PHILEBUS by Plato, Part 07
Soc. The bad, too, have pleasures painted in their fancy as well as the good; but I presume that they are false pleasures.
Pro. They are.
Soc. The bad then commonly delight in false pleasures, and the good in true pleasures?
Soc. Then upon this view there are false pleasures in the souls of men which are a ludicrous imitation of the true, and there are pains of a similar character?
Pro. There are.
Soc. And did we not allow that a man who had an opinion at all had a real opinion, but often about things which had no existence either in the past, present, or future?
Pro. Quite true.
Soc. And this was the source of false opinion and opining; am I not right?
Soc. And must we not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real but illusory character?
Pro. How do you mean?
Soc. I mean to say that a man must be admitted to have real pleasure; who is pleased with anything or anyhow; and he may be pleased about things which neither have nor have ever had any real existence, and, more often than not, are never likely to exist.
Pro. Yes, Socrates, that again is undeniable.
Soc. And may not the same be said about fear and anger and the like; are they not often false?
Pro. Quite so.
Soc. And can opinions be good or bad except in as far as they are true or false?
Pro. In no other way.
Soc. Nor can pleasures be conceived to be bad except in so far as they are false.
Pro. Nay, Socrates, that is the very opposite of truth; for no one would call pleasures and pains bad because they are false, but by reason of some other great corruption to which they are liable.
Soc. Well, of pleasures which are and caused by corruption we will hereafter speak, if we care to continue the enquiry; for the present I would rather show by another argument that there are many false pleasures existing or coming into existence in us, because this may assist our final decision.
Pro. Very true; that is to say, if there are such pleasures.
Soc. I think that there are, Protarchus; but this is an opinion which should be well assured, and not rest upon a mere assertion.
Pro. Very good.
Soc. Then now, like wrestlers, let us approach and grasp this new argument.
Soc. We were maintaining a little while since, that when desires, as they are termed, exist in us, then the body has separate feelings apart from the soul-do you remember?
Pro. Yes, I remember that you said so.
Soc. And the soul was supposed to desire the opposite of the bodily state, while the body was the source of any pleasure or pain which was experienced.
Soc. Then now you may infer what happens in such cases.
Pro. What am I to infer?
Soc. That in such cases pleasure and pains come simultaneously; and there is a juxtaposition of the opposite sensations which correspond to them, as has been already shown.
Soc. And there is another point to which we have agreed.
Pro. What is it?
Soc. That pleasure and pain both admit of more and less, and that they are of the class of infinites.
Pro. Certainly, we said so.
Soc. But how can we rightly judge of them?
Pro. How can we?
Soc. It is our intention to judge of their comparative importance and intensity, measuring pleasure against pain, and pain against pain, and pleasure against pleasure?
Pro. Yes, such is our intention, and we shall judge of them accordingly.
Soc. Well, take the case of sight. Does not the nearness or distance of magnitudes obscure their true proportions, and make us opine falsely; and do we not find the same illusion happening in the case of pleasures and pains?
Pro. Yes, Socrates, and in a degree far greater.
Soc. Then what we are now saying is the opposite of what we were saying before.
Pro. What was that?
Soc. Then the opinions were true and false, and infected the pleasures and pains with their own falsity.
Pro. Very true.
Soc. But now it is the pleasures which are said to be true and false because they are seen at various distances, and subjected to comparison; the pleasures appear to be greater and more vehement when placed side by side with the pains, and the pains when placed side by side with the pleasures.
Pro. Certainly, and for the reason which you mention.
Soc. And suppose you part off from pleasures and pains the element which makes them appear to be greater or less than they really are: you will acknowledge that this element is illusory, and you will never say that the corresponding excess or defect of pleasure or pain is real or true.
Pro. Certainly not.
Soc. Next let us see whether in another direction we may not find pleasures and pains existing and appearing in living beings, which are still more false than these.
Pro. What are they, and how shall we find them?
Soc. If I am not mistaken, I have often repeated that pains and aches and suffering and uneasiness of all sorts arise out of a corruption of nature caused by concretions, and dissolutions, and repletions, and evacuations, and also by growth and decay?
Pro. Yes, that has been often said.
Soc. And we have also agreed that the restoration of the natural state is pleasure?
Soc. But now let us suppose an interval of time at which the body experiences none of these changes.
Pro. When can that be, Socrates?
Soc. Your question, Protarchus, does not help the argument.
Pro. Why not, Socrates?
Soc. Because it does not prevent me from repeating mine.
Pro. And what was that?
Soc. Why, Protarchus, admitting that there is no such interval, I may ask what would be the necessary consequence if there were?
Pro. You mean, what would happen if the body were not changed either for good or bad?
Pro. Why then, Socrates, I should suppose that there would be neither pleasure nor pain.
Soc. Very good; but still, if I am not mistaken, you do assert that we must always be experiencing one of them; that is what the wise tell us; for, say they, all things are ever flowing up and down.
Pro. Yes, and their words are of no mean authority.
Soc. Of course, for they are no mean authorities themselves; and I should like to avoid the brunt of their argument. Shall I tell you how I mean to escape from them? And you shall be the partner of my flight.
Soc. To them we will say: "Good; but are we, or living things in general, always conscious of what happens to us-for example, of our growth, or the like? Are we not, on the contrary, almost wholly unconscious of this and similar phenomena?" You must answer for them.
Pro. The latter alternative is the true one.
Soc. Then we were not right in saying, just now, that motions going up and down cause pleasures and pains?
Soc. A better and more unexceptionable way of speaking will be-
Soc. If we say that the great changes produce pleasures and pains, but that the moderate and lesser ones do neither.
Pro. That, Socrates, is the more correct mode of speaking.
Soc. But if this be true, the life to which I was just now referring again appears.
Pro. What life?
Soc. The life which we affirmed to be devoid either of pain or of joy.
Pro. Very true.
Soc. We may assume then that there are three lives, one pleasant, one painful, and the third which is neither; what say you?
Pro. I should say as you do that there are three of them.
Soc. But if so, the negation of pain will not be the same with pleasure.
Pro. Certainly not.
Soc. Then when you hear a person saying, that always to live without pain is the pleasantest of all things, what would you understand him to mean by that statement?
Pro. I think that by pleasure he must mean the negative of pain.
Soc. Let us take any three things; or suppose that we embellish a little and call the first gold, the second silver, and there shall be a third which is neither.
Pro. Very good.
Soc. Now, can that which is neither be either gold or silver?
Soc. No more can that neutral or middle life be rightly or reasonably spoken or thought of as pleasant or painful.
Pro. Certainly not.
Soc. And yet, my friend, there are, as we know, persons who say and think so.
Soc. And do they think that they have pleasure when they are free from pain?
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