ὁ δʼ Αἰσχύλος καλῶς ἔοικεν ἐπιπλήττειν τοῖς νομίζουσι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι κακόν, λέγων ὧδε ὡς οὐ δικαίως θάνατον ἔχθουσιν βροτοί, / ὅσπερ μέγιστον ῥῦμα τῶν πολλῶν κακῶν / τοῦτον γὰρ ἀπεμιμήσατο καὶ ὁ εἰπών ὦ θάνατε παιὰν ἰατρὸς μόλοις /
λιμὴν γὰρ ὄντως Ἀίδας ἀνʼ αἶαν. μέγα γάρ ἐστι τὸ μετὰ πείσματος τεθαρρηκότος εἰπεῖν τίς δʼ ἐστὶ δοῦλος τοῦ θανεῖν ἄφροντις ὤν; / καὶ ᾍδην δʼ ἔχων βοηθὸν οὐ τρέμω σκιάς / τί γὰρ τὸ χαλεπόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ δυσανιῶν καὶ ἐν τῷ τεθνάναι; τὰ γὰρ τοῦ θανάτου μήποτε καὶ λίαν ἡμῖν ὄντα συνήθη καὶ συμφυᾶ πάλιν οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅπως δυσαλγῆ δοκεῖ εἶναι. τί γὰρ θαυμαστὸν εἰ τὸ τμητὸν τέτμηται, εἰ τὸ τηκτὸν τέτηκται, εἰ τὸ καυστὸν κέκαυται, εἰ τὸ φθαρτὸν ἔφθαρται; πότε γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ θάνατος; καί, φησιν Ἡράκλειτος, ταὐτὸ γʼ ἔνι ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκὸς καὶ τὸ ἐγρηγορὸς καὶ τὸ καθεῦδον καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιὸν τάδε γὰρ μεταπεσόντα ἐκεῖνά ἐστι, κἀκεῖνα πάλιν μεταπεσόντα ταῦτα. ὡς γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πηλοῦ δύναταί τις πλάττων ζῷα συγχεῖν καὶ πάλιν πλάττειν καὶ συγχεῖν καὶ τοῦθʼ ἓν παρʼ ἓν ποιεῖν ἀδιαλείπτως, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φύσις ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ὕλης πάλαι μὲν τοὺς προγόνους ἡμῶν ἀνέσχεν, εἶτα συνεχεῖς αὐτοῖς ἐγέννησε τοὺς πατέρας, εἶθʼ ἡμᾶς, εἶτʼ ἄλλους ἐπʼ ἄλλοις ἀνακυκλήσει. καὶ ὁ τῆς γενέσεως ποταμὸς οὕτως ἐνδελεχῶς ῥέων οὔποτε στήσεται, καὶ πάλιν ὁ ἐξ ἐναντίας αὐτῷ ὁ τῆς φθορᾶς εἴτʼ Ἀχέρων εἴτε Κωκυτὸς καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν, ἡ πρώτη οὖν αἰτία ἡ δείξασα ἡμῖν τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς, ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ τὸν ζοφερὸν ᾍδην ἄγει. καὶ μήποτε τοῦδʼ εἰκὼν ᾖ ὁ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἀήρ, ἓν παρʼ ἓν ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτα ποιῶν, ἐπαγωγοὺς ζωῆς τε καὶ θανάτου καὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως. διὸ καὶ μοιρίδιον χρέος εἶναι λέγεται τὸ ζῆν, ὡς ἀποδοθησόμενον ὃ ἐδανείσαντο ἡμῶν οἱ προπάτορες. ὃ δὴ καὶ εὐκόλως καταβλητέον καὶ ἀστενάκτως, ὅταν ὁ δανείσας ἀπαιτῇ· εὐγνωμονέστατοι γὰρ ἂν οὕτω φανείημεν.
Aeschylus also doth justly reprimand those who think death to be an evil, declaring after this manner:— Some as a thing injurious death do fly; / But of all mischiefs ’tis the remedy. / And he who spoke thus very nicely imitated him:— Come, with impatience I expect thee, Death; / And stop with thy obliging hand my breath: / To thee as a physician all resort, / And we through tempests sail into thy port. / And it is great to speak this sentence with courage:— Where is the slave who never fears to die? / Or this:— And shadows never scare me, thanks to hell. / But what is it at length in death, that is so grievous and troublesome? For I know not how it comes to pass that, when it is so familiar and as it were related to us, it should seem so terrible. How can it be rational to wonder, if that cleaves asunder which is divisible, if that melts whose nature is liquefaction, if that burns which is combustible, and so, by a parity of reason, if that perisheth which by nature is perishable? For when is it that death is not in us? For, as Heraclitus saith, it is the same thing to be dead and alive, asleep and awake, a young man and decrepit; for these alternately are changed one into another. For as a potter can form the shape of an animal out of his clay and then as easily deface it, and can repeat this backwards and forwards as often as he pleaseth, so Nature too out of the same materials fashioned first our grandfathers, next our fathers, then us, and in process of time will engender others, and again others upon these. For as the flood of our generation glides on without any intermission and will never stop, so in the other direction the stream of our corruption flows eternally on, whether it be called Acheron or Cocytus by the poets. So that the same cause which first showed us the light of the sun carries us down to infernal darkness. And in my mind, the air which encompasseth us seems to be a lively image of the thing; for it brings on the vicissitudes of night and day, life and death, sleeping and waking. For this cause it is that life is called a fatal debt, which our fathers contracted and we are bound to pay; which is to be done calmly and without any complaint, when the creditor demands it; and by this means we shall show ourselves men of sedate passions.
οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὁρῶσαν τὸ τʼ ἄτακτον καὶ βραχυχρόνιον τοῦ βίου ἄδηλον ποιῆσαι τὴν τοῦ θανάτου προθεσμίαν τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ἄμεινον. εἰ γὰρ προῄδειμεν, κἂν προεξετήκοντό τινες ταῖς λύπαις καὶ πρὶν ἀποθανεῖν ἐτεθνήκεσαν. ὅρα δὲ καὶ τοῦ βίου τὸ ὀδυνηρὸν καὶ τὸ πολλαῖς φροντίσιν ἐπηντλημένον, ἃς εἰ βουλοίμεθα καταριθμεῖσθαι, λίαν ἂν αὐτοῦ καταγνοίημεν, ἐπαληθεύσαιμεν δὲ καὶ τὴν παρʼ ἐνίοις κρατοῦσαν δόξαν ὡς ἄρα κρεῖττόν ἐστι τὸ τεθνάναι τοῦ ζῆν. ὁ γοῦν Σιμωνίδης ἀνθρώπων φησὶν ὀλίγον μὲν κάρτος, ἄπρακτοι / δὲ μεληδόνες, / αἰῶνι δὲ παύρῳ πόνος ἀμφὶ πόνῳ. / ὁ δʼ ἄφυκτος ὁμῶς ἐπικρέμαται θάνατος· / κείνου γὰρ ἴσον λάχον μέρος οἳ τʼ ἀγαθοὶ / ὅστις τε κακός. / Πίνδαρος δὲ ἓν παρʼ ἐσθλὸν σύνδυο πήματα δαίονται βροτοῖς. / ἀθάνατοι. τὰ μὲν ὦν οὐ δύνανται νήπιοι κόσμῳ φέρειν / Σοφοκλῆς δέ σὺ δʼ ἄνδρα θνητὸν εἰ κατέφθιτο στένεις, / εἰδὼς τὸ μέλλον οὐδὲν εἰ κέρδος φέρει; / Εὐριπίδης δὲ τὰ θνητὰ πράγματʼ οἶδας ἣν ἔχει φύσιν; / δοκῶ μὲν οὔ πόθεν γάρ; ἀλλʼ ἄκουέ μου. / βροτοῖς ἅπασι κατθανεῖν ὀφείλεται, / κοὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῶν ὅστις ἐξεπίσταται / τὴν αὔριον μέλλουσαν εἰ βιώσεται. / τὸ τῆς τύχης γὰρ ἀφανὲς οἷ προβήσεται. / τοιούτου δὴ τοῦ βίου τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὄντος οἷον οὗτοί φασι, πῶς οὐκ εὐδαιμονίζειν μᾶλλον προσήκει τοὺς ἀπολυθέντας τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ λατρείας ἢ κατοικτίρειν τε καὶ θρηνεῖν, ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ δρῶσι διʼ ἀμαθίαν;
And I believe Nature, knowing the confusion and shortness of our life, hath industriously concealed the end of it from us, this making for our advantage. For if we were sensible of it beforehand, some would pine away with untimely sorrow, and would die before their death came. For she saw the woes of this life, and with what a torrent of cares it is overflowed,—which if thou didst undertake to number, thou wouldst grow angry with it, and confirm that opinion which hath a vogue amongst some, that death is more desirable than life. Simonides hath glossed upon it after this manner:— Our time is of a short and tender length, / Cares we have many, and but little strength; / Labors in crowds push one another on, / And cruel destiny we cannot shun. / The casting of these lots is very just, / For good and bad lie in one common dust. / Pindar hath it so:— The Gods unequal have us mortals vexed, / For to one good, two evils are annexed: / They pay a single joy with double care, / And fools such dispensations cannot bear. / Sophocles so:— Why at a mortal’s death dost thou complain? / Thou know’st not what may be his future gain. / And Euripides so:— Dost thou not know the state of human things? / A faithful monitor thy instruction brings. / Inevitable death hangs o’er our head, / And threatens falling by a doubtful thread. / There’s no man can be certain over night, / If he shall live to see to-morrow’s light. / Life without any interruption flows, / And the results of fate there’s no man knows. /
If then the condition of human life is such as they speak of, why do we not rather applaud their good fortunes who are feed from the drudgery of it, than pity and deplore them, as some men’s folly prompts them to do?
ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης παραπλήσιον ἔλεγεν εἶναι τὸν θάνατον ἤτοι τῷ βαθυτάτῳ ὕπνῳ ἢ ἀποδημίᾳ μακρᾷ καὶ πολυχρονίῳ ἢ τρίτον φθορᾷ τινι καὶ ἀφανισμῷ τοῦ τε σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, κατʼ οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων κακὸν εἶναι. καὶ καθʼ ἕκαστον ἐπεπορεύετο, καὶ πρῶτον τῷ πρώτῳ. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ὕπνος τίς ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος καὶ περὶ τοὺς καθεύδοντας μηδέν ἐστι κακόν, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ περὶ τοὺς τετελευτηκότας εἴη ἄν τι κακόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν γʼ ὅτι ἥδιστός ἐστιν ὁ βαθύτατος τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν; αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ πρᾶγμα φανερόν ἐστι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐπʼ αὐτοῦ λέγων νήγρετος ἥδιστός, θανάτῳ ἄγχιστα ἐοικώς / ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα λέγει ἔνθʼ Ὕπνῳ ξύμβλητο, κασιγνήτῳ Θανάτοιο / καὶ Ὕπνῳ καὶ Θανάτῳ διδυμάοσιν, / ὄψει τὴν ὁμοιότητα αὐτῶν δηλῶν τὰ γὰρ δίδυμα τὴν ὁμοιότητα μάλιστα παρεμφαίνει. πάλιν τὲ πού φησι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι χάλκεον ὕπνον, τὴν ἀναισθησίαν ἡμῶν αἰνιττόμενος. οὐκ ἀμούσως δʼ ἔδοξεν ἀποφήνασθαι οὐδʼ ὁ εἰπὼν τὸν ὕπνον τὰ μικρὰ τοῦ θανάτου μυστήρια· προμύησις γὰρ ὄντως ἐστὶ τοῦ θανάτου ὁ ὕπνος. πάνυ δὲ σοφῶς καὶ ὁ κυνικὸς Διογένης κατενεχθεὶς εἰς ὕπνον καὶ μέλλων ἐκλείπειν τὸν βίον, διεγείραντος αὐτὸν τοῦ ἰατροῦ καὶ πυθομένου μή τι περὶ αὐτὸν εἴη χαλεπόν, οὐδέν ἔφη· ὁ γὰρ ἀδελφὸς; τὸν, ἀδελφὸν προλαμβάνει
Socrates said that death was like either to a very deep sleep, or to a journey taken a great way and for a long time, or else to the utter extinction of soul and body; and if we examine each of these comparisons, he said, we shall find that death is not an evil upon any account. For if death is sleep, and no hurt happens to those who are in that innocent condition, it is manifest that neither are the dead ill dealt with. To what purpose should I talk of that which is so tritely known amongst all, that the most profound sleep is always the sweetest? Homer particularly attests it:— His senses all becalmed, he drew his breath, / His sleep was sound, and quiet like to death. / And in many places he saith thus,— She met Death’s brother, Sleep.— / And again,— Twin brothers, Sleep and Death,— / thereby representing the similitude (as it were) to the sight, for twins especially indicate similarity. And in another place he saith, Death is brazen sleep, thereby intimating to us that it is insensible. Neither hath he spoken much amiss who calls sleep the lesser mysteries of death; for sleep is really the first initiation into the mysteries of death.
Diogenes the Cynic, when a little before his death he fell into a slumber, and his physician rousing him out of it asked him whether any thing ailed him, wisely answered, Nothing, sir, only one brother anticipates another,—Sleep before Death.
εἴ γε μὴν ἀποδημίᾳ προσέοικεν ὁ θάνατος, οὐδʼ οὕτως ἐστὶ κακόν μήποτε δὲ καὶ τοὐναντίον ἀγαθόν. τὸ γὰρ ἀδούλωτον τῇ σαρκὶ καὶ τοῖς ταύτης πάθεσι διάγειν, ὑφʼ ὧν κατασπώμενος ὁ νοῦς τῆς θνητῆς ἀναπίμπλαται φλυαρίας, εὔδαιμόν τι καὶ μακάριον. μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφὴν ἔτι δʼ ἐάν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῖν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν, ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίπλησιν ἡμᾶς, ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτʼ οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι· διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίγνονται· τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτᾶσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου θεραπείᾳ· καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἀσχολίαν ἄγομεν φιλοσοφίας πέρι διὰ ταῦτα πάντα. τὸ δʼ ἔσχατον πάντων, ὅτι ἐάν τις ἡμῖν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ καὶ τραπώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι, ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσι πανταχοῦ παραπῖπτον θόρυβον παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν τἀληθές, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμῖν δέδεικται ὅτι εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἴσεσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα· καὶ τότε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν καὶ οὗ φαμεν ἐρᾶν (ἔστι δὲ φρόνησις), ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ζῶσι δʼ οὔ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἷόν τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρῶς γνῶναι, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἔστι κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ τελευτήσασι τότε γὰρ αὐτὴ καθʼ αὑτὴν ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος, πρότερον δʼ οὔ. καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζῶμεν, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωμεν ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς. καὶ οὕτω μὲν ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μετὰ τοιούτων ἐσόμεθα, διʼ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινὲς ὁρῶντες· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθές. μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ᾖ. ὥστʼ εἰ καὶ προσέοικε μετάγειν εἰς ἕτερον τόπον ὁ θάνατος, οὐκ ἔστι κακόν· μήποτε γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀναφαίνηται, καθάπερ ἀπέδειξεν ὁ Πλάτων. διὸ καὶ πάνυ δαιμονίως ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς τοιαῦτʼ ἔφη τὸ γὰρ δεδιέναι, ὦ ἄνδρες, τὸν θάνατον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς; τὸν θάνατον οὐδʼ εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ μέγιστον πάντων ὄν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δʼ ὡς εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστιν. οὐκ ἀπᾴδειν δʼ ἔοικε τούτων οὐδʼ ὁ εἰπών μηδεὶς φοβείσθω θάνατον ἀπόλυσιν πόνων, / ἀλλὰ καὶ κακῶν τῶν μεγίστων.
If death be like a journey, neither upon this account is it an evil, but rather the contrary; for certainly it is the emphasis of happiness to be freed from the incumbrances of the flesh and all those troublesome passions which attend it, which serve only to darken the understanding, and overspread it with all the folly that is incident to human nature.
The very body, saith Plato, procures us infinite disquiet only to supply its daily necessities with food; but if any diseases are coincident, they hinder our contemplations, and stop us in our researches after truth. Besides, it distracts us with irregular desires, fears, and vain amours, setting before us so many fantastic images of things, that the common saying is here most true, that on account of the body we can never become wise. For wars, popular seditions, and shedding of blood by the sword are owing to no other original than this care of the body and gratifying its licentious appetites; for we fight only to get riches, and these we acquire only to please the body; so that those who are thus employed have not leisure to be philosophers. And after all, when we have retrieved an interval of time to seek after truth, the body officiously interrupts us, is so troublesome and importune, that we can by no means discern its nature. Therefore it is evident that, if we will clearly know any thing, we must divest ourselves of the body, and behold things as they are in themselves with the mind itself, that at last we may attain what we so much desire, and what we do profess ourselves the most partial admirers of, which is wisdom. And this we cannot consummately enjoy till after death, as reason teacheth us. For if so be that we can understand nothing clearly as long as we are clogged with flesh, one of these things must needs be, either that we shall never arrive at that knowledge at all, or only when we die; for then the soul will exist by itself, separate from the body; and whilst we are in this life, we shall make the nearest advances towards it, if we have no more to do with the body than what decency and necessity require, if we break off all commerce with it, and keep ourselves pure from its contagion, till God shall give us a final release, and then being pure and freed from all its follies, we shall converse (it is likely) with intelligences as pure as ourselves, with our unaided vision beholding perfect purity,—and this is truth itself. For it is not fit that what is pure should be apprehended by what is impure.
Therefore, if death only transports us to another place, it is not to be looked upon as an evil, but rather as an exceeding good, as Plato hath demonstrated. The words of Socrates to his judges seem to me to be spoken even with inspiration: To fear death, gentlemen, is nothing else than to counterfeit the being wise, when we are not so. For he that fears death pretends to know what he is ignorant of; for no man is certain whether death be not the greatest good that can befall a man, but they positively dread it as if they were sure it was the greatest of evils. Agreeably to this said one after this manner:— Let no man fear what doth his labors end;— / and death sets us free even from the greatest evils.
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