PHILEBUS by Plato, Part 09
Soc. And yet surely by far the greatest number err about the goods of the mind; they imagine themselves to be much better men than they are.
Pro. Yes, that is by far the commonest delusion.
Soc. And of all the virtues, is not wisdom the one which the mass of mankind are always claiming, and which most arouses in them a spirit of contention and lying conceit of wisdom?
Soc. And may not all this be truly called an evil condition?
Pro. Very evil.
Soc But we must pursue the division a step further, Protarchus, if we would see in envy of the childish sort a singular mixture of pleasure and pain.
Pro. How can we make the further division which you suggest?
Soc. All who are silly enough to entertain this lying conceit of themselves may of course be divided, like the rest of mankind, into two classes-one having power and might; and the other the reverse.
Soc. Let this, then, be the principle of division; those of them who are weak and unable to revenge themselves, when they are laughed at, may be truly called ridiculous, but those who can defend themselves may be more truly described as strong and formidable; for ignorance in the powerul is hateful and horrible, because hurtful to others both in reality and in fiction, but powerless ignorance may be reckoned, and in truth is, ridiculous.
Pro. That is very true, but I do not as yet see where is the admixture of pleasures and pains.
Soc. Well, then, let us examine the nature of envy.
Soc. Is not envy an unrighteous pleasure, and also an unrighteous pain?
Pro. Most true.
Soc. There is nothing envious or wrong in rejoicing at the misfortunes of enemies?
Pro. Certainly not.
Soc. But to feel joy instead of sorrow at the sight of our friends' misfortunes-is not that wrong?
Soc. Did we not say that ignorance was always an evil?
Soc. And the three kinds of vain conceit in our friends which we enumerated-the vain conceit of beauty, of wisdom, and of wealth, are ridiculous if they are weak, and detestable when they are powerful: May we not say, as I was saying before, that our friends who are in this state of mind, when harmless to others, are simply ridiculous?
Pro. They are ridiculous.
Soc. And do we not acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to be a misfortune?
Soc. And do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it?
Pro. Clearly we feel pleasure.
Soc. And was not envy the source of this pleasure which we feel at the misfortunes of friends?
Soc. Then the argument shows that when we laugh at the folly of our friends, pleasure, in mingling with envy, mingles with pain, for envy has been acknowledged by us to be mental pain, and laughter is pleasant; and so we envy and laugh at the same instant.
Soc. And the argument implies that there are combinations of pleasure and pain in lamentations, and in tragedy and comedy, not only on the stage, but on the greater stage of human life; and so in endless other cases.
Pro. I do not see how any one can deny what you say, Socrates, however eager he may be to assert the opposite opinion.
Soc. I mentioned anger, desire, sorrow, fear, love, emulation, envy, and similar emotions, as examples in which we should find a mixture of the two elements so often named; did I not?
Soc. We may observe that our conclusions hitherto have had reference only to sorrow and envy and anger.
Pro. I see.
Soc. Then many other cases still remain?
Soc. And why do you suppose me to have pointed out to you the admixture which takes place in comedy? Why but to convince you that there was no difficulty in showing the mixed nature of fear and love and similar affections; and I thought that when I had given you the illustration, you would have let me off, and have acknowledged as a general truth that the body without the soul, and the soul without the body, as well as the two united, are susceptible of all sorts of admixtures of pleasures and pains; and so further discussion would have been unnecessary. And now I want to know whether I may depart; or will you keep me here until midnight? I fancy that I may obtain my release without many words;-if I promise that to-morrow I will give you an account of all these cases. But at present I would rather sail in another direction, and go to other matters which remain to be settled, before the judgment can be given which Philebus demands.
Pro. Very good, Socrates; in what remains take your own course.
Soc. Then after the mixed pleasures the unmixed should have their turn; this is the natural and necessary order.
Soc. These, in turn, then, I will now endeavour to indicate; for with the maintainers of the opinion that all pleasures are a cessation of pain, I do not agree, but, as I was saying, I use them as witnesses, that there are pleasures which seem only and are not, and there are others again which have great power and appear in many forms, yet are intermingled with pains, and are partly alleviations of agony and distress, both of body and mind.
Pro. Then what pleasures, Socrates, should we be right in conceiving to be true?
Soc. True pleasures are those which are given by beauty of colour and form, and most of of those which arise from smells; those of sound, again, and in general those of which the want is painless and unconscious, and of which the fruition is palpable to sense and pleasant and unalloyed with pain.
Pro. Once more, Socrates, I must ask what you mean.
Soc. My meaning is certainly not obvious, and I will endeavour to be plainer. I do not mean by beauty of form such beauty as that of animals or pictures, which the many would suppose to be my meaning; but, says the argument, understand me to mean straight lines and circles, and the plane solid figures which are formed out of them by turning-lathes and rulers and measurers of angles; for these I affirm to be not only relatively beautiful, like other things, but they are eternally and absolutely beautiful, and they have peculiar pleasures, quite unlike the pleasures of scratching. And there are colours which are of the same character, and have similar pleasures; now do you understand my meaning?
Pro. I am trying to understand, Socrates, and I hope that you will try to make your meaning dearer.
Soc. When sounds are smooth and clear, and have a single pure tone, then I mean to say that they are not relatively but absolutely beautiful, and have natural pleasures associated with them.
Pro. Yes, there are such pleasures.
Soc. The pleasures of smell are of a less ethereal sort, but they have no necessary admixture of pain; and all pleasures, however and wherever experienced, which are unattended by pains, I assign to an analogous class. Here then are two kinds of pleasures.
Pro. I understand.
Soc. To these may be added the pleasures of knowledge, if no hunger of knowledge and no pain caused by such hunger precede them.
Pro. And this is the case.
Soc. Well, but if a man who is full of knowledge loses his knowledge, are there not pains of forgetting?
Pro. Not necessarily, but there may be times of reflection, when he feels grief at the loss of his knowledge.
Soc. Yes, my friend, but at present we are enumerating only the natural perceptions, and have nothing to do with reflection.
Pro. In that case you are right in saying that the loss of knowledge is not attended with pain.
Soc. These pleasures of knowledge, then, are unmixed with pain; and they are not the pleasures of the many but of a very few.
Pro. Quite true.
Soc. And now, having fairly separated the pure pleasures and those which may be rightly termed impure, let us further add to our description of them, that the pleasures which are in excess have no measure, but that those which are not in excess have measure; the great, the excessive, whether more or less frequent, we shall be right in referring to the class of the infinite, and of the more and less, which pours through body and soul alike; and the others we shall refer to the class which has measure.
Pro. Quite right, Socrates.
Soc. Still there is something more to be considered about pleasures.
Pro. What is it?
Soc. When you speak of purity and clearness, or of excess, abundance, greatness and sufficiency, in what relation do these terms stand to truth?
Pro. Why do you ask, Socrates?
Soc. Because, Protarchus, I should wish to test pleasure and knowledge in every possible way, in order that if there be a pure and impure element in either of them, I may present the pure element for judgment, and then they will be more easily judged of by you and by me and by all of us.
Pro. Most true.
Soc. Let us investigate all the pure kinds; first selecting for consideration a single instance.
Pro. What instance shall we select?
Soc. Suppose that we first of all take whiteness.
Pro. Very good.
Soc. How can there be purity in whiteness, and what purity? Is that purest which is greatest or most in quantity, or that which is most unadulterated and freest from any admixture of other colours?
Pro. Clearly that which is most unadulterated.
Soc. True, Protarchus; and so the purest white, and not the greatest or largest in quantity, is to be deemed truest and most beautiful?
Soc. And we shall be quite right in saying that a little pure white is whiter and fairer and truer than a great deal that is mixed.
Pro. Perfectly right.
Soc. There is no need of adducing many similar examples in illustration of the argument about pleasures; one such is sufficient to prove to us that a small pleasure or a small amount of pleasure, if pure or unalloyed with pain. is always pleasanter and truer and fairer than a great pleasure or a great amount of pleasure of another kind.
Pro. Assuredly; and the instance you have given is quite sufficient.
Soc. But what do you say of another question:-have we not heard that pleasure is always a generation, and has no true being? Do not certain ingenious philosophers teach this doctrine, and ought not we to be grateful to them?
Pro. What do they mean?
Soc. I will explain to you, my dear Protarchus, what they mean, by putting a question.
Pro. Ask, and I will answer.
Soc. I assume that there are two natures, one self-existent, and the other ever in want of something.
Pro. What manner of natures are they?
Soc. The one majestic ever, the other inferior.
Pro. You speak riddles.
Soc. You have seen loves good and fair, and also brave lovers of them.
Pro. I should think so.
Soc. Search the universe for two terms which are like these two and are present everywhere.
Pro. Yet a third time I must say, Be a little plainer, Socrates.
Soc. There is no difficulty, Protarchus; the argument is only in play, and insinuates that some things are for the sake of something else (relatives), and that other things are the ends to which the former class subserve (absolutes).
Pro. Your many repetitions make me slow to understand.
Soc. As the argument proceeds, my boy, I dare say that the meaning will become clearer.
Pro. Very likely.
Soc. Here are two new principles.
Pro. What are they?