ΣΩ. ἐχέτω δὴ ὡς νῦν φαμεν, μία ἰδέα ἐξ ἑκάστων τῶν συναρμοττόντων στοιχείων γιγνομένη ἡ συλλαβή, ὁμοίως ἔν τε γράμμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεῖ εἶναι.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή;
ΣΩ. ὅτι οὗ ἂν ᾖ μέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα μέρη εἶναι. ἢ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γεγονὸς ἕν τι εἶδος ἕτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν;
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ δὴ πᾶν καὶ τὸ ὅλον πότερον ταὐτὸν καλεῖς ἢ ἕτερον ἑκάτερον;
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔχω μὲν οὐδὲν σαφές, ὅτι δὲ κελεύεις προθύμως ἀποκρίνασθαι, παρακινδυνεύων λέγω ὅτι ἕτερον.
ΣΩ. ἡ μὲν προθυμία, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὀρθή· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόκρισις, σκεπτέον.
ΘΕΑΙ. δεῖ γε δή.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν διαφέροι ἂν τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντός, ὡς ὁ νῦν λόγος;
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ δή; τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἔσθʼ ὅτι διαφέρει; οἷον ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν ἕν, δύο, τρία, τέτταρα, πέντε, ἕξ, καὶ ἐὰν δὶς τρία ἢ τρὶς δύο ἢ τέτταρά τε καὶ δύο ἢ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἕν, πότερον ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ἕτερον λέγομεν;
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ αὐτό.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἕξ;
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐφʼ ἑκάστης λέξεως πάντα ἓξ εἰρήκαμεν;
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
ΣΩ. πᾶν δʼ οὐδὲν λέγομεν τὰ πάντα λέγοντες;
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. ἦ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὰ ἕξ;
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.
ΣΩ. ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἔν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστι τό τε πᾶν προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἅπαντα;
ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. ὧδε δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν λέγωμεν. ὁ τοῦ πλέθρου ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὸ πλέθρον ταὐτόν· ἦ γάρ;
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
ΣΩ. καὶ ὁ τοῦ σταδίου δὴ ὡσαύτως.
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ τοῦ στρατοπέδου γε καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁμοίως; ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς πᾶς τὸ ὂν πᾶν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστιν.
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ ἑκάστων ἀριθμὸς μῶν ἄλλο τι ἢ μέρη ἐστίν;
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.
ΣΩ. ὅσα ἄρα ἔχει μέρη, ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εἴη;
ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. τὰ δέ γε πάντα μέρη τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ὡμολόγηται, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς τὸ πᾶν ἔσται.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.
ΣΩ. τὸ ὅλον ἄρʼ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ μερῶν. πᾶν γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὰ πάντα ὂν μέρη.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔοικεν.
ΣΩ. μέρος δʼ ἔσθʼ ὅτου ἄλλου ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ ὅλου;
ΘΕΑΙ. τοῦ παντός γε.
SOC. Let it be, then, as we say now, that the syllable or combination is a single form arising out of the several conjoined elements, and that it is the same in words and in all other things.
THEAET. Certainly.
SOC. Therefore there must be no parts of it.
THEAET. How so?
SOC. Because if there are parts of anything, the whole must inevitably be all the parts; or do you assert also that the whole that has arisen out of the parts is a single concept different from all the parts?
THEAET. Yes, I do.
SOC. Do you then say that all and the whole are the same, or that each of the two is different from the other?
THEAET. I am not sure; but you tell me to answer boldly, so I take the risk and say that they are different.
SOC. Your boldness, Theaetetus, is right; but whether your answer is so remains to be seen.
THEAET. Yes, certainly, we must see about that.
SOC. The whole, then, according to our present view, would differ from all?
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. How about this? Is there any difference between all in the plural and all in the singular? For instance, if we say one, two, three, four, five, six, or twice three, or three times two, or four and two, or three and two and one, are we in all these forms speaking of the same or of different numbers?
THEAET. Of the same.
SOC. That is, of six?
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. Then in each form of speech we have spoken of all the six?
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. And again do we not speak of one thing when we speak of them all?
THEAET. Assuredly.
SOC. That is, of six?
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. Then in all things that are made up of number, we apply the same term to all in the plural and all in the singular?
THEAET. Apparently.
SOC. Here is another way of approaching the matter. The number of the fathom and the fathom are the same, are they not?
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. And of the furlong likewise.
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. And the number of the army is the same as the army, and all such cases are alike? In each of them all the number is all the thing.
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. And is the number of each anything but the parts of each?
THEAET. No.
SOC. Everything that has parts, accordingly, consists of parts, does it not?
THEAET. Evidently.
SOC. But we are agreed that the all must be all the parts if all the number is to be the all.
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. Then the whole does not consist of parts, for if it consisted of all the parts it would be the all.
THEAET. That seems to be true.
SOC. But is a part a part of anything in the world but the whole?
THEAET. Yes, of the all.
ΣΩ. ἀνδρικῶς γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μάχῃ. τὸ πᾶν δὲ οὐχ ὅταν μηδὲν ἀπῇ, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστιν;
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. ὅλον δὲ οὐ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἔσται, οὗ ἂν μηδαμῇ μηδὲν ἀποστατῇ; οὗ δʼ ἂν ἀποστατῇ, οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε πᾶν, ἅμα γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτό;
ΘΕΑΙ. δοκεῖ μοι νῦν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὅλον.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐλέγομεν ὅτι οὗ ἂν μέρη ᾖ, τὸ ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν τὰ πάντα μέρη ἔσται;
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. πάλιν δή, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν, οὐκ, εἴπερ ἡ συλλαβὴ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖά ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν μὴ ὡς μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἢ ταὐτὸν οὖσαν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι;
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἵνα μὴ γένηται, ἕτερον αὐτῶν αὐτὴν ἐθέμεθα;
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ; εἰ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα συλλαβῆς μέρη ἐστίν, ἔχεις ἄλλʼ ἄττα εἰπεῖν ἃ μέρη μέν ἐστι συλλαβῆς, οὐ μέντοι στοιχεῖά γʼ ἐκείνης;
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς. εἰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μόριʼ ἄττʼ αὐτῆς συγχωροίην, γελοῖόν που τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀφέντα ἐπʼ ἄλλα ἰέναι.
ΣΩ. παντάπασι δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, κατὰ τὸν νῦν λόγον μία τις ἰδέα ἀμέριστος συλλαβὴ ἂν εἴη.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.
ΣΩ. μέμνησαι οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ὀλίγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἡγούμενοι εὖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τῶν πρώτων οὐκ εἴη λόγος ἐξ ὧν τἆλλα σύγκειται, διότι αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον εἴη ἀσύνθετον, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ «εἶναι» περὶ αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς ἔχοι προσφέροντα εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ «τοῦτο,» ὡς ἕτερα καὶ ἀλλότρια λεγόμενα, καὶ αὕτη δὴ ἡ αἰτία ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον αὐτὸ ποιοῖ;
ΘΕΑΙ. μέμνημαι.
ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν ἄλλη τις ἢ αὕτη ἡ αἰτία τοῦ μονοειδές τε καὶ ἀμέριστον αὐτὸ εἶναι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὁρῶ ἄλλην.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἐμπέπτωκεν ἡ συλλαβὴ εἶδος ἐκείνῳ, εἴπερ μέρη τε μὴ ἔχει καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἰδέα;
ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. εἰ μὲν ἄρα πολλὰ στοιχεῖα ἡ συλλαβή ἐστιν καὶ ὅλον τι, μέρη δʼ αὐτῆς ταῦτα, ὁμοίως αἵ τε συλλαβαὶ γνωσταὶ καὶ ῥηταὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐπείπερ τὰ πάντα μέρη τῷ ὅλῳ ταὐτὸν ἐφάνη.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.
ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γε ἕν τε καὶ ἀμερές, ὁμοίως μὲν συλλαβή, ὡσαύτως δὲ στοιχεῖον ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ αἰτία ποιήσει αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως εἰπεῖν.
ΣΩ. τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα μὴ ἀποδεχώμεθα, ὃς ἂν λέγῃ συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστὸν καὶ ῥητόν, στοιχεῖον δὲ τοὐναντίον.
ΘΕΑΙ. μὴ γάρ, εἴπερ τῷ λόγῳ πειθόμεθα.
SOC. You are putting up a brave fight, Theaetetus. But is not the all precisely that of which nothing is wanting?
THEAET. Necessarily.
SOC. And is not just this same thing, from which nothing whatsoever is lacking, a whole? For that from which anything is lacking is neither a whole nor all, which have become identical simultaneously and for the same reason.
THEAET. I think now that there is no difference between all and whole.
SOC. We were saying, were we not, that if there are parts of anything, the whole and all of it will be all the parts?
THEAET. Certainly.
SOC. Once more, then, as I was trying to say just now, if the syllable is not the letters, does it not follow necessarily that it contains the letters, not as parts of it, or else that being the same as the letters, it is equally knowable with them?
THEAET. It does.
SOC. And it was in order to avoid this that we assumed that it was different from them?
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. Well then, if the letters are not parts of the syllable, can you mention any other things which are parts of it, but are not the letters of it?
THEAET. Certainly not. For if I grant that there are parts of the syllable, it would be ridiculous to give up the letters and look for other things as parts.
SOC. Without question, then, Theaetetus, the syllable would be, according to our present view, some indivisible concept.
THEAET. I agree.
SOC. Do you remember, then, my friend, that we admitted a little while ago, on what we considered good grounds, that there can be no rational explanation of the primary elements of which other things are composed, because each of them, when taken by itself, is not composite, and we could not properly apply to such an element even the expression “be” or “this,” because these terms are different and alien, and for this reason it is irrational and unknowable?
THEAET. I remember.
SOC. And is not this the sole reason why it is single in form and indivisible? I can see no other.
THEAET. There is no other to be seen.
SOC. Then the syllable falls into the same class with the letter, if it has no parts and is a single form?
THEAET. Yes, unquestionably.
SOC. If, then, the syllable is a plurality of letters and is a whole of which the letters are parts, the syllables and the letters are equally knowable and expressible, if all the parts were found to be the same as the whole.
THEAET. Certainly.
SOC. But if one and indivisible, then syllable and likewise letter are equally irrational and unknowable; for the same cause will make them so.
THEAET. I cannot dispute it.
SOC. Then we must not accept the statement of any one who says that the syllable is knowable and expressible, but the letter is not.
THEAET. No, not if we are convinced by our argument.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ αὖ; τοὐναντίον λέγοντος ἆρʼ οὐ μᾶλλον ἂν ἀποδέξαιο ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς σύνοισθα σαυτῷ ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει;
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;
ΣΩ. ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μανθάνων διετέλεσας ἢ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἔν τε τῇ ὄψει διαγιγνώσκειν πειρώμενος καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀκοῇ αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον, ἵνα μὴ ἡ θέσις σε ταράττοι λεγομένων τε καὶ γραφομένων.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
ΣΩ. ἐν δὲ κιθαριστοῦ τελέως μεμαθηκέναι μῶν ἄλλο τι ἦν ἢ τὸ τῷ φθόγγῳ ἑκάστῳ δύνασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ποίας χορδῆς εἴη· ἃ δὴ στοιχεῖα πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογήσειε μουσικῆς λέγεσθαι;
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδὲν ἄλλο.
ΣΩ. ὧν μὲν ἄρʼ αὐτοὶ ἔμπειροί ἐσμεν στοιχείων καὶ συλλαβῶν, εἰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τούτων τεκμαίρεσθαι καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα, πολὺ τὸ τῶν στοιχείων γένος ἐναργεστέραν τε τὴν γνῶσιν ἔχειν φήσομεν καὶ κυριωτέραν τῆς συλλαβῆς πρὸς τὸ λαβεῖν τελέως ἕκαστον μάθημα, καὶ ἐάν τις φῇ συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστόν, ἄγνωστον δὲ πεφυκέναι στοιχεῖον, ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα παίζειν ἡγησόμεθʼ αὐτόν.
ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ δὴ τούτου μὲν ἔτι κἂν ἄλλαι φανεῖεν ἀποδείξεις, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ· τὸ δὲ προκείμενον μὴ ἐπιλαθώμεθα διʼ αὐτὰ ἰδεῖν, ὅτι δή ποτε καὶ λέγεται τὸ μετὰ δόξης ἀληθοῦς λόγον προσγενόμενον τὴν τελεωτάτην ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν χρὴ ὁρᾶν.
ΣΩ. φέρε δή, τί ποτε βούλεται τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν σημαίνειν; τριῶν γὰρ ἕν τί μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν.
ΘΕΑΙ. τίνων δή;
ΣΩ. τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἴη ἂν τὸ τὴν αὑτοῦ διάνοιαν ἐμφανῆ ποιεῖν διὰ φωνῆς μετὰ ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, ὥσπερ εἰς κάτοπτρον ἢ ὕδωρ τὴν δόξαν ἐκτυπούμενον εἰς τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος ῥοήν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ τοιοῦτον λόγος εἶναι;
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔμοιγε. τὸν γοῦν αὐτὸ δρῶντα λέγειν φαμέν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν αὖ τοῦτό γε πᾶς ποιεῖν δυνατὸς θᾶττον ἢ σχολαίτερον, τὸ ἐνδείξασθαι τί δοκεῖ περὶ ἑκάστου αὐτῷ, ὁ μὴ ἐνεὸς ἢ κωφὸς ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς· καὶ οὕτως ὅσοι τι ὀρθὸν δοξάζουσι, πάντες αὐτὸ μετὰ λόγου φανοῦνται ἔχοντες, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ὀρθὴ δόξα χωρὶς ἐπιστήμης γενήσεται.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.
SOC. But would you not rather accept the opposite belief, judging by your own experience when you were learning to read?
THEAET. What experience?
SOC. In learning, you were merely constantly trying to distinguish between the letters both by sight and by hearing, keeping each of them distinct from the rest, that you might not be disturbed by their sequence when they were spoken or written.
THEAET. That is very true.
SOC. And in the music school was not perfect attainment the ability to follow each note and tell which string produced it; and everyone would agree that the notes are the elements of music?
THEAET. Yes, that is all true.
SOC. Then if we are to argue from the elements and combinations in which we ourselves have experience to other things in general, we shall say that the elements as a class admit of a much clearer knowledge than the compounds and of a knowledge that is much more important for the complete attainment of each branch of learning, and if anyone says that the compound is by its nature knowable and the element unknowable, we shall consider that he is, intentionally or unintentionally, joking.
THEAET. Certainly.
SOC. Still other proofs of this might be brought out, I think; but let us not on that account lose sight of the question before us, which is: What is meant by the doctrine that the most perfect knowledge arises from the addition of rational explanation to true opinion?
THEAET. No, we must not.
SOC. Now what are we intended to understand by “rational explanation”? I think it means one of three things.
THEAET. What are they?
SOC. The first would be making one’s own thought clear through speech by means of verbs and nouns, imaging the opinion in the stream that flows through the lips, as in a mirror or water. Do you not think the rational explanation is something of that sort?
THEAET. Yes, I do. At any rate, we say that he who does that speaks or explains.
SOC. Well, that is a thing that anyone can do sooner or later; he can show what he thinks about anything, unless he is deaf or dumb from the first; and so all who have any right opinion will be found to have it with the addition of rational explanation, and there will henceforth be no possibility of right opinion apart from knowledge.
THEAET. True.
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