βούλει οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, μὴ ἧττον φῶμεν αὐτοὺς ἀλλὰ παντάπασι πρᾴους γεγονέναι καὶ πεπεῖσθαι, ἵνα, εἰ μή τι, ἀλλὰ αἰσχυνθέντες ὁμολογήσωσιν; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. οὗτοι μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τοῦτο πεπεισμένοι ἔστων· τοῦδε δὲ πέρι τις ἀμφισβητήσει, ὡς οὐκ ἂν τύχοιεν γενόμενοι βασιλέων ἔκγονοι ἢ δυναστῶν τὰς φύσεις φιλόσοφοι; οὐδʼ ἂν εἷς, ἔφη. τοιούτους δὲ γενομένους ὡς πολλὴ ἀνάγκη διαφθαρῆναι, ἔχει τις λέγειν; ὡς μὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸν σωθῆναι, καὶ ἡμεῖς συγχωροῦμεν· ὡς δὲ ἐν παντὶ τῷ χρόνῳ τῶν πάντων οὐδέποτε οὐδʼ ἂν εἷς σωθείη, ἔσθʼ ὅστις ἀμφισβητήσειε; καὶ πῶς; ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἷς ἱκανὸς γενόμενος, πόλιν ἔχων πειθομένην, πάντʼ ἐπιτελέσαι τὰ νῦν ἀπιστούμενα. ἱκανὸς γάρ, ἔφη. ἄρχοντος γάρ που, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τιθέντος τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἃ διεληλύθαμεν, οὐ δήπου ἀδύνατον ἐθέλειν ποιεῖν τοὺς πολίτας. οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν. ἀλλὰ δή, ἅπερ ἡμῖν δοκεῖ, δόξαι καὶ ἄλλοις θαυμαστόν τι καὶ ἀδύνατον; οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἦ δʼ ὅς. καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε βέλτιστα, εἴπερ δυνατά, ἱκανῶς ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, διήλθομεν. ἱκανῶς γάρ. νῦν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, συμβαίνει ἡμῖν περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας ἄριστα μὲν εἶναι ἃ λέγομεν, εἰ γένοιτο, χαλεπὰ δὲ γενέσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατά γε. συμβαίνει γάρ, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μόγις τέλος ἔσχεν, τὰ ἐπίλοιπα δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο λεκτέον, τίνα τρόπον ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τίνων μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων οἱ σωτῆρες ἐνέσονται τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ κατὰ ποίας ἡλικίας ἕκαστοι ἑκάστων ἁπτόμενοι; λεκτέον μέντοι, ἔφη. οὐδέν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τὸ σοφόν μοι ἐγένετο τήν τε τῶν γυναικῶν τῆς κτήσεως δυσχέρειαν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν παραλιπόντι καὶ παιδογονίαν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων κατάστασιν, εἰδότι ὡς ἐπίφθονός τε καὶ χαλεπὴ γίγνεσθαι ἡ παντελῶς ἀληθής· νῦν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἦλθεν τὸ δεῖν αὐτὰ διελθεῖν. καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων πεπέρανται, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀρχόντων ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μετελθεῖν δεῖ.
“Instead of less so, may we not say that they have been altogether tamed and convinced, so that for very shame, if for no other reason, they may assent?” “Certainly,” said he. “Let us assume, then,” said I, “that they are won over to this view. Will anyone contend that there is no chance that the offspring of kings and rulers should be born with the philosophic nature?” “Not one,” he said. “And can anyone prove that if so born they must necessarily be corrupted? The difficulty of their salvation we too concede; but that in all the course of time not one of all could be saved, will anyone maintain that?” “How could he?” “But surely,” said I, “the occurrence of one such is enough, if he has a state which obeys him, to realize all that now seems so incredible.” “Yes, one is enough,” he said. “For if such a ruler,” I said, “ordains the laws and institutions that we have described it is surely not impossible that the citizens should be content to carry them out.” “By no means.” “Would it, then, be at all strange or impossible for others to come to the opinion to which we have come?” “I think not,” said he. “And further that these things are best, if possible, has already, I take it, been sufficiently shown.” “Yes, sufficiently.” “Our present opinion, then, about this legislation is that our plan would be best if it could be realized and that this realization is difficult yet not impossible.” “That is the conclusion,” he said. “This difficulty disposed of, we have next to speak of what remains, in what way, namely, and as a result of what studies and pursuits, these preservers of the constitution will form a part of our state, and at what ages they will severally take up each study.” “Yes, we have to speak of that,” he said. “I gained nothing,” I said, “by my cunning in omitting heretofore the distasteful topic of the possession of women and procreation of children and the appointment of rulers, because I knew that the absolutely true and right way would provoke censure and is difficult of realization; for now I am none the less compelled to discuss them. The matter of the women and children has been disposed of, but the education of the rulers has to be examined again, I may say, from the starting-point.”
ἐλέγομεν δʼ, εἰ μνημονεύεις, δεῖν αὐτοὺς φιλοπόλιδάς τε φαίνεσθαι, βασανιζομένους ἐν ἡδοναῖς τε καὶ λύπαις, καὶ τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο μήτʼ ἐν πόνοις μήτʼ ἐν φόβοις μήτʼ ἐν ἄλλῃ μηδεμιᾷ μεταβολῇ φαίνεσθαι ἐκβάλλοντας, ἢ τὸν ἀδυνατοῦντα ἀποκριτέον, τὸν δὲ πανταχοῦ ἀκήρατον ἐκβαίνοντα ὥσπερ χρυσὸν ἐν πυρὶ βασανιζόμενον, στατέον ἄρχοντα καὶ γέρα δοτέον καὶ ζῶντι καὶ τελευτήσαντι καὶ ἆθλα. τοιαῦτʼ ἄττα ἦν τὰ λεγόμενα παρεξιόντος καὶ παρακαλυπτομένου τοῦ λόγου, πεφοβημένου κινεῖν τὸ νῦν παρόν. ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις· μέμνημαι γάρ. ὄκνος γάρ, ἔφην, ὦ φίλε, ἐγώ, εἰπεῖν τὰ νῦν ἀποτετολμημένα· νῦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τετολμήσθω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τοὺς ἀκριβεστάτους φύλακας φιλοσόφους δεῖ καθιστάναι. εἰρήσθω γάρ, ἔφη. νόησον δὴ ὡς εἰκότως ὀλίγοι ἔσονταί σοι· ἣν γὰρ διήλθομεν φύσιν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς, εἰς ταὐτὸν συμφύεσθαι αὐτῆς τὰ μέρη ὀλιγάκις ἐθέλει, τὰ πολλὰ δὲ διεσπασμένη φύεται. πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις; εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ ὀξεῖς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτοις ἕπεται οἶσθʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἅμα φύεσθαι καὶ νεανικοί τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας οἷοι κοσμίως μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ βεβαιότητος ἐθέλειν ζῆν, ἀλλʼ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὑπὸ ὀξύτητος φέρονται ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσιν, καὶ τὸ βέβαιον ἅπαν αὐτῶν ἐξοίχεται. ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. οὐκοῦν τὰ βέβαια αὖ ταῦτα ἤθη καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάβολα, οἷς ἄν τις μᾶλλον ὡς πιστοῖς χρήσαιτο, καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πρὸς τοὺς φόβους δυσκίνητα ὄντα, πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις αὖ ποιεῖ ταὐτόν· δυσκινήτως ἔχει καὶ δυσμαθῶς ὥσπερ ἀπονεναρκωμένα, καὶ ὕπνου τε καὶ χάσμης ἐμπίμπλανται, ὅταν τι δέῃ τοιοῦτον διαπονεῖν. ἔστι ταῦτα, ἔφη. ἡμεῖς δέ γέ φαμεν ἀμφοτέρων δεῖν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς μετέχειν, ἢ μήτε παιδείας τῆς ἀκριβεστάτης δεῖν αὐτῷ μεταδιδόναι μήτε τιμῆς μήτε ἀρχῆς. ὀρθῶς, ἦ δʼ ὅς. οὐκοῦν σπάνιον αὐτὸ οἴει ἔσεσθαι; πῶς δʼ οὔ; βασανιστέον δὴ ἔν τε οἷς τότε ἐλέγομεν πόνοις τε καὶ φόβοις καὶ ἡδοναῖς, καὶ ἔτι δὴ ὃ τότε παρεῖμεν νῦν λέγομεν, ὅτι καὶ ἐν μαθήμασι πολλοῖς γυμνάζειν δεῖ, σκοποῦντας εἰ καὶ τὰ μέγιστα μαθήματα δυνατὴ ἔσται ἐνεγκεῖν εἴτε καὶ ἀποδειλιάσει, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀποδειλιῶντες.
“We were saying, if you recollect, that they must approve themselves lovers of the state when tested in pleasures and pains, and make it apparent that they do not abandon this fixed faith under stress of labors or fears or any other vicissitude, and that anyone who could not keep that faith must he rejected, while he who always issued from the test pure and intact, like gold tried in the fire, is to be established as ruler and to receive honors in life and after death and prizes as well. Something of this sort we said while the argument slipped by with veiled face in fear of starting our present debate.” “Most true,” he said; “I remember.” “We shrank, my friend,” I said, “from uttering the audacities which have now been hazarded. But now let us find courage for the definitive pronouncement that as the most perfect guardians we must establish philosophers.” “Yes, assume it to have been said,” said he. “Note, then, that they will naturally be few, for the different components of the nature which we said their education presupposed rarely consent to grow in one; but for the most part these qualities are found apart.” “What do you mean?” he said. “Facility in learning, memory, sagacity, quickness of apprehension and their accompaniments, and youthful spirit and magnificence in soul are qualities, you know, that are rarely combined in human nature with a disposition to live orderly, quiet, and stable lives; but such men, by reason of their quickness, are driven about just as chance directs, and all steadfastness is gone out of them.” “You speak truly,” he said. “And on the other hand, the steadfast and stable temperaments, whom one could rather trust in use, and who in war are not easily moved and aroused to fear, are apt to act in the same way when confronted with studies. They are not easily aroused, learn with difficulty, as if benumbed, and are filled with sleep and yawning when an intellectual task is set them.” “It is so,” he said. “But we affirmed that a man must partake of both temperaments in due and fair combination or else participate in neither the highest education nor in honors nor in rule.” “And rightly,” he said. “Do you not think, then, that such a blend will be a rare thing?” “Of course.” “They must, then, be tested in the toils and fears and pleasures of which we then spoke, and we have also now to speak of a point we then passed by, that we must exercise them in many studies, watching them to see whether their nature is capable of enduring the greatest and most difficult studies or whether it will faint and flinch as men flinch in the trials and contests of the body.”
πρέπει γέ τοι δή, ἔφη, οὕτω σκοπεῖν. ἀλλὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις μαθήματα μέγιστα; μνημονεύεις μέν που, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅτι τριττὰ εἴδη ψυχῆς διαστησάμενοι συνεβιβάζομεν δικαιοσύνης τε πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ σοφίας ὃ ἕκαστον εἴη. μὴ γὰρ μνημονεύων, ἔφη, τὰ λοιπὰ ἂν εἴην δίκαιος μὴ ἀκούειν. ἦ καὶ τὸ προρρηθὲν αὐτῶν; τὸ ποῖον δή; ἐλέγομέν που ὅτι ὡς μὲν δυνατὸν ἦν κάλλιστα αὐτὰ κατιδεῖν ἄλλη μακροτέρα εἴη περίοδος, ἣν περιελθόντι καταφανῆ γίγνοιτο, τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν προειρημένων ἑπομένας ἀποδείξεις οἷόν τʼ εἴη προσάψαι. καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐξαρκεῖν ἔφατε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐρρήθη τὰ τότε τῆς μὲν ἀκριβείας, ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐφαίνετο, ἐλλιπῆ, εἰ δὲ ὑμῖν ἀρεσκόντως, ὑμεῖς ἂν τοῦτο εἴποιτε. ἀλλʼ ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, μετρίως· ἐφαίνετο μὴν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. ἀλλʼ, ὦ φίλε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, μέτρον τῶν τοιούτων ἀπολεῖπον καὶ ὁτιοῦν τοῦ ὄντος οὐ πάνυ μετρίως γίγνεται· ἀτελὲς γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς μέτρον. δοκεῖ δʼ ἐνίοτέ τισιν ἱκανῶς ἤδη ἔχειν καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖν περαιτέρω ζητεῖν. καὶ μάλʼ, ἔφη, συχνοὶ πάσχουσιν αὐτὸ διὰ ῥᾳθυμίαν. τούτου δέ γε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τοῦ παθήματος ἥκιστα προσδεῖ φύλακι πόλεώς τε καὶ νόμων. εἰκός, ἦ δʼ ὅς. τὴν μακροτέραν τοίνυν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἔφην, περιιτέον τῷ τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐχ ἧττον μανθάνοντι πονητέον ἢ γυμναζομένῳ· ἤ, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, τοῦ μεγίστου τε καὶ μάλιστα προσήκοντος μαθήματος ἐπὶ τέλος οὔποτε ἥξει. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα, ἔφη, μέγιστα, ἀλλʼ ἔτι τι μεῖζον δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ὧν διήλθομεν; καὶ μεῖζον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων οὐχ ὑπογραφὴν δεῖ ὥσπερ νῦν θεάσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀπεργασίαν μὴ παριέναι. ἢ οὐ γελοῖον ἐπὶ μὲν ἄλλοις σμικροῦ ἀξίοις πᾶν ποιεῖν συντεινομένους ὅπως ὅτι ἀκριβέστατα καὶ καθαρώτατα ἕξει, τῶν δὲ μεγίστων μὴ μεγίστας ἀξιοῦν εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἀκριβείας; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, [ἄξιον τὸ διανόημα]· ὃ μέντοι μέγιστον μάθημα καὶ περὶ ὅτι αὐτὸ λέγεις, οἴει τινʼ ἄν σε, ἔφη, ἀφεῖναι μὴ ἐρωτήσαντα τί ἐστιν; οὐ πάνυ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐρώτα.
“That is certainly the right way of looking at it,” he said. “But what do you understand by the greatest studies?” “You remember, I presume,” said I, “that after distinguishing three kinds in the soul, we established definitions of justice, sobriety, bravery and wisdom severally.” “If I did not remember,” he said, “I should not deserve to hear the rest.” “Do you also remember what was said before this?” “What?” “We were saying, I believe, that for the most perfect discernment of these things another longer way was requisite which would make them plain to one who took it, but that it was possible to add proofs on a par with the preceding discussion. And you said that that was sufficient, and it was on this understanding that what we then said was said, falling short of ultimate precision as it appeared to me, but if it contented you it is for you to say.” “Well,” he said, “it was measurably satisfactory to me, and apparently to the rest of the company.” “Nay, my friend,” said I, “a measure of such things that in the least degree falls short of reality proves no measure at all. For nothing that is imperfect is the measure of anything, though some people sometimes think that they have already done enough and that there is no need of further inquiry.” “Yes, indeed,” he said, “many experience this because of their sloth.” “An experience,” said I, “that least of all befits the guardians of a state and of its laws.” “That seems likely,” he said. “Then,” said I, “such a one must go around the longer way and must labor no less in studies than in the exercises of the body or else, as we were just saying, he will never come to the end of the greatest study and that which most properly belongs to him.” “Why, are not these things the greatest?” said he; “but is there still something greater than justice and the other virtues we described?” “There is not only something greater,” I said, “but of these very things we need not merely to contemplate an outline as now, but we must omit nothing of their most exact elaboration. Or would it not be absurd to strain every nerve to attain to the utmost precision and clarity of knowledge about other things of trifling moment and not to demand the greatest precision for the greatest matters?” “It would indeed,” he said; “but do you suppose that anyone will let you go without asking what is the greatest study and with what you think it is concerned?” “By no means,” said I; “but do you ask the question.”
πάντως αὐτὸ οὐκ ὀλιγάκις ἀκήκοας, νῦν δὲ ἢ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ἢ αὖ διανοῇ ἐμοὶ πράγματα παρέχειν ἀντιλαμβανόμενος. οἶμαι δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον· ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα μέγιστον μάθημα, πολλάκις ἀκήκοας, ᾗ δὴ καὶ δίκαια καὶ τἆλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται. καὶ νῦν σχεδὸν οἶσθʼ ὅτι μέλλω τοῦτο λέγειν, καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ ὅτι αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἴσμεν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν, ἄνευ δὲ ταύτης εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα τἆλλα ἐπισταίμεθα, οἶσθʼ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἡμῖν ὄφελος, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ εἰ κεκτῄμεθά τι ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἢ οἴει τι πλέον εἶναι πᾶσαν κτῆσιν ἐκτῆσθαι, μὴ μέντοι ἀγαθήν; ἢ πάντα τἆλλα φρονεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν φρονεῖν; μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε οἶσθα, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ κομψοτέροις φρόνησις. πῶς δʼ οὔ; καὶ ὅτι γε, ὦ φίλε, οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι ἥτις φρόνησις, ἀλλʼ ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φάναι. καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, γελοίως. πῶς γὰρ οὐχί, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἰ ὀνειδίζοντές γε ὅτι οὐκ ἴσμεν τὸ ἀγαθὸν λέγουσι πάλιν ὡς εἰδόσιν; φρόνησιν γὰρ αὐτό φασιν εἶναι ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς αὖ συνιέντων ἡμῶν ὅτι λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὰν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φθέγξωνται ὄνομα. ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. τί δὲ οἱ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν ὁριζόμενοι; μῶν μή τι ἐλάττονος πλάνης ἔμπλεῳ τῶν ἑτέρων; ἢ οὐ καὶ οὗτοι ἀναγκάζονται ὁμολογεῖν ἡδονὰς εἶναι κακάς; σφόδρα γε. συμβαίνει δὴ αὐτοῖς οἶμαι ὁμολογεῖν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι καὶ κακὰ ταὐτά. ἦ γάρ; τί μήν; οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν μεγάλαι καὶ πολλαὶ ἀμφισβητήσεις περὶ αὐτοῦ, φανερόν; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; τί δέ; τόδε οὐ φανερόν, ὡς δίκαια μὲν καὶ καλὰ πολλοὶ ἂν ἕλοιντο τὰ δοκοῦντα, κἂν εἰ μὴ εἴη, ὅμως ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν, ἀγαθὰ δὲ οὐδενὶ ἔτι ἀρκεῖ τὰ δοκοῦντα κτᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα ζητοῦσιν, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐνταῦθα ἤδη πᾶς ἀτιμάζει; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. ὃ δὴ διώκει μὲν ἅπασα ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει, ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς τί ποτʼ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ πίστει χρήσασθαι μονίμῳ οἵᾳ καὶ περὶ τἆλλα, διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἀποτυγχάνει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τι ὄφελος ἦν, περὶ δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ τοσοῦτον οὕτω φῶμεν δεῖν ἐσκοτῶσθαι καὶ ἐκείνους τοὺς βελτίστους ἐν τῇ πόλει, οἷς πάντα ἐγχειριοῦμεν;
“You certainly have heard it often, but now you either do not apprehend or again you are minded to make trouble for me by attacking the argument. I suspect it is rather the latter. For you have often heard that the greatest thing to learn is the idea of good by reference to which just things and all the rest become useful and beneficial. And now I am almost sure you know that this is what I am going to speak of and to say further that we have no adequate knowledge of it. And if we do not know it, then, even if without the knowledge of this we should know all other things never so well, you are aware that it would avail us nothing, just as no possession either is of any avail without the possession of the good. Or do you think there is any profit in possessing everything except that which is good, or in understanding all things else apart from the good while understanding and knowing nothing that is fair and good?” “No, by Zeus, I do not,” he said. “But, furthermore, you know this too, that the multitude believe pleasure to be the good, and the finer spirits intelligence or knowledge.” “Certainly.” “And you are also aware, my friend, that those who hold this latter view are not able to point out what knowledge it is but are finally compelled to say that it is the knowledge of the good.” “Most absurdly,” he said. “Is it not absurd,” said I, “if while taunting us with our ignorance of the good they turn about and talk to us as if we knew it? For they say it is the knowledge of the good, as if we understood their meaning when they utter the word ‘good.’” “Most true,” he said. “Well, are those who define the good as pleasure infected with any less confusion of thought than the others? Or are not they in like manner compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures?” “Most assuredly.” “The outcome is, I take it, that they are admitting the same things to be both good and bad, are they not?” “Certainly.” “Then is it not apparent that there are many and violent disputes about it?” “Of course.” “And again, is it not apparent that while in the case of the just and the honorable many would prefer the semblance without the reality in action, possession, and opinion, yet when it comes to the good nobody is content with the possession of the appearance but all men seek the reality, and the semblance satisfies nobody here?” “Quite so,” he said. “That, then, which every soul pursues and for its sake does all that it does, with an intuition of its reality, but yet baffled and unable to apprehend its nature adequately, or to attain to any stable belief about it as about other things, and for that reason failing of any possible benefit from other things,— in a matter of this quality and moment, can we, I ask you, allow a like blindness and obscurity in those best citizens to whose hands we are to entrust all things?”
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