ΣΩ. ὧν εἷς γέγονεν Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου καὶ ἄλλοι πάνυ πολλοί· οὕς, ὅταν πάλιν ἔλθωσι δεόμενοι τῆς ἐμῆς συνουσίας καὶ θαυμαστὰ δρῶντες, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει συνεῖναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἐᾷ, καὶ πάλιν οὗτοι ἐπιδιδόασι. πάσχουσι δὲ δὴ οἱ ἐμοὶ συγγιγνόμενοι καὶ τοῦτο ταὐτὸν ταῖς τικτούσαις· ὠδίνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπορίας ἐμπίμπλανται νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ʼκεῖναι· ταύτην δὲ τὴν ὠδῖνα ἐγείρειν τε καὶ ἀποπαύειν ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ οὕτως. ἐνίοις δέ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οἳ ἄν μοι μὴ δόξωσί πως ἐγκύμονες εἶναι, γνοὺς ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ δέονται, πάνυ εὐμενῶς προμνῶμαι καί, σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἱκανῶς τοπάζω οἷς ἂν συγγενόμενοι ὄναιντο· ὧν πολλοὺς μὲν δὴ ἐξέδωκα προδίκῳ, πολλοὺς δὲ ἄλλοις σοφοῖς τε καὶ θεσπεσίοις ἀνδράσι. ταῦτα δή σοι, ὦ ἄριστε, ἕνεκα τοῦδε ἐμήκυνα· ὑποπτεύω σε, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς οἴει, ὠδίνειν τι κυοῦντα ἔνδον. προσφέρου οὖν πρός με ὡς πρὸς μαίας ὑὸν καὶ αὐτὸν μαιευτικόν, καὶ ἃ ἂν ἐρωτῶ προθυμοῦ ὅπως οἷός τʼ εἶ οὕτως ἀποκρίνασθαι· καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα σκοπούμενός τι ὧν ἂν λέγῃς ἡγήσωμαι εἴδωλον καὶ μὴ ἀληθές, εἶτα ὑπεξαιρῶμαι καὶ ἀποβάλλω, μὴ ἀγρίαινε ὥσπερ αἱ πρωτοτόκοι περὶ τὰ παιδία. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πρός με οὕτω διετέθησαν, ὥστε ἀτεχνῶς δάκνειν ἕτοιμοι εἶναι, ἐπειδάν τινα λῆρον αὐτῶν ἀφαιρῶμαι, καὶ οὐκ οἴονταί με εὐνοίᾳ τοῦτο ποιεῖν, πόρρω ὄντες τοῦ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδεὶς θεὸς δύσνους ἀνθρώποις, οὐδʼ ἐγὼ δυσνοίᾳ τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν δρῶ, ἀλλά μοι ψεῦδός τε συγχωρῆσαι καὶ ἀληθὲς ἀφανίσαι οὐδαμῶς θέμις. πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὅτι ποτʼ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, πειρῶ λέγειν· ὡς δʼ οὐχ οἷός τʼ εἶ, μηδέποτʼ εἴπῃς. ἐὰν γὰρ θεὸς ἐθέλῃ καὶ ἀνδρίζῃ, οἷός τʼ ἔσῃ.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοῦ γε οὕτω παρακελευομένου αἰσχρὸν μὴ οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυμεῖσθαι ὅτι τις ἔχει λέγειν. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ὁ ἐπιστάμενός τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο ὃ ἐπίσταται, καὶ ὥς γε νυνὶ φαίνεται, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις.
ΣΩ. εὖ γε καὶ γενναίως, ὦ παῖ· χρὴ γὰρ οὕτως ἀποφαινόμενον λέγειν. ἀλλὰ φέρε δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα, γόνιμον ἢ ἀνεμιαῖον τυγχάνει ὄν. αἴσθησις, φῄς, ἐπιστήμη;
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
SOC. One of these was Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus, and there are very many more. When such men come back and beg me, as they do, with wonderful eagerness to let them join me again, the spiritual monitor that comes to me forbids me to associate with some of them, but allows me to converse with others, and these again make progress. Now those who associate with me are in this matter also like women in childbirth; they are in pain and are full of trouble night and day, much more than are the women; and my art can arouse this pain and cause it to cease. Well, that is what happens to them. But in some cases, Theaetetus, when they do not seem to me to be exactly pregnant, since I see that they have no need of me, I act with perfect goodwill as match-maker and, under God, I guess very successfully with whom they can associate profitably, and I have handed over many of them to Prodicus, and many to other wise and inspired men. Now I have said all this to you at such length, my dear boy, because I suspect that you, as you yourself believe, are in pain because you are pregnant with something within you. Apply, then, to me, remembering that I am the son of a midwife and have myself a midwife’s gifts, and do your best to answer the questions I ask as I ask them. And if, when I have examined any of the things you say, it should prove that I think it is a mere image and not real, and therefore quietly take it from you and throw it away, do not be angry as women are when they are deprived of their first offspring. For many, my dear friend, before this have got into such a state of mind towards me that they are actually ready to bite me, if I take some foolish notion away from them, and they do not believe that I do this in kindness, since they are far from knowing that no god is unkind to mortals, and that I do nothing of this sort from unkindness, either, and that it is quite out of the question for me to allow an imposture or to destroy the true. And so, Theaetetus, begin again and try to tell us what knowledge is. And never say that you are unable to do so; for if God wills it and gives you courage, you will be able.
THEAET. Well then, Socrates, since you are so urgent it would be disgraceful for anyone not to exert himself in every way to say what he can. I think, then, that he who knows anything perceives that which he knows, and, as it appears at present, knowledge is nothing else than perception.
SOC. Good! Excellent, my boy! That is the way one ought to speak out. But come now, let us examine your utterance together, and see whether it is a real offspring or a mere wind-egg. Perception, you say, is knowledge?
THEAET. Yes.
ΣΩ. κινδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὐ φαῦλον εἰρηκέναι περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλʼ ὃν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον εἴρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. φησὶ γάρ που «πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον» ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, «τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.» ἀνέγνωκας γάρ που;
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί· ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε κἀγώ;
ΘΕΑΙ. λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτω.
ΣΩ. εἰκὸς μέντοι σοφὸν ἄνδρα μὴ ληρεῖν· ἐπακολουθήσωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ. ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐνίοτε πνέοντος ἀνέμου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν ῥιγῷ, ὁ δʼ οὔ; καὶ ὁ μὲν ἠρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα;
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν τότε αὐτὸ ἐφʼ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα ψυχρὸν ἢ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν; ἢ πεισόμεθα τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ὅτι τῷ μὲν ῥιγῶντι ψυχρόν, τῷ δὲ μὴ οὔ;
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτω ἑκατέρῳ;
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
ΣΩ. τὸ δέ γε «φαίνεται» αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν;
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστιν γάρ.
ΣΩ. φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταὐτὸν ἔν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἕκαστος, τοιαῦτα ἑκάστῳ καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.
ΣΩ. αἴσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἀεί ἐστιν καὶ ἀψευδὲς ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὖσα.
ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσσοφός τις ἦν ὁ Πρωταγόρας, καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ᾐνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγεν;
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο λέγεις;
ΣΩ. ἐγὼ ἐρῶ καὶ μάλʼ οὐ φαῦλον λόγον, ὡς ἄρα ἓν μὲν αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδʼ ἄν τι προσείποις ὀρθῶς οὐδʼ ὁποιονοῦν τι, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ὡς μέγα προσαγορεύῃς, καὶ σμικρὸν φανεῖται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρύ, κοῦφον, σύμπαντά τε οὕτως, ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἑνὸς μήτε τινὸς μήτε ὁποιουοῦν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα ἃ δή φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτʼ οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται. καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἑξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου συμφερέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος, ὃς εἰπών— Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν / πάντα εἴρηκεν ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ τοῦτο λέγειν;
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔμοιγε.
SOC. And, indeed, if I may venture to say so, it is not a bad description of knowledge that you have given, but one which Protagoras also used to give. Only, he has said the same thing in a different way. For he says somewhere that man is “the measure of all things, of the existence of the things that are and the non-existence of the things that are not.” You have read that, I suppose?
THEAET. Yes, I have read it often.
SOC. Well, is not this about what he means, that individual things are for me such as they appear to me, and for you in turn such as they appear to you —you and I being “man”?
THEAET. Yes, that is what he says.
SOC. It is likely that a wise man is not talking nonsense; so let us follow after him. Is it not true that sometimes, when the same wind blows, one of us feels cold, and the other does not? or one feels slightly and the other exceedingly cold?
THEAET. Certainly.
SOC. Then in that case, shall we say that the wind is in itself cold or not cold or shall we accept Protagoras’s saying that it is cold for him who feels cold and not for him who does not?
THEAET. Apparently we shall accept that.
SOC. Then it also seems cold, or not, to each of the two?
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. But “seems” denotes perceiving?
THEAET. It does.
SOC. Then seeming and perception are the same thing in matters of warmth and everything of that sort. For as each person perceives things, such they are to each person.
THEAET. Apparently.
SOC. Perception, then, is always of that which exists and, since it is knowledge, cannot be false.
THEAET. So it seems.
SOC. By the Graces! I wonder if Protagoras, who was a very wise man, did not utter this dark saying to the common herd like ourselves, and tell the truth in secret to his pupils.
THEAET. Why, Socrates, what do you mean by that?
SOC. I will tell you and it is not a bad description, either, that nothing is one and invariable, and you could not rightly ascribe any quality whatsoever to anything, but if you call it large it will also appear to be small, and light if you call it heavy, and everything else in the same way, since nothing whatever is one, either a particular thing or of a particular quality; but it is out of movement and motion and mixture with one another that all those things become which we wrongly say “are”—wrongly, because nothing ever is, but is always becoming. And on this subject all the philosophers, except Parmenides, may be marshalled in one line—Protagoras and Heracleitus and Empedocles—and the chief poets in the two kinds of poetry, Epicharmus, in comedy, and in tragedy, Homer, who, in the line “Oceanus the origin of the gods, and Tethys their mother,” has said that all things are the offspring of flow and motion; or don’t you think he means that?
THEAET. I think he does.
ΣΩ. τίς οὖν ἂν ἔτι πρός γε τοσοῦτον στρατόπεδον καὶ στρατηγὸν Ὅμηρον δύναιτο ἀμφισβητήσας μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι;
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. οὐ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε. ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε τῷ λόγῳ σημεῖα ἱκανά, ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἡσυχία· τὸ γὰρ θερμόν τε καὶ πῦρ, ὃ δὴ καὶ τἆλλα γεννᾷ καὶ ἐπιτροπεύει, αὐτὸ γεννᾶται ἐκ φορᾶς καὶ τρίψεως· τούτω δὲ κινήσεις. ἢ οὐχ αὗται γενέσεις πυρός;
ΘΕΑΙ. αὗται μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν τό γε τῶν ζῴων γένος ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων φύεται.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡσυχίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διόλλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ καὶ κινήσεως ἐπὶ πολὺ σῴζεται;
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ἡ δʼ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ μαθήσεως μὲν καὶ μελέτης, κινήσεων ὄντων, κτᾶταί τε μαθήματα καὶ σῴζεται καὶ γίγνεται βελτίων, ὑπὸ δʼ ἡσυχίας, ἀμελετησίας τε καὶ ἀμαθίας οὔσης, οὔτε τι μανθάνει ἅ τε ἂν μάθῃ ἐπιλανθάνεται;
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.
ΣΩ. τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἀγαθὸν κίνησις κατά τε ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ τοὐναντίον;
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.
ΣΩ. ἔτι οὖν σοι λέγω νηνεμίας τε καὶ γαλήνας καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σήπουσι καὶ ἀπολλύασι, τὰ δʼ ἕτερα σῴζει; καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα, [ἀναγκάζω] προσβιβάζω τὴν χρυσῆν σειρὰν ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸν ἥλιον Ὅμηρος λέγει, καὶ δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕως μὲν ἂν ἡ περιφορὰ ᾖ κινουμένη καὶ ὁ ἥλιος, πάντα ἔστι καὶ σῴζεται τὰ ἐν θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις, εἰ δὲ σταίη τοῦτο ὥσπερ δεθέν, πάντα χρήματʼ ἂν διαφθαρείη καὶ γένοιτʼ ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον ἄνω κάτω πάντα;
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα δηλοῦν ἅπερ λέγεις.
ΣΩ. ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὑτωσί· κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα πρῶτον, ὃ δὴ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκόν, μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἕτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὀμμάτων μηδʼ ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι μηδέ τινʼ αὐτῷ χώραν ἀποτάξῃς· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν εἴη τε δήπου ἐν τάξει καὶ μένον καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν γενέσει γίγνοιτο.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ πῶς;
SOC. Then who could still contend with such a great host, led by Homer as general, and not make himself ridiculous?
THEAET. It is not easy, Socrates.
SOC. No, Theaetetus, it is not. For the doctrine is amply proved by this, namely, that motion is the cause of that which passes for existence, that is, of becoming, whereas rest is the cause of non-existence and destruction; for warmth or fire, which, you know, is the parent and preserver of all other things, is itself the offspring of movement and friction, and these two are forms of motion. Or are not these the source of fire?
THEAET. Yes, they are.
SOC. And furthermore, the animal kingdom is sprung from these same sources.
THEAET. Of course.
SOC. Well, then, is not the bodily habit destroyed by rest and idleness, and preserved, generally speaking, by gymnastic exercises and motions?
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. And what of the habit of the soul? Does not the soul acquire information and is it not preserved and made better through learning and practice, which are motions, whereas through rest, which is want of practice and of study, it learns nothing and forgets what it has learned?
THEAET. Certainly.
SOC. Then the good, both for the soul and for the body, is motion, and rest is the opposite?
THEAET. Apparently.
SOC. Now shall I go on and mention to you also windless air, calm sea, and all that sort of thing, and say that stillness causes decay and destruction and that the opposite brings preservation? And shall I add to this the all-compelling and crowning argument that Homer by “the golden chain” refers to nothing else than the sun, and means that so long as the heavens and the sun go round everything exists and is preserved, among both gods and men, but if the motion should stop, as if bound fast, everything would be destroyed and would, as the saying is, be turned upside down?
THEAET. Yes, Socrates, I think he means what you say he does.
SOC. Then, my friend, you must apply the doctrine in this way: first as concerns vision, the color that you call white is not to be taken as something separate outside of your eyes, nor yet as something inside of them; and you must not assign any place to it, for then it would at once be in a definite position and stationary and would have no part in the process of becoming.
THEAET. But what do you mean?
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