PHILEBUS by Plato, Part 04
Pro. Let me hear.
Soc. We see that the elements which enter into the nature of the bodies of all animals, fire, water, air, and, as the storm-tossed sailor cries, "land" [i.e., earth], reappear in the constitution of the world.
Pro. The proverb may be applied to us; for truly the storm gathers over us, and we are at our wit's end.
Soc. There is something to be remarked about each of these elements.
Pro. What is it?
Soc. Only a small fraction of any one of them exists in us, and that of a mean sort, and not in any way pure, or having any power worthy of its nature. One instance will prove this of all of them; there is fire within us, and in the universe.
Soc. And is not our fire small and weak and mean? But the fire in the universe is wonderful in quantity and beauty, and in every power that fire has.
Pro. Most true.
Soc. And is the fire in the universe nourished and generated and ruled by the fire in us, or is the fire in you and me, and in other animals, dependent on the universal fire?
Pro. That is a question which does not deserve an answer.
Soc. Right; and you would say the same, if I am not mistaken, of the earth which is in animals and the earth which is in the universe, and you would give a similar reply about all the other elements?
Pro. Why, how could any man who gave any other be deemed in his senses?
Soc. I do not think that he could-but now go on to the next step. When we saw those elements of which we have been speaking gathered up in one, did we not call them a body?
Pro. We did.
Soc. And the same may be said of the cosmos, which for the same reason may be considered to be a body, because made up of the same elements.
Pro. Very true.
Soc. But is our body nourished wholly by this body, or is this body nourished by our body, thence deriving and having the qualities of which we were just now speaking?
Pro. That again, Socrates, is a question which does not deserve to be asked.
Soc. Well, tell me, is this question worth asking?
Pro. What question?
Soc. May our body be said to have a soul?
Soc. And whence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the body of the universe, which contains elements like those in our bodies but in every way fairer, had also a soul? Can there be another source?
Pro. Clearly, Socrates, that is the only source.
Soc. Why, yes, Protarchus; for surely we cannot imagine that of the four classes, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the two, and the cause, the fourth, which enters into all things, giving to our bodies souls, and the art of self-management, and of healing disease, and operating in other ways to heal and organize, having too all the attributes of wisdom;-we cannot, I say, imagine that whereas the self-same elements exist, both in the entire heaven and in great provinces of the heaven, only fairer and purer, this last should not also in that higher sphere have designed the noblest and fairest things?
Pro. Such a supposition is quite unreasonable.
Soc. Then if this be denied, should we not be wise in adopting the other view and maintaining that there is in the universe a mighty infinite and an adequate limit, of which we have often spoken, as well as a presiding cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind?
Pro. Most justly.
Soc. And wisdom and mind cannot exist without soul?
Pro. Certainly not.
Soc. And in the divine nature of Zeus would you not say that there is the soul and mind of a king, because there is in him the power of the cause? And other gods have other attributes, by which they are pleased to be called.
Pro. Very true.
Soc. Do not then suppose that these words are rashly spoken by us, O Protarchus, for they are in harmony with the testimony of those who said of old time that mind rules the universe.
Soc. And they furnish an answer to my enquiry; for they imply that mind is the parent of that class of the four which we called the cause of all; and I think that you now have my answer.
Pro. I have indeed, and yet I did not observe that you had answered.
Soc. A jest is sometimes refreshing, Protarchus, when it interrupts earnest.
Pro. Very true.
Soc. I think, friend, that we have now pretty clearly set forth the class to which mind belongs and what is the power of mind.
Soc. And the class to which pleasure belongs has also been long ago discovered?
Soc. And let us remember, too, of both of them, (1) that mind was akin to the cause and of this family; and (2) that pleasure is infinite and belongs to the class which neither has, nor ever will have in itself, a beginning, middle, or end of its own.
Pro. I shall be sure to remember.
Soc. We must next examine what is their place and under what conditions they are generated. And we will begin with pleasure, since her class was first examined; and yet pleasure cannot be rightly tested apart from pain ever
Pro. If this is the road, let us take it.
Soc. I wonder whether you would agree with me about the origin of pleasure and pain.
Pro. What do you mean?
Soc. I mean to say that their natural seat is in the mixed class.
Pro. And would you tell me again, sweet Socrates, which of the aforesaid classes is the mixed one?
Soc. I will my fine fellow, to the best of my ability.
Pro. Very good.
Soc. Let us then understand the mixed class to be that which we placed third in the list of four.
Pro. That which followed the infinite and the finite; and in which you ranked health, and, if I am not mistaken, harmony.
Soc. Capital; and now will you please to give me your best attention?
Pro. Proceed; I am attending.
Soc. I say that when the harmony in animals is dissolved, there is also a dissolution of nature and a generation of pain.
Pro. That is very probable.
Soc. And the restoration of harmony and return to nature is the source of pleasure, if I may be allowed to speak in the fewest and shortest words about matters of the greatest moment.
Pro. I believe that you are right, Socrates; but will you try to be a little plainer?
Soc. Do not obvious and every-day phenomena furnish the simplest illustration?
Pro. What phenomena do you mean?
Soc. Hunger, for example, is a dissolution and a pain.
Soc. Whereas eating is a replenishment and a pleasure?
Soc. Thirst again is a destruction and a pain, but the effect of moisture replenishing the dry Place is a pleasure: once more, the unnatural separation and dissolution caused by heat is painful, and the natural restoration and refrigeration is pleasant.
Pro. Very true.
Soc. And the unnatural freezing of the moisture in an animal is pain, and the natural process of resolution and return of the elements to their original state is pleasure. And would not the general proposition seem to you to hold, that the destroying of the natural union of the finite and infinite, which, as I was observing before, make up the class of living beings, is pain, and that the process of return of all things to their own nature is pleasure?
Pro. Granted; what you say has a general truth.
Soc. Here then is one kind of pleasures and pains originating severally in the two processes which we have described?
Soc. Let us next assume that in the soul herself there is an antecedent hope of pleasure which is sweet and refreshing, and an expectation of pain, fearful and anxious.
Pro. Yes; this is another class of pleasures and pains, which is of the soul only, apart from the body, and is produced by expectation.
Soc. Right; for in the analysis of these, pure, as I suppose them to be, the pleasures being unalloyed with pain and the pains with pleasure, methinks that we shall see clearly whether the whole class of pleasure is to be desired, or whether this quality of entire desirableness is not rather to be attributed to another of the classes which have been mentioned; and whether pleasure and pain, like heat and cold, and other things of the same kind, are not sometimes to be desired and sometimes not to be desired, as being not in themselves good, but only sometimes and in some instances admitting of the nature of good.
Pro. You say most truly that this is the track which the investigation should pursue.
Soc. Well, then, assuming that pain ensues on the dissolution, and pleasure on the restoration of the harmony, let us now ask what will be the condition of animated beings who are neither in process of restoration nor of dissolution. And mind what you say: I ask whether any animal who is in that condition can possibly have any feeling of pleasure or pain, great or small?
Pro. Certainly not.
Soc. Then here we have a third state, over and above that of pleasure and of pain?
Pro. Very true.
Soc. And do not forget that there is such a state; it will make a great difference in our judgment of pleasure, whether we remember this or not. And I should like to say a few words about it.
Pro. What have you to say?
Soc. Why, you know that if a man chooses the life of wisdom, there is no reason why he should not live in this neutral state.
Pro. You mean that he may live neither rejoicing nor sorrowing?
Soc. Yes; and if I remember rightly, when the lives were compared, no degree of pleasure, whether great or small, was thought to be necessary to him who chose the life of thought and wisdom.
Pro. Yes, certainly, we said so.
Soc. Then he will live without pleasure; and who knows whether this may not be the most divine of all lives?
Pro. If so, the gods, at any rate, cannot be supposed to have either joy or sorrow.
Soc. Certainly not-there would be a great impropriety in the assumption of either alternative. But whether the gods are or are not indifferent to pleasure is a point which may be considered hereafter if in any way relevant to the argument, and whatever is the conclusion we will place it to the account of mind in her contest for the second place, should she have to resign the first.
Pro. Just so.
Soc. The other class of pleasures, which as we were saying is purely mental, is entirely derived from memory.
Pro. What do you mean?
Soc. I must first of all analyse memory, or rather perception which is prior to, memory, if the subject of our discussion is ever to be properly cleared up.
Pro. How will you proceed?
Soc. Let us imagine affections of the body which are extinguished before they reach the soul, and leave her unaffected; and again, other affections which vibrate through both soul and body, and impart a shock to both and to each of them.
Soc. And the soul may be truly said to be oblivious of the first but not of the second?
Pro. Quite true.
Soc. When I say oblivious, do not suppose that I mean forgetfulness in a literal sense; for forgetfulness is the exit of memory, which in this case has not yet entered; and to speak of the loss of that which is not yet in existence, and never has been, is a contradiction; do you see?