ΣΩ. ἔστιν γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα μόρια τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἔφην ἐγώ, σοφία τε καὶ ἀνδρεία;—πάντων μάλιστα δήπου, ἔφη· καὶ μέγιστόν γε ἡ σοφία τῶν μορίων.—ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν ἐστιν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο;—ναί.—ἦ καὶ δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ἰδίαν ἔχει; ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου, οὐκ ἔστιν ὀφθαλμὸς οἷον τὰ ὦτα, οὐδʼ ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ ἡ αὐτή· οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν ἐστιν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον οὔτε κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν οὔτε κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα· ἆρʼ οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον, οὔτε αὐτὸ οὔτε ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, εἴπερ τῷ παραδείγματί γε ἔοικε;—ἀλλʼ οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες.—καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων ἄλλο οἷον ἐπιστήμη, οὐδʼ οἷον δικαιοσύνη, οὐδʼ οἷον ἀνδρεία, οὐδʼ οἷον σωφροσύνη, οὐδʼ οἷον ὁσιότης.—οὐκ ἔφη.—φέρε δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα ποῖόν τι αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἕκαστον. πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τοιόνδε· ἡ δικαιοσύνη πρᾶγμά τί ἐστιν ἢ οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ· τί δὲ σοί;—κἀμοί, ἔφη.—τί οὖν; εἴ τις ἔροιτο ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ· «ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἴπετον δή μοι, τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ὃ ὠνομάσατε ἄρτι, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἢ ἄδικον;» ἐγὼ μὲν ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμην ὅτι δίκαιον· σὺ δὲ τίνʼ ἂν ψῆφον θεῖο; τὴν αὐτὴν ἐμοὶ ἢ ἄλλην;—τὴν αὐτήν, ἔφη.—ἔστιν ἄρα τοιοῦτον ἡ δικαιοσύνη οἷον δίκαιον εἶναι, φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε ἀποκρινόμενος τῷ ἐρωτῶντι· οὐκοῦν καὶ σύ;—ναί, ἔφη.—εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο· «οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁσιότητά τινά φατε εἶναι;» φαῖμεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι.—ναί, ἦ δʼ ὅς.—«οὐκοῦν φατε καὶ τοῦτο πρᾶγμά τι εἶναι;» φαῖμεν ἄν· ἢ οὔ;—καὶ τοῦτο συνέφη.—«πότερον δὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμά φατε τοιοῦτον πεφυκέναι οἷον ἀνόσιον εἶναι ἢ οἷον ὅσιον;» ἀγανακτήσαιμʼ ἂν ἔγωγʼ, ἔφην, τῷ ἐρωτήματι, καὶ εἴποιμʼ ἄν· εὐφήμει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε· σχολῇ μεντἄν τι ἄλλο ὅσιον εἴη, εἰ μὴ αὐτή γε ἡ ὁσιότης ὅσιον ἔσται. τί δὲ σύ; οὐχ οὕτως ἂν ἀποκρίναιο;—πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο εἴποι ἐρωτῶν ἡμᾶς· «πῶς οὖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐλέγετε; ἆρʼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑμῶν κατήκουσα; ἐδόξατέ μοι φάναι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια εἶναι οὕτως ἔχοντα πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὡς οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον·»
Most undoubtedly they are, he answered; and wisdom is the noblest of the parts.
And they are all different from one another? I said.
Yes.
And has each of them a distinct function like the parts of the face;—the eye, for example, is not like the ear, and has not the same functions; and the other parts are none of them like one another, either in their functions, or in any other way? I want to know whether the comparison holds concerning the parts of virtue. Do they also differ from one another in themselves and in their functions? For that is clearly what the simile would imply.
Yes, Socrates, you are right in supposing that they differ.
Then, I said, no other part of virtue is like knowledge, or like justice, or like courage, or like temperance, or like holiness?
No, he answered.
Well then, I said, suppose that you and I enquire into their natures. And first, you would agree with me that justice is of the nature of a thing, would you not? That is my opinion: would it not be yours also?
Mine also, he said.
And suppose that some one were to ask us, saying, ‘O Protagoras, and you, Socrates, what about this thing which you were calling justice, is it just or unjust?’—and I were to answer, just: would you vote with me or against me?
With you, he said.
Thereupon I should answer to him who asked me, that justice is of the nature of the just: would not you?
Yes, he said.
And suppose that he went on to say: ‘Well now, is there also such a thing as holiness?’—we should answer, ‘Yes,’ if I am not mistaken?
Yes, he said.
Which you would also acknowledge to be a thing—should we not say so?
He assented.
‘And is this a sort of thing which is of the nature of the holy, or of the nature of the unholy?’ I should be angry at his putting such a question, and should say, ‘Peace, man; nothing can be holy if holiness is not holy.’ What would you say? Would you not answer in the same way?
Certainly, he said.
And then after this suppose that he came and asked us, ‘What were you saying just now? Perhaps I may not have heard you rightly, but you seemed to me to be saying that the parts of virtue were not the same as one another.’ I should reply, ‘You certainly heard that said, but not, as you
ΣΩ. εἴποιμʼ ἂν ἔγωγε ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὀρθῶς ἤκουσας, ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ οἴει εἰπεῖν τοῦτο, παρήκουσας· Πρωταγόρας γὰρ ὅδε ταῦτα ἀπεκρίνατο, ἐγὼ δὲ ἠρώτων. εἰ οὖν εἴποι· «ἀληθῆ ὅδε λέγει, ὦ Πρωταγόρα; σὺ φῂς οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον μόριον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς; σὸς οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐστίν;» τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκρίναιο;—ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁμολογεῖν. τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἀποκρινούμεθα αὐτῷ, ταῦτα ὁμολογήσαντες, ἐὰν ἡμᾶς ἐπανέρηται· «οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁσιότης οἷον δίκαιον εἶναι πρᾶγμα, οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη οἷον ὅσιον ἀλλʼ οἷον μὴ ὅσιον· ἡ δʼ ὁσιότης οἷον μὴ δίκαιον, ἀλλʼ ἄδικον ἄρα, τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον;» τί αὐτῷ ἀποκρινούμεθα; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ὑπέρ γε ἐμαυτοῦ φαίην ἂν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁσιότητα δίκαιον· καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ δέ, εἴ με ἐῴης, ταὐτὰ ἂν ταῦτα ἀποκρινοίμην, ὅτι ἤτοι ταὐτόν γʼ ἐστιν δικαιότης ὁσιότητι ἢ ὅτι ὁμοιότατον, καὶ μάλιστα πάντων ἥ τε δικαιοσύνη οἷον ὁσιότης καὶ ἡ ὁσιότης οἷον δικαιοσύνη. ἀλλʼ ὅρα εἰ διακωλύεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἢ καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτως.—οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἁπλοῦν εἶναι, ὥστε συγχωρῆσαι τήν τε δικαιοσύνην ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁσιότητα δίκαιον, ἀλλά τί μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ διάφορον εἶναι. ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο διαφέρει; ἔφη· εἰ γὰρ βούλει, ἔστω ἡμῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνη ὅσιον καὶ ὁσιότης δίκαιον.—μή μοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· οὐδὲν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ «εἰ βούλει» τοῦτο καὶ «εἴ σοι δοκεῖ» ἐλέγχεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ· τὸ δʼ «ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ» τοῦτο λέγω, οἰόμενος οὕτω τὸν λόγον βέλτιστʼ ἂν ἐλέγχεσθαι, εἴ τις τὸ «εἴ» ἀφέλοι αὐτοῦ.—ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦ δʼ ὅς, προσέοικέν τι δικαιοσύνη ὁσιότητι· καὶ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν ὁτῳοῦν ἁμῇ γέ πῃ προσέοικεν. τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι ἔστιν ὅπῃ προσέοικεν, καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τῷ μαλακῷ, καὶ τἆλλα ἃ δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτατα εἶναι ἀλλήλοις· καὶ ἃ τότε ἔφαμεν ἄλλην δύναμιν ἔχειν καὶ οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον, τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια, ἁμῇ γέ πῃ προσέοικεν καὶ ἔστιν τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον. ὥστε τούτῳ γε τῷ τρόπῳ κἂν ταῦτα ἐλέγχοις, εἰ βούλοιο, ὡς ἅπαντά ἐστιν ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις. ἀλλʼ οὐχὶ τὰ ὅμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ὅμοια δίκαιον καλεῖν, οὐδὲ τὰ ἀνόμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ἀνόμοια, κἂν πάνυ σμικρὸν ἔχῃ τὸ ὅμοιον.—καὶ ἐγὼ θαυμάσας εἶπον πρὸς αὐτόν· ἦ γὰρ οὕτω σοι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ὅσιον πρὸς ἄλληλα ἔχει, ὥστε ὅμοιόν τι σμικρὸν ἔχειν ἀλλήλοις;—
imagine, by me; for I only asked the question; Protagoras gave the answer.’ And suppose that he turned to you and said, ‘Is this true, Protagoras? and do you maintain that one part of virtue is unlike another, and is this your position?’—how would you answer him?
I could not help acknowledging the truth of what he said, Socrates.
Well then, Protagoras, we will assume this; and now supposing that he proceeded to say further, ‘Then holiness is not of the nature of justice, nor justice of the nature of holiness, but of the nature of unholiness; and holiness is of the nature of the not just, and therefore of the unjust, and the unjust is the unholy’: how shall we answer him? I should certainly answer him on my own behalf that justice is holy, and that holiness is just; and I would say in like manner on your behalf also, if you would allow me, that justice is either the same with holiness, or very nearly the same; and above all I would assert that justice is like holiness and holiness is like justice; and I wish that you would tell me whether I may be permitted to give this answer on your behalf, and whether you would agree with me.
He replied, I cannot simply agree, Socrates, to the proposition that justice is holy and that holiness is just, for there appears to me to be a difference between them. But what matter? if you please I please; and let us assume, if you will I, that justice is holy, and that holiness is just.
Pardon me, I replied; I do not want this ‘if you wish’ or ‘if you will’ sort of conclusion to be proven, but I want you and me to be proven: I mean to say that the conclusion will be best proven if there be no ‘if.’
Well, he said, I admit that justice bears a resemblance to holiness, for there is always some point of view in which everything is like every other thing; white is in a certain way like black, and hard is like soft, and the most extreme opposites have some qualities in common; even the parts of the face which, as we were saying before, are distinct and have different functions, are still in a certain point of view similar, and one of them is like another of them. And you may prove that they are like one another on the same principle that all things are like one another; and yet things which are like in some particular ought not to be called alike, nor things which are unlike in some particular, however slight, unlike.
And do you think, I said in a tone of surprise, that justice and holiness have but a small degree of likeness?
Certainly not; any more than I agree with what I understand to be your view.
ΣΩ. οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, οὕτως, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ αὖ ὡς σύ μοι δοκεῖς οἴεσθαι.—ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ δυσχερῶς δοκεῖς μοι ἔχειν πρὸς τοῦτο, τοῦτο μὲν ἐάσωμεν, τόδε δὲ ἄλλο ὧν ἔλεγες ἐπισκεψώμεθα. ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς;—ἔφη.—τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι οὐ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐστὶν ἡ σοφία;—ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη.—πότερον δὲ ὅταν πράττωσιν ἅνθρωποι ὀρθῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως, τότε σωφρονεῖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες, ἢ [εἰ] τοὐναντίον [ἔπραττον];—σωφρονεῖν, ἔφη.—οὐκοῦν σωφροσύνῃ σωφρονοῦσιν;—ἀνάγκη.—οὐκοῦν οἱ μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντες ἀφρόνως πράττουσιν καὶ οὐ σωφρονοῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες;—συνδοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη.—τοὐναντίον ἄρα ἐστὶν τὸ ἀφρόνως πράττειν τῷ σωφρόνως;—ἔφη.—οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν ἀφρόνως πραττόμενα ἀφροσύνῃ πράττεται, τὰ δὲ σωφρόνως σωφροσύνῃ;—ὡμολόγει.—οὐκοῦν εἴ τι ἰσχύϊ πράττεται, ἰσχυρῶς πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἀσθενείᾳ, ἀσθενῶς;—ἐδόκει.—καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ τάχους, ταχέως, καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ βραδυτῆτος, βραδέως;—ἔφη.—καὶ εἴ τι δὴ ὡσαύτως πράττεται, ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἐναντίως, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου;—συνέφη.—φέρε δή, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἔστιν τι καλόν;—συνεχώρει.—τούτῳ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ αἰσχρόν;—οὐκ ἔστιν.—τί δέ; ἔστιν τι ἀγαθόν;—ἔστιν.—τούτῳ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ κακόν;—οὐκ ἔστιν.—τί δέ; ἔστιν τι ὀξὺ ἐν φωνῇ;—ἔφη.—τούτῳ μὴ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ βαρύ;—οὐκ ἔφη.—οὐκοῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἐναντίων ἓν μόνον ἐστὶν ἐναντίον καὶ οὐ πολλά;—συνωμολόγει. ἴθι δή, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀναλογισώμεθα τὰ ὡμολογημένα ἡμῖν. ὡμολογήκαμεν ἓν ἑνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείω δὲ μή;—ὡμολογήκαμεν.—τὸ δὲ ἐναντίως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ ἐναντίων πράττεσθαι;—ἔφη.—ὡμολογήκαμεν δὲ ἐναντίως πράττεσθαι ὃ ἂν ἀφρόνως πράττηται τῷ σωφρόνως πραττομένῳ;—ἔφη.—τὸ δὲ σωφρόνως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης πράττεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀφρόνως ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης; —συνεχώρει.—οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἐναντίως πράττεται, ὑπὸ ἐναντίου πράττοιτʼ ἄν;—ναί.—πράττεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης;—ναί.—ἐναντίως;—πάνυ γε.—οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ ἐναντίων ὄντων;—ναί.—ἐναντίον ἄρʼ ἐστὶν ἀφροσύνη σωφροσύνης;—φαίνεται.—μέμνησαι οὖν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν ἀφροσύνη σοφίᾳ ἐναντίον εἶναι;—συνωμολόγει.—
Well, I said, as you appear to have a difficulty about this, let us take another of the examples which you mentioned instead. Do you admit the existence of folly?
I do.
And is not wisdom the very opposite of folly?
That is true, he said.
And when men act rightly and advantageously they seem to you to be temperate?
Yes, he said.
And temperance makes them temperate?
Certainly.
And they who do not act rightly act foolishly, and in acting thus are not temperate?
I agree, he said.
Then to act foolishly is the opposite of acting temperately?
He assented.
And foolish actions are done by folly, and temperate actions by temperance?
He agreed.
And that is done strongly which is done by strength, and that which is weakly done, by weakness?
He assented.
And that which is done with swiftness is done swiftly, and that which is done with slowness, slowly?
He assented again.
And that which is done in the same manner, is done by the same; and that which is done in an opposite manner by the opposite?
He agreed.
Once more, I said, is there anything beautiful?
Yes.
To which the only opposite is the ugly?
There is no other.
And is there anything good?
There is.
To which the only opposite is the evil?
There is no other.
And there is the acute in sound?
True.
To which the only opposite is the grave?
There is no other, he said, but that.
Then every opposite has one opposite only and no more?
He assented.
Then now, I said, let us recapitulate our admissions. First of all we admitted that everything has one opposite and not more than one?
We did so.
And we admitted also that what was done in opposite ways was done by opposites?
Yes.
And that which was done foolishly, as we further admitted, was done in the opposite way to that which was done temperately?
Yes.
And that which was done temperately was done by temperance, and that which was done foolishly by folly?
He agreed.
And that which is done in opposite ways is done by opposites?
Yes.
And one thing is done by temperance, and quite another thing by folly?
Yes.
And in opposite ways?
Certainly.
And therefore by opposites:—then folly is the opposite of temperance?
Clearly.
And do you remember that folly has already been acknowledged by us to be the opposite of wisdom?
He assented.
And we said that everything has only one opposite?
Yes.
Then,
ΣΩ. ἓν δὲ ἑνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι;—φημί.—πότερον οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, λύσωμεν τῶν λόγων; τὸ ἓν ἑνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, ἢ ἐκεῖνον ἐν ᾧ ἐλέγετο ἕτερον εἶναι σωφροσύνης σοφία, μόριον δὲ ἑκάτερον ἀρετῆς, καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια; πότερον οὖν δὴ λύσωμεν; οὗτοι γὰρ οἱ λόγοι ἀμφότεροι οὐ πάνυ μουσικῶς λέγονται· οὐ γὰρ συνᾴδουσιν οὐδὲ συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλοις. πῶς γὰρ ἂν συνᾴδοιεν, εἴπερ γε ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ μὲν ἓν μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείοσιν δὲ μή, τῇ δὲ ἀφροσύνῃ ἑνὶ ὄντι σοφία ἐναντία καὶ σωφροσύνη αὖ φαίνεται· ἦ γάρ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἢ ἄλλως πως;—ὡμολόγησεν καὶ μάλʼ ἀκόντως.—οὐκοῦν ἓν ἂν εἴη ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ σοφία; τὸ δὲ πρότερον αὖ ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ὁσιότης σχεδόν τι ταὐτὸν ὄν. ἴθι δή, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ ἀποκάμωμεν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ διασκεψώμεθα. ἆρά τίς σοι δοκεῖ ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος σωφρονεῖν, ὅτι ἀδικεῖ;—αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν, ἐπεὶ πολλοί γέ φασιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων.—πότερον οὖν πρὸς ἐκείνους τὸν λόγον ποιήσομαι, ἔφην, ἢ πρὸς σέ;—εἰ βούλει, ἔφη, πρὸς τοῦτον πρῶτον τὸν λόγον διαλέχθητι τὸν τῶν πολλῶν.—ἀλλʼ οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει, ἐὰν μόνον σύ γε ἀποκρίνῃ, εἴτʼ οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ταῦτα εἴτε μή· τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐξετάζω, συμβαίνει μέντοι ἴσως καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐξετάζεσθαι. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐκαλλωπίζετο ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας—τὸν γὰρ λόγον ᾐτιᾶτο δυσχερῆ εἶναι—ἔπειτα μέντοι συνεχώρησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.—ἴθι δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐξ ἀρχῆς μοι ἀπόκριναι. δοκοῦσί τινές σοι σωφρονεῖν ἀδικοῦντες;—ἔστω, ἔφη.—τὸ δὲ σωφρονεῖν λέγεις εὖ φρονεῖν;—ἔφη.—τὸ δʼ εὖ φρονεῖν εὖ βουλεύεσθαι, ὅτι ἀδικοῦσιν;—ἔστω, ἔφη.—πότερον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἰ εὖ πράττουσιν ἀδικοῦντες ἢ εἰ κακῶς;—εἰ εὖ.—λέγεις οὖν ἀγαθὰ ἄττα εἶναι;—λέγω.—ἆρʼ οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ταῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ ἅ ἐστιν ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; —καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δίʼ, ἔφη, κἂν μὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὠφέλιμα ᾖ, ἔγωγε καλῶ ἀγαθά.—καί μοι ἐδόκει ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἤδη τετραχύνθαι τε καὶ ἀγωνιᾶν καὶ παρατετάχθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι· ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἑώρων αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, εὐλαβούμενος ἠρέμα ἠρόμην.
Protagoras, which of the two assertions shall we renounce? One says that everything has but one opposite; the other that wisdom is distinct from temperance, and that both of them are parts of virtue; and that they are not only distinct, but dissimilar, both in themselves and in their functions, like the parts of a face. Which of these two assertions shall we renounce? For both of them together are certainly not in harmony; they do not accord or agree: for how can they be said to agree if everything is assumed to have only one opposite and not more than one, and yet folly, which is one, has clearly the two opposites—wisdom and temperance? Is not that true, Protagoras? What else would you say?
He assented, but with great reluctance.
Then temperance and wisdom are the same, as before justice and holiness appeared to us to be nearly the same. And now, Protagoras, I said, we must finish the enquiry, and not faint. Do you think that an unjust man can be temperate in his injustice?
I should be ashamed, Socrates, he said, to acknowledge this, which nevertheless many may be found to assert.
And shall I argue with them or with you? I replied.
I would rather, he said, that you should argue with the many first, if you will.
Whichever you please, if you will only answer me and say whether you are of their opinion or not. My object is to test the validity of the argument; and yet the result may be that I who ask and you who answer may both be put on our trial.
Protagoras at first made a show of refusing, as he said that the argument was not encouraging; at length, he consented to answer.
Now then, I said, begin at the beginning and answer me. You think that some men are temperate, and yet unjust?
Yes, he said; let that be admitted.
And temperance is good sense?
Yes.
And good sense is good counsel in doing injustice?
Granted.
If they succeed, I said, or if they do not succeed?
If they succeed.
And you would admit the existence of goods?
Yes.
And is the good that which is expedient for man?
Yes, indeed, he said: and there are some things which may be inexpedient, and yet I call them good.
I thought that Protagoras was getting ruffled and excited; he seemed to be setting himself in an attitude of war. Seeing this, I minded my business, and gently said:—
When you say, Protagoras, that things inexpedient are
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