ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ πᾶν τὸ δίκαιον ὅσιον; ἢ τὸ μὲν ὅσιον πᾶν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον οὐ πᾶν ὅσιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ ὅσιον, τὸ δέ τι καὶ ἄλλο;
ΕΥΘ. οὐχ ἕπομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῖς λεγομένοις.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν νεώτερός γέ μου εἶ οὐκ ἔλαττον ἢ ὅσῳ σοφώτερος· ἀλλʼ, ὃ λέγω, τρυφᾷς ὑπὸ πλούτου τῆς σοφίας. ἀλλʼ, ὦ μακάριε, σύντεινε σαυτόν· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ χαλεπὸν κατανοῆσαι ὃ λέγω. λέγω γὰρ δὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ ὁ ποιητὴς ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιήσας—Ζῆνα δὲ τὸν [θʼ] ἔρξαντα καὶ ὃς τάδε πάντʼ ἐφύτευσεν / οὐκ ἐθέλει νεικεῖν· ἵνα γὰρ δέος ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς. / ἐγὼ οὖν τούτῳ διαφέρομαι τῷ ποιητῇ. εἴπω σοι ὅπῃ;
ΕΥΘ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. οὐ δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι «ἵνα δέος ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς» πολλοὶ γάρ μοι δοκοῦσι καὶ νόσους καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα δεδιότες δεδιέναι μέν, αἰδεῖσθαι δὲ μηδὲν ταῦτα ἃ δεδίασιν· οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ;
ΕΥΘ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἵνα γε αἰδὼς ἔνθα καὶ δέος εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ἔστιν ὅστις αἰδούμενός τι πρᾶγμα καὶ αἰσχυνόμενος οὐ πεφόβηταί τε καὶ δέδοικεν ἅμα δόξαν πονηρίας;
ΕΥΘ. δέδοικε μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρʼ ὀρθῶς ἔχει λέγειν· «ἵνα γὰρ δέος ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς,» ἀλλʼ ἵνα μὲν αἰδὼς ἔνθα καὶ δέος, οὐ μέντοι ἵνα γε δέος πανταχοῦ αἰδώς· ἐπὶ πλέον γὰρ οἶμαι δέος αἰδοῦς. μόριον γὰρ αἰδὼς δέους ὥσπερ ἀριθμοῦ περιττόν, ὥστε οὐχ ἵναπερ ἀριθμὸς ἔνθα καὶ περιττόν, ἵνα δὲ περιττὸν ἔνθα καὶ ἀριθμός. ἕπῃ γάρ που νῦν γε;
ΕΥΘ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. τὸ τοιοῦτον τοίνυν καὶ ἐκεῖ λέγων ἠρώτων· ἆρα ἵνα δίκαιον ἔνθα καὶ ὅσιον; ἢ ἵνα μὲν ὅσιον ἔνθα καὶ δίκαιον, ἵνα δὲ δίκαιον οὐ πανταχοῦ ὅσιον· μόριον γὰρ τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον; οὕτω φῶμεν ἢ ἄλλως σοι δοκεῖ;
ΕΥΘ. οὔκ, ἀλλʼ οὕτω. φαίνῃ γάρ μοι ὀρθῶς λέγειν.
ΣΩ. ὅρα δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο. εἰ γὰρ μέρος τὸ ὅσιον τοῦ δικαίου, δεῖ δὴ ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐξευρεῖν τὸ ποῖον μέρος ἂν εἴη τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον. εἰ μὲν οὖν σύ με ἠρώτας τι τῶν νυνδή, οἷον ποῖον μέρος ἐστὶν ἀριθμοῦ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τίς ὢν τυγχάνει οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμός, εἶπον ἂν ὅτι ὃς ἂν μὴ σκαληνὸς ᾖ ἀλλʼ ἰσοσκελής· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;
ΕΥΘ. ἔμοιγε.
ΣΩ. πειρῶ δὴ καὶ σὺ ἐμὲ οὕτω διδάξαι τὸ ποῖον μέρος τοῦ δικαίου ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ἵνα καὶ Μελήτῳ λέγωμεν μηκέθʼ ἡμᾶς ἀδικεῖν μηδὲ ἀσεβείας γράφεσθαι, ὡς ἱκανῶς ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ μεμαθηκότας τά τε εὐσεβῆ καὶ ὅσια καὶ τὰ μή.
ΕΥΘ. τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὅσιον, τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ δικαίου μέρος.
Socrates. But is everything that is right also holy? Or is all which is holy right, and not all which is right holy, but part of it holy and part something else?
Euthyphro. I can’t follow you, Socrates.
Socrates. And yet you are as much younger than I as you are wiser; but, as I said, you are indolent on account of your wealth of wisdom. But exert yourself, my friend; for it is not hard to understand what I mean. What I mean is the opposite of what the poet said, who wrote: Zeus the creator, him who made all things, / thou wilt not name; for where fear is, there also is reverence. Now I disagree with the poet. Shall I tell you how?
Euthyphro. By all means.
Socrates. It does not seem to me true that where fear is, there also is reverence; for many who fear diseases and poverty and other such things seem to me to fear, but not to reverence at all these things which they fear. Don’t you think so, too?
Euthyphro. Certainly.
Socrates. But I think that where reverence is, there also is fear; for does not everyone who has a feeling of reverence and shame about any act also dread and fear the reputation for wickedness?
Euthyphro. Yes, he does fear.
Socrates. Then it is not correct to say “where fear is, there also is reverence.” On the contrary, where reverence is, there also is fear; but reverence is not everywhere where fear is, since, as I think, fear is more comprehensive than reverence; for reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number, so that it is not true that where number is, there also is the odd, but that where the odd is, there also is number. Perhaps you follow me now?
Euthyphro. Perfectly.
Socrates. It was something of this sort that I meant before, when I asked whether where the right is, there also is holiness, or where holiness is, there also is the right; but holiness is not everywhere where the right is, for holiness is a part of the right. Do we agree to this, or do you dissent?
Euthyphro. No, I agree; for I think the statement is correct.
Socrates. Now observe the next point. If holiness is a part of the right, we must, apparently, find out what part of the right holiness is. Now if you asked me about one of the things I just mentioned, as, for example, what part of number the even was, and what kind of a number it was I should say, “that which is not indivisible by two, but divisible by two”; or don’t you agree?
Euthyphro. I agree.
Socrates. Now try in your turn to teach me what part of the right holiness is, that I may tell Meletus not to wrong me any more or bring suits against me for impiety, since I have now been duly instructed by you about what is, and what is not, pious and holy.
Euthyphro. This then is my opinion, Socrates, that the part of the right which has to do with attention to the gods constitutes piety and holiness, and that the remaining part of the right is that which has to do with the service of men.
ΣΩ. καὶ καλῶς γέ μοι, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, φαίνῃ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ σμικροῦ τινος ἔτι ἐνδεής εἰμι· τὴν γὰρ θεραπείαν οὔπω συνίημι ἥντινα ὀνομάζεις. οὐ γάρ που λέγεις γε, οἷαίπερ καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα θεραπεῖαί εἰσιν, τοιαύτην καὶ περὶ θεούς— λέγομεν γάρ που—οἷόν φαμεν ἵππους οὐ πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν ἀλλὰ ὁ ἱππικός· ἦ γάρ;
ΕΥΘ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. ἡ γάρ που ἱππικὴ ἵππων θεραπεία.
ΕΥΘ. ναί.
ΣΩ. οὐδέ γε κύνας πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν ἀλλὰ ὁ κυνηγετικός.
ΕΥΘ. οὕτω.
ΣΩ. ἡ γάρ που κυνηγετικὴ κυνῶν θεραπεία.
ΕΥΘ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ἡ δέ γε βοηλατικὴ βοῶν.
ΕΥΘ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. ἡ δὲ δὴ ὁσιότης τε καὶ εὐσέβεια θεῶν, ὦ Εὐθύφρων; οὕτω λέγεις;
ΕΥΘ. ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν θεραπεία γε πᾶσα ταὐτὸν διαπράττεται; οἷον τοιόνδε· ἐπʼ ἀγαθῷ τινί ἐστι καὶ ὠφελίᾳ τοῦ θεραπευομένου, ὥσπερ ὁρᾷς δὴ ὅτι οἱ ἵπποι ὑπὸ τῆς ἱππικῆς θεραπευόμενοι ὠφελοῦνται καὶ βελτίους γίγνονται· ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι;
ΕΥΘ. ἔμοιγε.
ΣΩ. καὶ οἱ κύνες γέ που ὑπὸ τῆς κυνηγετικῆς, καὶ οἱ βόες ὑπὸ τῆς βοηλατικῆς, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὡσαύτως· ἢ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ οἴει τοῦ θεραπευομένου τὴν θεραπείαν εἶναι;
ΕΥΘ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐπʼ ὠφελίᾳ;
ΕΥΘ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν καὶ ἡ ὁσιότης θεραπεία οὖσα θεῶν ὠφελία τέ ἐστι θεῶν καὶ βελτίους τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖ; καὶ σὺ τοῦτο συγχωρήσαις ἄν, ὡς ἐπειδάν τι ὅσιον ποιῇς, βελτίω τινὰ τῶν θεῶν ἀπεργάζῃ;
ΕΥΘ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, οἶμαί σε τοῦτο λέγειν —πολλοῦ καὶ δέω—ἀλλὰ τούτου δὴ ἕνεκα καὶ ἀνηρόμην τίνα ποτὲ λέγοις τὴν θεραπείαν τῶν θεῶν, οὐχ ἡγούμενός σε τοιαύτην λέγειν.
ΕΥΘ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ τοιαύτην λέγω.
ΣΩ. εἶεν· ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ θεῶν θεραπεία εἴη ἂν ἡ ὁσιότης;
ΕΥΘ. ἥνπερ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δοῦλοι τοὺς δεσπότας θεραπεύουσιν.
ΣΩ. μανθάνω· ὑπηρετική τις ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη θεοῖς.
ΕΥΘ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. ἔχοις ἂν οὖν εἰπεῖν ἡ ἰατροῖς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν τυγχάνει οὖσα ὑπηρετική; οὐκ εἰς ὑγιείας οἴει;
ΕΥΘ. ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ ἡ ναυπηγοῖς ὑπηρετική; εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετική ἐστιν;
ΕΥΘ. δῆλον ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς πλοίου.
ΣΩ. καὶ ἡ οἰκοδόμοις γέ που εἰς οἰκίας;
ΕΥΘ. ναί.
ΣΩ. εἰπὲ δή, ὦ ἄριστε· ἡ δὲ θεοῖς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετικὴ ἂν εἴη; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι σὺ οἶσθα, ἐπειδήπερ τά γε θεῖα κάλλιστα φῂς εἰδέναι ἀνθρώπων.
ΕΥΘ. καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. εἰπὲ δὴ πρὸς Διὸς τί ποτέ ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ πάγκαλον ἔργον ὃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται ἡμῖν ὑπηρέταις χρώμενοι;
Socrates. I think you are correct, Euthyphro; but there is one little point about which I still want information, for I do not yet understand what you mean by “attention.” I don’t suppose you mean the same kind of attention to the gods which is paid to other things. We say, for example, that not everyone knows how to attend to horses, but only he who is skilled in horsemanship, do we not?
Euthyphro. Certainly.
Socrates. Then horsemanship is the art of attending to horses?
Euthyphro. Yes.
Socrates. And not everyone knows how to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman?
Euthyphro. That is so.
Socrates. Then the huntsman’s art is the art of attending to dogs?
Euthyphro. Yes.
Socrates. And the oxherd’s art is that of attending to oxen?
Euthyphro. Certainly.
Socrates. And holiness and piety is the art of attending to the gods? Is that what you mean, Euthyphro?
Euthyphro. Yes.
Socrates. Now does attention always aim to accomplish the same end? I mean something like this: It aims at some good or benefit to the one to whom it is given, as you see that horses, when attended to by the horseman’s art are benefited and made better; or don’t you think so?
Euthyphro. Yes, I do.
Socrates. And dogs are benefited by the huntsman’s art and oxen by the oxherd’s and everything else in the same way? Or do you think care and attention are ever meant for the injury of that which is cared for?
Euthyphro. No, by Zeus, I do not.
Socrates. But for its benefit?
Euthyphro. Of course.
Socrates. Then holiness, since it is the art of attending to the gods, is a benefit to the gods, and makes them better? And you would agree that when you do a holy or pious act you are making one of the gods better?
Euthyphro. No, by Zeus, not I.
Socrates. Nor do I, Euthyphro, think that is what you meant. Far from it. But I asked what you meant by “attention to the gods” just because I did not think you meant anything like that.
Euthyphro. You are right, Socrates; that is not what I mean.
Socrates. Well, what kind of attention to the gods is holiness?
Euthyphro. The kind, Socrates, that servants pay to their masters.
Socrates. I understand. It is, you mean, a kind of service to the gods?
Euthyphro. Exactly.
Socrates. Now can you tell me what result the art that serves the physician serves to produce? Is it not health?
Euthyphro. Yes.
Socrates. Well then; what is it which the art that serves shipbuilders serves to produce?
Euthyphro. Evidently, Socrates, a ship.
Socrates. And that which serves housebuilders serves to build a house?
Euthyphro. Yes.
Socrates. Then tell me, my friend; what would the art which serves the gods serve to accomplish? For it is evident that you know, since you say you know more than any other man about matters which have to do with the gods.
Euthyphro. And what I say is true, Socrates.
Socrates. Then, in the name of Zeus, tell me, what is that glorious result which the gods accomplish by using us as servants?
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