ΦΑΙ. οὑτωσὶ περὶ τούτου ἀκήκοα, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, οὐκ εἶναι ἀνάγκην τῷ μέλλοντι ῥήτορι ἔσεσθαι τὰ τῷ ὄντι δίκαια μανθάνειν ἀλλὰ τὰ δόξαντʼ ἂν πλήθει οἵπερ δικάσουσιν, οὐδὲ τὰ ὄντως ἀγαθὰ ἢ καλὰ ἀλλʼ ὅσα δόξει· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων εἶναι τὸ πείθειν ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας.
ΣΩ. «οὔτοι ἀπόβλητον ἔπος» εἶναι δεῖ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ὃ ἂν εἴπωσι σοφοί, ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖν μή τι λέγωσι· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ νῦν λεχθὲν οὐκ ἀφετέον.
ΦΑΙ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις.
ΣΩ. ὧδε δὴ σκοπῶμεν αὐτό.
ΦΑΙ. πῶς;
ΣΩ. εἴ σε πείθοιμι ἐγὼ πολεμίους ἀμύνειν κτησάμενον ἵππον, ἄμφω δὲ ἵππον ἀγνοοῖμεν, τοσόνδε μέντοι τυγχάνοιμι εἰδὼς περὶ σοῦ, ὅτι Φαῖδρος ἵππον ἡγεῖται τὸ τῶν ἡμέρων ζῴων μέγιστα ἔχον ὦτα—
ΦΑΙ. γελοῖόν γʼ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴη.
ΣΩ. οὔπω γε· ἀλλʼ ὅτε δὴ σπουδῇ σε πείθοιμι, συντιθεὶς λόγον ἔπαινον κατὰ τοῦ ὄνου, ἵππον ἐπονομάζων καὶ λέγων ὡς παντὸς ἄξιον τὸ θρέμμα οἴκοι τε κεκτῆσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς, ἀποπολεμεῖν τε χρήσιμον καὶ πρός γʼ ἐνεγκεῖν δυνατὸν σκεύη καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ὠφέλιμον.
ΦΑΙ. παγγέλοιόν γʼ ἂν ἤδη εἴη.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ κρεῖττον γελοῖον καὶ φίλον ἢ δεινόν τε καὶ ἐχθρὸν [εἶναι ἢ φίλον];
ΦΑΙ. φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. ὅταν οὖν ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀγνοῶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, λαβὼν πόλιν ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν πείθῃ, μὴ περὶ ὄνου σκιᾶς ὡς ἵππου τὸν ἔπαινον ποιούμενος, ἀλλὰ περὶ κακοῦ ὡς ἀγαθοῦ, δόξας δὲ πλήθους μεμελετηκὼς πείσῃ κακὰ πράττειν ἀντʼ ἀγαθῶν, ποῖόν τινʼ ἂν οἴει μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν ῥητορικὴν καρπὸν ὧν ἔσπειρε θερίζειν;
ΦΑΙ. οὐ πάνυ γε ἐπιεικῆ.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν, ὦ ἀγαθέ, ἀγροικότερον τοῦ δέοντος λελοιδορήκαμεν τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην; ἡ δʼ ἴσως ἂν εἴποι· «τί ποτʼ, ὦ θαυμάσιοι, ληρεῖτε; ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐδένʼ ἀγνοοῦντα τἀληθὲς ἀναγκάζω μανθάνειν λέγειν, ἀλλʼ, εἴ τι ἐμὴ συμβουλή, κτησάμενον ἐκεῖνο οὕτως ἐμὲ λαμβάνειν· τόδε δʼ οὖν μέγα λέγω, ὡς ἄνευ ἐμοῦ τῷ τὰ ὄντα εἰδότι οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἔσται πείθειν τέχνῃ.»
ΦΑΙ. οὐκοῦν δίκαια ἐρεῖ, λέγουσα ταῦτα;
ΣΩ. φημί, ἐὰν οἵ γʼ ἐπιόντες αὐτῇ λόγοι μαρτυρῶσιν εἶναι τέχνῃ. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀκούειν δοκῶ τινων προσιόντων καὶ διαμαρτυρομένων λόγων, ὅτι ψεύδεται καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη ἀλλʼ ἄτεχνος τριβή· τοῦ δὲ λέγειν, φησὶν ὁ Λάκων, ἔτυμος τέχνη ἄνευ τοῦ ἀληθείας ἧφθαι οὔτʼ ἔστιν οὔτε μή ποτε ὕστερον γένηται.
Phaedrus. On that point, Socrates, I have heard that one who is to be an orator does not need to know what is really just, but what would seem just to the multitude who are to pass judgment, and not what is really good or noble, but what will seem to be so; for they say that persuasion comes from what seems to be true, not from the truth.
Socrates. Phaedrus, The word, which the wise speak must not be rejected, / but we must see if they are right; so we must not pass by this which you just said.
Phaedrus. You are right.
Socrates. Let us then examine it in this way.
Phaedrus. How?
Socrates. If I should urge you to buy a horse and fight against the invaders, and neither of us knew what a horse was, but I merely knew this about you, that Phaedrus thinks a horse is the one of the tame animals which has the longest ears—
Phaedrus. It would be ridiculous, Socrates.
Socrates. No, not yet; but if I tried to persuade you in all seriousness, composing a speech in praise of the ass, which I called a horse, and saying that the beast was a most valuable possession at home and in war, that you could use him as a mount in battle, and that he was able to carry baggage and was useful for many other purposes—
Phaedrus. Then it would be supremely ridiculous.
Socrates. But is it not better to be ridiculous than to be clever and an enemy?
Phaedrus. To be sure.
Socrates. Then when the orator who does not know what good and evil are undertakes to persuade a state which is equally ignorant, not by praising the shadow of an ass under the name of a horse, but by praising evil under the name of good, and having studied the opinions of the multitude persuades them to do evil instead of good, what harvest do you suppose his oratory will reap thereafter from the seed he has sown?
Phaedrus. No very good harvest.
Socrates. Well, do you think we have reproached the art of speaking too harshly? Perhaps she might say: “Why do you talk such nonsense, you strange men? I do not compel anyone to learn to speak without knowing the truth, but if my advice is of any value, he learns that first and then acquires me. So what I claim is this, that without my help the knowledge of the truth does not give the art of persuasion.”
Phaedrus. And will she be right in saying this?
Socrates. Yes, if the arguments that are coming against her testify that she is an art. For I seem, as it were, to hear some arguments approaching and protesting that she is lying and is not an art, but a craft devoid of art. A real art of speaking, says the Laconian, which does not seize hold of truth, does not exist and never will.
ΦΑΙ. τούτων δεῖ τῶν λόγων, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ δεῦρο αὐτοὺς παράγων ἐξέταζε τί καὶ πῶς λέγουσιν.
ΣΩ. πάριτε δή, θρέμματα γενναῖα, καλλίπαιδά τε Φαῖδρον πείθετε ὡς ἐὰν μὴ ἱκανῶς φιλοσοφήσῃ, οὐδὲ ἱκανός ποτε λέγειν ἔσται περὶ οὐδενός. ἀποκρινέσθω δὴ ὁ Φαῖδρος.
ΦΑΙ. ἐρωτᾶτε.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἂν εἴη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων, οὐ μόνον ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι δημόσιοι σύλλογοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις, ἡ αὐτὴ σμικρῶν τε καὶ μεγάλων πέρι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐντιμότερον τό γε ὀρθὸν περὶ σπουδαῖα ἢ περὶ φαῦλα γιγνόμενον; ἢ πῶς σὺ ταῦτʼ ἀκήκοας;
ΦΑΙ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δίʼ οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτως, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μέν πως περὶ τὰς δίκας λέγεταί τε καὶ γράφεται τέχνῃ, λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ δημηγορίας· ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ οὐκ ἀκήκοα.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἦ τὰς Νέστορος καὶ Ὀδυσσέως τέχνας μόνον περὶ λόγων ἀκήκοας, ἃς ἐν Ἰλίῳ σχολάζοντες συνεγραψάτην, τῶν δὲ Παλαμήδους ἀνήκοος γέγονας;
ΦΑΙ. καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δίʼ ἔγωγε τῶν Νέστορος, εἰ μὴ Γοργίαν Νέστορά τινα κατασκευάζεις, ἤ τινα Θρασύμαχόν τε καὶ Θεόδωρον Ὀδυσσέα.
ΣΩ. ἴσως. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τούτους ἐῶμεν· σὺ δʼ εἰπέ, ἐν δικαστηρίοις οἱ ἀντίδικοι τί δρῶσιν; οὐκ ἀντιλέγουσιν μέντοι; ἢ τί φήσομεν;
ΦΑΙ. τοῦτʼ αὐτό.
ΣΩ. περὶ τοῦ δικαίου τε καὶ ἀδίκου;
ΦΑΙ. ναί.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνῃ τοῦτο δρῶν ποιήσει φανῆναι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δίκαιον, ὅταν δὲ βούληται, ἄδικον;
ΦΑΙ. τί μήν;
ΣΩ. καὶ ἐν δημηγορίᾳ δὴ τῇ πόλει δοκεῖν τὰ αὐτὰ τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθά, τοτὲ δʼ αὖ τἀναντία;
ΦΑΙ. οὕτως.
ΣΩ. τὸν οὖν Ἐλεατικὸν Παλαμήδην λέγοντα οὐκ ἴσμεν τέχνῃ, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι τὰ αὐτὰ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια, καὶ ἓν καὶ πολλά, μένοντά τε αὖ καὶ φερόμενα;
ΦΑΙ. μάλα γε.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα μόνον περὶ δικαστήριά τέ ἐστιν ἡ ἀντιλογικὴ καὶ περὶ δημηγορίαν, ἀλλʼ, ὡς ἔοικε, περὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα μία τις τέχνη, εἴπερ ἔστιν, αὕτη ἂν εἴη, ᾗ τις οἷός τʼ ἔσται πᾶν παντὶ ὁμοιοῦν τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ οἷς δυνατόν, καὶ ἄλλου ὁμοιοῦντος καὶ ἀποκρυπτομένου εἰς φῶς ἄγειν.
ΦΑΙ. πῶς δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγεις;
ΣΩ. τῇδε δοκῶ ζητοῦσιν φανεῖσθαι. ἀπάτη πότερον ἐν πολὺ διαφέρουσι γίγνεται μᾶλλον ἢ ὀλίγον;
Phaedrus. We have need of these arguments, Socrates. Bring them here and examine their words and their meaning.
Socrates. Come here, then, noble creatures, and persuade the fair young Phaedrus that unless he pay proper attention to philosophy he will never be able to speak properly about anything. And let Phaedrus answer.
Phaedrus. Ask your questions.
Socrates. Is not rhetoric in its entire nature an art which leads the soul by means of words, not only in law courts and the various other public assemblages, but in private companies as well? And is it not the same when concerned with small things as with great, and, properly speaking, no more to be esteemed in important than in trifling matters? Is this what you have heard?
Phaedrus. No, by Zeus, not that exactly; but the art of speaking and writing is exercised chiefly in lawsuits, and that of speaking also in public assemblies; and I never heard of any further uses.
Socrates. Then you have heard only of the treatises on rhetoric by Nestor and Odysseus, which they wrote when they had nothing to do at Troy, and you have not heard of that by Palamedes?
Phaedrus. Nor of Nestor’s either, unless you are disguising Gorgias under the name of Nestor and Thrasymachus or Theodorus under that of Odysseus.
Socrates. Perhaps I am. However, never mind them; but tell me, what do the parties in a lawsuit do in court? Do they not contend in speech, or what shall we say they do?
Phaedrus. Exactly that.
Socrates. About the just and the unjust?
Phaedrus. Yes.
Socrates. Then he whose speaking is an art will make the same thing appear to the same persons at one time just and at another, if he wishes, unjust?
Phaedrus. Certainly.
Socrates. And in political speaking he will make the same things seem to the State at one time good and at another the opposite?
Phaedrus. Just so.
Socrates. Do we not know that the Eleatic Palamedes (Zeno) has such an art of speaking that the same things appear to his hearers to be alike and unlike, one and many, stationary and in motion?
Phaedrus. Certainly.
Socrates. Then the art of contention in speech is not confined to courts and political gatherings, but apparently, if it is an art at all, it would be one and the same in all kinds of speaking, the art by which a man will be able to produce a resemblance between all things between which it can be produced, and to bring to the light the resemblances produced and disguised by anyone else.
Phaedrus. What do you mean by that?
Socrates. I think it will be plain if we examine the matter in this way. Is deception easier when there is much difference between things or when there is little?
ΦΑΙ. ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγον.
ΣΩ. ἀλλά γε δὴ κατὰ σμικρὸν μεταβαίνων μᾶλλον λήσεις ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ κατὰ μέγα.
ΦΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ΣΩ. δεῖ ἄρα τὸν μέλλοντα ἀπατήσειν μὲν ἄλλον, αὐτὸν δὲ μὴ ἀπατήσεσθαι, τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ἀκριβῶς διειδέναι.
ΦΑΙ. ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν οἷός τε ἔσται, ἀλήθειαν ἀγνοῶν ἑκάστου, τὴν τοῦ ἀγνοουμένου ὁμοιότητα σμικράν τε καὶ μεγάλην ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις διαγιγνώσκειν;
ΦΑΙ. ἀδύνατον.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῖς παρὰ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζουσι καὶ ἀπατωμένοις δῆλον ὡς τὸ πάθος τοῦτο διʼ ὁμοιοτήτων τινῶν εἰσερρύη.
ΦΑΙ. γίγνεται γοῦν οὕτως.
ΣΩ. ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως τεχνικὸς ἔσται μεταβιβάζειν κατὰ σμικρὸν διὰ τῶν ὁμοιοτήτων ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος ἑκάστοτε ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον ἀπάγων, ἢ αὐτὸς τοῦτο διαφεύγειν, ὁ μὴ ἐγνωρικὼς ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων;
ΦΑΙ. οὐ μή ποτε.
ΣΩ. λόγων ἄρα τέχνην, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν μὴ εἰδώς, δόξας δὲ τεθηρευκώς, γελοίαν τινά, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἄτεχνον παρέξεται.
ΦΑΙ. κινδυνεύει.
ΣΩ. βούλει οὖν ἐν τῷ Λυσίου λόγῳ ὃν φέρεις, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡμεῖς εἴπομεν ἰδεῖν τι ὧν φαμεν ἀτέχνων τε καὶ ἐντέχνων εἶναι;
ΦΑΙ. πάντων γέ που μάλιστα, ὡς νῦν γε ψιλῶς πως λέγομεν, οὐκ ἔχοντες ἱκανὰ παραδείγματα.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν κατὰ τύχην γέ τινα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐρρηθήτην τὼ λόγω ἔχοντέ τι παράδειγμα, ὡς ἂν ὁ εἰδὼς τὸ ἀληθὲς προσπαίζων ἐν λόγοις παράγοι τοὺς ἀκούοντας. καὶ ἔγωγε, ὦ Φαῖδρε, αἰτιῶμαι τοὺς ἐντοπίους θεούς· ἴσως δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Μουσῶν προφῆται οἱ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ᾠδοὶ ἐπιπεπνευκότες ἂν ἡμῖν εἶεν τοῦτο τὸ γέρας· οὐ γάρ που ἔγωγε τέχνης τινὸς τοῦ λέγειν μέτοχος.
ΦΑΙ. ἔστω ὡς λέγεις· μόνον δήλωσον ὃ φῄς.
ΣΩ. ἴθι δή μοι ἀνάγνωθι τὴν τοῦ Λυσίου λόγου ἀρχήν.
ΦΑΙ. «περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὡς νομίζω συμφέρειν ἡμῖν τούτων γενομένων, ἀκήκοας. ἀξιῶ δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀτυχῆσαι ὧν δέομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐραστὴς ὢν σοῦ τυγχάνω. ὡς ἐκείνοις μὲν τότε μεταμέλει» —
ΣΩ. παῦσαι. τί δὴ οὖν οὗτος ἁμαρτάνει καὶ ἄτεχνον ποιεῖ λεκτέον· ἦ γάρ;
Phaedrus. When there is little.
Socrates. And if you make a transition by small steps from anything to its opposite you will be more likely to escape detection than if you proceed by leaps and bounds.
Phaedrus. Of course.
Socrates. Then he who is to deceive another, and is not to be deceived himself, must know accurately the similarity and dissimilarity of things.
Phaedrus. Yes, he must.
Socrates. Now will he be able, not knowing the truth about a given thing, to recognize in other things the great or small degree of likeness to that which he does not know?
Phaedrus. It is impossible.
Socrates. In the case, then, of those whose opinions are at variance with facts and who are deceived, this error evidently slips in through some resemblances.
Phaedrus. It does happen in that way.
Socrates. Then he who does not understand the real nature of things will not possess the art of making his hearers pass from one thing to its opposite by leading them through the intervening resemblances, or of avoiding such deception himself?
Phaedrus. Never in the world.
Socrates. Then, my friend, he who knows not the truth, but pursues opinions, will, it seems, attain an art of speech which is ridiculous, and not an art at all.
Phaedrus. Probably.
Socrates. Shall we look in the speech of Lysias, which you have with you, and in what I said, for something which we think shows art and the lack of art?
Phaedrus. By all means, for now our talk is too abstract, since we lack sufficient examples.
Socrates. And by some special good fortune, as it seems, the two discourses contain an example of the way in which one who knows the truth may lead his hearers on with sportive words; and I, Phaedrus, think the divinities of the place are the cause thereof; and perhaps too, the prophets of the Muses, who are singing above our heads, may have granted this boon to us by inspiration; at any rate, I possess no art of speaking.
Phaedrus. So be it; only make your meaning clear.
Socrates. Read me the beginning of Lysias’ discourse.
Phaedrus. You know what my condition is, and you have heard how I think it is to our advantage to arrange these matters. And I claim that I ought not to be refused what I ask because I am not your lover. For lovers repent of—
Socrates. Stop. Now we must tell what there is in this that is faulty and lacks art, must we not?
ΦΑΙ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ παντὶ δῆλον τό γε τοιόνδε, ὡς περὶ μὲν ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων ὁμονοητικῶς ἔχομεν, περὶ δʼ ἔνια στασιωτικῶς;
ΦΑΙ. δοκῶ μὲν ὃ λέγεις μανθάνειν, ἔτι δʼ εἰπὲ σαφέστερον.
ΣΩ. ὅταν τις ὄνομα εἴπῃ σιδήρου ἢ ἀργύρου, ἆρʼ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ πάντες διενοήθημεν;
ΦΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ ὅταν δικαίου ἢ ἀγαθοῦ; οὐκ ἄλλος ἄλλῃ φέρεται, καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς;
ΦΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς συμφωνοῦμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς οὔ.
ΦΑΙ. οὕτω.
ΣΩ. ποτέρωθι οὖν εὐαπατητότεροί ἐσμεν, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐν ποτέροις μεῖζον δύναται;
ΦΑΙ. δῆλον ὅτι ἐν οἷς πλανώμεθα.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸν μέλλοντα τέχνην ῥητορικὴν μετιέναι πρῶτον μὲν δεῖ ταῦτα ὁδῷ διῃρῆσθαι, καὶ εἰληφέναι τινὰ χαρακτῆρα ἑκατέρου τοῦ εἴδους, ἐν ᾧ τε ἀνάγκη τὸ πλῆθος πλανᾶσθαι καὶ ἐν ᾧ μή.
ΦΑΙ. καλὸν γοῦν ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἶδος εἴη κατανενοηκὼς ὁ τοῦτο λαβών.
ΣΩ. ἔπειτά γε οἶμαι πρὸς ἑκάστῳ γιγνόμενον μὴ λανθάνειν ἀλλʼ ὀξέως αἰσθάνεσθαι περὶ οὗ ἂν μέλλῃ ἐρεῖν ποτέρου ὂν τυγχάνει τοῦ γένους.
ΦΑΙ. τί μήν;
ΣΩ. τί οὖν; τὸν ἔρωτα πότερον φῶμεν εἶναι τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων ἢ τῶν μή;
ΦΑΙ. τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων δήπου· ἢ οἴει ἄν σοι ἐγχωρῆσαι εἰπεῖν ἃ νυνδὴ εἶπες περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς βλάβη τέ ἐστι τῷ ἐρωμένῳ καὶ ἐρῶντι, καὶ αὖθις ὡς μέγιστον ὂν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τυγχάνει;
ΣΩ. ἄριστα λέγεις· ἀλλʼ εἰπὲ καὶ τόδε—ἐγὼ γάρ τοι διὰ τὸ ἐνθουσιαστικὸν οὐ πάνυ μέμνημαι—εἰ ὡρισάμην ἔρωτα ἀρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου.
ΦΑΙ. νὴ Δία ἀμηχάνως γε ὡς σφόδρα.
ΣΩ. φεῦ, ὅσῳ λέγεις τεχνικωτέρας Νύμφας τὰς Ἀχελῴου καὶ Πᾶνα τὸν Ἑρμοῦ Λυσίου τοῦ Κεφάλου πρὸς λόγους εἶναι. ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Λυσίας ἀρχόμενος τοῦ ἐρωτικοῦ ἠνάγκασεν ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν ἔρωτα ἕν τι τῶν ὄντων ὃ αὐτὸς ἐβουλήθη, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἤδη συνταξάμενος πάντα τὸν ὕστερον λόγον διεπεράνατο; βούλει πάλιν ἀναγνῶμεν τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ;
ΦΑΙ. εἰ σοί γε δοκεῖ· ὃ μέντοι ζητεῖς οὐκ ἔστʼ αὐτόθι.
ΣΩ. λέγε, ἵνα ἀκούσω αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου.
Phaedrus. Yes.
Socrates. It is clear to everyone that we are in accord about some matters of this kind and at variance about others, is it not?
Phaedrus. I think I understand your meaning, but express it still more clearly.
Socrates. When one says “iron” or “silver,” we all understand the same thing, do we not?
Phaedrus. Surely.
Socrates. What if he says “justice” or “goodness”? Do we not part company, and disagree with each other and with ourselves?
Phaedrus. Certainly.
Socrates. Then in some things we agree and in others we do not.
Phaedrus. True.
Socrates. Then in which of the two are we more easy to deceive, and in which has rhetoric the greater power?
Phaedrus. Evidently in the class of doubtful things.
Socrates. Then he who is to develop an art of rhetoric must first make a methodical division and acquire a clear impression of each class, that in which people must be in doubt and that in which they are not.
Phaedrus. He who has acquired that would have conceived an excellent principle.
Socrates. Then I think when he has to do with a particular case, he will not be ignorant, but will know clearly to which of the two classes the thing belongs about which he is to speak.
Phaedrus. Of course.
Socrates. Well then, to which does Love belong? To the doubtful things or the others?
Phaedrus. To the doubtful, surely; if he did not, do you think he would have let you say what you said just now about him, that he is an injury to the beloved and to the lover, and again that he is the greatest of blessings?
Socrates. Excellent. But tell me this—for I was in such an ecstasy that I have quite forgotten—whether I defined love in the beginning of my discourse.
Phaedrus. Yes, by Zeus, and wonderfully well.
Socrates. Oh, how much more versed the nymphs, daughters of Achelous, and Pan, son of Hermes, are in the art of speech than Lysias, son of Cephalus! Or am I wrong, and did Lysias also, in the beginning of his discourse on Love, compel us to suppose Love to be some one thing which he chose to consider it, and did he then compose and finish his discourse with that in view? Shall we read the beginning of it again?
Phaedrus. If you like; but what you seek is not in it.
Socrates. Read, that I may hear Lysias himself.
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