ΣΩ. τί οὖν; οἴει τινὰ πώποτε αὐτὸν ἐν αὑτῷ πέντε καὶ ἑπτά, λέγω δὲ μὴ ἀνθρώπους ἑπτὰ καὶ πέντε προθέμενον σκοπεῖν μηδʼ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλʼ αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτά, ἅ φαμεν ἐκεῖ μνημεῖα ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐκ εἶναι δοξάσαι, ταῦτα αὐτὰ εἴ τις ἀνθρώπων ἤδη πώποτε ἐσκέψατο λέγων πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ ἐρωτῶν πόσα ποτʼ ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ μέν τις εἶπεν οἰηθεὶς ἕνδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ δώδεκα, ἢ πάντες λέγουσί τε καὶ οἴονται δώδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι;
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ ἕνδεκα· ἐὰν δέ γε ἐν πλείονι ἀριθμῷ τις σκοπῆται, μᾶλλον σφάλλεται. οἶμαι γάρ σε περὶ παντὸς [μᾶλλον] ἀριθμοῦ λέγειν.
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἴει· καὶ ἐνθυμοῦ μή τι τότε γίγνεται ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ δώδεκα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ ἕνδεκα οἰηθῆναι.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικέ γε.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρώτους πάλιν ἀνήκει λόγους; ὁ γὰρ τοῦτο παθών, ὃ οἶδεν, ἕτερον αὐτὸ οἴεται εἶναι ὧν αὖ οἶδεν, ὃ ἔφαμεν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τούτῳ αὐτῷ ἠναγκάζομεν μὴ εἶναι ψευδῆ δόξαν, ἵνα μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀναγκάζοιτο εἰδὼς μὴ εἰδέναι ἅμα.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἄλλʼ ὁτιοῦν δεῖ ἀποφαίνειν τὸ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν ἢ διανοίας πρὸς αἴσθησιν παραλλαγήν. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτʼ ἦν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς διανοήμασιν ἐψευδόμεθα. νῦν δὲ ἤτοι οὐκ ἔστι ψευδὴς δόξα, ἢ ἅ τις οἶδεν, οἷόν τε μὴ εἰδέναι. καὶ τούτων πότερα αἱρῇ;
ΘΕΑΙ. ἄπορον αἵρεσιν προτίθης, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφότερά γε κινδυνεύει ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἐάσειν. ὅμως δέ—πάντα γὰρ τολμητέον—τί εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαιμεν ἀναισχυντεῖν;
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;
ΣΩ. ἐθελήσαντες εἰπεῖν ποῖόν τί ποτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ τί τοῦτο ἀναίσχυντον;
ΣΩ. ἔοικας οὐκ ἐννοεῖν ὅτι πᾶς ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος ζήτησις γέγονεν ἐπιστήμης ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσι τί ποτʼ ἐστίν.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἐννοῶ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. ἔπειτʼ οὐκ ἀναιδὲς δοκεῖ μὴ εἰδότας ἐπιστήμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷόν ἐστιν; ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πάλαι ἐσμὲν ἀνάπλεῳ τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι. μυριάκις γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ «γιγνώσκομεν» καὶ «οὐ γιγνώσκομεν,» καὶ «ἐπιστάμεθα» καὶ «οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα,» ὥς τι συνιέντες ἀλλήλων ἐν ᾧ ἔτι ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοοῦμεν· εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κεχρήμεθʼ αὖ τῷ «ἀγνοεῖν» τε καὶ «συνιέναι,» ὡς προσῆκον αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι εἴπερ στερόμεθα ἐπιστήμης.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον διαλέξῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτων ἀπεχόμενος;
SOC. Well, then, do you think that anyone ever considered in his own mind five and seven,— I do not mean by setting before his eyes seven men and five men and considering them, or anything of that sort, but seven and five in the abstract, which we say are imprints in the block of wax, and in regard to which we deny the possibility of forming false opinions—taking these by themselves, do you imagine that anybody in the world has ever considered them, talking to himself and asking himself what their sum is, and that one person has said and thought eleven, and another twelve, or do all say and think that it is twelve?
THEAET. No, by Zeus; many say eleven, and if you take a larger number for consideration, there is greater likelihood of error. For I suppose you are speaking of any number rather than of these only.
SOC. You are right in supposing so; and consider whether in that instance the abstract twelve in the block of wax is not itself imagined to be eleven.
THEAET. It seems so.
SOC. Have we not, then, come back again to the beginning of our talk? For the man who is affected in this way imagines that one thing which he knows is another thing which he knows. This we said was impossible, and by this very argument we were forcing false opinion out of existence, that the same man might not be forced to know and not know the same things at the same time.
THEAET. Very true.
SOC. Then we must show that forming false opinion is something or other different from the interchange of thought and perception. For if it were that, we should never be deceived in abstract thoughts. But as the case now stands, either there is no false opinion or it is possible for a man not to know that which he knows. Which alternative will you choose?
THEAET. There is no possible choice, Socrates.
SOC. And yet the argument is not likely to admit both. But still, since we must not shrink from any risk, what if we should try to do a shameless deed?
THEAET. What is it?
SOC. To undertake to tell what it really is to know.
THEAET. And why is that shameless?
SOC. You seem not to remember that our whole talk from the beginning has been a search for knowledge, because we did not know what it is.
THEAET. Oh yes, I remember.
SOC. Then is it not shameless to proclaim what it is to know, when we are ignorant of knowledge? But really, Theaetetus, our talk has been badly tainted with unclearness all along; for we have said over and over again “we know” and “we do not know” and “we have knowledge” and “we have no knowledge,” as if we could understand each other, while we were still ignorant of knowledge; and at this very moment, if you please, we have again used the terms “be ignorant” and “understand,” as though we had any right to use them if we are deprived of knowledge.
THEAET. But how will you converse, Socrates, if you refrain from these words?
ΣΩ. οὐδένα ὤν γε ὃς εἰμί, εἰ μέντοι ἦ ἀντιλογικός· οἷος ἀνὴρ εἰ καὶ νῦν παρῆν, τούτων τʼ ἂν ἔφη ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ἡμῖν σφόδρʼ ἂν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐπέπληττεν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐσμεν φαῦλοι, βούλει τολμήσω εἰπεῖν οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι; φαίνεται γάρ μοι προὔργου τι ἂν γενέσθαι.
ΘΕΑΙ. τόλμα τοίνυν νὴ Δία. τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπεχομένῳ σοι ἔσται πολλὴ συγγνώμη.
ΣΩ. ἀκήκοας οὖν ὃ νῦν λέγουσιν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι;
ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως· οὐ μέντοι ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι μνημονεύω.
ΣΩ. ἐπιστήμης που ἕξιν φασὶν αὐτὸ εἶναι.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.
ΣΩ. ἡμεῖς τοίνυν σμικρὸν μεταθώμεθα καὶ εἴπωμεν ἐπιστήμης κτῆσιν.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί οὖν δὴ φήσεις τοῦτο ἐκείνου διαφέρειν;
ΣΩ. ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὃ δʼ οὖν δοκεῖ ἀκούσας συνδοκίμαζε.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἐάνπερ γε οἷός τʼ ὦ.
ΣΩ. οὐ τοίνυν μοι ταὐτὸν φαίνεται τῷ κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ἔχειν. οἷον ἱμάτιον πριάμενός τις καὶ ἐγκρατὴς ὢν μὴ φορῶν, ἔχειν μὲν οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν αὐτό, κεκτῆσθαί γε μὴν φαῖμεν.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς γε.
ΣΩ. ὅρα δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἰ δυνατὸν οὕτω κεκτημένον μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ εἴ τις ὄρνιθας ἀγρίας, περιστερὰς ἤ τι ἄλλο, θηρεύσας οἴκοι κατασκευασάμενος περιστερεῶνα τρέφοι, τρόπον μὲν [γὰρ] ἄν πού τινα φαῖμεν αὐτὸν αὐτὰς ἀεὶ ἔχειν, ὅτι δὴ κέκτηται. ἦ γάρ;
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
ΣΩ. τρόπον δέ γʼ ἄλλον οὐδεμίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ δύναμιν μὲν αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτὰς παραγεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐν οἰκείῳ περιβόλῳ ὑποχειρίους ἐποιήσατο, λαβεῖν καὶ σχεῖν ἐπειδὰν βούληται, θηρευσαμένῳ ἣν ἂν ἀεὶ ἐθέλῃ, καὶ πάλιν ἀφιέναι, καὶ τοῦτο ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν ὁποσάκις ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. πάλιν δή, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν κήρινόν τι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατεσκευάζομεν οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅτι πλάσμα, νῦν αὖ ἐν ἑκάστῃ ψυχῇ ποιήσωμεν περιστερεῶνά τινα παντοδαπῶν ὀρνίθων, τὰς μὲν κατʼ ἀγέλας οὔσας χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, τὰς δὲ κατʼ ὀλίγας, ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι πετομένας.
ΘΕΑΙ. πεποιήσθω δή. ἀλλὰ τί τοὐντεῦθεν;
ΣΩ. παιδίων μὲν ὄντων φάναι χρὴ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγγεῖον κενόν, ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν ὀρνίθων ἐπιστήμας νοῆσαι· ἣν δʼ ἂν ἐπιστήμην κτησάμενος καθείρξῃ εἰς τὸν περίβολον, φάναι αὐτὸν μεμαθηκέναι ἢ ηὑρηκέναι τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἦν αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι τοῦτʼ εἶναι.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστω.
SOC. Not at all, being the man I am; but I might if I were a real reasoner; if such a man were present at this moment he would tell us to refrain from these terms, and would criticize my talk scathingly. But since we are poor creatures, shall I venture to say what the nature of knowing is? For it seems to me that would be of some advantage.
THEAET. Venture it then, by Zeus. You shall have full pardon for not refraining from those terms.
SOC. Have you heard what they say nowadays that knowing is?
THEAET. Perhaps; however, I don’t remember just at this moment.
SOC. They say it is having knowledge.
THEAET. True.
SOC. Let us make a slight change and say possessing knowledge.
THEAET. Why, how will you claim that the one differs from the other?
SOC. Perhaps it doesn’t; but first hear how it seems to me to differ, and then help me to test my view.
THEAET. I will if I can.
SOC. Well, then, having does not seem to me the same as possessing. For instance, if a man bought a cloak and had it under his control, but did not wear it, we should certainly say, not that he had it, but that he possessed it.
THEAET. And rightly.
SOC. Now see whether it is possible in the same way for one who possesses knowledge not to have it, as, for instance, if a man should catch wild birds—pigeons or the like—and should arrange an aviary at home and keep them in it, we might in a way assert that he always has them because he possesses them, might we not?
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. And yet in another way that he has none of them, but that he has acquired power over them, since he has brought them under his control in his own enclosure, to take them and hold them whenever he likes, by catching whichever bird he pleases, and to let them go again; and he can do this as often as be sees fit.
THEAET. That is true.
SOC. Once more, then, just as a while ago we contrived some sort of a waxen figment in the soul, so now let us make in each soul an aviary stocked with all sorts of birds, some in flocks apart from the rest, others in small groups, and some solitary, flying hither and thither among them all.
THEAET. Consider it done. What next?
SOC. We must assume that while we are children this receptacle is empty, and we must understand that the birds represent the varieties of knowledge. And whatsoever kind of knowledge a person acquires and shuts up in the enclosure, we must say that he has learned or discovered the thing of which this is the knowledge, and that just this is knowing.
THEAET. So be it.
ΣΩ. τὸ τοίνυν πάλιν ἣν ἂν βούληται τῶν ἐπιστημῶν θηρεύειν καὶ λαβόντα ἴσχειν καὶ αὖθις ἀφιέναι σκόπει τίνων δεῖται ὀνομάτων, εἴτε τῶν αὐτῶν ὧν τὸ πρῶτον ὅτε ἐκτᾶτο εἴτε ἑτέρων. μαθήσῃ δʼ ἐνθένδε σαφέστερον τί λέγω. ἀριθμητικὴν μὲν γὰρ λέγεις τέχνην;
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ταύτην δὴ ὑπόλαβε θήραν ἐπιστημῶν ἀρτίου τε καὶ περιττοῦ παντός.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὑπολαμβάνω.
ΣΩ. ταύτῃ δὴ οἶμαι τῇ τέχνῃ αὐτός τε ὑποχειρίους τὰς ἐπιστήμας τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἔχει καὶ ἄλλῳ παραδίδωσιν ὁ παραδιδούς.
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
ΣΩ. καὶ καλοῦμέν γε παραδιδόντα μὲν διδάσκειν, παραλαμβάνοντα δὲ μανθάνειν, ἔχοντα δὲ δὴ τῷ κεκτῆσθαι ἐν τῷ περιστερεῶνι ἐκείνῳ ἐπίστασθαι.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. τῷ δὲ δὴ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη πρόσσχες τὸν νοῦν. ἀριθμητικὸς γὰρ ὢν τελέως ἄλλο τι πάντας ἀριθμοὺς ἐπίσταται; πάντων γὰρ ἀριθμῶν εἰσιν αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστῆμαι.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;
ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀριθμοῖ ἄν ποτέ τι ἢ αὐτὸς πρὸς αὑτὸν αὐτὰ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἔξω ὅσα ἔχει ἀριθμόν;
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ ἀριθμεῖν γε οὐκ ἄλλο τι θήσομεν τοῦ σκοπεῖσθαι πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει ὤν.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.
ΣΩ. ὃ ἄρα ἐπίσταται, σκοπούμενος φαίνεται ὡς οὐκ εἰδώς, ὃν ὡμολογήκαμεν ἅπαντα ἀριθμὸν εἰδέναι. ἀκούεις γάρ που τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητήσεις.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς ἀπεικάζοντες τῇ τῶν περιστερῶν κτήσει τε καὶ θήρᾳ ἐροῦμεν ὅτι διττὴ ἦν ἡ θήρα, ἡ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι τοῦ κεκτῆσθαι ἕνεκα, ἡ δὲ κεκτημένῳ τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἃ πάλαι ἐκέκτητο. οὕτως δὲ καὶ ὧν πάλαι ἐπιστῆμαι ἦσαν αὐτῷ μαθόντι καὶ ἠπίστατο αὐτά, πάλιν ἔστι καταμανθάνειν ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀναλαμβάνοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἑκάστου καὶ ἴσχοντα, ἣν ἐκέκτητο μὲν πάλαι, πρόχειρον δʼ οὐκ εἶχε τῇ διανοίᾳ;
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.
ΣΩ. τοῦτο δὴ ἄρτι ἠρώτων, ὅπως χρὴ τοῖς ὀνόμασι χρώμενον λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅταν ἀριθμήσων ἴῃ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἤ τι ἀναγνωσόμενος ὁ γραμματικός, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάλιν ἔρχεται μαθησόμενος παρʼ ἑαυτοῦ ἃ ἐπίσταται;
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ ἄτοπον, ὦ Σώκρατες.
SOC. Consider then what expressions are needed for the process of recapturing and taking and holding and letting go again whichever he please of the kinds of knowledge, whether they are the same expressions as those needed for the original acquisition, or others. But you will understand better by an illustration. You admit that there is an art of arithmetic?
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. Now suppose this to be a hunt after the kinds of knowledge, or sciences, of all odd and even numbers.
THEAET. I do so.
SOC. Now it is by this art, I imagine, that a man has the sciences of numbers under his own control and also that any man who transmits them to another does this.
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. And we say that when anyone transmits them he teaches, and when anyone receives them he learns, and when anyone, by having acquired them, has them in that aviary of ours, he knows them.
THEAET. Certainly.
SOC. Now pay attention to what follows from this. Does not the perfect arithmetician understand all numbers; for he has the sciences of all numbers in his mind?
THEAET. To be sure.
SOC. Then would such a man ever count anything—either any abstract numbers in his head, or any such external objects as possess number?
THEAET. Of course,
SOC. But we shall affirm that counting is the same thing as considering how great any number in question is.
THEAET. We shall.
SOC. Then he who by our previous admission knows all number is found to be considering that which he knows as if he did not know it. You have doubtless heard of such ambiguities.
THEAET. Yes, I have.
SOC. Continuing, then, our comparison with the acquisition and hunting of the pigeons, we shall say that the hunting is of two kinds, one before the acquisition for the sake of possessing, the other carried on by the possessor for the sake of taking and holding in his hands what he had acquired long before. And just so when a man long since by learning came to possess knowledge of certain things, and knew them, he may have these very things afresh by taking up again the knowledge of each of them separately and holding it—the knowledge which he had acquired long before, but had not at hand in his mind?
THEAET. That is true.
SOC. This, then, was my question just now: How should we express ourselves in speaking about them when an arithmetician undertakes to count or a man of letters to read something? In such a case shall we say that although he knows he sets himself to learn again from himself that which he knows?
THEAET. But that is extraordinary, Socrates.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἃ οὐκ ἐπίσταται φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἀναγνώσεσθαι καὶ ἀριθμήσειν, δεδωκότες αὐτῷ πάντα μὲν γράμματα πάντα δὲ ἀριθμὸν ἐπίστασθαι;
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτʼ ἄλογον.
ΣΩ. βούλει οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν ἡμῖν μέλει, ὅπῃ τις χαίρει ἕλκων τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μανθάνειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὡρισάμεθα ἕτερον μέν τι τὸ κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἔχειν, ὃ μέν τις ἔκτηται μὴ κεκτῆσθαι ἀδύνατόν φαμεν εἶναι, ὥστε οὐδέποτε συμβαίνει ὅ τις οἶδεν μὴ εἰδέναι, ψευδῆ μέντοι δόξαν οἷόν τʼ εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν;
ΣΩ. μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τούτου οἷόν τε, ἀλλʼ ἑτέραν ἀντʼ ἐκείνης, ὅταν θηρεύων τινά πού ποτʼ ἐπιστήμην διαπετομένων ἀνθʼ ἑτέρας ἑτέραν ἁμαρτὼν λάβῃ, τότε ἄρα τὰ ἕνδεκα δώδεκα ᾠήθη εἶναι, τὴν τῶν ἕνδεκα ἐπιστήμην ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν δώδεκα λαβὼν τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ οἷον φάτταν ἀντὶ περιστερᾶς.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔχει γὰρ οὖν λόγον.
ΣΩ. ὅταν δέ γε ἣν ἐπιχειρεῖ λαβεῖν λάβῃ, ἀψευδεῖν τε καὶ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν τότε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τε καὶ ψευδῆ δόξαν, καὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐδυσχεραίνομεν οὐδὲν ἐμποδὼν γίγνεσθαι; ἴσως οὖν μοι συμφήσεις· ἢ πῶς ποιήσεις;
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.
ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἃ ἐπίστανται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι ἀπηλλάγμεθα· ἃ γὰρ κεκτήμεθα μὴ κεκτῆσθαι οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι συμβαίνει, οὔτε ψευσθεῖσί τινος οὔτε μή. δεινότερον μέντοι πάθος ἄλλο παραφαίνεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ.
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;
ΣΩ. εἰ ἡ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μεταλλαγὴ ψευδὴς γενήσεταί ποτε δόξα.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δή;
ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν τό τινος ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀγνοεῖν, μὴ ἀγνωμοσύνῃ ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ· ἔπειτα ἕτερον αὖ τοῦτο δοξάζειν, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον τοῦτο, πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία, ἐπιστήμης παραγενομένης γνῶναι μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν μηδέν, ἀγνοῆσαι δὲ πάντα; ἐκ γὰρ τούτου τοῦ λόγου κωλύει οὐδὲν καὶ ἄγνοιαν παραγενομένην γνῶναί τι ποιῆσαι καὶ τυφλότητα ἰδεῖν, εἴπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοῆσαί ποτέ τινα ποιήσει.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ καλῶς τὰς ὄρνιθας ἐτίθεμεν ἐπιστήμας μόνον τιθέντες, ἔδει δὲ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνας τιθέναι ὁμοῦ συνδιαπετομένας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ τὸν θηρεύοντα τοτὲ μὲν ἐπιστήμην λαμβάνοντα, τοτὲ δʼ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τοῦ αὐτοῦ πέρι ψευδῆ μὲν δοξάζειν τῇ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ, ἀληθῆ δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.
SOC. But shall we say that he is going to read or count that which he does not know, when we have granted that he knows all letters and all numbers?
THEAET. But that too is absurd.
SOC. Shall we then say that words are nothing to us, if it amuses anyone to drag the expressions “know” and “learn” one way and another, but since we set up the distinction that it is one thing to possess knowledge and another thing to have it, we affirm that it is impossible not to possess what one possesses, so that it never happens that a man does not know that which he knows, but that it is possible to conceive a false opinion about it? For it is possible to have not the knowledge of this thing, but some other knowledge instead, when in hunting for some one kind of knowledge, as the various kinds fly about, he makes a mistake and catches one instead of another; so in one example he thought eleven was twelve, because he caught the knowledge of twelve, which was within him, instead of that of eleven, caught a ringdove, as it were, instead of a pigeon.
THEAET. Yes, that is reasonable.
SOC. But when he catches the knowledge he intends to catch, he is not deceived and has true opinion, and so true and false opinion exist and none of the things which formerly annoyed us interferes? Perhaps you will agree to this; or what will you do?
THEAET. I will agree.
SOC. Yes, for we have got rid of our difficulty about men not knowing that which they know; for we no longer find ourselves not possessing that which we possess, whether we are deceived about anything or not. However, another more dreadful disaster seems to be coming in sight.
THEAET. What disaster?
SOC. If the interchange of kinds of knowledge should ever turn out to be false opinion.
THEAET. How so?
SOC. Is it not the height of absurdity, in the first place for one who has knowledge of something to be ignorant of this very thing, not through ignorance but through his knowledge; secondly, for him to be of opinion that this thing is something else and something else is this thing—for the soul, when knowledge has come to it, to know nothing and be ignorant of all things? For by this argument there is nothing to prevent ignorance from coming to us and making us know something and blindness from making us see, if knowledge is ever to make us ignorant.
THEAET. Perhaps, Socrates, we were not right in making the birds represent kinds of knowledge only, but we ought to have imagined kinds of ignorance also flying about in the soul with the others; then the hunter would catch sometimes knowledge and sometimes ignorance of the same thing, and through the ignorance he would have false, but through the knowledge true opinion.
ΣΩ. οὐ ῥᾴδιόν γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μὴ ἐπαινεῖν σε· ὃ μέντοι εἶπες πάλιν ἐπίσκεψαι. ἔστω μὲν γὰρ ὡς λέγεις· ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην λαβὼν ψευδῆ μέν, φῄς, δοξάσει. ἦ γάρ;
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
ΣΩ. οὐ δήπου καὶ ἡγήσεταί γε ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γάρ;
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἀληθῆ γε, καὶ ὡς εἰδὼς διακείσεται περὶ ὧν ἔψευσται.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;
ΣΩ. ἐπιστήμην ἄρα οἰήσεται τεθηρευκὼς ἔχειν ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην.
ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν μακρὰν περιελθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην πάρεσμεν ἀπορίαν. ὁ γὰρ ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκεῖνος γελάσας φήσει· «πότερον,» ὦ βέλτιστοι, «ἀμφοτέρας τις εἰδώς, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην, ἣν οἶδεν, ἑτέραν αὐτὴν οἴεταί τινα εἶναι ὧν οἶδεν; ἢ οὐδετέραν [αὐτὴν] εἰδώς, ἣν μὴ οἶδε, δοξάζει ἑτέραν ὧν οὐκ οἶδεν; ἢ τὴν μὲν εἰδώς, τὴν δʼ οὔ, ἣν οἶδεν, ἣν μὴ οἶδεν; ἢ ἣν μὴ οἶδεν, ἣν οἶδεν ἡγεῖται; ἢ πάλιν αὖ μοι ἐρεῖτε ὅτι τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν εἰσὶν αὖ ἐπιστῆμαι, ἃς ὁ κεκτημένος ἐν ἑτέροις τισὶ γελοίοις περιστερεῶσιν ἢ κηρίνοις πλάσμασι καθείρξας, ἕωσπερ ἂν κεκτῆται ἐπίσταται, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ προχείρους ἔχῃ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀναγκασθήσεσθε εἰς ταὐτὸν περιτρέχειν μυριάκις οὐδὲν πλέον ποιοῦντες;» τί πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀποκρινούμεθα;
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δίʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἔχω τί χρὴ λέγειν.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἡμῖν, ὦ παῖ, καλῶς ὁ λόγος ἐπιπλήττει καὶ ἐνδείκνυται ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψευδῆ δόξαν προτέραν ζητοῦμεν ἐπιστήμης, ἐκείνην ἀφέντες; τὸ δʼ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον γνῶναι πρὶν ἄν τις ἐπιστήμην ἱκανῶς λάβῃ τί ποτʼ ἐστίν.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὡς λέγεις οἴεσθαι.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν τις ἐρεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιστήμην; οὐ γάρ που ἀπεροῦμέν γέ πω;
ΘΕΑΙ. ἥκιστα, ἐάνπερ μὴ σύ γε ἀπαγορεύῃς.
ΣΩ. λέγε δή, τί ἂν αὐτὸ μάλιστα εἰπόντες ἥκιστʼ ἂν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐναντιωθεῖμεν;
ΘΕΑΙ. ὅπερ ἐπεχειροῦμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε ἄλλο οὐδέν.
ΣΩ. τὸ ποῖον;
ΘΕΑΙ. τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. ἀναμάρτητόν γέ πού ἐστιν τὸ δοξάζειν ἀληθῆ, καὶ τὰ ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ γίγνεται.
SOC. It is not easy, Theaetetus, to refrain from praising you. However, examine your suggestion once more. Let it be as you say: the man who catches the ignorance will, you say, have false opinion. Is that it?
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. But surely he will not also think that he has false opinion.
THEAET. Certainly not.
SOC. No, but true opinion, and will have the attitude of knowing that about which he is deceived.
THEAET. Of course.
SOC. Hence he will fancy that he has caught, and has, knowledge, not ignorance.
THEAET. Evidently.
SOC. Then, after our long wanderings, we have come round again to our first difficulty. For the real reasoner will laugh and say, “Most excellent Sirs, does a man who knows both knowledge and ignorance think that one of them, which he knows, is another thing which he knows; or, knowing neither of them, is he of opinion that one, which he does not know, is another thing which he does not know; or, knowing one and not the other, does he think that the one he does not know is the one he knows; or that the one he knows is the one he does not know? Or will you go on and tell me that there are kinds of knowledge of the kinds of knowledge and of ignorance, and that he who possesses these kinds of knowledge and has enclosed them in some sort of other ridiculous aviaries or waxen figments, knows them, so long as he possesses them, even if he has them not at hand in his soul? And in this fashion are you going to be compelled to trot about endlessly in the same circle without making any progress?” What shall we reply to this, Theaetetus?
THEAET. By Zeus, Socrates, I don’t know what to say.
SOC. Then, my boy, is the argument right in rebuking us and in pointing out that we were wrong to abandon knowledge and seek first for false opinion? It is impossible to know the latter until we have adequately comprehended the nature of knowledge.
THEAET. As the case now stands, Socrates, we cannot help thinking as you say.
SOC. To begin, then, at the beginning once more, what shall we say knowledge is? For surely we are not going to give it up yet, are we?
THEAET. Not by any means, unless, that is, you give it up.
SOC. Tell us, then, what definition will make us contradict ourselves least.
THEAET. The one we tried before, Socrates; at any rate, I have nothing else to offer.
SOC. What one?
THEAET. That knowledge is true opinion; for true opinion is surely free from error and all its results are fine and good.
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