ΞΕ. δικαίως δὴ μετέχειν ἂν λέγοιτο τῆς γνωστικῆς ἐπιστήμης.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πάνυ γε.
ΞΕ. τούτῳ δέ γε οἶμαι προσήκει κρίναντι μὴ τέλος ἔχειν μηδʼ ἀπηλλάχθαι, καθάπερ ὁ λογιστὴς ἀπήλλακτο, προστάττειν δὲ ἑκάστοις τῶν ἐργατῶν τό γε πρόσφορον ἕως ἂν ἀπεργάσωνται τὸ προσταχθέν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν γνωστικαὶ μὲν αἵ τε τοιαῦται σύμπασαι καὶ ὁπόσαι συνέπονται τῇ λογιστικῇ, κρίσει δὲ καὶ ἐπιτάξει διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοιν τούτω τὼ γένη;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. φαίνεσθον.
ΞΕ. ἆρʼ οὖν συμπάσης τῆς γνωστικῆς εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐπιτακτικὸν μέρος, τὸ δὲ κριτικὸν διαιρούμενοι προσείποιμεν, ἐμμελῶς ἂν φαῖμεν διῃρῆσθαι;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν.
ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῖς γε κοινῇ τι πράττουσιν ἀγαπητὸν ὁμονοεῖν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ΞΕ. τούτου τοίνυν μέχριπερ ἂν αὐτοὶ κοινωνῶμεν, ἐατέον τά γε τῶν ἄλλων δοξάσματα χαίρειν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. τί μήν;
ΞΕ. φέρε δή, τούτοιν τοῖν τέχναιν ἡμῖν τὸν βασιλικὸν ἐν ποτέρᾳ θετέον; ἆρʼ ἐν τῇ κριτικῇ, καθάπερ τινὰ θεατήν, ἢ μᾶλλον τῆς ἐπιτακτικῆς ὡς ὄντα αὐτὸν τέχνης θήσομεν, δεσπόζοντά γε;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ μᾶλλον;
ΞΕ. τὴν ἐπιτακτικὴν δὴ τέχνην πάλιν ἂν εἴη θεατέον εἴ πῃ διέστηκεν. καί μοι δοκεῖ τῇδέ πῃ, καθάπερ ἡ τῶν καπήλων τέχνη τῆς τῶν αὐτοπωλῶν διώρισται τέχνης, καὶ τὸ βασιλικὸν γένος ἔοικεν ἀπὸ τοῦ τῶν κηρύκων γένους ἀφωρίσθαι.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πῶς;
ΞΕ. πωληθέντα που πρότερον ἔργα ἀλλότρια παραδεχόμενοι δεύτερον πωλοῦσι πάλιν οἱ κάπηλοι.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ κηρυκικὸν φῦλον ἐπιταχθέντʼ ἀλλότρια νοήματα παραδεχόμενον αὐτὸ δεύτερον ἐπιτάττει πάλιν ἑτέροις.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ἀληθέστατα.
ΞΕ. τί οὖν; εἰς ταὐτὸν μείξομεν βασιλικὴν ἑρμηνευτικῇ, κελευστικῇ, μαντικῇ, κηρυκικῇ, καὶ πολλαῖς ἑτέραις τούτων τέχναις συγγενέσιν, αἳ σύμπασαι τό γʼ ἐπιτάττειν ἔχουσιν; ἢ βούλει, καθάπερ ᾐκάζομεν νυνδή, καὶ τοὔνομα παρεικάσωμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνώνυμον ὂν τυγχάνει τὸ τῶν αὐτεπιτακτῶν γένος, καὶ ταύτῃ ταῦτα διελώμεθα, τὸ μὲν τῶν βασιλέων γένος εἰς τὴν αὐτεπιτακτικὴν θέντες, τοῦ δὲ ἄλλου παντὸς ἀμελήσαντες, ὄνομα ἕτερον αὐτοῖς παραχωρήσαντες θέσθαι τινά; τοῦ γὰρ ἄρχοντος ἕνεκα ἡμῖν ἡ μέθοδος ἦν ἀλλʼ οὐχὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου.
Str. So he may fairly be said to participate in intellectual science.
Y. Soc. Certainly.
Str. But it is his business, I suppose, not to pass judgement and be done with it and go away, as the calculator did, but to give each of the workmen the proper orders, until they have finished their appointed task.
Y. Soc. You are right.
Str. Then all such sciences, and all those that are in the class with calculating, are alike intellectual sciences, but these two classes differ from one another in the matter of judging and commanding. Am I right?
Y. Soc. I think so.
Str. Then if we bisected intellectual science as a whole and called one part the commanding and the other the judging part, might we say we had made fitting division?
Y. Soc. Yes, in my opinion.
Str. And surely when men are doing anything in common it is pleasant for them to agree.
Y. Soc. Of course it is.
Str. On this point, then, so long as we ourselves are in agreement, we need not bother about the opinions of others.
Y. Soc. Of course not.
Str. Now to which of these two classes is the kingly man to be assigned? Shall we assign him to the art of judging, as a kind of spectator, or rather to the art of commanding, inasmuch as he is a ruler?
Y. Soc. Rather to the latter, of course.
Str. Then once more we must see whether the art of command falls into two divisions. It seems to me that it does, and I think there is much the same distinction between the kingly class and the class of heralds as between the art of men who sell what they themselves produce and that of retail dealers.
Y. Soc. How so?
Str. Retail dealers receive and sell over again the productions of others, which have generally been sold before.
Y. Soc. Certainly.
Str. And in like manner heralds receive the purposes of others in the form of orders, and then give the orders a second time to others.
Y. Soc. Very true.
Str. Shall we, then, join the art of the king in the same class with the art of the interpreter, the boatswain, the prophet, the herald, and many other kindred arts, all of which involve giving orders? Or, as we just now made a comparison of functions, shall we now by comparison make a name also—since the class of those who issue orders of their own is virtually nameless—and assign kings to the science of giving orders of one’s own, disregarding all the rest and leaving to someone else the task of naming them? For the object of our present quest is the ruler, not his opposite.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μετρίως ἀφέστηκεν ἀπʼ ἐκείνων, ἀλλοτριότητι διορισθὲν πρὸς οἰκειότητα, τοῦτο αὐτὸ πάλιν αὖ διαιρεῖν ἀναγκαῖον, εἴ τινα τομὴν ἔτι ἔχομεν ὑπείκουσαν ἐν τούτῳ;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πάνυ γε.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν φαινόμεθα ἔχειν· ἀλλʼ ἐπακολουθῶν σύντεμνε.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πῇ;
ΞΕ. πάντας ὁπόσους ἂν ἄρχοντας διανοηθῶμεν ἐπιτάξει προσχρωμένους ἆρʼ οὐχ εὑρήσομεν γενέσεώς τινος ἕνεκα προστάττοντας;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν τά γε γιγνόμενα πάντα δίχα διαλαβεῖν οὐ παντάπασι χαλεπόν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πῇ;
ΞΕ. τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα αὐτῶν ἐστί που συμπάντων, τὰ δʼ ἔμψυχα.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ναί.
ΞΕ. τούτοις δέ γε αὐτοῖς τὸ τοῦ γνωστικοῦ μέρος ἐπιτακτικὸν ὄν, εἴπερ βουλόμεθα τέμνειν, τεμοῦμεν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. κατὰ τί;
ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν ἀψύχων γενέσεσιν αὐτοῦ τάττοντες, τὸ δʼ ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν ἐμψύχων· καὶ πᾶν οὕτως ἤδη διαιρήσεται δίχα.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. παντάπασί γε.
ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν τοίνυν αὐτῶν παραλίπωμεν, τὸ δʼ ἀναλάβωμεν, ἀναλαβόντες δὲ μερισώμεθα εἰς δύο τὸ σύμπαν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. λέγεις δʼ αὐτοῖν ἀναληπτέον εἶναι πότερον;
ΞΕ. πάντως που τὸ περὶ τὰ ζῷα ἐπιτακτικόν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε τῆς βασιλικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐστί ποτε τῶν ἀψύχων ἐπιστατοῦν, οἷον ἀρχιτεκτονικόν, ἀλλὰ γενναιότερον, ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὴν δύναμιν ἀεὶ κεκτημένον.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς.
ΞΕ. τήν γε μὴν τῶν ζῴων γένεσιν καὶ τροφὴν τὴν μέν τις ἂν ἴδοι μονοτροφίαν οὖσαν, τὴν δὲ κοινὴν τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀγέλαις θρεμμάτων ἐπιμέλειαν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς.
ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ οὐ μὴν τόν γε πολιτικὸν εὑρήσομεν ἰδιοτρόφον, ὥσπερ βοηλάτην ἤ τινα ἱπποκόμον, ἀλλʼ ἱπποφορβῷ τε καὶ βουφορβῷ μᾶλλον προσεοικότα.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. φαίνεταί γε δὴ ῥηθὲν νῦν.
ΞΕ. πότερον οὖν τῆς ζῳοτροφίας τὴν τῶν συμπόλλων κοινὴν τροφὴν ἀγελαιοτροφίαν ἢ κοινοτροφικήν τινα ὀνομάζομεν;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ὁπότερον ἂν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ συμβαίνῃ.
Y. Soc. Quite right.
Str. Then since a reasonable distinction between this class and the rest has been made, by distinguishing the commands given as one’s own or another’s, shall we again divide this class, if there is in it any further line of section?
Y. Soc. Certainly.
Str. I think there is one; please help me in making the section.
Y. Soc. On what line?
Str. Take the case of all those whom we conceive of as rulers who give commands: shall we not find that they all issue commands for the sake of producing something?
Y. Soc. Of course.
Str. Furthermore it is not at all difficult to divide all that is produced into two classes.
Y. Soc. How?
Str. Of the whole class, some have life and others have no life.
Y. Soc. Yes.
Str. And on these same lines we may, if we like, make a division of the part of intellectual science which commands.
Y. Soc. In what way?
Str. By assigning one part of it to the production of lifeless, the other to that of living objects; and in this way the whole will be divided into two parts.
Y. Soc. Certainly.
Str. Let us then leave one half and take up the other, and then let us divide that entire half into two parts.
Y. Soc. Which half shall we take up?
Str. That which issues commands relating to living objects, assuredly. For certainly the science of the king is not, like that of the architect, one which supervises lifeless objects; it is a nobler science, since it exercises its power among living beings and in relation to them alone.
Y. Soc. True.
Str. Now you may notice that the breeding and nurture of living beings is sometimes the nurture of a single animal and sometimes the common care of creatures in droves.
Y. Soc. True.
Str. But we shall find that the statesman is not one who tends a single creature, like the driver of a single ox or the groom who tends a horse; he has more resemblance to a man who tends a herd of cattle or a drove of horses.
Y. Soc. That seems to be true, now that you mention it.
Str. Shall we call the art of caring for many living creatures the art of tending a herd or something like community management?
Y. Soc. Whichever we happen to say.
ΞΕ. καλῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες· κἂν διαφυλάξῃς τὸ μὴ σπουδάζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, πλουσιώτερος εἰς τὸ γῆρας ἀναφανήσῃ φρονήσεως. νῦν δὲ τοῦτο μέν, καθάπερ διακελεύῃ, ποιητέον· τὴν δὲ ἀγελαιοτροφικὴν ἆρʼ ἐννοεῖς πῇ τις δίδυμον ἀποφήνας τὸ ζητούμενον ἐν διπλασίοισι τὰ νῦν ἐν τοῖς ἡμίσεσιν εἰς τότε ποιήσει ζητεῖσθαι;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. προθυμήσομαι. καί μοι δοκεῖ τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἑτέρα τις εἶναι, τῶν δʼ αὖ θηρίων ἄλλη τροφή.
ΞΕ. παντάπασί γε προθυμότατα καὶ ἀνδρειότατα διῄρησαι· μὴ μέντοι τοῦτό γε εἰς αὖθις κατὰ δύναμιν πάσχωμεν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. τὸ ποῖον;
ΞΕ. μὴ σμικρὸν μόριον ἓν πρὸς μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ ἀφαιρῶμεν, μηδὲ εἴδους χωρίς· ἀλλὰ τὸ μέρος ἅμα εἶδος ἐχέτω. κάλλιστον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων εὐθὺς διαχωρίζειν τὸ ζητούμενον, ἂν ὀρθῶς ἔχῃ, καθάπερ ὀλίγον σὺ πρότερον οἰηθεὶς ἔχειν τὴν διαίρεσιν ἐπέσπευσας τὸν λόγον, ἰδὼν ἐπʼ ἀνθρώπους πορευόμενον· ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ φίλε, λεπτουργεῖν οὐκ ἀσφαλές, διὰ μέσων δὲ ἀσφαλέστερον ἰέναι τέμνοντας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἰδέαις ἄν τις προστυγχάνοι. τοῦτο δὲ διαφέρει τὸ πᾶν πρὸς τὰς ζητήσεις.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πῶς, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις τοῦτο;
ΞΕ. πειρατέον ἔτι σαφέστερον φράζειν εὐνοίᾳ τῆς σῆς φύσεως, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐν τῷ μὲν οὖν παρεστηκότι τὰ νῦν δηλῶσαι μηδὲν ἐνδεῶς ἀδύνατον· ἐπιχειρητέον δέ τι καὶ σμικρῷ πλέον αὐτὸ προαγαγεῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν σαφηνείας ἕνεκα.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ποῖον οὖν δὴ φράζεις διαιρουμένους ἡμᾶς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἄρτι δρᾶν;
ΞΕ. τοιόνδε, οἷον εἴ τις τἀνθρώπινον ἐπιχειρήσας δίχα διελέσθαι γένος διαιροῖ καθάπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε διανέμουσι, τὸ μὲν Ἑλληνικὸν ὡς ἓν ἀπὸ πάντων ἀφαιροῦντες χωρίς, σύμπασι δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις γένεσιν, ἀπείροις οὖσι καὶ ἀμείκτοις καὶ ἀσυμφώνοις πρὸς ἄλληλα, βάρβαρον μιᾷ κλήσει προσειπόντες αὐτὸ διὰ ταύτην τὴν μίαν κλῆσιν καὶ γένος ἓν αὐτὸ εἶναι προσδοκῶσιν· ἢ τὸν ἀριθμόν τις αὖ νομίζοι κατʼ εἴδη δύο διαιρεῖν μυριάδα ἀποτεμνόμενος ἀπὸ πάντων, ὡς ἓν εἶδος ἀποχωρίζων, καὶ τῷ λοιπῷ δὴ παντὶ θέμενος ἓν ὄνομα διὰ τὴν κλῆσιν αὖ καὶ τοῦτʼ ἀξιοῖ γένος ἐκείνου χωρὶς ἕτερον ἓν γίγνεσθαι. κάλλιον δέ που καὶ μᾶλλον κατʼ εἴδη καὶ δίχα διαιροῖτʼ ἄν, εἰ τὸν μὲν ἀριθμὸν ἀρτίῳ καὶ περιττῷ τις τέμνοι, τὸ δὲ αὖ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ἄρρενι καὶ θήλει, Λυδοὺς δὲ ἢ Φρύγας ἤ τινας ἑτέρους πρὸς ἅπαντας τάττων ἀποσχίζοι τότε, ἡνίκα ἀποροῖ γένος ἅμα καὶ μέρος εὑρίσκειν ἑκάτερον τῶν σχισθέντων.
Str. Good, Socrates! If you preserve this attitude of indifference to mere names, you will turn out richer in wisdom when you are old. But now we will, as you suggest, not trouble ourselves about the name; but do you see a way in which a man may show that the art of herding is twofold, and may thereby cause that which is now sought among a double number of things to be sought among half as many?
Y. Soc. I am quite willing to try. I think one kind is the care of men, the other that of beasts.
Str. You made the division with perfect willingness and courage. However, let us do our best not to fall again into your error.
Y. Soc. What error?
Str. We must not take a single small part, and set it off against many large ones, nor disregard species in making our division. On the contrary, the part must be also a species. It is a very fine thing to separate the object of our search at once from everything else, if the separation can be made correctly, and so, just now, you thought you had the right division and you hurried our discussion along, because you saw that it was leading towards man. But, my friend, it is not safe to whittle off shavings; it is safer to proceed by cutting through the middle, and in that way one is more likely to find classes. This makes all the difference in the conduct of research.
Y. Soc. What do you mean by that, Stranger?
Str. I must try to speak still more clearly, Socrates, out of regard for your capacity. Just at present it is impossible to make the matter entirely plain, but I will try to lay it before you a little more fully for the sake of clearness.
Y. Soc. What is it, then, that you say we did wrongly in making our division just now?
Str. It was very much as if, in undertaking to divide the human race into two parts, one should make the division as most people in this country do; they separate the Hellenic race from all the rest as one, and to all the other races, which are countless in number and have no relation in blood or language to one another, they give the single name “barbarian”; then, because of this single name, they think it is a single species. Or it was as if a man should think he was dividing number into two classes by cutting off a myriad from all the other numbers, with the notion that he was making one separate class, and then should give one name to all the rest, and because of that name should think that this also formed one class distinct from the other. A better division, more truly classified and more equal, would be made by dividing number into odd and even, and the human race into male and female; as for the Lydians and Phrygians and various others they could be opposed to the rest and split off from them when it was impossible to find and separate two parts, each of which formed a class.
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