ΚΛ. οὐκοῦν τό γʼ ἡμέτερον, ὦ ξένε, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη πάλαι τιθέμενον; πρὸς γὰρ ἓν ἔφαμεν δεῖν ἀεὶ πάνθʼ ἡμῖν τὰ τῶν νόμων βλέποντʼ εἶναι, τοῦτο δʼ ἀρετήν που συνεχωροῦμεν πάνυ ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι.
ΑΘ. ναί.
ΚΛ. τὴν δέ γε ἀρετὴν τέτταρα ἔθεμέν που.
ΑΘ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΚΛ. νοῦν δέ γε πάντων τούτων ἡγεμόνα, πρὸς ὃν δὴ τά τε ἄλλα πάντα καὶ τούτων τὰ τρία δεῖ βλέπειν.
ΑΘ. κάλλιστʼ ἐπακολουθεῖς, ὦ Κλεινία. καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ συνακολούθει. νοῦν γὰρ δὴ κυβερνητικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὸν καὶ στρατηγικὸν εἴπομεν εἰς τὸ ἓν ἐκεῖνο οἷ δεῖ βλέπειν, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ἐλέγχοντες ἐνταῦθʼ ἐσμὲν νῦν, καὶ καθάπερ ἄνθρωπον ἐπανερωτῶντες εἴποιμεν ἄν· «ὦ θαυμάσιε, σὺ δὲ δὴ ποῖ σκοπεῖς; τί ποτʼ ἐκεῖνό ἐστι τὸ ἕν, ὃ δὴ σαφῶς ὁ μὲν ἰατρικὸς νοῦς ἔχει φράζειν, σὺ δʼ ὢν δὴ διαφέρων, ὡς φαίης ἄν, πάντων τῶν ἐμφρόνων, οὐχ ἕξεις εἰπεῖν;» ἢ σύ γε, Μέγιλλε καὶ Κλεινία, ἔχετον διαρθροῦντες ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ φράζειν πρὸς ἐμὲ τί ποτέ φατε εἶναι τοῦτο, καθάπερ ὑπὲρ ἄλλων ἐγὼ πρὸς ὑμᾶς συχνῶν διωριζόμην;
ΚΛ. οὐδαμῶς, ὦ ξένε.
ΑΘ. τί δʼ ὅτι δεῖ προθυμεῖσθαί τε συνιδεῖν αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν οἷς;
ΚΛ. οἷον ἐν τίσι λέγεις;
ΑΘ. οἷον ὅτε τέτταρα ἐφήσαμεν ἀρετῆς εἴδη γεγονέναι, δῆλον ὡς ἓν ἕκαστον ἀνάγκη φάναι, τεττάρων γε ὄντων.
ΚΛ. τί μήν;
ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν ἕν γε ἅπαντα ταῦτα προσαγορεύομεν. ἀνδρείαν γάρ φαμεν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἀρετήν, καὶ τὰ δύο τἆλλα, ὡς ὄντως ὄντα οὐ πολλὰ ἀλλʼ ἓν τοῦτο μόνον, ἀρετήν.
ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΑΘ. ἧι μὲν τοίνυν διαφέρετον αὐτοῖν τούτω τὼ δύο καὶ δύʼ ὀνόματα ἐλαβέτην καὶ τἆλλα, οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν· ᾗ δὲ ἓν ἀμφοῖν ἐπωνομάσαμεν, ἀρετήν, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὐκ εὐπετὲς ἔτι.
ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;
ΑΘ. οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν ὃ λέγω δηλῶσαι. διανειμώμεθα γὰρ ἀλλήλοις τὴν ἐρώτησιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν.
ΚΛ. πῶς αὖ φράζεις;
ΑΘ. ἐρώτησόν με τί ποτε ἓν προσαγορεύοντες ἀρετὴν ἀμφότερα, δύο πάλιν αὐτὰ προσείπομεν, τὸ μὲν ἀνδρείαν, τὸ δὲ φρόνησιν. ἐρῶ γάρ σοι τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅτι τὸ μέν ἐστιν περὶ φόβον, οὗ καὶ τὰ θηρία μετέχει, τῆς ἀνδρείας, καὶ τά γε τῶν παίδων ἤθη τῶν πάνυ νέων· ἄνευ γὰρ λόγου καὶ φύσει γίγνεται ἀνδρεία ψυχή, ἄνευ δὲ αὖ λόγου ψυχὴ φρόνιμός τε καὶ νοῦν ἔχουσα οὔτʼ ἐγένετο πώποτε οὔτʼ ἔστιν οὐδʼ αὖθίς ποτε γενήσεται, ὡς ὄντος ἑτέρου.
ΚΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Clin. Then, Stranger, was not the view we stated long ago the right one? We said that all our laws must always aim at one single object, which, as we agreed, is quite rightly named “virtue.”
Ath. Yes.
Clin. And we stated that virtue consists of four things.
Ath. Certainly.
Clin. And that the chief of all the four is reason, at which the other three, as well as everything else, should aim.
Ath. You follow us admirably, Clinias; and now follow us in what comes next. In the case of the pilot, the doctor, and the general, reason is directed, as we said, towards the one object of aim which is proper in each case; and now we are at the point of examining reason in the case of a statesman, and, addressing it as a man, we shall question it thus:—“O admirable sir, what is your aim? Medical reason is able to state clearly the one single object at which it aims; so will you be unable to state your one object—you who are superior, as perhaps you will say, to all the wise?” Can you two, Megillus and Clinias, define that object on his behalf, and tell me what you say it is, just as I, on behalf of many others, defined their objects for you?
Clin. We are totally unable to do so.
Ath. Well then, can you declare that we need zeal in discerning both the object itself as a whole and the forms it assumes?
Clin. Illustrate what you mean by “the forms” you speak of.
Ath. For example, when we said that there are four forms of virtue, obviously, since there are four, we must assert that each is a separate one.
Clin. Certainly.
Ath. And yet we call them all by one name: we assert that courage is virtue, and wisdom virtue, and the other two likewise, as though they were really not a plurality, but solely this one thing—virtue.
Clin. Very true.
Ath. Now it is not hard to explain wherein these two (and the rest) differ from one another, and how they have got two names; but to explain why we have given the one name “virtue” to both of them (and to the rest) is no longer an easy matter.
Clin. How do you mean?
Ath. It is not hard to make clear my meaning. Let one of us adopt the role of questioner, the other of answerer.
Clin. In what way?
Ath. Do you ask me this question—why, when calling both the two by the single name of “virtue,” did we again speak of them as two—courage and wisdom? Then I shall tell you the reason,—which is, that the one of them has to do with fear, namely courage, in which beasts also share, and the characters of very young children; for a courageous soul comes into existence naturally and without reasoning, but without reasoning there never yet came into existence, and there does not nor ever will exist, a soul that is wise and rational, it being a distinct kind.
Clin. That is true.
ΑΘ. ἧι μὲν τοίνυν ἐστὸν διαφόρω καὶ δύο, σὺ παρʼ ἐμοῦ ἀπείληφας τῷ λόγῳ· ᾗ δὲ ἓν καὶ ταὐτόν, σὺ πάλιν ἀπόδος ἐμοί. διανοοῦ δὲ ὡς ἐρῶν καὶ ὅπῃ τέτταρα ὄντα ἕν ἐστι, καὶ ἐμὲ δὲ ἀξίου, σοῦ δείξαντος ὡς ἕν, πάλιν ὅπῃ τέτταρα. καὶ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο σκοπῶμεν τὸν εἰδότα ἱκανῶς περὶ ὡντινωνοῦν οἷς ἔστιν μὲν ὄνομα, ἔστιν δὲ αὖ καὶ λόγος, πότερον μόνον ἐπίστασθαι τοὔνομα χρεών, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀγνοεῖν, ἢ τόν γε ὄντα τι καὶ περὶ τῶν διαφερόντων μεγέθει τε καὶ κάλλει πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγνοεῖν αἰσχρόν.
ΚΛ. ἔοικεν γοῦν.
ΑΘ. μεῖζον δή τι νομοθέτῃ τε καὶ νομοφύλακι, καὶ ὃς ἀρετῇ πάντων διαφέρειν οἴεται καὶ νικητήρια τούτων αὐτῶν εἴληφεν, ἢ ταῦτα αὐτὰ περὶ ὧν νῦν λέγομεν, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, φρόνησις;
ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς;
ΑΘ. τούτων δὴ πέρι τοὺς ἐξηγητάς, τοὺς διδασκάλους, τοὺς νομοθέτας, τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς φύλακας, τῷ δεομένῳ γνῶναί τε καὶ εἰδέναι, ἢ τῷ δεομένῳ κολάζεσθαί τε καὶ ἐπιπλῆξαι ἁμαρτάνοντι, πότερον οὐ διδάσκοντα ἣν δύναμιν ἔχει κακία τε καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ πάντως δηλοῦντα, διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλʼ ἢ ποιητήν τινα ἐλθόντα εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἢ παιδευτὴν νέων φάσκοντʼ εἶναι βελτίω φαίνεσθαι τοῦ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν νενικηκότος; εἶτα ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πόλει ὅπου μὴ λόγῳ ἔργῳ τε ἱκανοὶ φύλακες εἶεν, ἀρετῆς πέρι γιγνώσκοντες ἱκανῶς, θαυμαστόν τι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν ἀφύλακτον οὖσαν πάσχειν ἃ πολλαὶ πάσχουσι τῶν νῦν πόλεων;
ΚΛ. οὐδέν γε, ὡς εἰκός.
ΑΘ. τί οὖν; ὃ λέγομεν νῦν ποιητέον ἡμῖν, ἢ πῶς; τοὺς φύλακας ἀκριβεστέρους τῶν πολλῶν περὶ ἀρετῆς ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ κατασκευαστέον; ἢ τίνα τρόπον τῇ τῶν ἐμφρόνων κεφαλῇ τε καὶ αἰσθήσεσιν ὁμοιωθήσεται ἡμῖν ἡ πόλις, ὡς τοιαύτην τινὰ φυλακὴν κεκτημένη ἐν αὑτῇ;
ΚΛ. πῶς οὖν δὴ καὶ τίνα τρόπον, ὦ ξένε, ἀπεικάζοντες αὐτὸ τοιούτῳ τινὶ λέγομεν;
ΑΘ. δῆλον ὡς αὐτῆς μὲν τῆς πόλεως οὔσης τοῦ κύτους, τῶν δὲ φυλάκων τοὺς μὲν νέους οἷον ἐν ἄκρᾳ κορυφῇ, ἀπειλεγμένους τοὺς εὐφυεστάτους, ὀξύτητας ἐν πάσῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντας, περὶ ὅλην κύκλῳ τὴν πόλιν ὁρᾶν,
Ath. Wherein they differ and are two you have now learnt from my reply. So do you, in turn, inform me how it is that they are one and identical. Imagine you are also going to tell me how it is that, though four, they are yet one; and then, after you have shown me how they are one, do you again ask me how they are four. And after that, let us enquire regarding the person who has full knowledge of any objects which possess both a name and a definition, whether he ought to know the name only, and not know the definition, or whether it is not a shameful thing for a man worth anything to be ignorant of all these points in regard to matters of surpassing beauty and importance.
Clin. It would certainly seem to be so.
Ath. For the lawgiver and the Law-warden, and for him who thinks he surpasses all men in virtue and who has won prizes for just such qualities, is there anything more important than these very qualities with which we are now dealing—courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom?
Clin. Impossible.
Ath. In regard to these matters, is it not right that the interpreters, the teachers, the lawgivers, as the wardens of the rest, in dealing with him that requires knowledge and information, or with him that requires punishment and reproof for his sin, should excel all others in the art of instructing him in the quality of vice and virtue and exhibiting it fully? Or is some poet who comes into the State, or one who calls himself a trainer of youth, to be accounted evidently superior to him that has won prizes for all the virtues? In a State like that, where there are no wardens who are competent both in word and deed, and possessed of a competent knowledge of virtue,—is it surprising, I ask, if such a State, all unwarded as it is, suffers the same fate as do many of the States which exist today?
Clin. Not at all, I should say.
Ath. Well then, must we do what we now propose, or what? Must we contrive how our wardens shall have a more accurate grasp of virtue, both in word and deed, than the majority of men? For otherwise, how shall our State resemble a wise man’s head and senses, on the ground that it possesses within itself a similar kind of wardenship?
Clin. What is this resemblance we speak of and wherein does it consist?
Ath. Evidently we are comparing the State itself to the skull; and, of the wardens, the younger ones, who are selected as the most intelligent and nimble in every part of their souls, are set, as it were, like the eyes, in the top of the head, and survey the State all round;
ΑΘ. φρουροῦντας δὲ παραδιδόναι μὲν τὰς αἰσθήσεις ταῖς μνήμαις, τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις δὲ ἐξαγγέλους γίγνεσθαι πάντων τῶν κατὰ πόλιν, τοὺς δὲ νῷ ἀπῃκασμένους τῷ πολλὰ καὶ ἄξια λόγου διαφερόντως φρονεῖν, τοὺς γέροντας, βουλεύεσθαι, καὶ ὑπηρέταις χρωμένους μετὰ συμβουλίας τοῖς νέοις, οὕτω δὴ κοινῇ σῴζειν ἀμφοτέρους ὄντως τὴν πόλιν ὅλην. πότερον οὕτω λέγομεν ἤ πως ἄλλως δεῖν κατασκευάζεσθαι; μῶν ὁμοίους πάντας κεκτημένους καὶ μὴ διηκριβωμένους ἔστιν οὓς τραφέντας τε καὶ πεπαιδευμένους;
ΚΛ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἀδύνατον.
ΑΘ. ἰτέον ἄρα ἐπί τινα ἀκριβεστέραν παιδείαν τῆς ἔμπροσθεν.
ΚΛ. ἴσως.
ΑΘ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἧς δὴ νῦν σχεδὸν ἐφηψάμεθα, τυγχάνοι ἂν οὖσα ἧς χρείαν ἔχομεν αὕτη;
ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ἐλέγομεν τόν γε πρὸς ἕκαστα ἄκρον δημιουργόν τε καὶ φύλακα μὴ μόνον δεῖν πρὸς τὰ πολλὰ βλέπειν δυνατὸν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἓν ἐπείγεσθαι γνῶναί τε, καὶ γνόντα πρὸς ἐκεῖνο συντάξασθαι πάντα συνορῶντα;
ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς.
ΑΘ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἀκριβεστέρα σκέψις θέα τε ἂν περὶ ὁτουοῦν ὁτῳοῦν γίγνοιτο ἢ τὸ πρὸς μίαν ἰδέαν ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἀνομοίων δυνατὸν εἶναι βλέπειν;
ΚΛ. ἴσως.
ΑΘ. οὐκ ἴσως, ἀλλʼ ὄντως, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ταύτης οὐκ ἔστιν σαφεστέρα μέθοδος ἀνθρώπων οὐδενί.
ΚΛ. σοὶ πιστεύων, ὦ ξένε, συγχωρῶ δή, καὶ ταύτῃ πορευώμεθα λέγοντες.
ΑΘ. ἀναγκαστέον ἄρʼ, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ τοὺς τῆς θείας πολιτείας ἡμῖν φύλακας ἀκριβῶς ἰδεῖν πρῶτον τί ποτε διὰ πάντων τῶν τεττάρων ταὐτὸν τυγχάνει, ὃ δή φαμεν ἔν τε ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἐν φρονήσει ἓν ὄν, ἀρετὴν ἑνὶ δικαίως ἂν ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεσθαι. τοῦτο, ὦ φίλοι, εἰ μὲν βουλόμεθα, τὰ νῦν οἷόνπερ σφόδρα πιέσαντες μὴ ἀνῶμεν, πρὶν ἂν ἱκανῶς εἴπωμεν τί ποτʼ ἔστιν εἰς ὃ βλεπτέον, εἴτε ὡς ἓν εἴτε ὡς ὅλον εἴτε ἀμφότερα εἴτε ὅπως ποτὲ πέφυκεν· ἢ τούτου διαφυγόντος ἡμᾶς, οἰόμεθά ποτε ἡμῖν ἱκανῶς ἕξειν τὰ πρὸς ἀρετήν, περὶ ἧς οὔτʼ εἰ πολλά ἐστʼ οὔτʼ εἰ τέτταρα οὔθʼ ὡς ἓν δυνατοὶ φράζειν ἐσόμεθα; οὔκουν ἐάν γε ἡμῖν συμβούλοις πειθώμεθα, ἄλλως δέ πως μηχανησόμεθα ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐγγεγονέναι τοῦθʼ ἡμῖν· εἰ δʼ ἄρα τὸ παράπαν δοκεῖ ἐᾶν, ὁρᾶν δὴ χρεών.
ΚΛ. ἥκιστα, νὴ τὸν ξένιον, ὦ ξένε, θεόν, ἐατέον που τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖς ἡμῖν ὀρθότατα λέγειν. ἀλλὰ δὴ πῶς τις τοῦτʼ ἂν μηχανῷτο;
Ath. and as they watch, they pass on their perceptions to the organs of memory,—that is, they report to the elder wardens all that goes on in the State,— while the old men, who are likened to the reason because of their eminent wisdom in many matters of importance, act as counsellors, and make use of the young men as ministers and colleagues also in their counsels, so that both these classes by their co-operation really effect the salvation of the whole State. Is this the way, or ought we to contrive some other? Should the State, do you think, have all its members equal instead of having some more highly trained and educated?
Clin. Nay, my good sir, that were impossible.
Ath. We must proceed, then, to expound a type of education that is higher than the one previously described.
Clin. I suppose so.
Ath. Will the type which we hinted at just now prove to be that which we require?
Clin. Certainly.
Ath. Did we not say that he who is a first-class craftsman or warden, in any department, must not only be able to pay regard to the many, but must be able also to press towards the One so as to discern it and, on discerning it, to survey and organize all the rest with a single eye to it?
Clin. Quite right.
Ath. Can any man get an accurate vision and view of any object better than by being able to look from the many and dissimilar to the one unifying form?
Clin. Probably not.
Ath. It is certain, my friend, rather than probable, that no man can possibly have a clearer method than this.
Clin. I believe you, Stranger, and I assent; so let us employ this method in our subsequent discourse.
Ath. Naturally we must compel the wardens also of our divine polity to observe accurately, in the first place, what that identical element is which pervades all the four virtues, and which,—since it exists as a unity in courage, temperance, justice and wisdom,— may justly be called, as we assert, by the single name of “virtue.” This element, my friends, we must now (if we please) hold very tight, and not let go until we have adequately explained the essential nature of the object to be aimed at—whether, that is, it exists by nature as a unity, or as a whole, or as both, or in some other way. Else, if this eludes us, can we possibly suppose that we shall adequately grasp the nature of virtue, when we are unable to state whether it is many or four or one? Accordingly, if we follow our own counsel, we shall contrive somehow, by hook or by crook, that this knowledge shall exist in our State. Should we decide, however, to pass it over entirely—pass it over we must.
Clin. Nay, Stranger, in the name of the Stranger’s God, we must by no means pass over a matter such as this, since what you say seems to us most true. But how is this to be contrived?
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