PHILEBUS by Plato, Part 05
Soc. Then just be so good as to change the terms.
Pro. How shall I change them?
Soc. Instead of the oblivion of the soul, when you are describing the state in which she is unaffected by the shocks of the body, say unconsciousness.
Pro. I see.
Soc. And the union or communion of soul and body in one feeling and motion would be properly called consciousness?
Pro. Most true.
Soc. Then now we know the meaning of the word?
Soc. And memory may, I think, be rightly described as the preservation of consciousness?
Soc. But do we not distinguish memory from recollection?
Pro. I think so.
Soc. And do we not mean by recollection the power which the soul has of recovering, when by herself, some feeling which she experienced when in company with the body?
Soc. And when she recovers of herself the lost recollection of some consciousness or knowledge, the recovery is termed recollection and reminiscence?
Pro. Very true.
Soc. There is a reason why I say all this.
Pro. What is it?
Soc. I want to attain the plainest possible notion of pleasure and desire, as they exist in the mind only, apart from the body; and the previous analysis helps to show the nature of both.
Pro. Then now, Socrates, let us proceed to the next point.
Soc. There are certainly many things to be considered in discussing the generation and whole complexion of pleasure. At the outset we must determine the nature and seat of desire.
Pro. Ay; let us enquire into that, for we shall lose nothing.
Soc. Nay, Protarchus, we shall surely lose the puzzle if we find the answer.
Pro. A fair retort; but let us proceed.
Soc. Did we not place hunger, thirst, and the like, in the class of desires?
Soc. And yet they are very different; what common nature have we in view when we call them by a single name?
Pro. By heavens, Socrates, that is a question which is, not easily answered; but it must be answered.
Soc. Then let us go back to our examples.
Pro. Where shall we begin?
Soc. Do we mean anything when we say "a man thirsts"?
Soc. We mean to say that he "is empty"?
Pro. Of course.
Soc. And is not thirst desire?
Pro. Yes, of drink.
Soc. Would you say of drink, or of replenishment with drink?
Pro. I should say, of replenishment with drink.
Soc. Then he who is empty desires, as would appear, the opposite of what he experiences; for he is empty and desires to be full?
Pro. Clearly so.
Soc. But how can a man who is empty for the first time, attain either by perception or memory to any apprehension of replenishment, of which he has no present or past experience?
Soc. And yet he who desires, surely desires something?
Pro. Of course.
Soc. He does not desire that which he experiences, for he experiences thirst, and thirst is emptiness; but he desires replenishment?
Soc. Then there must be something in the thirsty man which in some way apprehends replenishment?
Pro. There must.
Soc. And that cannot be the body, for the body is supposed to be emptied?
Soc. The only remaining alternative is that the soul apprehends the replenishment by the help of memory; as is obvious, for what other way can there be?
Pro. I cannot imagine any other.
Soc. But do you see the consequence?
Pro. What is it?
Soc. That there is no such thing as desire of the body.
Pro. Why so?
Soc. Why, because the argument shows that the endeavour of every animal is to the reverse of his bodily state.
Soc. And the impulse which leads him to the opposite of what he is experiencing proves that he has a memory of the opposite state.
Soc. And the argument, having proved that memory attracts us towards the objects of desire, proves also that the impulses and the desires and the moving principle in every living being have their origin in the soul.
Pro. Most true.
Soc. The argument will not allow that our body either hungers or thirsts or has any similar experience.
Pro. Quite right.
Soc. Let me make a further observation; the argument appears to me to imply that there is a kind of life which consists in these affections.
Pro. Of what affections, and of what kind of life, are you speaking?
Soc. I am speaking of being emptied and replenished, and of all that relates to the preservation and destruction of living beings, as well as of the pain which is felt in one of these states and of the pleasure which succeeds to it.
Soc. And what would you say of the intermediate state?
Pro. What do you mean by "intermediate"?
Soc. I mean when a person is in actual suffering and yet remembers past pleasures which, if they would only return, would relieve him; but as yet he has them not. May we not say of him, that he is in an intermediate state?
Soc. Would you say that he was wholly pained or wholly pleased?
Pro. Nay, I should say that he has two pains; in his body there is the actual experience of pain, and in his soul longing and expectation.
Soc. What do you mean, Protarchus, by the two pains? May not a man who is empty have at one time a sure hope of being filled, and at other times be quite in despair?
Pro. Very true.
Soc. And has he not the pleasure of memory when he is hoping to be filled, and yet in that he is empty is he not at the same time in pain?
Soc. Then man and the other animals have at the same time both pleasure and pain?
Pro. I suppose so.
Soc. But when a man is empty and has no hope of being filled, there will be the double experience of pain. You observed this and inferred that the double experience was the single case possible.
Pro. Quite true, Socrates.
Soc. Shall the enquiry into these states of feeling be made the occasion of raising a question?
Pro. What question?
Soc. Whether we ought to say that the pleasures and pains of which we are speaking are true or false? or some true and some false?
Pro. But how, Socrates, can there be false pleasures and pains?
Soc. And how, Protarchus, can there be true and false fears, or true and false expectations, or true and false opinions?
Pro. I grant that opinions may be true or false, but not pleasures.
Soc. What do you mean? I am afraid that we are raising a very serious enquiry.
Pro. There I agree.
Soc. And yet, my boy, for you are one of Philebus' boys, the point to be considered, is, whether the enquiry is relevant to the argument.
Soc. No tedious and irrelevant discussion can be allowed; what is said should be pertinent.
Soc. I am always wondering at the question which has now been raised.
Pro. How so?
Soc. Do you deny that some pleasures are false, and others true?
Pro. To be sure I do.
Soc. Would you say that no one ever seemed to rejoice and yet did not rejoice, or seemed to feel pain and yet did not feel pain, sleeping or waking, mad or lunatic?