήσιμον ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ἐν διαφορᾷ τινι πρὸς τοὺς υἱοὺς γενόμενος, ὡς ᾔσθετο τοὺς ἐχθροὺς χαίροντας, ἐκκλησίαν συναγαγὼν ἔφη βούλεσθαι μὲν αὐτὸς πεῖσαι τοὺς παῖδας, ἐπεὶ δὲ δυσκόλως ἔχουσιν, αὐτὸς ἐκείνοις πείσεσθαι καὶ ἀκολουθήσειν. οὕτω δὴ καὶ φιλόσοφος ἀνὴρ ἐν συμπόταις μὴ δεχομένοις τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ μεταθέμενος ἕψεται καὶ ἀγαπήσει τὴν ἐκείνων διατριβὴν, ἐφʼ ὅσον μὴ ἐκβαίνει τὸ εὔσχημον· εἰδὼς ὅτι ῥητορεύουσι μὲν ἄνθρωποι διὰ λόγου, φιλοσοφοῦσι δὲ καὶ σιωπῶντες καὶ παίζοντες καὶ νὴ Δία σκωπτόμενοι καὶ σκώπτοντες. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀδικίας ἐσχάτης ἐστίν ὥς φησι Πλάτωνμὴ ὄντα δίκαιον εἶναι δοκεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνέσεως ἄκρας φιλοσοφοῦντα μὴ δοκεῖν φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ παίζοντα διαπράττεσθαι τὰ τῶν σπουδαζόντων. ὡς γὰρ αἱ παρʼ Εὐριπίδῃ μαινάδες ἄνοπλοι καὶ ἀσίδηροι τοῖς θυρσαρίοις παίουσαι τοὺς ἐπιτιθεμένους τραυματίζουσιν, οὕτω τῶν ἀληθινῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ τὰ σκώμματα καὶ οἱ γέλωτες τοὺς μὴ παντελῶς ἀτρώτους κινοῦσιν ἁμωσγέπως καὶ συνεπιστρέφουσιν.

And when you affirmed that none ought to oppose what Crato said, but determine what sorts of philosophical topics were to be admitted as fit companions at a feast, and so avoid that just and pleasant taunt put upon the wrangling disputers of the age, Come now to supper, that we may contend; and when you seemed concerned and urged us to speak to that head, I first replied: Sir, we must consider what company we have; for if the greater part of the guests are learned men,—as for instance, at Agatho’s entertainment, men like Socrates, Phaedrus, Pausanias, Euryximachus; or at Callias’s board, Charmides, Antisthenes, Hermogenes, and the like,—we will permit them to philosophize, and to mix Bacchus with the Muses as well as with the Nymphs; for the latter make him wholesome and gentle to the body, and the other pleasant and agreeable to the soul. And if there are some few illiterate persons present, they, as mute consonants with vowels, in the midst of the other learned, will participate in a voice not altogether inarticulate and insignificant. But if the greater part consists of such who can better endure the noise of any bird, fiddle-string, or piece of wood than the voice of a philosopher, Pisistratus hath shown us what to do; for being at difference with his sons, when he heard his enemies rejoiced at it, in a full assembly he declared that he had endeavored to persuade his sons to submit to him, but since he found them obstinate, he was resolved to yield and submit to their humors. So a philosopher, midst those companions that slight his excellent discourse, will lay aside his gravity, follow them, and comply with their humor as far as decency will permit; knowing very well that men cannot exercise their rhetoric unless they speak, but may their philosophy even whilst they are silent or jest merrily, nay, whilst they are piqued upon or repartee. For it is not only (as Plato says) the highest degree of injustice not to be just and yet seem so; but it is the top of wisdom to philosophize, yet not appear to do it; and in mirth to do the same with those that are serious, and yet seem in earnest. For as in Euripides, the Bacchae, though unprovided of iron weapons and unarmed, wounded their invaders with their boughs, thus the very jests and merry talk of true philosophers move and correct in some sort those that are not altogether insensible.

οἶμαι δὲ διηγήσεων εἶναί τι συμποτικὸν γένος, ὧν τὰς μὲν ἱστορία δίδωσι, τὰς δʼ ἐκ τῶν ἀνὰ χεῖρα πραγμάτων λαβεῖν ἔστι, πολλὰ μὲν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν παραδείγματα πολλὰ δʼ εἰς εὐσέβειαν ἐχούσας, ἀνδρικῶν τε πράξεων καὶ μεγαλοθύμων ἐνίας δὲ χρηστῶν καὶ φιλανθρώπων ζῆλον ἐπαγούσας· αἷς ἤν τις ἀνυπόπτως χρώμενος διαπαιδαγωγῇ τοὺς πίνοντας, οὐ τὰ ἐλάχιστα τῶν κακῶν ἀφαιρήσει τῆς μέθης. οἱ μὲν οὖν τὰ βούγλωσσα καταμιγνύντες εἰς τὸν οἶνον καὶ τοῖς ἀποβρέγμασι τῶν περιστερεώνων καὶ ἀδιάντων τὰ ἐδάφη ῥαίνοντες, ὡς τούτων τινὰ τοῖς ἑστιωμένοις εὐθυμίαν καὶ φιλοφροσύνην ἐνδιδόντων, ἀπομιμούμενοι τὴν Ὁμηρικὴν Ἑλένην ὑποφαρμάττουσαν τὸν ἄκρατον, οὐ συνορῶσιν ὅτι κἀκεῖνος ὁ μῦθος ἐκπεριελθὼν ἀπʼ Αἰγύπτου μακρὰν ὁδὸν εἰς λόγους ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ πρέποντας ἐτελεύτησεν ἡ γὰρ Ἑλένη πίνουσιν αὐτοῖς διηγεῖται περὶ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως· οἷον τόδʼ ἔρεξε καὶ ἔτλη καρτερὸς ἀνήρ, / αὐτόν μιν πληγῇσιν ἀεικελίῃσι δαμάσσας· / τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ὡς ἔοικε τὸ νηπενθὲς φάρμακον καὶ ἀνώδυνον, λόγος ἔχων καιρὸν ἁρμόζοντα τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πάθεσι καὶ πράγμασιν. οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες, κἂν ἀπʼ εὐθείας φιλοσοφῶσι, τηνικαῦτα διὰ τοῦ πιθανοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ βιαστικοῦ τῶν ἀποδείξεων ἄγουσι τὸν λόγον. ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ περὶ τέλους διαλεγόμενος καὶ τοῦ πρώτου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ὅλως θεολογῶν οὐκ ἐντείνει τὴν ἀπόδειξιν οὐδʼ ὑποκονίεται, τὴν λαβὴν ὥσπερ εἴωθεν εὔτονον ποιῶν καὶ ἄφυκτον, ἀλλʼ ὑγροτέροις λήμμασι καὶ παραδείγμασι καὶ μυθολογίαις προσάγεται τοὺς ἄνδρας.

I think there are topics fit to be used at table, some of which reading and study give us, others the present occasion; some to incite to study, others to piety and great and noble actions, others to make us rivals of the bountiful and kind; which if a man cunningly and without any apparent design inserts for the instruction of the rest, he will free these entertainments from many of those considerable evils which usually attend them. Some that put borage into the wine, or sprinkle the floor with water in which verbena and maiden-hair have been steeped, as good to raise mirth and jollity in the guests (in imitation of Homer’s Helen, who with some medicament diluted the pure wine she had prepared), do not understand that that fable, coming round from Egypt, after a long way ends at last in easy and fit discourse. For whilst they were drinking, Helen relates the story of Ulysses, How Fortune’s spite the hero did control, / And bore his troubles with a manly soul. / For that, in my opinion, was the Nepenthe, the care-dissolving medicament,—that story exactly fitted to the then disasters and juncture of affairs. The pleasing men, though they designedly and apparently instruct, draw on their maxims with persuasive and smooth arguments, rather than the violent force of demonstrations. You see that even Plato in his Symposium, where he disputes of the chief end, the chief good, and is altogether on subjects theological, doth not lay down strong and close demonstrations; he doth not prepare himself for the contest (as he is wont) like a wrestler, that he may take the faster hold of his adversary and be sure of giving him the trip; but he draws men on by more soft and pliable attacks, by pleasant fictions and pat examples.

εἶναι δὲ δεῖ καὶ αὐτὰς τὰς ζητήσεις ὑγροτέρας καὶ γνώριμα τὰ προβλήματα καὶ τὰς πεύσεις ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ μὴ γλίσχρας, ἵνα μὴ πνίγωσι τοὺς ἀνοητοτέρους μηδʼ ἀποτρέπωσιν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ σώματα πινόντων διʼ ὀρχήσεως καὶ χορείας νενόμισται σαλεύειν, ἂν δʼ ὁπλομαχεῖν ἀναστάντας ἢ δισκεύειν ἀναγκάζωμεν αὐτούς, οὐ μόνον ἀτερπὲς ἀλλὰ καὶ βλαβερὸν ἔσται τὸ συμπόσιον· οὕτω τὰς ψυχὰς αἱ μὲν ἐλαφραὶ ζητήσεις ἐμμελῶς καὶ ὠφελίμως κινοῦσιν, ἐριδαντέων δὲ κατὰ Δημόκριτονκαὶ ἱμαντελικτέων λόγους ἀφετέον, οἳ αὐτούς τε κατατείνουσιν ἐν πράγμασι γλίσχροις καὶ δυσθεωρήτοις τούς τε παρατυγχάνοντας ἀνιῶσι· δεῖ γὰρ ὡς τὸν οἶνον κοινὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸν λόγον, οὗ πάντες μεθέξουσιν. οἱ δὲ τοιαῦτα προβλήματα καθιέντες οὐδὲν ἂν τῆς Αἰσωπείου γεράνου καὶ ἀλώπεκος ἐπιεικέστεροι πρὸς κοινωνίαν φανεῖεν· ὧν ἡ μὲν ἔτνος τι λιπαρὸν κατὰ λίθου πλατείας καταχεαμένη τὴν γέρανον ἐδέξατο οὐκ εὐωχουμένην, ἀλλὰ γελοῖα πάσχουσαν· ἐξέφευγε γὰρ ὑγρότητι τὸ ἔτνος τὴν λεπτότητα τοῦ στόματος αὐτῆς. ἐν μέρει τοίνυν ἡ γέρανος αὐτῇ καταγγείλασα δεῖπνον ἐν λαγυνίδι προὔθηκε λεπτὸν ἐχούσῃ καὶ μακρὸν τράχηλον, ὥστʼ αὐτὴ μὲν καθιέναι τὸ στόμα ῥᾳδίως καὶ ἀπολαύειν, τὴν δʼ ἀλώπεκα μὴ δυναμένην κομίζεσθαι συμβολὰς πρεπούσας. οὕτω τοίνυν, ὅταν οἱ φιλόσοφοι παρὰ πότον εἰς λεπτὰ καὶ διαλεκτικὰ προβλήματα καταδύντες ἐνοχλῶσι τοῖς πολλοῖς ἕπεσθαι μὴ δυναμένοις, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ πάλιν ἐπʼ ᾠδάς τινας καὶ διηγήματα φλυαρώδη καὶ λόγους βαναύσους καὶ ἀγοραίους ἐμβάλλωσιν ἑαυτούς, οἴχεται τῆς συμποτικῆς κοινωνίας τὸ τέλος καὶ καθύβρισται ὁ Διόνυσος. ὥσπερ οὖν, Φρυνίχου καὶ Αἰσχύλου τὴν τραγῳδίαν εἰς μύθους καὶ πάθη προαγόντων, ἐλέχθη τὸ τί ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον; οὕτως ἔμοιγε πολλάκις εἰπεῖν παρέστη πρὸς τοὺς ἕλκοντας εἰς τὰ συμπόσια τὸν Κυριεύοντα ὦ ἄνθρωπε, τί ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον; ᾄδειν μὲν γὰρ ἴσως τὰ καλούμενα σκόλια, κρατῆρος ἐν μέσῳ προκειμένου καὶ στεφάνων διανεμομένων, οὓς ὁ θεὸς ἐλευθερῶν ἡμᾶς ἐπιτίθησιν, οὐ καλὸν δʼ οὐδὲ συμποτικόν. ἐπεί τοι καὶ τὰ σκόλιά φασιν οὐ γένος ᾀσμάτων εἶναι πεποιημένων ἀσαφῶς, ἀλλʼ ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ᾖδον ᾠδὴν τοῦ θεοῦ κοινῶς ἅπαντες μιᾷ φωνῇ παιανίζοντες, δεύτερον δʼ ἐφεξῆς ἑκάστῳ μυρσίνης παραδιδομένης, ἣν αἴσακον οἶμαι διὰ τὸ ᾄδειν τὸν δεξάμενον ἐκάλουν· ἐπὶ δὲ τούτῳ λύρας περιφερομένης, ὁ μὲν πεπαιδευμένος ἐλάμβανε καὶ ᾖδεν ἁρμοζόμενος, τῶν δʼ ἀμούσων οὐ προσιεμένων, σκολιὸν ὠνομάσθη τὸ μὴ κοινὸν αὐτοῦ μηδὲ ῥᾴδιον. ἄλλοι δέ φασι τὴν μυρσίνην οὐ καθεξῆς βαδίζειν, ἀλλὰ καθʼ ἕκαστον ἀπὸ κλίνης ἐπὶ κλίνην διαφέρεσθαι· τὸν γὰρ πρῶτον ᾄσαντα τῷ πρώτῳ τῆς δευτέρας κλίνης ἀποστέλλειν, ἐκεῖνον δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ τῆς τρίτης, εἶτα τὸν δεύτερον ὁμοίως τῷ δευτέρῳ, καὶ τὸ ποικίλον καὶ πολυκαμπὲς ὡς ἔοικε τῆς περιόδου σκολιὸν ὠνομάσθη.

Besides, the questions should be easy, the problems known, the interrogations plain and familiar, not intricate and dark, that they might neither vex the unlearned, nor fright them from the disquisition. For—as it is allowable to dissolve our entertainment into a dance, but if we force our guests to pitch quoits or play at cudgels, we shall not only make our feast unpleasant, but hurtful and unnatural—thus light and easy disquisitions do pleasantly and profitably excite us, but we must forbear all contentious and (to use Democritus’s word) wrangling disputes, which perplex the proposers with intricate and inexplicable doubts, and trouble all the others that are present. Our discourse should be like our wine, common to all, and of which every one may equally partake; and they that propose hard problems seem no better fitted for society than Aesop’s fox and crane. For the fox vexed the crane with thin broth poured out upon a flat stone, and laughed at her when he saw her, by reason of the narrowness of her bill and the thinness of the broth, incapable of partaking what he had prepared; and the crane, in requital, inviting the fox to supper, brought forth her dainties in a pot with a long and narrow neck, which she could conveniently thrust her bill into, whilst the fox could not reach one bit. Just so, when philosophers midst their cups dive into minute and logical disputes, they are very troublesome to those that cannot follow them through the same depths; and those that bring in idle songs, trifling disquisitions, common talk, and mechanical discourse destroy the very end of conversation and merry entertainments, and abuse Bacchus. Therefore, as when Phrynichus and Aeschylus brought tragedy to discourse of fables and misfortunes, it was asked, What is this to Bacchus?—so methinks, when I hear some pedantically drawing a syllogism into table-talk, I have reason to cry out, Sir, what is this to Bacchus? Perchance one, the great bowl standing in the midst, and the chaplets given round, which the God in token of the liberty he bestows sets on every head, sings one of those songs called σκολιά (crooked or obscure); this is not fit nor agreeable to a feast. Though some say these σκολιά were not dark and intricate composures; but that the guests sang the first song all together, praising Bacchus and describing the power of the God; and the second each man sang singly in his turn, a myrtle bough being delivered to every one in order, which they call an αἴσακον because he that received it was obliged to sing (ᾄδειν); and after this a harp being carried round the company, the skilful took it, and fitted the music to the song; this when the unskilful could not perform, the song was called σκολιόν, because it was hard to them, and one in which they could not bear a part. Others say this myrtle bough was not delivered in order, but from bed to bed; and when the uppermost of the first table had sung, he sent it to the uppermost of the second, and he to the uppermost of the third; and so the second in like manner to the second; and from these many windings and this circuit it was called σκολιόν, crooked.

People and places in this passage

English translation by Thomas Creech (1874). Original text: William W. Goodwin (ed.), Plutarch's Morals, translated from the Greek by several hands, vol. 3, Boston: Little, Brown and Company; Cambridge: Press of John Wilson and Son, 1874 (Greek text: Gregorius N. Bernardakis, Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia, vol. 4, Leipzig: Teubner, 1892, as digitised by Perseus).

Greek text and translation from the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0 (Perseus Digital Library); translation public domain. Introductions, summaries and notes © GreekMythology.com.