Plato · Statesman Πολιτικός

Plato, Statesman 296a–298e: Laws as second best: the ship's captain, the physician and the absurd rule of law

The Stranger says that it would be as ridiculous to forbid a better lawgiver, if one should come, to change the old laws as it would be to forbid a physician or a pilot to depart from a written prescription. A ruler with knowledge, like the captain of a ship who looks to the good of the vessel and the sailors, makes his art the law, and does not govern by written rules. He imagines a city in which people, angry at being treated badly by captains and physicians, make laws that bind them to written rules, so that the arts of navigation and medicine would be controlled by the many and become impossible.

Sections 296a–298e · 1400 words · click a number to copy its link

ΞΕ. τῷ δὲ τὰ δίκαια δὴ καὶ ἄδικα καὶ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ γράψαντι καὶ ἄγραφα νομοθετήσαντι ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀγέλαις, ὁπόσαι κατὰ πόλιν ἐν ἑκάσταις νομεύονται κατὰ τοὺς τῶν γραψάντων νόμους, ἂν ὁ μετὰ τέχνης γράψας ἤ τις ἕτερος ὅμοιος ἀφίκηται, μὴ ἐξέστω δὴ παρὰ ταῦτα ἕτερα προστάττειν; ἢ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἀπόρρημα οὐδὲν ἧττον ἂν ἐκείνου τῇ ἀληθείᾳ γελοῖον φαίνοιτο;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. τί μήν;

ΞΕ. οἶσθʼ οὖν ἐπὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγον τὸν παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν λεγόμενον;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. οὐκ ἐννοῶ νῦν γʼ οὕτως.

ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν εὐπρεπής. φασὶ γὰρ δὴ δεῖν, εἴ τις γιγνώσκει παρὰ τοὺς τῶν ἔμπροσθεν βελτίους νόμους, νομοθετεῖν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πόλιν ἕκαστον πείσαντα, ἄλλως δὲ μή.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. τί οὖν; οὐκ ὀρθῶς;

ΞΕ. ἴσως. ἂν δʼ οὖν μὴ πείθων τις βιάζηται τὸ βέλτιον, ἀπόκριναι, τί τοὔνομα τῆς βίας ἔσται; μὴ μέντοι πω, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν πρότερον.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΞΕ. ἄν τις ἄρα μὴ πείθων τὸν ἰατρευόμενον, ἔχων δὲ ὀρθῶς τὴν τέχνην, παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα τὸ βέλτιον ἀναγκάζῃ δρᾶν παῖδα ἤ τινα ἄνδρα ἢ καὶ γυναῖκα, τί τοὔνομα τῆς βίας ἔσται ταύτης; ἆρʼ οὐ πᾶν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ παρὰ τὴν τέχνην λεγόμενον ἁμάρτημα τὸ νοσῶδες; καὶ πάντα ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν ἔστι πρότερον τῷ βιασθέντι περὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον πλὴν ὅτι νοσώδη καὶ ἄτεχνα πέπονθεν ὑπὸ τῶν βιασαμένων ἰατρῶν;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΞΕ. τί δὲ ἡμῖν δὴ τὸ παρὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην ἁμάρτημα λεγόμενόν ἐστιν; ἆρʼ οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ [τὸ] κακὸν καὶ ἄδικον;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. παντάπασί γε.

ΞΕ. τῶν δὴ βιασθέντων παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα καὶ πάτρια δρᾶν ἕτερα δικαιότερα καὶ ἀμείνω καὶ καλλίω τῶν ἔμπροσθεν, φέρε, τὸν τῶν τοιούτων αὖ ψόγον περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης βίας, ἆρʼ, εἰ μέλλει μὴ καταγελαστότατος εἶναι πάντων, πάντʼ αὐτῷ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἑκάστοτε πλὴν ὡς αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἄδικα καὶ κακὰ πεπόνθασιν οἱ βιασθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν βιασαμένων;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ ἆρα ἐὰν μὲν πλούσιος ὁ βιασάμενος ᾖ, δίκαια, ἂν δʼ ἄρα πένης, ἄδικα τὰ βιασθέντα ἐστίν; ἢ κἂν πείσας κἂν μὴ πείσας τις, πλούσιος ἢ πένης, ἢ κατὰ γράμματα ἢ παρὰ γράμματα, δρᾷ [μὴ σύμφορα ἢ] σύμφορα, τοῦτον δεῖ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὸν ὅρον εἶναι τόν γε ἀληθινώτατον ὀρθῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως, ὃν ὁ σοφὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ διοικήσει τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων;

Str. But he who has made written or unwritten laws about the just and unjust, the honorable and disgraceful, the good and the bad for the herds of men that are tended in their several cities in accordance with the laws of the law-makers, is not to be permitted to give other laws contrary to those, if the scientific law-maker, or another like him, should come! Would not such a prohibition appear in truth as ridiculous as the other?

Y. Soc. It certainly would.

Str. Do you know what people in general say about such a case?

Y. Soc. I don’t recall it just now off-hand.

Str. Yes, it is very plausible; for they say that if anyone has anything better than the old laws to offer, he must first persuade the state, and then he may make his laws, but not otherwise.

Y. Soc. And is that not right?

Str. Perhaps. But suppose a man does not use persuasion, but makes an improvement by force. What is this force to be called? Answer me—or, no, not yet; first answer in reference to what we were talking of before.

Y. Soc. What do you mean?

Str. Suppose a physician who has right knowledge of his profession does not persuade, but forces, his patient, whether man, woman, or child, to do the better thing, though it be contrary to the written precepts, what will such violence be called? The last name in the world to call it would be “unscientific and baneful error,” as the phrase is, would it not? And the patient so forced might rightly say anything else rather than that he had been treated in a baneful or unscientific way by the physicians who used force upon him.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. But what can we call the unscientific error in the field of statesmanship? Is it not baseness and evil and injustice?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Now if people are forced, contrary to the written laws and inherited traditions, to do what is juster and nobler and better than what they did before, tell me, will not anyone who blames such use of force, unless he is to be most utterly ridiculous, always say anything or everything rather than that those who have been so forced have suffered base and unjust and evil treatment at the hands of those who forced them?

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. But would the violence be just if he who uses it is rich, and unjust if he is poor? Or if a man, whether rich or poor, by persuasion or by other means, in accordance with written laws or contrary to them, does what is for the good of the people, must not this be the truest criterion of right government, in accordance with which the wise and good man will govern the affairs of his subjects?

ΞΕ. ὥσπερ ὁ κυβερνήτης τὸ τῆς νεὼς καὶ ναυτῶν ἀεὶ συμφέρον παραφυλάττων, οὐ γράμματα τιθεὶς ἀλλὰ τὴν τέχνην νόμον παρεχόμενος, σῴζει τοὺς συνναύτας, οὕτω καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον παρὰ τῶν οὕτως ἄρχειν δυναμένων ὀρθὴ γίγνοιτʼ ἂν πολιτεία, τὴν τῆς τέχνης ῥώμην τῶν νόμων παρεχομένων κρείττω; καὶ πάντα ποιοῦσι τοῖς ἔμφροσιν ἄρχουσιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἁμάρτημα, μέχριπερ ἂν ἓν μέγα φυλάττωσι, τὸ μετὰ νοῦ καὶ τέχνης δικαιότατον ἀεὶ διανέμοντες τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει σῴζειν τε αὐτοὺς οἷοί τε ὦσιν καὶ ἀμείνους ἐκ χειρόνων ἀποτελεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. οὐκ ἔστʼ ἀντειπεῖν παρά γε ἃ νῦν εἴρηται.

ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα οὐδὲ ἀντιρρητέον.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. τὰ ποῖα εἶπες;

ΞΕ. ὡς οὐκ ἄν ποτε πλῆθος οὐδʼ ὡντινωνοῦν τὴν τοιαύτην λαβὸν ἐπιστήμην οἷόν τʼ ἂν γένοιτο μετὰ νοῦ διοικεῖν πόλιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ σμικρόν τι καὶ ὀλίγον καὶ τὸ ἕν ἐστι ζητητέον τὴν μίαν ἐκείνην πολιτείαν τὴν ὀρθήν, τὰς δʼ ἄλλας μιμήματα θετέον, ὥσπερ καὶ ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐρρήθη, τὰς μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ καλλίονα, τὰς δʼ ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχίω μιμουμένας ταύτην.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πῶς τί τοῦτʼ εἴρηκας; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄρτι δῆθεν κατέμαθον τὸ περὶ τῶν μιμημάτων.

ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν οὐ φαῦλόν γε, ἂν κινήσας τις τοῦτον τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ καταβάλῃ καὶ μὴ διελθὼν ἐνδείξηται τὸ νῦν γιγνόμενον ἁμάρτημα περὶ αὐτό.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ποῖον δή;

ΞΕ. τοιόνδε τι δεῖ γε ζητεῖν, οὐ πάνυ σύνηθες οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον ἰδεῖν· ὅμως μὴν πειρώμεθα λαβεῖν αὐτό. φέρε γάρ· ὀρθῆς ἡμῖν μόνης οὔσης ταύτης τῆς πολιτείας ἣν εἰρήκαμεν, οἶσθʼ ὅτι τὰς ἄλλας δεῖ τοῖς ταύτης συγγράμμασι χρωμένας οὕτω σῴζεσθαι, δρώσας τὸ νῦν ἐπαινούμενον, καίπερ οὐκ ὀρθότατον ὄν;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. τὸ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους μηδὲν μηδένα τολμᾶν ποιεῖν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὸν τολμῶντα δὲ θανάτῳ ζημιοῦσθαι καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐσχάτοις. καὶ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ὀρθότατα καὶ κάλλιστʼ ἔχον ὡς δεύτερον, ἐπειδὰν τὸ πρῶτόν τις μεταθῇ τὸ νυνδὴ ῥηθέν· ᾧ δὲ τρόπῳ γεγονός ἐστι τοῦτο ὃ δὴ δεύτερον ἐφήσαμεν, διαπερανώμεθα. ἦ γάρ;

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. εἰς δὴ τὰς εἰκόνας ἐπανίωμεν πάλιν, αἷς ἀναγκαῖον ἀπεικάζειν ἀεὶ τοὺς βασιλικοὺς ἄρχοντας.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ποίας;

ΞΕ. τὸν γενναῖον κυβερνήτην καὶ τὸν ἑτέρων πολλῶν ἀντάξιον ἰατρόν. κατίδωμεν γὰρ δή τι σχῆμα ἐν τούτοις αὐτοῖς πλασάμενοι.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ποῖόν τι;

Str. Just as the captain of a ship keeps watch for what is at any moment for the good of the vessel and the sailors, not by writing rules, but by making his science his law, and thus preserves his fellow voyagers, so may not a right government be established in the same way by men who could rule by this principle, making science more powerful than the laws? And whatever the wise rulers do, they can commit no error, so long as they maintain one great principle and by always dispensing absolute justice to them with wisdom and science are able to preserve the citizens and make them better than they were, so far as that is possible. Is not this true?

Y. Soc. There is no denying the truth of what you have just said.

Str. And those other statements cannot be denied, either.

Y. Soc. What statements?

Str. That no great number of men, whoever they may be, could ever acquire political science and be able to administer a state with wisdom, but our one right form of government must be sought in some small number or one person, and all other forms are merely, as we said before, more or less successful imitations of that.

Y. Soc. What do you mean by that? I did not understand about the imitations a little while ago, either.

Str. And yet it is quite a serious matter if after stirring up this question we drop it and do not go on and show the error which is committed in relation to it nowadays.

Y. Soc. What is the error?

Str. I will tell you what we must investigate; it is not at all familiar or easy to see, but let us try to grasp it nevertheless. Tell me this: Assuming that the form of government we have described is the only right form, don’t you see that the other forms must employ its written laws if they are to be preserved by doing that which is approved of nowadays, although it is not perfectly right?

Y. Soc. What is not perfectly right?

Str. That no citizen shall dare to do anything contrary to the laws, and that he who does shall be punished by death and the most extreme penalties. And this is perfectly right and good as a second choice, as soon as you depart from the first form of which we were just speaking. Now let us tell in some detail how this which we called the second choice comes about. Shall we do so?

Y. Soc. By all means.

Str. Let us return once more to the images which we always have to use in portraying kingly rulers.

Y. Soc. What images?

Str. The noble captain of a ship and the “physician who is worth as much as many others.” Let us make a simile of them and use it to help us to discover something.

Y. Soc. What is your simile?

ΞΕ. τοιόνδε· οἷον εἰ πάντες περὶ αὐτῶν διανοηθεῖμεν ὅτι δεινότατα ὑπʼ αὐτῶν πάσχομεν. ὃν μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐθελήσωσιν ἡμῶν τούτων ἑκάτεροι σῴζειν, ὁμοίως δὴ σῴζουσιν, ὃν δʼ ἂν λωβᾶσθαι βουληθῶσιν, λωβῶνται τέμνοντες καὶ κάοντες καὶ προστάττοντες ἀναλώματα φέρειν παρʼ ἑαυτοὺς οἷον φόρους, ὧν σμικρὰ μὲν εἰς τὸν κάμνοντα καὶ οὐδὲν ἀναλίσκουσιν, τοῖς δʼ ἄλλοις αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ οἰκέται χρῶνται· καὶ δὴ καὶ τελευτῶντες ἢ παρὰ συγγενῶν ἢ παρά τινων ἐχθρῶν τοῦ κάμνοντος χρήματα μισθὸν λαμβάνοντες ἀποκτεινύασιν. οἵ τʼ αὖ κυβερνῆται μυρία ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐργάζονται, καταλείποντές τε ἔκ τινος ἐπιβουλῆς ἐν ταῖς ἀναγωγαῖς ἐρήμους, καὶ σφάλματα ποιοῦντες ἐν τοῖς πελάγεσιν ἐκβάλλουσιν εἰς τὴν θάλατταν, καὶ ἕτερα κακουργοῦσιν. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα διανοηθέντες βουλευσαίμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν βουλήν τινα, τούτων τῶν τεχνῶν μηκέτι ἐπιτρέπειν ἄρχειν αὐτοκράτορι μηδετέρᾳ μήτʼ οὖν δούλων μήτʼ ἐλευθέρων, συλλέξαι δʼ ἐκκλησίαν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἢ σύμπαντα τὸν δῆμον ἢ τοὺς πλουσίους μόνον, ἐξεῖναι δὲ καὶ ἰδιωτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν περί τε πλοῦ καὶ περὶ νόσων γνώμην ξυμβαλέσθαι καθʼ ὅτι χρὴ τοῖς φαρμάκοις ἡμᾶς καὶ τοῖς ἰατρικοῖς ὀργάνοις πρὸς τοὺς κάμνοντας χρῆσθαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς πλοίοις τε αὐτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ναυτικοῖς ὀργάνοις εἰς τὴν τῶν πλοίων χρείαν καὶ περὶ τοὺς κινδύνους τούς τε πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν πλοῦν ἀνέμων καὶ θαλάττης πέρι καὶ πρὸς τὰς τοῖς λῃσταῖς ἐντεύξεις, καὶ ἐὰν ναυμαχεῖν ἄρα δέῃ που μακροῖς πλοίοις πρὸς ἕτερα τοιαῦτα· τὰ δὲ τῷ πλήθει δόξαντα περὶ τούτων, εἴτε τινῶν ἰατρῶν καὶ κυβερνητῶν εἴτʼ ἄλλων ἰδιωτῶν συμβουλευόντων, γράψαντας ἐν κύρβεσί τισι καὶ στήλαις, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἄγραφα πάτρια θεμένους ἔθη, κατὰ ταῦτα ἤδη πάντα τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ναυτίλλεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν καμνόντων θεραπείας ποιεῖσθαι.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. κομιδῇ γε εἴρηκας ἄτοπα.

ΞΕ. κατʼ ἐνιαυτὸν δέ γε ἄρχοντας καθίστασθαι τοῦ πλήθους, εἴτε ἐκ τῶν πλουσίων εἴτε ἐκ τοῦ δήμου παντός, ὃς ἂν κληρούμενος λαγχάνῃ· τοὺς δὲ καταστάντας ἄρχοντας ἄρχειν κατὰ τὰ γράμματα κυβερνῶντας τὰς ναῦς καὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας ἰωμένους.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ταῦτʼ ἔτι χαλεπώτερα.

Str. Something of this sort: Imagine that we all thought in regard to captains and physicians: “We are most abominably treated by them. For whomsoever of us either of them wishes to save, he saves, one of them just like the other, and whomsoever he wishes to maltreat, he maltreats. They cut us up and burn us and order us to bring them payments of money, as if they were exacting tribute, of which they spend little or nothing for their patients; they themselves and their servants use the rest. And finally they are bribed by the patient’s relatives or enemies and actually bring about his death. And as for the captains, they commit countless other misdeeds they make plots and leave us deserted ashore when they put out to sea, they bring on mishaps at sea and so cast us into the water, and are guilty of other wrong-doings.” Now suppose, with these thoughts in mind, we deliberated about them and decided that we would no longer allow either of these arts to rule without control over slaves or free men, but that we would call an assembly either of all the people or of the rich only, and that anyone, whether he were engaged in some other form of skilled labor or were without any special qualifications, should be free to offer an opinion about navigation and diseases, how drugs and surgical or medical instruments should be applied to the patients, and how ships and nautical instruments should be used for navigation and in meeting dangers, not only those of winds and sea that affect the voyage itself, but also those met in encounters with pirates, and if battles have to be fought between ships of war; and that whatever the majority decided about these matters, whether any physicians or ship captains or merely unskilled persons took part in the deliberations, should be inscribed upon tablets and slabs or in some instances should be adopted as unwritten ancestral customs, and that henceforth forever navigation and the care of the sick should be conducted in accordance with these provisions.

Y. Soc. That is a most absurd state of things that you have described.

Str. And suppose that rulers of the people are set up annually, whether from the rich or from the whole people, on the principle that whoever is chosen by lot should rule, and that these rulers exercise their authority in commanding the ships or treating the sick in accordance with the written rules.

Y. Soc. That is still harder to imagine.

English translation by Harold North Fowler (1925). Original text: Harold North Fowler (trans.), Plato VIII: Statesman, Philebus, Ion, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, 1925; Greek text: John Burnet, Platonis Opera, Oxford Classical Texts (as digitised by Perseus).

Greek text and translation from the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0 (Perseus Digital Library); translation public domain. Introductions, summaries and notes © GreekMythology.com.