Plato · Republic Πολιτεία

Plato, Republic 565a–569c: Book VIII: From the people's champion to the tyrant; the tyrant's guards and the people's mistake

Socrates describes democracy as having three classes, the drones, the rich who are plundered, and the people, and says that the people choose a champion and make him great, and the champion turns to tyrant when he first tastes kindred blood, as in the legend of the shrine of Lycaean Zeus in Arcadia, where he who tastes the human entrails becomes a wolf. He accuses men, exiles them, and cancels debts and divides land, until he is forced either to perish or to become a wolf, and like the man in the oracle to Croesus, he flees by the pebble-strewn Hermos. He asks for a bodyguard, and when he has secured it he drives out or kills his former friends and the brave, and keeps up wars so that the people need a leader. The people will find that the creature they have bred will expel his father's friends, and the demos, in trying to escape the smoke of free men's slavery, will fall into the fire of slaves' tyranny.

Sections 565a–569c · 1980 words · click a number to copy its link

δῆμος δʼ ἂν εἴη τρίτον γένος, ὅσοι αὐτουργοί τε καὶ ἀπράγμονες, οὐ πάνυ πολλὰ κεκτημένοι· ὃ δὴ πλεῖστόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ ὅτανπερ ἁθροισθῇ. ἔστιν γάρ, ἔφη· ἀλλʼ οὐ θαμὰ ἐθέλει ποιεῖν τοῦτο, ἐὰν μὴ μέλιτός τι μεταλαμβάνῃ. οὐκοῦν μεταλαμβάνει, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀεί, καθʼ ὅσον δύνανται οἱ προεστῶτες, τοὺς ἔχοντας τὴν οὐσίαν ἀφαιρούμενοι, διανέμοντες τῷ δήμῳ, τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτοὶ ἔχειν. μεταλαμβάνει γὰρ οὖν, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὕτως. ἀναγκάζονται δὴ οἶμαι ἀμύνεσθαι, λέγοντές τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ πράττοντες ὅπῃ δύνανται, οὗτοι ὧν ἀφαιροῦνται. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; αἰτίαν δὴ ἔσχον ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων, κἂν μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσι νεωτερίζειν, ὡς ἐπιβουλεύουσι τῷ δήμῳ καί εἰσιν ὀλιγαρχικοί. τί μήν; οὐκοῦν καὶ τελευτῶντες, ἐπειδὰν ὁρῶσι τὸν δῆμον, οὐχ ἑκόντα ἀλλʼ ἀγνοήσαντά τε καὶ ἐξαπατηθέντα ὑπὸ τῶν διαβαλλόντων, ἐπιχειροῦντα σφᾶς ἀδικεῖν, τότʼ ἤδη, εἴτε βούλονται εἴτε μή, ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀλιγαρχικοὶ γίγνονται, οὐχ ἑκόντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ κακὸν ἐκεῖνος ὁ κηφὴν ἐντίκτει κεντῶν αὐτούς. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. εἰσαγγελίαι δὴ καὶ κρίσεις καὶ ἀγῶνες περὶ ἀλλήλων γίγνονται. καὶ μάλα. οὐκοῦν ἕνα τινὰ ἀεὶ δῆμος εἴωθεν διαφερόντως προΐστασθαι ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τοῦτον τρέφειν τε καὶ αὔξειν μέγαν; εἴωθε γάρ. τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, δῆλον, ὅτι, ὅτανπερ φύηται τύραννος, ἐκ προστατικῆς ῥίζης καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἐκβλαστάνει. καὶ μάλα δῆλον. τίς ἀρχὴ οὖν μεταβολῆς ἐκ προστάτου ἐπὶ τύραννον; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἐπειδὰν ταὐτὸν ἄρξηται δρᾶν ὁ προστάτης τῷ ἐν τῷ μύθῳ ὃς περὶ τὸ ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ τὸ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Λυκαίου ἱερὸν λέγεται; τίς; ἔφη. ὡς ἄρα ὁ γευσάμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχνου, ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλων ἱερείων ἑνὸς ἐγκατατετμημένου, ἀνάγκη δὴ τούτῳ λύκῳ γενέσθαι. ἢ οὐκ ἀκήκοας τὸν λόγον; ἔγωγε.

“And the third class, composing the ‘people,’ would comprise all quiet cultivators of their own farms who possess little property. This is the largest and most potent group in a democracy when it meets in assembly.” “Yes, it is,” he said, “but it will not often do that, unless it gets a share of the honey.” “Well, does it not always share,” I said, “to the extent that the men at the head find it possible, in distributing to the people what they take from the well-to-do, to keep the lion’s share for themselves?” “Why, yes,” he said, “it shares in that sense.” “And so, I suppose, those who are thus plundered are compelled to defend themselves by speeches in the assembly and any action in their power.” “Of course.” “And thereupon the charge is brought against them by the other party, though they may have no revolutionary designs, that they are plotting against the people, and it is said that they are oligarchs.” “Surely.” “And then finally, when they see the people, not of its own will but through misapprehension, and being misled by the calumniators, attempting to wrong them, why then, whether they wish it or not, they become in very deed oligarchs, not willingly, but this evil too is engendered by those drones which sting them.” “Precisely.” “And then there ensue impeachments and judgements and lawsuits on either side.” “Yes, indeed.” “And is it not always the way of a demos to put forward one man as its special champion and protector and cherish and magnify him?” “Yes, it is.” “This, then, is plain,” said I, “that when a tyrant arises he sprouts from a protectorate root and from nothing else.” “Very plain.” “What, then, is the starting-point of the transformation of a protector into a tyrant? Is it not obviously when the protector’s acts begin to reproduce the legend that is told of the shrine of Lycaean Zeus in Arcadia?” “What is that?” he said. “The story goes that he who tastes of the one bit of human entrails minced up with those of other victims is inevitably transformed into a wolf. Have you not heard the tale?” “I have.”

ἆρʼ οὖν οὕτω καὶ ὃς ἂν δήμου προεστώς, λαβὼν σφόδρα πειθόμενον ὄχλον, μὴ ἀπόσχηται ἐμφυλίου αἵματος, ἀλλʼ ἀδίκως ἐπαιτιώμενος, οἷα δὴ φιλοῦσιν, εἰς δικαστήρια ἄγων μιαιφονῇ, βίον ἀνδρὸς ἀφανίζων, γλώττῃ τε καὶ στόματι ἀνοσίῳ γευόμενος φόνου συγγενοῦς, καὶ ἀνδρηλατῇ καὶ ἀποκτεινύῃ καὶ ὑποσημαίνῃ χρεῶν τε ἀποκοπὰς καὶ γῆς ἀναδασμόν, ἆρα τῷ τοιούτῳ ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ εἵμαρται ἢ ἀπολωλέναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἢ τυραννεῖν καὶ λύκῳ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου γενέσθαι; πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. οὗτος δή, ἔφην, ὁ στασιάζων γίγνεται πρὸς τοὺς ἔχοντας τὰς οὐσίας. οὗτος. ἆρʼ οὖν ἐκπεσὼν μὲν καὶ κατελθὼν βίᾳ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τύραννος ἀπειργασμένος κατέρχεται; δῆλον. ἐὰν δὲ ἀδύνατοι ἐκβάλλειν αὐτὸν ὦσιν ἢ ἀποκτεῖναι διαβάλλοντες τῇ πόλει, βιαίῳ δὴ θανάτῳ ἐπιβουλεύουσιν ἀποκτεινύναι λάθρᾳ. φιλεῖ γοῦν, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὕτω γίγνεσθαι. τὸ δὴ τυραννικὸν αἴτημα τὸ πολυθρύλητον ἐπὶ τούτῳ πάντες οἱ εἰς τοῦτο προβεβηκότες ἐξευρίσκουσιν, αἰτεῖν τὸν δῆμον φύλακάς τινας τοῦ σώματος, ἵνα σῶς αὐτοῖς ᾖ ὁ τοῦ δήμου βοηθός. καὶ μάλʼ, ἔφη. διδόασι δὴ οἶμαι δείσαντες μὲν ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου, θαρρήσαντες δὲ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν. καὶ μάλα. οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ὅταν ἴδῃ ἀνὴρ χρήματα ἔχων καὶ μετὰ τῶν χρημάτων αἰτίαν μισόδημος εἶναι, τότε δὴ οὗτος, ὦ ἑταῖρε, κατὰ τὸν Κροίσῳ γενόμενον χρησμὸν— […] πολυψήφιδα παρʼ Ἕρμον / φεύγει, οὐδὲ μένει, οὐδʼ αἰδεῖται κακὸς εἶναι. / οὐ γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, δεύτερον αὖθις αἰδεσθείη. ὁ δέ γε οἶμαι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καταληφθεὶς θανάτῳ δίδοται. ἀνάγκη. ὁ δὲ δὴ προστάτης ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸς δῆλον δὴ ὅτι μέγας μεγαλωστὶ οὐ κεῖται, ἀλλὰ καταβαλὼν ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἕστηκεν ἐν τῷ δίφρῳ τῆς πόλεως, τύραννος ἀντὶ προστάτου ἀποτετελεσμένος. τί δʼ οὐ μέλλει; ἔφη. διέλθωμεν δὴ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς πόλεως, ἐν ᾗ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος βροτὸς ἐγγένηται; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, διέλθωμεν. ἆρʼ οὖν, εἶπον, οὐ ταῖς μὲν πρώταις ἡμέραις τε καὶ χρόνῳ προσγελᾷ τε καὶ ἀσπάζεται πάντας, ᾧ ἂν περιτυγχάνῃ, καὶ οὔτε τύραννός φησιν εἶναι ὑπισχνεῖταί τε πολλὰ καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, χρεῶν τε ἠλευθέρωσε καὶ γῆν διένειμε δήμῳ τε καὶ τοῖς περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ πᾶσιν ἵλεώς τε καὶ πρᾷος εἶναι προσποιεῖται; ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. ὅταν δέ γε οἶμαι πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω ἐχθροὺς τοῖς μὲν καταλλαγῇ, τοὺς δὲ καὶ διαφθείρῃ, καὶ ἡσυχία ἐκείνων γένηται, πρῶτον μὲν πολέμους τινὰς ἀεὶ κινεῖ, ἵνʼ ἐν χρείᾳ ἡγεμόνος ὁ δῆμος ᾖ. εἰκός γε.

“And is it not true that in like manner a leader of the people who, getting control of a docile mob, does not withhold his hand from the shedding of tribal blood, but by the customary unjust accusations brings a citizen into court and assassinates him, blotting out a human life, and with unhallowed tongue and lips that have tasted kindred blood, banishes and slays and hints at the abolition of debts and the partition of lands—is it not the inevitable consequence and a decree of fate that such a one be either slain by his enemies or become a tyrant and be transformed from a man into a wolf?” “It is quite inevitable,” he said. “He it is,” I said, “who becomes the leader of faction against the possessors of property.” “Yes, he.” “May it not happen that he is driven into exile and, being restored in defiance of his enemies, returns a finished tyrant?” “Obviously.” “And if they are unable to expel him or bring about his death by calumniating him to the people, they plot to assassinate him by stealth.” “That is certainly wont to happen,” said he. “And thereupon those who have reached this stage devise that famous petition of the tyrant—to ask from the people a bodyguard to make their city safe for the friend of democracy.” “They do indeed,” he said. “And the people grant it, I suppose, fearing for him but unconcerned for themselves.” “Yes, indeed.” “And when he sees this, the man who has wealth and with his wealth the repute of hostility to democracy, then in the words of the oracle delivered to Croesus, By the pebble-strewn strand of the Hermos Swift is his flight, he stays not nor blushes to show the white feather. ” “No, for he would never get a second chance to blush.” “And he who is caught, methinks, is delivered to his death.” “Inevitably.” “And then obviously that protector does not lie prostrate, mighty with far-flung limbs, in Homeric overthrow, but overthrowing many others towers in the car of state transformed from a protector into a perfect and finished tyrant.” “What else is likely?” he said. “Shall we, then, portray the happiness,” said I, “of the man and the state in which such a creature arises?” “By all means let us describe it,” he said. “Then at the start and in the first days does he not smile upon all men and greet everybody he meets and deny that he is a tyrant, and promise many things in private and public, and having freed men from debts, and distributed lands to the people and his own associates, he affects a gracious and gentle manner to all?” “Necessarily,” he said. “But when, I suppose, he has come to terms with some of his exiled enemies and has got others destroyed and is no longer disturbed by them, in the first place he is always stirring up some war so that the people may be in need of a leader.” “That is likely.”

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἵνα χρήματα εἰσφέροντες πένητες γιγνόμενοι πρὸς τῷ καθʼ ἡμέραν ἀναγκάζωνται εἶναι καὶ ἧττον αὐτῷ ἐπιβουλεύωσι; δῆλον. καὶ ἄν γέ τινας οἶμαι ὑποπτεύῃ ἐλεύθερα φρονήματα ἔχοντας μὴ ἐπιτρέψειν αὐτῷ ἄρχειν, ὅπως ἂν τούτους μετὰ προφάσεως ἀπολλύῃ ἐνδοὺς τοῖς πολεμίοις; τούτων πάντων ἕνεκα τυράννῳ ἀεὶ ἀνάγκη πόλεμον ταράττειν; ἀνάγκη. ταῦτα δὴ ποιοῦντα ἕτοιμον μᾶλλον ἀπεχθάνεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; οὐκοῦν καί τινας τῶν συγκαταστησάντων καὶ ἐν δυνάμει ὄντων παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐπιπλήττοντας τοῖς γιγνομένοις, οἳ ἂν τυγχάνωσιν ἀνδρικώτατοι ὄντες; εἰκός γε. ὑπεξαιρεῖν δὴ τούτους πάντας δεῖ τὸν τύραννον, εἰ μέλλει ἄρξειν, ἕως ἂν μήτε φίλων μήτʼ ἐχθρῶν λίπῃ μηδένα ὅτου τι ὄφελος. δῆλον. ὀξέως ἄρα δεῖ ὁρᾶν αὐτὸν τίς ἀνδρεῖος, τίς μεγαλόφρων, τίς φρόνιμος, τίς πλούσιος· καὶ οὕτως εὐδαίμων ἐστίν, ὥστε τούτοις ἅπασιν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ, εἴτε βούλεται εἴτε μή, πολεμίῳ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιβουλεύειν, ἕως ἂν καθήρῃ τὴν πόλιν. καλόν γε, ἔφη, καθαρμόν. ναί, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τὸν ἐναντίον ἢ οἱ ἰατροὶ τὰ σώματα· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ χείριστον ἀφαιροῦντες λείπουσι τὸ βέλτιστον, ὁ δὲ τοὐναντίον. ὡς ἔοικε γάρ, αὐτῷ, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ ἄρξει. ἐν μακαρίᾳ ἄρα, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἀνάγκῃ δέδεται, ἣ προστάττει αὐτῷ ἢ μετὰ φαύλων τῶν πολλῶν οἰκεῖν, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μισούμενον, ἢ μὴ ζῆν. ἐν τοιαύτῃ, ἦ δʼ ὅς. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐχὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον τοῖς πολίταις ἀπεχθάνηται ταῦτα δρῶν, τοσούτῳ πλειόνων καὶ πιστοτέρων δορυφόρων δεήσεται; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; τίνες οὖν οἱ πιστοί; καὶ πόθεν αὐτοὺς μεταπέμψεται; αὐτόματοι, ἔφη, πολλοὶ ἥξουσι πετόμενοι, ἐὰν τὸν μισθὸν διδῷ. κηφῆνας, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, νὴ τὸν κύνα, δοκεῖς αὖ τινάς μοι λέγειν ξενικούς τε καὶ παντοδαπούς. ἀληθῆ γάρ, ἔφη, δοκῶ σοι. τίς δὲ αὐτόθεν; ἆρʼ οὐκ ἂν ἐθελήσειεν— πῶς; τοὺς δούλους ἀφελόμενος τοὺς πολίτας, ἐλευθερώσας, τῶν περὶ ἑαυτὸν δορυφόρων ποιήσασθαι. σφόδρα γʼ, ἔφη· ἐπεί τοι καὶ πιστότατοι αὐτῷ οὗτοί εἰσιν.

“And also that being impoverished by war-taxes they may have to devote themselves to their daily business and be less likely to plot against him?” “Obviously.” “And if, I presume, he suspects that there are free spirits who will not suffer his domination, his further object is to find pretexts for destroying them by exposing them to the enemy? From all these motives a tyrant is compelled to be always provoking wars?” “Yes, he is compelled to do so.” “And by such conduct will he not the more readily incur the hostility of the citizens?” “Of course.” “And is it not likely that some of those who helped to establish and now share in his power, voicing their disapproval of the course of events, will speak out frankly to him and to one another—such of them as happen to be the bravest?” “Yes, it is likely.” “Then the tyrant must do away with all such if he is to maintain his rule, until he has left no one of any worth, friend or foe.” “Obviously.” “He must look sharp to see, then, who is brave, who is great-souled, who is wise, who is rich and such is his good fortune that, whether he wishes it or not, he must be their enemy and plot against them all until he purge the city.” “A fine purgation,” he said. “Yes,” said I, “just the opposite of that which physicians practise on our bodies. For while they remove the worst and leave the best, he does the reverse.” “Yes, for apparently he must,” he said, “if he is to keep his power.” “Blessed, then, is the necessity that binds him,” said I, “which bids him dwell for the most part with base companions who hate him, or else forfeit his life.” “Such it is,” he said. “And would he not, the more he offends the citizens by such conduct, have the greater need of more and more trustworthy bodyguards?” “Of course.” “Whom, then, may he trust, and whence shall he fetch them?” “Unbidden,” he said, “they will wing their way to him in great numbers if he furnish their wage.” “Drones, by the dog,” I said, “I think you are talking of again, an alien and motley crew.” “You think rightly,” he said. “But what of the home supply, would he not choose to employ that?” “How?” “By taking their slaves from the citizens, emancipating them and enlisting them in his bodyguard.” “Assuredly,” he said, “since these are those whom he can most trust.”

ἦ μακάριον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, λέγεις τυράννου χρῆμα, εἰ τοιούτοις φίλοις τε καὶ πιστοῖς ἀνδράσι χρῆται, τοὺς προτέρους ἐκείνους ἀπολέσας. ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, τοιούτοις γε χρῆται. καὶ θαυμάζουσι δή, εἶπον, οὗτοι οἱ ἑταῖροι αὐτὸν καὶ σύνεισιν οἱ νέοι πολῖται, οἱ δʼ ἐπιεικεῖς μισοῦσί τε καὶ φεύγουσι; τί δʼ οὐ μέλλουσιν; οὐκ ἐτός, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἥ τε τραγῳδία ὅλως σοφὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ὁ Εὐριπίδης διαφέρων ἐν αὐτῇ. τί δή; ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο πυκνῆς διανοίας ἐχόμενον ἐφθέγξατο, ὡς ἄρα «σοφοὶ τύραννοί» εἰσι «τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ.» καὶ ἔλεγε δῆλον ὅτι τούτους εἶναι τοὺς σοφοὺς οἷς σύνεστιν. καὶ ὡς ἰσόθεόν γʼ, ἔφη, τὴν τυραννίδα ἐγκωμιάζει, καὶ ἕτερα πολλά, καὶ οὗτος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί. τοιγάρτοι, ἔφην, ἅτε σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιηταὶ συγγιγνώσκουσιν ἡμῖν τε καὶ ἐκείνοις ὅσοι ἡμῶν ἐγγὺς πολιτεύονται, ὅτι αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν οὐ παραδεξόμεθα ἅτε τυραννίδος ὑμνητάς. οἶμαι ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη, συγγιγνώσκουσιν ὅσοιπέρ γε αὐτῶν κομψοί. εἰς δέ γε οἶμαι τὰς ἄλλας περιιόντες πόλεις, συλλέγοντες τοὺς ὄχλους, καλὰς φωνὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ πιθανὰς μισθωσάμενοι, εἰς τυραννίδας τε καὶ δημοκρατίας ἕλκουσι τὰς πολιτείας. μάλα γε. οὐκοῦν καὶ προσέτι τούτων μισθοὺς λαμβάνουσι καὶ τιμῶνται, μάλιστα μέν, ὥσπερ τὸ εἰκός, ὑπὸ τυράννων, δεύτερον δὲ ὑπὸ δημοκρατίας· ὅσῳ δʼ ἂν ἀνωτέρω ἴωσιν πρὸς τὸ ἄναντες τῶν πολιτειῶν, μᾶλλον ἀπαγορεύει αὐτῶν ἡ τιμή, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ ἄσθματος ἀδυνατοῦσα πορεύεσθαι. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἀλλὰ δή, εἶπον, ἐνταῦθα μὲν ἐξέβημεν· λέγωμεν δὲ πάλιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ τοῦ τυράννου στρατόπεδον, τὸ καλόν τε καὶ πολὺ καὶ ποικίλον καὶ οὐδέποτε ταὐτόν, πόθεν θρέψεται. δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι, ἐάν τε ἱερὰ χρήματα ᾖ ἐν τῇ πόλει, ταῦτα ἀναλώσει, ὅποι ποτὲ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐξαρκῇ τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων, ἐλάττους εἰσφορὰς ἀναγκάζων τὸν δῆμον εἰσφέρειν. τί δʼ ὅταν δὴ ταῦτα ἐπιλίπῃ; δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν πατρῴων θρέψεται αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ συμπόται τε καὶ ἑταῖροι καὶ ἑταῖραι. μανθάνω, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· ὅτι ὁ δῆμος ὁ γεννήσας τὸν τύραννον θρέψει αὐτόν τε καὶ ἑταίρους. πολλὴ αὐτῷ, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη.

“Truly,” said I, “this tyrant business is a blessed thing on your showing, if such are the friends and ‘trusties’ he must employ after destroying his former associates.” “But such are indeed those he does make use of,” he said. “And these companions admire him,” I said, “and these new citizens are his associates, while the better sort hate and avoid him.” “Why should they not?” “Not for nothing,” said I, “is tragedy in general esteemed wise, and Euripides beyond other tragedians.” “Why, pray?” “Because among other utterances of pregnant thought he said, Tyrants are wise by converse with the wise. He meant evidently that these associates of the tyrant are the wise.” “Yes, he and the other poets,” he said, “call the tyrant’s power ‘likest God’s’ and praise it in many other ways.” “Wherefore,” said I, “being wise as they are, the poets of tragedy will pardon us and those whose politics resemble ours for not admitting them into our polity, since they hymn the praises of tyranny.” “I think,” he said, “that the subtle minds among them will pardon us.” “But going about to other cities, I fancy, collecting crowds and hiring fine, loud, persuasive voices, they draw the polities towards tyrannies or democracies.” “Yes, indeed.” “And, further, they are paid and honored for this, chiefly, as is to be expected, by tyrants, and secondly by democracy. But the higher they go, breasting constitution hill, the more their honor fails, as it were from lack of breath unable to proceed.” “Quite so.” “But this,” said I, “is a digression. Let us return to that fair, multitudinous, diversified and ever-changing bodyguard of the tyrant and tell how it will be supported.” “Obviously,” he said, “if there are sacred treasures in the city he will spend these as long as they last and the property of those he has destroyed, thus requiring smaller contributions from the populace.” “But what when these resources fail?” “Clearly,” he said, “his father’s estate will have to support him and his wassailers, his fellows and his she-fellows.” “I understand,” I said, “that the people which begot the tyrant will have to feed him and his companions.” “It cannot escape from that,” he said.

πῶς [δὲ] λέγεις; εἶπον· ἐὰν δὲ ἀγανακτῇ τε καὶ λέγῃ ὁ δῆμος ὅτι οὔτε δίκαιον τρέφεσθαι ὑπὸ πατρὸς ὑὸν ἡβῶντα, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ὑπὸ ὑέος πατέρα, οὔτε τούτου αὐτὸν ἕνεκα ἐγέννησέν τε καὶ κατέστησεν, ἵνα, ἐπειδὴ μέγας γένοιτο, τότε αὐτὸς δουλεύων τοῖς αὑτοῦ δούλοις τρέφοι ἐκεῖνόν τε καὶ τοὺς δούλους μετὰ συγκλύδων ἄλλων, ἀλλʼ ἵνα ἀπὸ τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν λεγομένων ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐλευθερωθείη ἐκείνου προστάντος, καὶ νῦν κελεύει ἀπιέναι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἑταίρους, ὥσπερ πατὴρ ὑὸν ἐξ οἰκίας μετὰ ὀχληρῶν συμποτῶν ἐξελαύνων; γνώσεταί γε, νὴ Δία, ἦ δʼ ὅς, τότʼ ἤδη ὁ δῆμος οἷος οἷον θρέμμα γεννῶν ἠσπάζετό τε καὶ ηὖξεν, καὶ ὅτι ἀσθενέστερος ὢν ἰσχυροτέρους ἐξελαύνει. πῶς, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, λέγεις; τολμήσει τὸν πατέρα βιάζεσθαι, κἂν μὴ πείθηται, τύπτειν ὁ τύραννος; ναί, ἔφη, ἀφελόμενός γε τὰ ὅπλα. πατραλοίαν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, λέγεις τύραννον καὶ χαλεπὸν γηροτρόφον, καὶ ὡς ἔοικε τοῦτο δὴ ὁμολογουμένη ἂν ἤδη τυραννὶς εἴη, καί, τὸ λεγόμενον, ὁ δῆμος φεύγων ἂν καπνὸν δουλείας ἐλευθέρων εἰς πῦρ δούλων δεσποτείας ἂν ἐμπεπτωκὼς εἴη, ἀντὶ τῆς πολλῆς ἐκείνης καὶ ἀκαίρου ἐλευθερίας τὴν χαλεπωτάτην τε καὶ πικροτάτην δούλων δουλείαν μεταμπισχόμενος. καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, ταῦτα οὕτω γίγνεται. τί οὖν; εἶπον· οὐκ ἐμμελῶς ἡμῖν εἰρήσεται, ἐὰν φῶμεν ἱκανῶς διεληλυθέναι ὡς μεταβαίνει τυραννὶς ἐκ δημοκρατίας, γενομένη τε οἵα ἐστίν; πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἱκανῶς, ἔφη.

“And what have you to say,” I said, “in case the people protests and says that it is not right that a grown-up son should be supported by his father, but the reverse, and that it did not beget and establish him in order that, when he had grown great, it, in servitude to its own slaves, should feed him and the slaves together with a nondescript rabble of aliens, but in order that, with him for protector, it might be liberated from the rule of the rich and the so-called ‘better classes,’ and that it now bids him and his crew depart from the city as a father expels from his house a son together with troublesome revellers?” “The demos, by Zeus,” he said, “will then learn to its cost what it is and what a creature it begot and cherished and bred to greatness, and that in its weakness it tries to expel the stronger.” “What do you mean?” said I; “will the tyrant dare to use force against his father, and, if he does not yield, to strike him?” “Yes,” he said, “after he has once taken from him his arms.” “A very parricide,” said I, “you make the tyrant out to be, and a cruel nurse of old age, and, as it seems, this is at last tyranny open and avowed, and, as the saying goes, the demos trying to escape the smoke of submission to the free would have plunged into the fire of enslavement to slaves, and in exchange for that excessive and unseasonable liberty has clothed itself in the garb of the most cruel and bitter servile servitude.” “Yes indeed,” he said, “that is just what happens.” “Well, then,” said I, “shall we not be fairly justified in saying that we have sufficiently described the transformation of a democracy into a tyranny and the nature of the tyranny itself?” “Quite sufficiently,” he said.

People and places in this passage

English translation by Paul Shorey (1930). Original text: Paul Shorey (trans.), Plato: The Republic, Loeb Classical Library, vol. 1 (Books I-V), 1930, and vol. 2 (Books VI-X), 1935, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann; Greek text: John Burnet, Platonis Opera, Oxford Classical Texts (as digitised by Perseus).

Greek text and translation from the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0 (Perseus Digital Library); translation public domain. Introductions, summaries and notes © GreekMythology.com.