ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὔ τι σοῦ γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἄμεινον. μὴ οὖν οἴου ἐμὲ μὲν τῷ σῷ ἑταίρῳ τετελευτηκότι δεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπαμύνειν, σὲ δὲ μηδενί. ἀλλʼ ἴθι, ὦ ἄριστε, ὀλίγον ἐπίσπου, μέχρι τούτου αὐτοῦ ἕως ἂν εἰδῶμεν εἴτε ἄρα σὲ δεῖ διαγραμμάτων πέρι μέτρον εἶναι, εἴτε πάντες ὁμοίως σοὶ ἱκανοὶ ἑαυτοῖς εἴς τε ἀστρονομίαν καὶ τἆλλα ὧν δὴ σὺ πέρι αἰτίαν ἔχεις διαφέρειν.
ΘΕΟ. οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοὶ παρακαθήμενον μὴ διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ ἄρτι παρελήρησα φάσκων σε ἐπιτρέψειν μοι μὴ ἀποδύεσθαι, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀναγκάσειν καθάπερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι· σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν Σκίρωνα μᾶλλον τείνειν. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν γὰρ ἀπιέναι ἢ ἀποδύεσθαι κελεύουσι, σὺ δὲ κατʼ Ἀνταῖόν τί μοι μᾶλλον δοκεῖς τὸ δρᾶμα δρᾶν· τὸν γὰρ προσελθόντα οὐκ ἀνίης πρὶν ἂν ἀναγκάσῃς ἀποδύσας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις προσπαλαῖσαι.
ΣΩ. ἄριστά γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τὴν νόσον μου ἀπῄκασας· ἰσχυρικώτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκείνων. μυρίοι γὰρ ἤδη μοι Ἡρακλέες τε καὶ Θησέες ἐντυχόντες καρτεροὶ πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μάλʼ εὖ συγκεκόφασιν, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀφίσταμαι· οὕτω τις ἔρως δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε τῆς περὶ ταῦτα γυμνασίας. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ σὺ φθονήσῃς προσανατριψάμενος σαυτόν τε ἅμα καὶ ἐμὲ ὀνῆσαι.
ΘΕΟ. οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλʼ ἄγε ὅπῃ ʼθέλεις· πάντως τὴν περὶ ταῦτα εἱμαρμένην ἣν ἂν σὺ ἐπικλώσῃς δεῖ ἀνατλῆναι ἐλεγχόμενον. οὐ μέντοι περαιτέρω γε ὧν προτίθεσαι οἷός τʼ ἔσομαι παρασχεῖν ἐμαυτόν σοι.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἀρκεῖ καὶ μέχρι τούτων. καί μοι πάνυ τήρει τὸ τοιόνδε, μή που παιδικόν τι λάθωμεν εἶδος τῶν λόγων ποιούμενοι, καί τις πάλιν ἡμῖν αὐτὸ ὀνειδίσῃ.
ΘΕΟ. ἀλλὰ δὴ πειράσομαί γε καθʼ ὅσον ἂν δύνωμαι.
ΣΩ. τοῦδε τοίνυν πρῶτον πάλιν ἀντιλαβώμεθα οὗπερ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ ἴδωμεν ὀρθῶς ἢ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐδυσχεραίνομεν ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ λόγῳ ὅτι αὐτάρκη ἕκαστον εἰς φρόνησιν ἐποίει, καὶ ἡμῖν συνεχώρησεν ὁ Πρωταγόρας περί τε τοῦ ἀμείνονος καὶ χείρονος διαφέρειν τινάς, οὓς δὴ καὶ εἶναι σοφούς. οὐχί;
ΘΕΟ. ναί.
ΣΩ. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν αὐτὸς παρὼν ὡμολόγει ἀλλὰ μὴ ἡμεῖς βοηθοῦντες ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ συνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδὲν ἂν πάλιν ἔδει ἐπαναλαβόντας βεβαιοῦσθαι· νῦν δὲ τάχʼ ἄν τις ἡμᾶς ἀκύρους τιθείη τῆς ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ὁμολογίας. διὸ καλλιόνως ἔχει σαφέστερον περὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ διομολογήσασθαι· οὐ γάρ τι σμικρὸν παραλλάττει οὕτως ἔχον ἢ ἄλλως.
ΘΕΟ. λέγεις ἀληθῆ.
SOC. Yes, but not better than you, Theodorus. So you must not imagine that I have to defend your deceased friend by any and every means, while you do nothing at all; but come, my good man, follow the discussion a little way, just until we can see whether, after all, you must be a measure in respect to diagrams, or whether all men are as sufficient unto themselves as you are in astronomy and the other sciences in which you are alleged to be superior.
THEO. It is not easy, Socrates, for anyone to sit beside you and not be forced to give an account of himself and it was foolish of me just now to say you would excuse me and would not oblige me, as the Lacedaemonians do, to strip; you seem to me to take rather after Sciron. For the Lacedaemonians tell people to go away or else strip, but you seem to me to play rather the role of Antaeus; for you do not let anyone go who approaches you until you have forced him to strip and wrestle with you in argument.
SOC. Your comparison with Sciron and Antaeus pictures my complaint admirably; only I am a more stubborn combatant than they; for many a Heracles and many a Theseus, strong men of words, have fallen in with me and belabored me mightily, but still I do not desist, such a terrible love of this kind of exercise has taken hold on me. So, now that it is your turn, do not refuse to try a bout with me; it will be good for both of us.
THEO. I say no more. Lead on as you like. Most assuredly I must endure whatsoever fate you spin for me, and submit to interrogation. However, I shall not be able to leave myself in your hands beyond the point you propose.
SOC. Even that is enough. And please be especially careful that we do not inadvertently give a playful turn to our argument and somebody reproach us again for it.
THEO. Rest assured that I will try so far as in me lies.
SOC. Let us, therefore, first take up the same question as before, and let us see whether we were right or wrong in being displeased and finding fault with the doctrine because it made each individual self-sufficient in wisdom. Protagoras granted that some persons excelled others in respect to the better and the worse, and these he said were wise, did he not?
THEO. Yes.
SOC. Now if he himself were present and could agree to this, instead of our making the concession for him in our effort to help him, there would be no need of taking up the question again or of reinforcing his argument. But, as it is, perhaps it might be said that we have no authority to make the agreement for him; therefore it is better to make the agreement still clearer on this particular point; for it makes a good deal of difference whether it is so or not.
THEO. That is true.
ΣΩ. μὴ τοίνυν διʼ ἄλλων ἀλλʼ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκείνου λόγου ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων λάβωμεν τὴν ὁμολογίαν.
ΘΕΟ. πῶς;
ΣΩ. οὑτωσί· τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναί φησί που ᾧ δοκεῖ;
ΘΕΟ. φησὶ γὰρ οὖν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντων ἀνθρώπων δόξας λέγομεν, καὶ φαμὲν οὐδένα ὅντινα οὐ τὰ μὲν αὑτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν ἄλλων σοφώτερον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλους ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἔν γε τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις, ὅταν ἐν στρατείαις ἢ νόσοις ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ χειμάζωνται, ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ἐν ἑκάστοις ἄρχοντας, σωτῆρας σφῶν προσδοκῶντας, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τῳ διαφέροντας ἢ τῷ εἰδέναι· καὶ πάντα που μεστὰ τἀνθρώπινα ζητούντων διδασκάλους τε καὶ ἄρχοντας ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τῶν τε ἐργασιῶν, οἰομένων τε αὖ ἱκανῶν μὲν διδάσκειν, ἱκανῶν δὲ ἄρχειν εἶναι. καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἅπασι τί ἄλλο φήσομεν ἢ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡγεῖσθαι σοφίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι παρὰ σφίσιν;
ΘΕΟ. οὐδὲν ἄλλο.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν ἀληθῆ διάνοιαν ἡγοῦνται, τὴν δὲ ἀμαθίαν ψευδῆ δόξαν;
ΘΕΟ. τί μήν;
ΣΩ. τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, χρησόμεθα τῷ λόγῳ; πότερον ἀληθῆ φῶμεν ἀεὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δοξάζειν, ἢ τοτὲ μὲν ἀληθῆ, τοτὲ δὲ ψευδῆ; ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γάρ που συμβαίνει μὴ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆ ἀλλʼ ἀμφότερα αὐτοὺς δοξάζειν. σκόπει γάρ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, εἰ ἐθέλοι ἄν τις τῶν ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν ἢ σὺ αὐτὸς διαμάχεσθαι ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡγεῖται ἕτερος ἕτερον ἀμαθῆ τε εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.
ΘΕΟ. ἀλλʼ ἄπιστον, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν εἰς τοῦτό γε ἀνάγκης ὁ λόγος ἥκει ὁ πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον λέγων.
ΘΕΟ. πῶς δή;
ΣΩ. ὅταν σὺ κρίνας τι παρὰ σαυτῷ πρός με ἀποφαίνῃ περί τινος δόξαν, σοὶ μὲν δὴ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον ἀληθὲς ἔστω, ἡμῖν δὲ δὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις περὶ τῆς σῆς κρίσεως πότερον οὐκ ἔστιν κριταῖς γενέσθαι, ἢ ἀεὶ σὲ κρίνομεν ἀληθῆ δοξάζειν; ἢ μυρίοι ἑκάστοτέ σοι μάχονται ἀντιδοξάζοντες, ἡγούμενοι ψευδῆ κρίνειν τε καὶ οἴεσθαι;
ΘΕΟ. νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, μάλα μυρίοι δῆτα, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, οἵ γέ μοι τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πράγματα παρέχουσιν.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν; βούλει λέγωμεν ὡς σὺ τότε σαυτῷ μὲν ἀληθῆ δοξάζεις, τοῖς δὲ μυρίοις ψευδῆ;
ΘΕΟ. ἔοικεν ἔκ γε τοῦ λόγου ἀνάγκη εἶναι.
SOC. Let us then get the agreement in as concise a form as possible, not through others, but from his own statement.
THEO. How?
SOC. In this way: He says, does he not? “that which appears to each person really is to him to whom it appears.”
THEO. Yes, that is what he says.
SOC. Well then, Protagoras, we also utter the opinions of a man, or rather, of all men, and we say that there is no one who does not think himself wiser than others in some respects and others wiser than himself in other respects; for instance, in times of greatest danger, when people are distressed in war or by diseases or at sea, they regard their commanders as gods and expect them to be their saviors, though they excel them in nothing except knowledge. And all the world of men is, I dare say, full of people seeking teachers and rulers for themselves and the animals and for human activities, and, on the other hand, of people who consider themselves qualified to teach and qualified to rule. And in all these instances we must say that men themselves believe that wisdom and ignorance exist in the world of men, must we not?
THEO. Yes, we must.
SOC. And therefore they think that wisdom is true thinking and ignorance false opinion, do they not?
THEO. Of course.
SOC. Well then, Protagoras, what shall we do about the doctrine? Shall we say that the opinions which men have are always true, or sometimes true and sometimes false? For the result of either statement is that their opinions are not always true, but may be either true or false. Just think, Theodorus, would any follower of Protagoras, or you yourself care to contend that no person thinks that another is ignorant and has false opinions?
THEO. No, that is incredible, Socrates.
SOC. And yet this is the predicament to which the doctrine that man is the measure of all things inevitably leads.
THEO. How so?
SOC. When you have come to a decision in your own mind about something, and declare your opinion to me, this opinion is, according to his doctrine, true to you; let us grant that; but may not the rest of us sit in judgement on your decision, or do we always judge that your opinion is true? Do not myriads of men on each occasion oppose their opinions to yours, believing that your judgement and belief are false?
THEO. Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, countless myriads in truth, as Homer says, and they give me all the trouble in the world.
SOC. Well then, shall we say that in such a case your opinion is true to you but false to the myriads?
THEO. That seems to be the inevitable deduction.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ; ἆρʼ οὐχὶ ἀνάγκη, εἰ μὲν μηδὲ αὐτὸς ᾤετο μέτρον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον μηδὲ οἱ πολλοί, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἴονται, μηδενὶ δὴ εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἣν ἐκεῖνος ἔγραψεν; εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν ᾤετο, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος μὴ συνοίεται, οἶσθʼ ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ὅσῳ πλείους οἷς μὴ δοκεῖ ἢ οἷς δοκεῖ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἔστιν.
ΘΕΟ. ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ γε καθʼ ἑκάστην δόξαν ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται.
ΣΩ. ἔπειτά γε τοῦτʼ ἔχει κομψότατον· ἐκεῖνος μὲν περὶ τῆς αὑτοῦ οἰήσεως τὴν τῶν ἀντιδοξαζόντων οἴησιν, ᾗ ἐκεῖνον ἡγοῦνται ψεύδεσθαι, συγχωρεῖ που ἀληθῆ εἶναι ὁμολογῶν τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἅπαντας.
ΘΕΟ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὴν αὑτοῦ ἂν ψευδῆ συγχωροῖ, εἰ τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων αὐτὸν ψεύδεσθαι ὁμολογεῖ ἀληθῆ εἶναι;
ΘΕΟ. ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. οἱ δέ γʼ ἄλλοι οὐ συγχωροῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς ψεύδεσθαι;
ΘΕΟ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
ΣΩ. ὁ δέ γʼ αὖ ὁμολογεῖ καὶ ταύτην ἀληθῆ τὴν δόξαν ἐξ ὧν γέγραφεν.
ΘΕΟ. φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. ἐξ ἁπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ Πρωταγόρου ἀρξαμένων ἀμφισβητήσεται, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπό γε ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσεται, ὅταν τῷ τἀναντία λέγοντι συγχωρῇ ἀληθῆ αὐτὸν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς συγχωρήσεται μήτε κύνα μήτε τὸν ἐπιτυχόντα ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι μηδὲ περὶ ἑνὸς οὗ ἂν μὴ μάθῃ. οὐχ οὕτως;
ΘΕΟ. οὕτως.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων, οὐδενὶ ἂν εἴη ἡ Πρωταγόρου Ἀλήθεια ἀληθής, οὔτε τινὶ ἄλλῳ οὔτʼ αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ.
ΘΕΟ. ἄγαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν ἑταῖρόν μου καταθέομεν.
ΣΩ. ἀλλά τοι, ὦ φίλε, ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ παραθέομεν τὸ ὀρθόν. εἰκός γε ἄρα ἐκεῖνον πρεσβύτερον ὄντα σοφώτερον ἡμῶν εἶναι· καὶ εἰ αὐτίκα ἐντεῦθεν ἀνακύψειε μέχρι τοῦ αὐχένος, πολλὰ ἂν ἐμέ τε ἐλέγξας ληροῦντα, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, καὶ σὲ ὁμολογοῦντα, καταδὺς ἂν οἴχοιτο ἀποτρέχων. ἀλλʼ ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη οἶμαι χρῆσθαι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὁποῖοί τινές ἐσμεν, καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀεὶ ταῦτα λέγειν. καὶ δῆτα καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι φῶμεν ὁμολογεῖν ἂν τοῦτό γε ὁντινοῦν, τὸ εἶναι σοφώτερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀμαθέστερον;
ΘΕΟ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ ταύτῃ ἂν μάλιστα ἵστασθαι τὸν λόγον, ᾗ ἡμεῖς ὑπεγράψαμεν βοηθοῦντες Πρωταγόρᾳ, ὡς τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ᾗ δοκεῖ, ταύτῃ καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάστῳ, θερμά, ξηρά, γλυκέα, πάντα ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου· εἰ δέ που ἔν τισι συγχωρήσεται διαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλου, περὶ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη ἐθελῆσαι ἂν φάναι μὴ πᾶν γύναιον καὶ παιδίον, καὶ θηρίον δέ, ἱκανὸν εἶναι ἰᾶσθαι αὑτὸ γιγνῶσκον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ὑγιεινόν, ἀλλὰ ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄλλον ἄλλου διαφέρειν, εἴπερ που;
ΘΕΟ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.
SOC. And what of Protagoras himself? If neither he himself thought, nor people in general think, as indeed they do not, that man is the measure of all things, is it not inevitable that the “truth” which he wrote is true to no one? But if he himself thought it was true, and people in general do not agree with him, in the first place you know that it is just so much more false than true as the number of those who do not believe it is greater than the number of those who do.
THEO. Necessarily, if it is to be true or false according to each individual opinion.
SOC. Secondly, it involves this, which is a very pretty result; he concedes about his own opinion the truth of the opinion of those who disagree with him and think that his opinion is false, since he grants that the opinions of all men are true.
THEO. Certainly.
SOC. Then would he not be conceding that his own opinion is false, if he grants that the opinion of those who think he is in error is true?
THEO. Necessarily.
SOC. But the others do not concede that they are in error, do they?
THEO. No, they do not.
SOC. And he, in turn, according to his writings, grants that this opinion also is true.
THEO. Evidently.
SOC. Then all men, beginning with Protagoras, will dispute—or rather, he will grant, after he once concedes that the opinion of the man who holds the opposite view is true—even Protagoras himself, I say, will concede that neither a dog nor any casual man is a measure of anything whatsoever that he has not learned. Is not that the case?
THEO. Yes.
SOC. Then since the “truth” of Protagoras is disputed by all, it would be true to nobody, neither to anyone else nor to him.
THEO. I think, Socrates, we are running my friend too hard.
SOC. But, my dear man, I do not see that we are running beyond what is right. Most likely, though, he, being older, is wiser than we, and if, for example, he should emerge from the ground, here at our feet, if only as far as the neck, he would prove abundantly that I was making a fool of myself by my talk, in all probability, and you by agreeing with me; then he would sink down and be off at a run. But we, I suppose, must depend on ourselves, such as we are, and must say just what we think. And so now must we not say that everybody would agree that some men are wiser and some more ignorant than others?
THEO. Yes, I think at least we must.
SOC. And do you think his doctrine might stand most firmly in the form in which we sketched it when defending Protagoras, that most things—hot, dry, sweet, and everything of that sort—are to each person as they appear to him, and if Protagoras is to concede that there are cases in which one person excels another, he might be willing to say that in matters of health and disease not every woman or child—or beast, for that matter—knows what is wholesome for it and is able to cure itself, but in this point, if in any, one person excels another?
THEO. Yes, I think that is correct.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν, καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα καὶ ὅσια καὶ μή, οἷα ἂν ἑκάστη πόλις οἰηθεῖσα θῆται νόμιμα αὑτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἑκάστῃ, καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὐδὲν σοφώτερον οὔτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτου οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως εἶναι· ἐν δὲ τῷ συμφέροντα ἑαυτῇ ἢ μὴ συμφέροντα τίθεσθαι, ἐνταῦθʼ, εἴπερ που, αὖ ὁμολογήσει σύμβουλόν τε συμβούλου διαφέρειν καὶ πόλεως δόξαν ἑτέραν ἑτέρας πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν πάνυ τολμήσειε φῆσαι, ἃ ἂν θῆται πόλις συμφέροντα οἰηθεῖσα αὑτῇ, παντὸς μᾶλλον ταῦτα καὶ συνοίσειν· ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖ οὗ λέγω, ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἀδίκοις καὶ ὁσίοις καὶ ἀνοσίοις, ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν τοῦτο γίγνεται ἀληθὲς τότε, ὅταν δόξῃ καὶ ὅσον ἂν δοκῇ χρόνον. καὶ ὅσοι γε ἂν μὴ παντάπασι τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον λέγωσιν, ὧδέ πως τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι. λόγος δὲ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἐκ λόγου μείζων ἐξ ἐλάττονος καταλαμβάνει.
ΘΕΟ. οὐκοῦν σχολὴν ἄγομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες;
ΣΩ. φαινόμεθα. καὶ πολλάκις μέν γε δή, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ ἄλλοτε κατενόησα, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν, ὡς εἰκότως οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολὺν χρόνον διατρίψαντες εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια ἰόντες γελοῖοι φαίνονται ῥήτορες.
ΘΕΟ. πῶς δὴ οὖν λέγεις;
ΣΩ. κινδυνεύουσιν οἱ ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ τοιᾷδε διατριβῇ τεθραμμένους ὡς οἰκέται πρὸς ἐλευθέρους τεθράφθαι.
ΘΕΟ. πῇ δή;
ΣΩ. ἧι τοῖς μὲν τοῦτο ὃ σὺ εἶπες ἀεὶ πάρεστι, σχολή, καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται· ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς νυνὶ τρίτον ἤδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω κἀκεῖνοι, ἐὰν αὐτοὺς ὁ ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον καθάπερ ἡμᾶς ἀρέσῃ· καὶ διὰ μακρῶν ἢ βραχέων μέλει οὐδὲν λέγειν, ἂν μόνον τύχωσι τοῦ ὄντος· οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ τε ἀεὶ λέγουσι—κατεπείγει γὰρ ὕδωρ ῥέον—καὶ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσι τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκην ἔχων ὁ ἀντίδικος ἐφέστηκεν καὶ ὑπογραφὴν παραναγιγνωσκομένην ὧν ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥητέον [ἣν ἀντωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν]· οἱ δὲ λόγοι ἀεὶ περὶ ὁμοδούλου πρὸς δεσπότην καθήμενον, ἐν χειρί τινα δίκην ἔχοντα, καὶ οἱ ἀγῶνες οὐδέποτε τὴν ἄλλως ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος· ὥστʼ ἐξ ἁπάντων τούτων ἔντονοι καὶ δριμεῖς γίγνονται, ἐπιστάμενοι τὸν δεσπότην λόγῳ τε θωπεῦσαι καὶ ἔργῳ ὑπελθεῖν, σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχάς.
SOC. And likewise in affairs of state, the honorable and disgraceful, the just and unjust, the pious and its opposite, are in truth to each state such as it thinks they are and as it enacts into law for itself, and in these matters no citizen and no state is wiser than another; but in making laws that are advantageous to the state, or the reverse, Protagoras again will agree that one counsellor is better than another, and the opinion of one state better than that of another as regards the truth, and he would by no means dare to affirm that whatsoever laws a state makes in the belief that they will be advantageous to itself are perfectly sure to prove advantageous. But in the other class of things—I mean just and unjust, pious and impious—they are willing to say with confidence that no one of them possesses by nature an existence of its own; on the contrary, that the common opinion becomes true at the time when it is adopted and remains true as long as it is held; this is substantially the theory of those who do not altogether affirm the doctrine of Protagoras. But, Theodorus, argument after argument, a greater one after a lesser, is overtaking us.
THEO. Well, Socrates, we have plenty of leisure, have we not?
SOC. Apparently we have. And that makes me think, my friend, as I have often done before, how natural it is that those who have spent a long time in the study of philosophy appear ridiculous when they enter the courts of law as speakers.
THEO. What do you mean?
SOC. Those who have knocked about in courts and the like from their youth up seem to me, when compared with those who have been brought up in philosophy and similar pursuits, to be as slaves in breeding compared with freemen.
THEO. In what way is this the case?
SOC. In this way: the latter always have that which you just spoke of, leisure, and they talk at their leisure in peace; just as we are now taking up argument after argument, already beginning a third, so can they, if as in our case, the new one pleases them better than that in which they are engaged; and they do not care at all whether their talk is long or short, if only they attain the truth. But the men of the other sort are always in a hurry—for the water flowing through the water-clock urges them on— and the other party in the suit does not permit them to talk about anything they please, but stands over them exercising the law’s compulsion by reading the brief, from which no deviation is allowed (this is called the affidavit); and their discourse is always about a fellow slave and is addressed to a master who sits there holding some case or other in his hands; and the contests never run an indefinite course, but are always directed to the point at issue, and often the race is for the defendant’s life. As a result of all this, the speakers become tense and shrewd; they know how to wheedle their master with words and gain his favor by acts; but in their souls they become small and warped.
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