ΣΩ. ὁ τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγούμενος, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔφη ἄρα δείξειν αὐτό· καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ἰόντες ἐρευνῶμεν, τάχʼ ἂν ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον αὐτὸ φήνειεν τὸ ζητούμενον, μένουσι δὲ δῆλον οὐδέν.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις· ἀλλʼ ἴωμέν γε καὶ σκοπῶμεν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε βραχείας σκέψεως· τέχνη γάρ σοι ὅλη σημαίνει μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτό.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δή; καὶ τίς αὕτη;
ΣΩ. ἡ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν, οὓς δὴ καλοῦσιν ῥήτοράς τε καὶ δικανικούς. οὗτοι γάρ που τῇ ἑαυτῶν τέχνῃ πείθουσιν οὐ διδάσκοντες ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποιοῦντες ἃ ἂν βούλωνται. ἢ σὺ οἴει δεινούς τινας οὕτω διδασκάλους εἶναι, ὥστε οἷς μὴ παρεγένοντό τινες ἀποστερουμένοις χρήματα ἤ τι ἄλλο βιαζομένοις, τούτοις δύνασθαι πρὸς ὕδωρ σμικρὸν διδάξαι ἱκανῶς τῶν γενομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν;
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πεῖσαι μέν.
ΣΩ. τὸ πεῖσαι δʼ οὐχὶ δοξάσαι λέγεις ποιῆσαι;
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅταν δικαίως πεισθῶσιν δικασταὶ περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι μόνον ἔστιν εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ μή, ταῦτα τότε ἐξ ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν λαβόντες, ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἔκριναν, ὀρθὰ πεισθέντες, εἴπερ εὖ ἐδίκασαν;
ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄν, ὦ φίλε, εἴ γε ταὐτὸν ἦν δόξα τε ἀληθὴς καὶ δικαστήρια καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὀρθά ποτʼ ἂν δικαστὴς ἄκρος ἐδόξαζεν ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης· νῦν δὲ ἔοικεν ἄλλο τι ἑκάτερον εἶναι.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὅ γε ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπόντος του ἀκούσας ἐπελελήσμην, νῦν δʼ ἐννοῶ· ἔφη δὲ τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης· καὶ ὧν μὲν μή ἐστι λόγος, οὐκ ἐπιστητὰ εἶναι, οὑτωσὶ καὶ ὀνομάζων, ἃ δʼ ἔχει, ἐπιστητά.
ΣΩ. ἦ καλῶς λέγεις. τὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπιστητὰ ταῦτα καὶ μὴ πῇ διῄρει, λέγε, εἰ ἄρα κατὰ ταὐτὰ σύ τε κἀγὼ ἀκηκόαμεν.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ οὐκ οἶδα εἰ ἐξευρήσω· λέγοντος μεντἂν ἑτέρου, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀκολουθήσαιμʼ ἄν.
ΣΩ. ἄκουε δὴ ὄναρ ἀντὶ ὀνείρατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ αὖ ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν τινῶν ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οἱονπερεὶ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε συγκείμεθα καὶ τἆλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι.
SOC. The man who was leading the way through the river, Theaetetus, said: “The result itself will show;” and so in this matter, if we go on with our search, perhaps the thing will turn up in our path and of itself reveal the object of our search; but if we stay still, we shall discover nothing.
THEAET. You are right; let us go on with our investigation.
SOC. Well, then, this at least calls for slight investigation; for you have a whole profession which declares that true opinion is not knowledge.
THEAET. How so? What profession is it?
SOC. The profession of those who are greatest in wisdom, who are called orators and lawyers; for they persuade men by the art which they possess, not teaching them, but making them have whatever opinion they like. Or do you think there are any teachers so clever as to be able, in the short time allowed by the water-clock, satisfactorily to teach the judges the truth about what happened to people who have been robbed of their money or have suffered other acts of violence, when there were no eyewitnesses?
THEAET. I certainly do not think so; but I think they can persuade them.
SOC. And persuading them is making them have an opinion, is it not?
THEAET. Of course.
SOC. Then when judges are justly persuaded about matters which one can know only by having seen them and in no other way, in such a case, judging of them from hearsay, having acquired a true opinion of them, they have judged without knowledge, though they are rightly persuaded, if the judgement they have passed is correct, have they not?
THEAET. Certainly.
SOC. But, my friend, if true opinion and knowledge were the same thing in law courts, the best of judges could never have true opinion without knowledge; in fact, however, it appears that the two are different.
THEAET. Oh yes, I remember now, Socrates, having heard someone make the distinction, but I had forgotten it. He said that knowledge was true opinion accompanied by reason, but that unreasoning true opinion was outside of the sphere of knowledge; and matters of which there is not a rational explanation are unknowable—yes, that is what he called them—and those of which there is are knowable.
SOC. I am glad you mentioned that. But tell us how he distinguished between the knowable and the unknowable, that we may see whether the accounts that you and I have heard agree.
THEAET. But I do not know whether I can think it out; but if someone else were to make the statement of it, I think I could follow.
SOC. Listen then, while I relate it to you—“a dream for a dream.” I in turn used to imagine that I heard certain persons say that the primary elements of which we and all else are composed admit of no rational explanation;
ΣΩ. αὐτὸ γὰρ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον ὀνομάσαι μόνον εἴη, προσειπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατόν, οὔθʼ ὡς ἔστιν, οὔθʼ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν οὐσίαν ἢ μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστίθεσθαι, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν προσφέρειν, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τις ἐρεῖ. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ «αὐτὸ» οὐδὲ τὸ «ἐκεῖνο» οὐδὲ τὸ «ἕκαστον» οὐδὲ τὸ «μόνον» οὐδὲ «τοῦτο» προσοιστέον οὐδʼ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα· ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι, ἕτερα ὄντα ἐκείνων οἷς προστίθεται, δεῖν δέ, εἴπερ ἦν δυνατὸν αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι καὶ εἶχεν οἰκεῖον αὑτοῦ λόγον, ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων λέγεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὁτιοῦν τῶν πρώτων ῥηθῆναι λόγῳ· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτῷ ἀλλʼ ἢ ὀνομάζεσθαι μόνον—ὄνομα γὰρ μόνον ἔχειν—τὰ δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἤδη συγκείμενα, ὥσπερ αὐτὰ πέπλεκται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν συμπλακέντα λόγον γεγονέναι· ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου οὐσίαν. οὕτω δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄλογα καὶ ἄγνωστα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δέ· τὰς δὲ συλλαβὰς γνωστάς τε καὶ ῥητὰς καὶ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ δοξαστάς. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν τινός τις λάβῃ, ἀληθεύειν μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν περὶ αὐτό, γιγνώσκειν δʼ οὔ· τὸν γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενον δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ τούτου· προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγον δυνατόν τε ταῦτα πάντα γεγονέναι καὶ τελείως πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν. οὕτως σὺ τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἢ ἄλλως ἀκήκοας;
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν παντάπασιν.
ΣΩ. ἀρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταύτῃ, δόξαν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι;
ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, νῦν οὕτω τῇδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ εἰλήφαμεν ὃ πάλαι καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν ζητοῦντες πρὶν εὑρεῖν κατεγήρασαν;
ΘΕΑΙ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς λέγεσθαι τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν.
ΣΩ. καὶ εἰκός γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχειν· τίς γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἔτι ἐπιστήμη εἴη χωρὶς τοῦ λόγου τε καὶ ὀρθῆς δόξης; ἓν μέντοι τί με τῶν ῥηθέντων ἀπαρέσκει.
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δή;
ΣΩ. ὃ καὶ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι κομψότατα, ὡς τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄγνωστα, τὸ δὲ τῶν συλλαβῶν γένος γνωστόν.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς;
ΣΩ. ἰστέον δή· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁμήρους ἔχομεν τοῦ λόγου τὰ παραδείγματα οἷς χρώμενος εἶπε πάντα ταῦτα.
ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖα δή;
ΣΩ. τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖά τε καὶ συλλαβάς. ἢ οἴει ἄλλοσέ ποι βλέποντα ταῦτα εἰπεῖν τὸν εἰπόντα ἃ λέγομεν;
ΘΕΑΙ. οὔκ, ἀλλʼ εἰς ταῦτα.
SO. for each alone by itself can only be named, and no qualification can be added, neither that it is nor that it is not, for that would at once be adding to it existence or non-existence, whereas we must add nothing to it, if we are to speak of that itself alone. Indeed, not even “itself” or “that” or “each” or “alone” or “this” or anything else of the sort, of which there are many, must be added; for these are prevalent terms which are added to all things indiscriminately and are different from the things to which they are added; but if it were possible to explain an element, and it admitted of a rational explanation of its own, it would have to be explained apart from everything else. But in fact none of the primal elements can be expressed by reason; they can only be named, for they have only a name; but the things composed of these are themselves complex, and so their names are complex and form a rational explanation; for the combination of names is the essence of reasoning. Thus the elements are not objects of reason or of knowledge, but only of perception, whereas the combinations of them are objects of knowledge and expression and true opinion. When therefore a man acquires without reasoning the true opinion about anything, his mind has the truth about it, but has no knowledge; for he who cannot give and receive a rational explanation of a thing is without knowledge of it; but when he has acquired also a rational explanation he may possibly have become all that I have said and may now be perfect in knowledge. Is that the version of the dream you have heard, or is it different?
THEAET. That was it exactly.
SOC. Are you satisfied, then, and do you state it in this way, that true opinion accompanied by reason is knowledge?
THEAET. Precisely.
SOC. Can it be, Theaetetus, that we now, in this casual manner, have found out on this day what many wise men have long been seeking and have grown grey in the search?
THEAET. I, at any rate, Socrates, think our present statement is good.
SOC. Probably this particular statement is so; for what knowledge could there still be apart from reason and right opinion? One point, however, in what has been said is unsatisfactory to me.
THEAET. What point?
SOC. Just that which seems to be the cleverest; the assertion that the elements are unknowable and the class of combinations is knowable.
THEAET. Is that not right?
SOC. We are sure to find out, for we have as hostages the examples which he who said all this used in his argument.
THEAET. What examples?
SOC. The elements in writing, the letters of the alphabet, and their combinations, the syllables ; or do you think the author of the statements we are discussing had something else in view?
THEAET. No; those are what he had in view.
ΣΩ. βασανίζωμεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβάνοντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, οὕτως ἢ οὐχ οὕτως γράμματα ἐμάθομεν. φέρε πρῶτον· ἆρʼ αἱ μὲν συλλαβαὶ λόγον ἔχουσι, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἄλογα;
ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως.
ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. Σωκράτους γοῦν εἴ τις ἔροιτο τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν οὑτωσί· «ὦ Θεαίτητε, λέγε τί ἐστι ΣΩ»; τί ἀποκρινῇ;
ΘΕΑΙ. ὅτι σῖγμα καὶ ὦ.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦτον ἔχεις λόγον τῆς συλλαβῆς;
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, οὕτως εἰπὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦ σῖγμα λόγον.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς τοῦ στοιχείου τις ἐρεῖ στοιχεῖα; καὶ γὰρ δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, τό τε σῖγμα τῶν ἀφώνων ἐστί, ψόφος τις μόνον, οἷον συριττούσης τῆς γλώττης· τοῦ δʼ αὖ βῆτα οὔτε φωνὴ οὔτε ψόφος, οὐδὲ τῶν πλείστων στοιχείων. ὥστε πάνυ εὖ ἔχει τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὰ ἄλογα, ὧν γε τὰ ἐναργέστατα αὐτὰ τὰ ἑπτὰ φωνὴν μόνον ἔχει, λόγον δὲ οὐδʼ ὁντινοῦν.
ΣΩ. τουτὶ μὲν ἄρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, κατωρθώκαμεν περὶ ἐπιστήμης.
ΘΕΑΙ. φαινόμεθα.
ΣΩ. τί δέ; τὸ μὴ γνωστὸν εἶναι τὸ στοιχεῖον ἀλλὰ τὴν συλλαβὴν ἆρʼ ὀρθῶς ἀποδεδείγμεθα;
ΘΕΑΙ. εἰκός γε.
ΣΩ. φέρε δή, τὴν συλλαβὴν πότερον λέγομεν τὰ ἀμφότερα στοιχεῖα, καὶ ἐὰν πλείω ᾖ ἢ δύο, τὰ πάντα, ἢ μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν γεγονυῖαν συντεθέντων αὐτῶν;
ΘΕΑΙ. τὰ ἅπαντα ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν.
ΣΩ. ὅρα δὴ ἐπὶ δυοῖν, σῖγμα καὶ ὦ. ἀμφότερά ἐστιν ἡ πρώτη συλλαβὴ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὀνόματος. ἄλλο τι ὁ γιγνώσκων αὐτὴν τὰ ἀμφότερα γιγνώσκει;
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;
ΣΩ. τὸ σῖγμα καὶ τὸ ὦ ἄρα γιγνώσκει.
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ; ἑκάτερον ἄρʼ ἀγνοεῖ καὶ οὐδέτερον εἰδὼς ἀμφότερα γιγνώσκει;
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ δεινὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι εἴ γε ἀνάγκη ἑκάτερον γιγνώσκειν, εἴπερ ἀμφότερά τις γνώσεται, προγιγνώσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἅπασα ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντί ποτε γνώσεσθαι συλλαβήν, καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰχήσεται.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα γε ἐξαίφνης.
ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ καλῶς αὐτὸν φυλάττομεν. χρῆν γὰρ ἴσως τὴν συλλαβὴν τίθεσθαι μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἐκείνων ἕν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἔχον, ἕτερον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ τάχα γʼ ἂν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἢ ʼκείνως ἔχοι.
ΣΩ. σκεπτέον καὶ οὐ προδοτέον οὕτως ἀνάνδρως μέγαν τε καὶ σεμνὸν λόγον.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
SOC. Let us, then, take them up and examine them, or rather, let us examine ourselves and see whether it was in accordance with this theory, or not, that we learned letters. First then, the syllables have a rational explanation, but the letters have not?
THEAET. I suppose so.
SOC. I think so, too, decidedly. Now if anyone should ask about the first syllable of Socrates; “Theaetetus, tell me, what is SO?” What would you reply?
THEAET. I should say “S and O.”
SOC. This, then, is your explanation of the syllable?
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. Come now, in the same manner give me the explanation of the S.
THEAET. How can one give any elements of an element? For really, Socrates, the S is a voiceless letter, a mere noise, as of the tongue hissing; B again has neither voice nor noise, nor have most of the other letters; and so it is quite right to say that they have no explanation, seeing that the most distinct of them, the seven vowels, have only voice, but no explanation whatsoever.
SOC. In this point, then, my friend, it would seem that we have reached a right conclusion about knowledge.
THEAET. I think we have.
SOC. But have we been right in laying down the principle that whereas the letter is unknowable, yet the syllable is knowable?
THEAET. Probably.
SOC. Well then, shall we say that the syllable is the two letters, or, if there be more than two, all of them, or is it a single concept that has arisen from their combination?
THEAET. I think we mean all the letters it contains.
SOC. Now take the case of two, S and O. The two together are the first syllable of my name. He who knows it knows the two letters, does he not?
THEAET. Of course.
SOC. He knows, that is, the S and the O.
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. How is that? He is ignorant of each, and knowing neither of them he knows them both?
THEAET. That is monstrous and absurd, Socrates.
SOC. And yet if a knowledge of each letter is necessary before one can know both, he who is ever to know a syllable must certainly know the letters first, and so our fine theory will have run away and vanished!
THEAET. And very suddenly, too.
SOC. Yes, for we are not watching it carefully. Perhaps we ought to have said that the syllable is not the letters, but a single concept that has arisen from them, having a single form of its own, different from the letters.
THEAET. Certainly; and perhaps that will be better than the other way.
SOC. Let us look into that; we must not give up in such unmanly fashion a great and impressive theory.
THEAET. No, we must not.
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