οἱ μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, καὶ οἱ μὴ διὰ μακροῦ τινος διεξελθόντες λόγου μόγις πως ἀνεφάνησαν οἵ εἰσιν ἑκάτεροι. ἴσως γάρ, ἔφη, διὰ βραχέος οὐ ῥᾴδιον. οὐ φαίνεται, εἶπον· ἐμοὶ γοῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ ἂν βελτιόνως φανῆναι εἰ περὶ τούτου μόνου ἔδει ῥηθῆναι, καὶ μὴ πολλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ διελθεῖν μέλλοντι κατόψεσθαι τί διαφέρει βίος δίκαιος ἀδίκου. τί οὖν, ἔφη, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμῖν; τί δʼ ἄλλο, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἢ τὸ ἑξῆς; ἐπειδὴ φιλόσοφοι μὲν οἱ τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἀλλʼ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ παντοίως ἴσχουσιν πλανώμενοι οὐ φιλόσοφοι, ποτέρους δὴ δεῖ πόλεως ἡγεμόνας εἶναι; πῶς οὖν λέγοντες ἂν αὐτό, ἔφη, μετρίως λέγοιμεν; ὁπότεροι ἄν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, δυνατοὶ φαίνωνται φυλάξαι νόμους τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα πόλεων, τούτους καθιστάναι φύλακας. ὀρθῶς, ἔφη. τόδε δέ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἆρα δῆλον, εἴτε τυφλὸν εἴτε ὀξὺ ὁρῶντα χρὴ φύλακα τηρεῖν ὁτιοῦν; καὶ πῶς, ἔφη, οὐ δῆλον; ἦ οὖν δοκοῦσί τι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν οἱ τῷ ὄντι τοῦ ὄντος ἑκάστου ἐστερημένοι τῆς γνώσεως, καὶ μηδὲν ἐναργὲς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντες παράδειγμα, μηδὲ δυνάμενοι ὥσπερ γραφῆς εἰς τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἀποβλέποντες κἀκεῖσε ἀεὶ ἀναφέροντές τε καὶ θεώμενοι ὡς οἷόν τε ἀκριβέστατα, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε νόμιμα καλῶν τε πέρι καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν τίθεσθαί τε, ἐὰν δέῃ τίθεσθαι, καὶ τὰ κείμενα φυλάττοντες σῴζειν; οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὐ πολύ τι διαφέρει. τούτους οὖν μᾶλλον φύλακας στησόμεθα ἢ τοὺς ἐγνωκότας μὲν ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν, ἐμπειρίᾳ δὲ μηδὲν ἐκείνων ἐλλείποντας μηδʼ ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ μέρει ἀρετῆς ὑστεροῦντας; ἄτοπον μεντἄν, ἔφη, εἴη ἄλλους αἱρεῖσθαι, εἴ γε τἆλλα μὴ ἐλλείποιντο· τούτῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ σχεδόν τι τῷ μεγίστῳ ἂν προέχοιεν.
“So now, Glaucon,” I said, “our argument after winding a long and weary way has at last made clear to us who are the philosophers or lovers of wisdom and who are not.” “Yes,” he said, “a shorter way is perhaps not feasible.” “Apparently not,” I said. “I, at any rate, think that the matter would have been made still plainer if we had had nothing but this to speak of, and if there were not so many things left which our purpose of discerning the difference between the just and the unjust life requires us to discuss.” “What, then,” he said, “comes next?” “What else,” said I, “but the next in order? Since the philosophers are those who are capable of apprehending that which is eternal and unchanging, while those who are incapable of this but lose themselves and wander amid the multiplicities of multifarious things, are not philosophers, which of the two kinds ought to be the leaders in a state?” “What, then,” he said, “would be a fair statement of the matter?” “Whichever,” I said, “appear competent to guard the laws and pursuits of society, these we should establish as guardians.” “Right,” he said. “Is this, then,” said I, “clear, whether the guardian who is to keep watch over anything ought to be blind or keen of sight?” “Of course it is clear,” he said. “Do you think, then, that there is any appreciable difference between the blind and those who are veritably deprived of the knowledge of the veritable being of things, those who have no vivid pattern in their souls and so cannot, as painters look to their models, fix their eyes on the absolute truth, and always with reference to that ideal and in the exactest possible contemplation of it establish in this world also the laws of the beautiful, the just and the good, when that is needful, or guard and preserve those that are established?” “No, by heaven,” he said, “there is not much difference.” “Shall we, then, appoint these blind souls as our guardians, rather than those who have learned to know the ideal reality of things and who do not fall short of the others in experience and are not second to them in any part of virtue?” “It would be strange indeed,” he said, “to choose others than the philosophers, provided they were not deficient in those other respects, for this very knowledge of the ideal would perhaps be the greatest of superiorities.”
οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ λέγωμεν, τίνα τρόπον οἷοί τʼ ἔσονται οἱ αὐτοὶ κἀκεῖνα καὶ ταῦτα ἔχειν; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ὃ τοίνυν ἀρχόμενοι τούτου τοῦ λόγου ἐλέγομεν, τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν πρῶτον δεῖ καταμαθεῖν· καὶ οἶμαι, ἐὰν ἐκείνην ἱκανῶς ὁμολογήσωμεν, ὁμολογήσειν καὶ ὅτι οἷοί τε ταῦτα ἔχειν οἱ αὐτοί, ὅτι τε οὐκ ἄλλους πόλεων ἡγεμόνας δεῖ εἶναι ἢ τούτους. πῶς; τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῶν φιλοσόφων φύσεων πέρι ὡμολογήσθω ἡμῖν ὅτι μαθήματός γε ἀεὶ ἐρῶσιν ὃ ἂν αὐτοῖς δηλοῖ ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ἀεὶ οὔσης καὶ μὴ πλανωμένης ὑπὸ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς. ὡμολογήσθω. καὶ μήν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ ὅτι πάσης αὐτῆς, καὶ οὔτε σμικροῦ οὔτε μείζονος οὔτε τιμιωτέρου οὔτε ἀτιμοτέρου μέρους ἑκόντες ἀφίενται, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν περί τε τῶν φιλοτίμων καὶ ἐρωτικῶν διήλθομεν. ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις. τόδε τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτο σκόπει εἰ ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς τούτῳ ἐν τῇ φύσει οἳ ἂν μέλλωσιν ἔσεσθαι οἵους ἐλέγομεν. τὸ ποῖον; τὴν ἀψεύδειαν καὶ τὸ ἑκόντας εἶναι μηδαμῇ προσδέχεσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος ἀλλὰ μισεῖν, τὴν δʼ ἀλήθειαν στέργειν. εἰκός γʼ, ἔφη. οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ φίλε, εἰκός, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τὸν ἐρωτικῶς του φύσει ἔχοντα πᾶν τὸ συγγενές τε καὶ οἰκεῖον τῶν παιδικῶν ἀγαπᾶν. ὀρθῶς, ἔφη. ἦ οὖν οἰκειότερον σοφίᾳ τι ἀληθείας ἂν εὕροις; καὶ πῶς; ἦ δʼ ὅς. ἦ οὖν δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ φιλοψευδῆ; οὐδαμῶς γε. τὸν ἄρα τῷ ὄντι φιλομαθῆ πάσης ἀληθείας δεῖ εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ὅτι μάλιστα ὀρέγεσθαι. παντελῶς γε. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτῳ γε εἰς ἕν τι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι σφόδρα ῥέπουσιν, ἴσμεν που ὅτι εἰς τἆλλα τούτῳ ἀσθενέστεραι, ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα ἐκεῖσε ἀπωχετευμένον. τί μήν; ὧι δὴ πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐρρυήκασιν, περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οἶμαι ἡδονὴν αὐτῆς καθʼ αὑτὴν εἶεν ἄν, τὰς δὲ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐκλείποιεν, εἰ μὴ πεπλασμένως ἀλλʼ ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφός τις εἴη. μεγάλη ἀνάγκη. σώφρων μὴν ὅ γε τοιοῦτος καὶ οὐδαμῇ φιλοχρήματος· ὧν γὰρ ἕνεκα χρήματα μετὰ πολλῆς δαπάνης σπουδάζεται, ἄλλῳ τινὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τούτῳ προσήκει σπουδάζειν. οὕτω.
“Then what we have to say is how it would be possible for the same persons to have both qualifications, is it not?” “ Quite so.” “Then, as we were saying at the beginning of this discussion, the first thing to understand is the nature that they must have from birth; and I think that if we sufficiently agree on this we shall also agree that the combination of qualities that we seek belongs to the same persons, and that we need no others for guardians of states than these.” “How so?” “We must accept as agreed this trait of the philosophical nature, that it is ever enamored of the kind of knowledge which reveals to them something of that essence which is eternal, and is not wandering between the two poles of generation and decay.” “Let us take that as agreed.” “And, further,” said I, “that their desire is for the whole of it and that they do not willingly renounce a small or a great, a more precious or a less honored, part of it. That was the point of our former illustration drawn from lovers and men covetous of honor.” “You are right,” he said. “Consider, then, next whether the men who are to meet our requirements must not have this further quality in their natures.” “What quality?” “The spirit of truthfulness, reluctance to admit falsehood in any form, the hatred of it and the love of truth.” “It is likely,” he said. “It is not only likely, my friend, but there is every necessity that he who is by nature enamored of anything should cherish all that is akin and pertaining to the object of his love.” “Right,” he said. “Could you find anything more akin to wisdom than truth?” “Impossible,” he said. “Then can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and of falsehood?” “By no means.” “Then the true lover of knowledge must, from childhood up, be most of all a striver after truth in every form.” “By all means.” “But, again, we surely are aware that when in a man the desires incline strongly to any one thing, they are weakened for other things. It is as if the stream had been diverted into another channel.” “Surely.” “So, when a man’s desires have been taught to flow in the channel of learning and all that sort of thing, they will be concerned, I presume, with the pleasures of the soul in itself, and will be indifferent to those of which the body is the instrument, if the man is a true and not a sham philosopher.” “That is quite necessary.” “Such a man will be temperate and by no means greedy for wealth; for the things for the sake of which money and great expenditure are eagerly sought others may take seriously, but not he.” “It is so.”
καὶ μήν που καὶ τόδε δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὅταν κρίνειν μέλλῃς φύσιν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ μή. τὸ ποῖον; μή σε λάθῃ μετέχουσα ἀνελευθερίας· ἐναντιώτατον γάρ που σμικρολογία ψυχῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντὸς ἀεὶ ἐπορέξεσθαι θείου τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνου. ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. ἧι οὖν ὑπάρχει διανοίᾳ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας, οἷόν τε οἴει τούτῳ μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον; ἀδύνατον, ἦ δʼ ὅς. οὐκοῦν καὶ θάνατον οὐ δεινόν τι ἡγήσεται ὁ τοιοῦτος; ἥκιστά γε. δειλῇ δὴ καὶ ἀνελευθέρῳ φύσει φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἂν μετείη. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ. τί οὖν; ὁ κόσμιος καὶ μὴ φιλοχρήματος μηδʼ ἀνελεύθερος μηδʼ ἀλαζὼν μηδὲ δειλὸς ἔσθʼ ὅπῃ ἂν δυσσύμβολος ἢ ἄδικος γένοιτο; οὐκ ἔστιν. καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ψυχὴν σκοπῶν φιλόσοφον καὶ μὴ εὐθὺς νέου ὄντος ἐπισκέψῃ, εἰ ἄρα δικαία τε καὶ ἥμερος ἢ δυσκοινώνητος καὶ ἀγρία. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε παραλείψεις, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι. τὸ ποῖον; εὐμαθὴς ἢ δυσμαθής. ἢ προσδοκᾷς ποτέ τινά τι ἱκανῶς ἂν στέρξαι, ὃ πράττων ἂν ἀλγῶν τε πράττοι καὶ μόγις σμικρὸν ἀνύτων; οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο. τί δʼ εἰ μηδὲν ὧν μάθοι σῴζειν δύναιτο, λήθης ὢν πλέως; ἆρʼ ἂν οἷός τʼ εἴη ἐπιστήμης μὴ κενὸς εἶναι; καὶ πῶς; ἀνόνητα δὴ πονῶν οὐκ οἴει ἀναγκασθήσεται τελευτῶν αὑτόν τε μισεῖν καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην πρᾶξιν; πῶς δʼ οὔ; ἐπιλήσμονα ἄρα ψυχὴν ἐν ταῖς ἱκανῶς φιλοσόφοις μή ποτε ἐγκρίνωμεν, ἀλλὰ μνημονικὴν αὐτὴν ζητῶμεν δεῖν εἶναι. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ἀλλʼ οὐ μὴν τό γε τῆς ἀμούσου τε καὶ ἀσχήμονος φύσεως ἄλλοσέ ποι ἂν φαῖμεν ἕλκειν ἢ εἰς ἀμετρίαν. τί μήν; ἀλήθειαν δʼ ἀμετρίᾳ ἡγῇ συγγενῆ εἶναι ἢ ἐμμετρίᾳ; ἐμμετρίᾳ. ἔμμετρον ἄρα καὶ εὔχαριν ζητῶμεν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις διάνοιαν φύσει, ἣν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἰδέαν ἑκάστου τὸ αὐτοφυὲς εὐάγωγον παρέξει. πῶς δʼ οὔ; τί οὖν; μή πῃ δοκοῦμέν σοι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἕκαστα διεληλυθέναι καὶ ἑπόμενα ἀλλήλοις τῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὄντος ἱκανῶς τε καὶ τελέως ψυχῇ μεταλήψεσθαι;
“And there is this further point to be considered in distinguishing the philosophical from the unphilosophical nature.” “What point?” “You must not overlook any touch of illiberality. For nothing can be more contrary than such pettiness to the quality of a soul that is ever to seek integrity and wholeness in all things human and divine.” “Most true,” he said. “Do you think that a mind habituated to thoughts of grandeur and the contemplation of all time and all existence can deem this life of man a thing of great concern?” “Impossible,” said he. “Hence such a man will not suppose death to be terrible?” “Least of all.” “Then a cowardly and illiberal spirit, it seems, could have no part in genuine philosophy.” “I think not.” “What then? Could a man of orderly spirit, not a lover of money, not illiberal, nor a braggart nor a coward, ever prove unjust, or a driver of hard bargains?” “Impossible.” “This too, then, is a point that in your discrimination of the philosophic and unphilosophic soul you will observe—whether the man is from youth up just and gentle or unsocial and savage.” “Assuredly.” “Nor will you overlook this, I fancy.” “What?” “Whether he is quick or slow to learn. Or do you suppose that anyone could properly love a task which he performed painfully and with little result from much toil?” “That could not be.” “And if he could not keep what he learned, being steeped in oblivion, could he fail to be void of knowledge?” “How could he?” “And so, having all his labor for naught, will he not finally be constrained to loathe himself and that occupation?” “Of course.” “The forgetful soul, then, we must not list in the roll of competent lovers of wisdom, but we require a good memory.” “By all means.” “But assuredly we should not say that the want of harmony and seemliness in a nature conduces to anything else than the want of measure and proportion.” “Certainly.” “And do you think that truth is akin to measure and proportion or to disproportion?” “To proportion.” “Then in addition to our other requirements we look for a mind endowed with measure and grace, whose native disposition will make it easily guided to the aspect of the ideal reality in all things.” “Assuredly.” “Tell me, then, is there any flaw in the argument? Have we not proved the qualities enumerated to be necessary and compatible with one another for the soul that is to have a sufficient and perfect apprehension of reality?”
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