ΝΕ. ΣΩ. κινδυνεύει.
ΞΕ. τὴν δέ γε τῶν μὴ πολλῶν, ὥσπερ ἑνὸς καὶ πλήθους τὸ ὀλίγον μέσον, οὕτως ἡγησώμεθα μέσην ἐπʼ ἀμφότερα· τὴν δʼ αὖ τοῦ πλήθους κατὰ πάντα ἀσθενῆ καὶ μηδὲν μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν μέγα δυναμένην ὡς πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας διὰ τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐν ταύτῃ διανενεμῆσθαι κατὰ σμικρὰ εἰς πολλούς. διὸ γέγονε πασῶν μὲν νομίμων τῶν πολιτειῶν οὐσῶν τούτων χειρίστη, παρανόμων δὲ οὐσῶν συμπασῶν βελτίστη· καὶ ἀκολάστων μὲν πασῶν οὐσῶν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ νικᾷ ζῆν, κοσμίων δʼ οὐσῶν ἥκιστα ἐν ταύτῃ βιωτέον, ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ δὲ πολὺ πρῶτόν τε καὶ ἄριστον, πλὴν τῆς ἑβδόμης· πασῶν γὰρ ἐκείνην γε ἐκκριτέον, οἷον θεὸν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. φαίνεται ταῦθʼ οὕτω συμβαίνειν τε καὶ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ποιητέον ᾗπερ λέγεις.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν δὴ καὶ τοὺς κοινωνοὺς τούτων τῶν πολιτειῶν πασῶν πλὴν τῆς ἐπιστήμονος ἀφαιρετέον ὡς οὐκ ὄντας πολιτικοὺς ἀλλὰ στασιαστικούς, καὶ εἰδώλων μεγίστων προστάτας ὄντας καὶ αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοιούτους, μεγίστους δὲ ὄντας μιμητὰς καὶ γόητας μεγίστους γίγνεσθαι τῶν σοφιστῶν σοφιστάς.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. κινδυνεύει τοῦτο εἰς τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λεγομένους περιεστράφθαι τὸ ῥῆμα ὀρθότατα.
ΞΕ. εἶεν· τοῦτο μὲν ἀτεχνῶς ἡμῖν ὥσπερ δρᾶμα, καθάπερ ἐρρήθη νυνδὴ Κενταυρικὸν ὁρᾶσθαι καὶ Σατυρικόν τινα θίασον, ὃν δὴ χωριστέον ἀπὸ πολιτικῆς εἴη τέχνης· νῦν δʼ οὕτω πάνυ μόγις ἐχωρίσθη.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. φαίνεται.
ΞΕ. τούτου δέ γʼ ἕτερον ἔτι χαλεπώτερον λείπεται τῷ συγγενές τε ὁμοῦ τʼ εἶναι μᾶλλον τῷ βασιλικῷ γένει καὶ δυσκαταμαθητότερον· καί μοι φαινόμεθα τοῖς τὸν χρυσὸν καθαίρουσι πάθος ὅμοιον πεπονθέναι.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πῶς;
ΞΕ. Γῆν που καὶ λίθους καὶ πόλλʼ ἄττα ἕτερα ἀποκρίνουσι καὶ ἐκεῖνοι πρῶτον οἱ δημιουργοί· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λείπεται συμμεμειγμένα τὰ συγγενῆ τοῦ χρυσοῦ τίμια καὶ πυρὶ μόνον ἀφαιρετά, χαλκὸς καὶ ἄργυρος, ἔστι δʼ ὅτε καὶ ἀδάμας, ἃ μετὰ βασάνων ταῖς ἑψήσεσι μόγις ἀφαιρεθέντα τὸν λεγόμενον ἀκήρατον χρυσὸν εἴασεν ἡμᾶς ἰδεῖν αὐτὸν μόνον ἐφʼ ἑαυτοῦ.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. λέγεται γὰρ οὖν δὴ ταῦτα οὕτω γίγνεσθαι.
Y. Soc. I fancy it is.
Str. But just as few is intermediate between one and a multitude, so the government of the few must be considered intermediate, both in good and in evil. But the government of the multitude is weak in all respects and able to do nothing great, either good or bad, when compared with the other forms of government, because in this the powers of government are distributed in small shares among many men; therefore of all these governments when they are lawful, this is the worst, and when they are all lawless it is the best; and if they are all without restraint, life is most desirable in a democracy, but if they are orderly, that is the worst to live in; but life in the first kind of state is by far the first and best, with the exception of the seventh, for that must be set apart from all the others, as God is set apart from men.
Y. Soc. That statement appears to be true to the facts, and we must do as you say.
Str. Then those who participate in all those governments with the exception of the scientific one—are to be eliminated as not being statesmen, but partisans and since they preside over the greatest counterfeits, they are themselves counterfeits, and since they are the greatest of imitators and cheats, they are the greatest of all sophists.
Y. Soc. This term “sophist” seems to have come round quite rightly to the so-called statesmen.
Str. Well, this part has been exactly like a play. Just as we remarked a moment ago, a festive troop of centaurs or satyrs was coming into view, which we had to separate from the art of statesmanship; and now we have succeeded in doing this, though it has been very difficult.
Y. Soc. So it seems.
Str. But another group remains, which is still more difficult to separate, because it is more closely akin to the kingly class and is also harder to recognize. I think we are in somewhat the same position as refiners of gold.
Y. Soc. How so?
Str. Why, the refiners first remove earth and stones and all that sort of thing; and after that there remain the precious substances which are mixed with the gold and akin to it and can be removed only by fire—copper and silver and sometimes adamant. These are removed by the difficult processes of smelting and tests, leaving before our eyes what is called unalloyed gold in all its purity.
Y. Soc. Yes, that is said, at least, to be the process.
ΞΕ. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τοίνυν λόγον ἔοικε καὶ νῦν ἡμῖν τὰ μὲν ἕτερα καὶ ὁπόσα ἀλλότρια καὶ τὰ μὴ φίλα πολιτικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀποκεχωρίσθαι, λείπεσθαι δὲ τὰ τίμια καὶ συγγενῆ. τούτων δʼ ἐστί που στρατηγία καὶ δικαστικὴ καὶ ὅση βασιλικῇ κοινωνοῦσα ῥητορεία πείθουσα τὸ δίκαιον συνδιακυβερνᾷ τὰς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράξεις· ἃ δὴ τίνι τρόπῳ ῥᾷστά τις ἀπομερίζων δείξει γυμνὸν καὶ μόνον ἐκεῖνον καθʼ αὑτὸν τὸν ζητούμενον ὑφʼ ἡμῶν;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. δῆλον ὅτι τοῦτό πῃ δρᾶν πειρατέον.
ΞΕ. πείρας μὲν τοίνυν ἕνεκα φανερὸς ἔσται· διὰ δὲ μουσικῆς αὐτὸν ἐγχειρητέον δηλῶσαι. καί μοι λέγε.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. τὸ ποῖον;
ΞΕ. μουσικῆς ἔστι πού τις ἡμῖν μάθησις, καὶ ὅλως τῶν περὶ χειροτεχνίας ἐπιστημῶν;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ἔστιν.
ΞΕ. τί δέ; τὸ δʼ αὖ τούτων ἡντινοῦν εἴτε δεῖ μανθάνειν ἡμᾶς εἴτε μή, πότερα φήσομεν ἐπιστήμην αὖ καὶ ταύτην εἶναί τινα περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. οὕτως, εἶναι φήσομεν.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ἑτέραν ὁμολογήσομεν ἐκείνων εἶναι ταύτην;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ναί.
ΞΕ. πότερα δὲ αὐτῶν οὐδεμίαν ἄρχειν δεῖν ἄλλην ἄλλης, ἢ ἐκείνας ταύτης, ἢ ταύτην δεῖν ἐπιτροπεύουσαν ἄρχειν συμπασῶν τῶν ἄλλων;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ταύτην ἐκείνων.
ΞΕ. τὴν εἰ δεῖ μανθάνειν ἢ μὴ τῆς μανθανομένης καὶ διδασκούσης ἄρα σύ γε ἀποφαίνῃ δεῖν ἡμῖν ἄρχειν;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. σφόδρα γε.
ΞΕ. καὶ τὴν εἰ δεῖ πείθειν ἄρα ἢ μὴ τῆς δυναμένης πείθειν;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ΞΕ. εἶεν· τίνι τὸ πειστικὸν οὖν ἀποδώσομεν ἐπιστήμῃ πλήθους τε καὶ ὄχλου διὰ μυθολογίας ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ διδαχῆς;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. φανερὸν οἶμαι καὶ τοῦτο ῥητορικῇ δοτέον ὄν.
ΞΕ. τὸ δʼ εἴτε διὰ πειθοῦς εἴτε καὶ διά τινος βίας δεῖ πράττειν πρός τινας ὁτιοῦν ἢ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν, τοῦτʼ αὖ ποίᾳ προσθήσομεν ἐπιστήμῃ;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. τῇ τῆς πειστικῆς ἀρχούσῃ καὶ λεκτικῆς.
ΞΕ. εἴη δʼ ἂν οὐκ ἄλλη τις, ὡς οἶμαι, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ δύναμις.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. κάλλιστʼ εἴρηκας.
ΞΕ. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἔοικε ταχὺ κεχωρίσθαι πολιτικῆς τὸ ῥητορικόν, ὡς ἕτερον εἶδος ὄν, ὑπηρετοῦν μὴν ταύτῃ.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ναί.
ΞΕ. τί δὲ περὶ τῆς τοιᾶσδʼ αὖ δυνάμεως διανοητέον;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ποίας;
ΞΕ. τῆς ὡς πολεμητέον ἑκάστοις οἷς ἂν προελώμεθα πολεμεῖν, εἴτε αὐτὴν ἄτεχνον εἴτε ἔντεχνον ἐροῦμεν;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. καὶ πῶς ἂν ἄτεχνον διανοηθεῖμεν, ἥν γε ἡ στρατηγικὴ καὶ πᾶσα ἡ πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις πράττει;
ΞΕ. τὴν δὲ εἴτε πολεμητέον εἴτε διὰ φιλίας ἀπαλλακτέον οἵαν τε καὶ ἐπιστήμονα διαβουλεύσασθαι, ταύτης ἑτέραν ὑπολάβωμεν ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτῃ;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. τοῖς πρόσθεν ἀναγκαῖον ἑπομένοισιν ἑτέραν.
Str. By the same method I think all that is different and alien and incompatible has now been eliminated by us from the science of statesmanship, and what is precious and akin to it is left. Herein are included the arts of the general and of the judge and that kind of oratory which partakes of the kingly art because it persuades men to justice and thereby helps to steer the ship of state. Now in what way shall we most easily eliminate these and show him whom we seek alone by himself and undisguised?
Y. Soc. Clearly we must do this somehow.
Str. Then if it is a question of trying, he will be shown. But I think we had better try to disclose him by means of music. Please answer my question.
Y. Soc. What is it?
Str. Shall we agree that there is such a thing as learning music and the sciences of handicraft in general?
Y. Soc. There is.
Str. And how about this? Shall we say that there is another science connected with those, which tells whether we ought or ought not to learn any one of then?
Y. Soc. Yes, we shall say that there is.
Str. And shall we agree that this is different from those?
Y. Soc. Yes.
Str. And shall we say that none of them ought to have control of any other, or that those sciences should control this one, or that this should control and rule all the others?
Y. Soc. This should control those others.
Str. You mean that the science which decides whether we ought to learn or not should control the science which is learnt or teaches?
Y. Soc. Emphatically.
Str. And the science which decides whether to persuade or not should control that which can persuade?
Y. Soc. Certainly.
Str. Well, then, to what science shall we assign the power of persuading a multitude or a mob by telling edifying stories, not by teaching?
Y. Soc. It is, I think, clear that this must be added to rhetoric.
Str. But the power of deciding whether some action, no matter what, should be taken, either by persuasion or by some exercise of force, in relation to any person, or whether to take no action at all—to what science is that to be assigned?
Y. Soc. To the science which controls the sciences of persuasion and speech.
Str. And that would, I think, be no other than the function of the statesman.
Y. Soc. A most excellent conclusion.
Str. So rhetoric also seems to have been quickly separated from statesmanship as a different species, subservient to the other.
Y. Soc. Yes.
Str. Here is another function or power; what are we to think about it?
Y. Soc. What is it?
Str. The power of determining how war shall be waged against those upon whom we have declared war, whether we are to call this a science or not a science?
Y. Soc. How could we think it is not a science, when generalship and all military activity practise it?
Str. And the power which is able and knows how to deliberate and decide whether to make war or peace, shall we assume that it is the same as this or different?
Y. Soc. If we are consistent, we must assume that it is different.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ἄρχουσαν ταύτης αὐτὴν ἀποφανούμεθα, εἴπερ τοῖς ἔμπροσθέν γε ὑποληψόμεθα ὁμοίως;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. φημί.
ΞΕ. τίνʼ οὖν ποτε καὶ ἐπιχειρήσομεν οὕτω δεινῆς καὶ μεγάλης τέχνης συμπάσης τῆς πολεμικῆς δεσπότιν ἀποφαίνεσθαι πλήν γε δὴ τὴν ὄντως οὖσαν βασιλικήν;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. οὐδεμίαν ἄλλην.
ΞΕ. οὐκ ἄρα πολιτικὴν θήσομεν, ὑπηρετικήν γε οὖσαν, τὴν τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐπιστήμην.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. οὐκ εἰκός.
ΞΕ. ἴθι δή, καὶ τὴν τῶν δικαστῶν τῶν ὀρθῶς δικαζόντων θεασώμεθα δύναμιν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΞΕ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἐπὶ πλέον τι δύναται τοῦ περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια πάνθʼ ὁπόσα κεῖται νόμιμα παρὰ νομοθέτου βασιλέως παραλαβοῦσα, κρίνειν εἰς ἐκεῖνα σκοποῦσα τά τε δίκαια ταχθέντʼ εἶναι καὶ ἄδικα, τὴν αὑτῆς ἰδίαν ἀρετὴν παρεχομένη τοῦ μήθʼ ὑπό τινων δώρων μήθʼ ὑπὸ φόβων μήτε οἴκτων μήθʼ ὑπό τινος ἄλλης ἔχθρας μηδὲ φιλίας ἡττηθεῖσα παρὰ τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου τάξιν ἐθέλειν ἂν τἀλλήλων ἐγκλήματα διαιρεῖν;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ὅσον εἴρηκας ταύτης ἐστὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ἔργον.
ΞΕ. καὶ τὴν τῶν δικαστῶν ἄρα ῥώμην ἀνευρίσκομεν οὐ βασιλικὴν οὖσαν ἀλλὰ νόμων φύλακα καὶ ὑπηρέτιν ἐκείνης.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ἔοικέν γε.
ΞΕ. τόδε δὴ κατανοητέον ἰδόντι συναπάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας αἳ εἴρηνται, ὅτι πολιτική γε αὐτῶν οὐδεμία ἀνεφάνη. τὴν γὰρ ὄντως οὖσαν βασιλικὴν οὐκ αὐτὴν δεῖ πράττειν ἀλλʼ ἄρχειν τῶν δυναμένων πράττειν, γιγνώσκουσαν τὴν ἀρχήν τε καὶ ὁρμὴν τῶν μεγίστων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐγκαιρίας τε πέρι καὶ ἀκαιρίας, τὰς δʼ ἄλλας τὰ προσταχθέντα δρᾶν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς.
ΞΕ. διὰ ταῦτα ἄρα ἃς μὲν ἄρτι διεληλύθαμεν, οὔτʼ ἀλλήλων οὔθʼ αὑτῶν ἄρχουσαι, περὶ δέ τινα ἰδίαν αὑτῆς οὖσα ἑκάστη πρᾶξιν, κατὰ τὴν ἰδιότητα τῶν πράξεων τοὔνομα δικαίως εἴληφεν ἴδιον.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. εἴξασι γοῦν.
ΞΕ. τὴν δὲ πασῶν τε τούτων ἄρχουσαν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ συμπάντων τῶν κατὰ πόλιν ἐπιμελουμένην καὶ πάντα συνυφαίνουσαν ὀρθότατα, τοῦ κοινοῦ τῇ κλήσει περιλαβόντες τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς, προσαγορεύοιμεν δικαιότατʼ ἄν, ὡς ἔοικε, πολιτικήν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν δὴ καὶ κατὰ τὸ τῆς ὑφαντικῆς παράδειγμα βουλοίμεθʼ ἂν ἐπεξελθεῖν αὐτὴν νῦν, ὅτε καὶ πάντα τὰ γένη τὰ κατὰ πόλιν δῆλα ἡμῖν γέγονε;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. καὶ σφόδρα γε.
Str. Shall we, then, assume that it controls the other, if we are to agree with our views in the former examples?
Y. Soc. Yes.
Str. And what other art shall we make bold to declare is mistress of that great and terrible art, the art of war as a whole, except the truly kingly art?
Y. Soc. No other.
Str. We shall, then, not call the art of the generals statesmanship, since it is subservient.
Y. Soc. No; that would not be reasonable.
Str. Now let us examine the function of the righteous judges.
Y. Soc. Certainly.
Str. Has it any power beyond that of judging men’s contracts with one another, pronouncing them right or wrong by the standard of the existing laws which it has received from the king and law-giver; showing its own peculiar virtue in that it is not so perverted by any bribes, or fears, or pity, or enmity, or friendship, as ever to consent to decide the lawsuits of men with each other contrary to the enactments of the lawgiver?
Y. Soc. No; the business of this power is about as you have described it.
Str. Then we find that the strength of judges is not kingly, but is guardian of laws and a servant of the kingly power.
Y. Soc. So it appears.
Str. The consideration of all these arts which have been mentioned leads to the conclusion that none of them is the art of the statesman. For the art that is truly kingly ought not to act itself, but should rule over the arts that have the power of action; it should decide upon the right or wrong time for the initiation of the most important measures in the state, and the other arts should perform its behests.
Y. Soc. Right.
Str. Therefore those arts which we have just described, as they control neither one another nor themselves, but have each its own peculiar sphere of action, are quite properly called by special names corresponding to those special actions.
Y. Soc. That appears, at least, to be the case.
Str. But the art which holds sway over them all and watches over the laws and all things in the state, weaving them all most perfectly together, we may, I think, by giving to its function a designation which indicates its power over the community, with full propriety call “statecraft.”
Y. Soc. Most assuredly.
Str. Shall we then proceed to discuss it after the model supplied by weaving, now that all the classes in the state have been made plain to us?
Y. Soc. By all means.
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