PHILEBUS by Plato, Part 03
Pro. That is most true.
Soc. Ever, as we say, into the hotter and the colder there enters a more and a less.
Soc. Then, says the argument, there is never any end of them, and being endless they must also be infinite.
Pro. Yes, Socrates, that is exceedingly true.
Soc. Yes, my dear Protarchus, and your answer reminds me that such an expression as "exceedingly," which you have just uttered, and also the term "gently," have the same significance as more or less; for whenever they occur they do not allow of the existence of quantity-they are always introducing degrees into actions, instituting a comparison of a more or a less excessive or a more or a less gentle, and at each creation of more or less, quantity disappears. For, as I was just now saying, if quantity and measure did not disappear, but were allowed to intrude in the sphere of more and less and the other comparatives, these last would be driven out of their own domain. When definite quantity is once admitted, there can be no longer a "hotter" or a "colder" (for these are always progressing, and are never in one stay); but definite quantity is at rest, and has ceased to progress. Which proves that comparatives, such as the hotter, and the colder, are to be ranked in the class of the infinite.
Pro. Your remark certainly, has the look of truth, Socrates; but these subjects, as you were saying, are difficult to follow at first. I think however, that if I could hear the argument repeated by you once or twice, there would be a substantial agreement between us.
Soc. Yes, and I will try to meet your wish; but, as I would rather not waste time in the enumeration of endless particulars, let me know whether I may not assume as a note of the infinite-
Soc. I want to know whether such things as appear to us to admit of more or less, or are denoted by the words "exceedingly," "gently," "extremely," and the like, may not be referred to the class of the infinite, which is their unity, for, as was asserted in the previous argument, all things that were divided and dispersed should be brought together, and have the mark or seal of some one nature, if possible, set upon them-do you remember?
Soc. And all things which do not admit of more or less, but admit their opposites, that is to say, first of all, equality, and the equal, or again, the double, or any other ratio of number and measure-all these may, I think, be rightly reckoned by us in the class of the limited or finite; what do you say?
Pro. Excellent, Socrates.
Soc. And now what nature shall we ascribe to the third or compound kind?
Pro. You, I think, will have to tell me that.
Soc. Rather God will tell you, if there be any God who will listen to my prayers.
Pro. Offer up a prayer, then, and think.
Soc. I am thinking, Protarchus, and I believe that some God has befriended us.
Pro. What do you mean, and what proof have you to offer of what you are saying?
Soc. I will tell you, and do you listen to my words.
Soc. Were we not speaking just now of hotter and colder?
Soc. Add to them drier, wetter, more, less, swifter, slower, greater, smaller, and all that in the preceding argument we placed under the unity of more and less.
Pro. In the class of the infinite, you mean?
Soc. Yes; and now mingle this with the other.
Pro. What is the other.
Soc. The class of the finite which we ought to have brought together as we did the infinite; but, perhaps, it will come to the same thing if we do so now;-when the two are combined, a third will appear.
Pro. What do you mean by the class of the finite?
Soc. The class of the equal and the double, and any class which puts an end to difference and opposition, and by introducing number creates harmony and proportion among the different elements.
Pro. I understand; you seem to me to mean that the various opposites, when you mingle with them the class of the finite, takes certain forms.
Soc. Yes, that is my meaning.
Soc. Does not the right participation in the finite give health-in disease, for instance?
Soc. And whereas the high and low, the swift and the slow are infinite or unlimited, does not the addition of the principles aforesaid introduce a limit, and perfect the whole frame of music?
Pro. Yes, certainly.
Soc. Or, again, when cold and heat prevail, does not the introduction of them take away excess and indefiniteness, and infuse moderation and harmony?
Soc. And from a like admixture of the finite and infinite come the seasons, and all the delights of life?
Pro. Most true.
Soc. I omit ten thousand other things, such as beauty and health and strength, and the many beauties and high perfections of the soul: O my beautiful Philebus, the goddess, methinks, seeing the universal wantonness and wickedness of all things, and that there was in them no limit to pleasures and self-indulgence, devised the limit of law and order, whereby, as you say, Philebus, she torments, or as I maintain, delivers the soul-What think you, Protarchus?
Pro. Her ways are much to my mind, Socrates.
Soc. You will observe that I have spoken of three classes?
Pro. Yes, I think that I understand you: you mean to say that the infinite is one class, and that the finite is a second class of existences; but what you would make the third I am not so certain.
Soc. That is because the amazing variety of the third class is too much for you, my dear friend; but there was not this difficulty with the infinite, which also comprehended many classes, for all of them were sealed with the note of more and less, and therefore appeared one.
Soc. And the finite or limit had not many divisions, and we ready acknowledged it to be by nature one?
Soc. Yes, indeed; and when I speak of the third class, understand me to mean any offspring of these, being a birth into true being, effected by the measure which the limit introduces.
Pro. I understand.
Soc. Still there was, as we said, a fourth class to be investigated, and you must assist in the investigation; for does not everything which comes into being, of necessity come into being through a cause?
Pro. Yes, certainly; for how can there be anything which has no cause?
Soc. And is not the agent the same as the cause in all except name; the agent and the cause may be rightly called one?
Pro. Very true.
Soc. And the same may be said of the patient, or effect; we shall find that they too differ, as I was saying, only in name-shall we not?
Pro. We shall.
Soc. The agent or cause always naturally leads, and the patient or effect naturally follows it?
Soc. Then the cause and what is subordinate to it in generation are not the same, but different?
Soc. Did not the things which were generated, and the things out of which they were generated, furnish all the three classes?
Soc. And the creator or cause of them has been satisfactorily proven to be distinct from them-and may therefore be called a fourth principle?
Pro. So let us call it.
Soc. Quite right; but now, having distinguished the four, I think that we had better refresh our memories by recapitulating each of them in order.
Pro. By all means.
Soc. Then the first I will call the infinite or unlimited, and the second the finite or limited; then follows the third, an essence compound and generated; and I do not think that I shall be far wrong in speaking of the cause of mixture and generation as the fourth.
Pro. Certainly not.
Soc. And now what is the next question, and how came we hither? Were we not enquiring whether the second place belonged to pleasure or wisdom?
Pro. We were.
Soc. And now, having determined these points, shall we not be better able to decide about the first and second place, which was the original subject of dispute?
Pro. I dare say.
Soc. We said, if you remember, that the mixed life of pleasure and wisdom was the conqueror-did we not?
Soc. And we see what is the place and nature of this life and to what class it is to be assigned?
Pro. Beyond a doubt.
Soc. This is evidently comprehended in the third or mixed class; which is not composed of any two particular ingredients, but of all the elements of infinity, bound down by the finite, and may therefore be truly said to comprehend the conqueror life.
Pro. Most true.
Soc. And what shall we say, Philebus, of your life which is all sweetness; and in which of the aforesaid classes is that to be placed? Perhaps you will allow me to ask you a question before you answer?
Phi. Let me hear.
Soc. Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class which admits of more and less?
Phi. They belong to the class which admits of more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in quantity and degree.
Soc. Nor would pain, Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore the infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some degree of good. But now-admitting, if you like, that pleasure is of the nature of the infinite-in which of the aforesaid classes, O Protarchus and Philebus, can we without irreverence place wisdom and knowledge and mind? And let us be careful, for I think that the danger will be very serious if we err on this point.
Phi. You magnify, Socrates, the importance of your favourite god.
Soc. And you, my friend, are also magnifying your favourite goddess; but still I must beg you to answer the question.
Pro. Socrates is quite right, Philebus, and we must submit to him.
Phi. And did not you, Protarchus, propose to answer in my place?
Pro. Certainly I did; but I am now in a great strait, and I must entreat you, Socrates, to be our spokesman, and then we shall not say anything wrong or disrespectful of your favourite.
Soc. I must obey you, Protarchus; nor is the task which you impose a difficult one; but did I really, as Philebus implies, disconcert you with my playful solemnity, when I asked the question to what class mind and knowledge belong?
Pro. You did, indeed, Socrates.
Soc. Yet the answer is easy, since all philosophers assert with one voice that mind is the king of heaven and earth-in reality they are magnifying themselves. And perhaps they are right. But still I should like to consider the class of mind, if you do not object, a little more fully.
Phi. Take your own course, Socrates, and never mind length; we shall not tire of you.
Soc. Very good; let us begin then, Protarchus, by asking a question.
Pro. What question?
Soc. Whether all this which they call the universe is left to the guidance of unreason and chance medley, or, on the contrary, as our fathers have declared, ordered and governed by a marvellous intelligence and wisdom.
Pro. Wide asunder are the two assertions, illustrious Socrates, for that which you were just now saying to me appears to be blasphemy; but the other assertion, that mind orders all things, is worthy of the aspect of the world, and of the sun, and of the moon, and of the stars and of the whole circle of the heavens; and never will I say or think otherwise.
Soc. Shall we then agree with them of old time in maintaining this doctrine-not merely reasserting the notions of others, without risk to ourselves,-but shall we share in the danger, and take our part of the reproach which will await us, when an ingenious individual declares that all is disorder?
Pro. That would certainly be my wish.
Soc. Then now please to consider the next stage of the argument.