PHILEBUS by Plato, Part 02
Phi. I think so too, but how do his words bear upon us and upon the argument?
Soc. Philebus is right in asking that question of us, Protarchus.
Pro. Indeed he is, and you must answer him.
Soc. I will; but you must let me make one little remark first about these matters; I was saying, that he who begins with any individual unity, should proceed from that, not to infinity, but to a definite number, and now I say conversely, that he who has to begin with infinity should not jump to unity, but he should look about for some number, representing a certain quantity, and thus out of all end in one. And now let us return for an illustration of our principle to the case of letters.
Pro. What do you mean?
Soc. Some god or divine man, who in the Egyptian legend is said to have been Theuth, observing that the human voice was infinite, first distinguished in this infinity a certain number of vowels, and then other letters which had sound, but were not pure vowels (i.e., the semivowels); these too exist in a definite number; and lastly, he distinguished a third class of letters which we now call mutes, without voice and without sound, and divided these, and likewise the two other classes of vowels and semivowels, into the individual sounds, told the number of them, and gave to each and all of them the name of letters; and observing that none of us could learn any one of them and not learn them all, and in consideration of this common bond which in a manner united them, he assigned to them all a single art, and this he called the art of grammar or letters.
Phi. The illustration, Protarchus, has assisted me in understanding the original statement, but I still feel the defect of which I just now complained.
Soc. Are you going to ask, Philebus, what this has to do with the argument?
Phi. Yes, that is a question which Protarchus and I have been long asking.
Soc. Assuredly you have already arrived at the answer to the question which, as you say, you have been so long asking?
Phi. How so?
Soc. Did we not begin by enquiring into the comparative eligibility of pleasure and wisdom?
Soc. And we maintain that they are each of them one?
Soc. And the precise question to which the previous discussion desires an answer is, how they are one and also many [i.e., how they have one genus and many species], and are not at once infinite, and what number of species is to be assigned to either of them before they pass into infinity.
Pro. That is a very serious question, Philebus, to which Socrates has ingeniously brought us round, and please to consider which of us shall answer him; there may be something ridiculous in my being unable to answer, and therefore imposing the task upon you, when I have undertaken the whole charge of the argument, but if neither of us were able to answer, the result methinks would be still more ridiculous. Let us consider, then, what we are to do:-Socrates, if I understood him rightly, is asking whether there are not kinds of pleasure, and what is the number and nature of them, and the same of wisdom.
Soc. Most true, O son of Callias; and the previous argument showed that if we are not able to tell the kinds of everything that has unity, likeness, sameness, or their opposites, none of us will be of the smallest use in any enquiry.
Pro. That seems to be very near the truth, Socrates. Happy would the wise man be if he knew all things, and the next best thing for him is that he should know himself. Why do I say so at this moment? I will tell you. You, Socrates, have granted us this opportunity of conversing with you, and are ready to assist us in determining what is the best of human goods. For when Philebus said that pleasure and delight and enjoyment and the like were the chief good, you answered-No, not those, but another class of goods; and we are constantly reminding ourselves of what you said, and very properly, in order that we may not forget to examine and compare the two. And these goods, which in your opinion are to be designated as superior to pleasure, and are the true objects of pursuit, are mind and knowledge and understanding and art and the like. There was a dispute about which were the best, and we playfully threatened that you should not be allowed to go home until the question was settled; and you agreed, and placed yourself at our disposal. And now, as children say, what has been fairly given cannot be taken back; cease then to fight against us in this way.
Soc. In what way?
Phi. Do not perplex us, and keep asking questions of us to which we have not as yet any sufficient answer to give; let us not imagine that a general puzzling of us all is to be the end of our discussion, but if we are unable to answer, do you answer, as you have promised. Consider, then, whether you will divide pleasure and knowledge according to their kinds; or you may let the matter drop, if you are able and willing to find some other mode of clearing up our controversy.
Soc. If you say that, I have nothing to apprehend, for the words "if you are willing" dispel all my fear; and, moreover, a god seems to have recalled something to my mind.
Phi. What is that?
Soc. I remember to have heard long ago certain discussions about pleasure and wisdom, whether awake or in a dream I cannot tell; they were to the effect that neither the one nor the other of them was the good, but some third thing, which was different from them, and better than either. If this be clearly established, then pleasure will lose the victory, for the good will cease to be identified with her:-Am I not right?
Soc. And there will cease to be any need of distinguishing the kinds of pleasures, as I am inclined to think, but this will appear more clearly as we proceed.
Pro. Capital, Socrates; pray go on as you propose.
Soc. But, let us first agree on some little points.
Pro. What are they?
Soc. Is the good perfect or imperfect?
Pro. The most perfect, Socrates, of all things.
Soc. And is the good sufficient?
Pro. Yes, certainly, and in a degree surpassing all other things.
Soc. And no one can deny that all percipient beings desire and hunt after good, and are eager to catch and have the good about them, and care not for the attainment of anything which its not accompanied by good.
Pro. That is undeniable.
Soc. Now let us part off the life of pleasure from the life of wisdom, and pass them in review.
Pro. How do you mean?
Soc. Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure, nor any pleasure in the life of wisdom, for if either of them is the chief good, it cannot be supposed to want anything, but if either is shown to want anything, then it cannot really be the chief good.
Soc. And will you help us to test these two lives?
Soc. Then answer.
Soc. Would you choose, Protarchus, to live all your life long in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures?
Pro. Certainly I should.
Soc. Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to you if you had perfect pleasure?
Pro. Certainly not.
Soc. Reflect; would you not want wisdom and intelligence and forethought, and similar qualities? would you not at any rate want sight?
Pro. Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things.
Soc. Living thus, you would always throughout your life enjoy the greatest pleasures?
Pro. I should.
Soc. But if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge, nor true opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of whether you were pleased or not, because you would be entirely devoid of intelligence.
Soc. And similarly, if you had no memory you would not recollect that you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection of the pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you; and if you had no true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when you were; and if you had no power of calculation you would not be able to calculate on future pleasure, and your life would be the life, not of a man, but of an oyster or pulmo marinus. Could this be otherwise?
Soc. But is such a life eligible?
Pro. I cannot answer you, Socrates; the argument has taken away from me the power of speech.
Soc. We must keep up our spirits;-let us now take the life of mind and examine it in turn.
Pro. And what is this life of mind?
Soc. I want to know whether any one of us would consent to live, having wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory of all things, but having no sense of pleasure or pain, and wholly unaffected by these and the like feelings?
Pro. Neither life, Socrates, appears eligible to me, or is likely, as I should imagine, to be chosen by any one else.
Soc. What would you say, Protarchus, to both of these in one, or to one that was made out of the union of the two?
Pro. Out of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and wisdom?
Soc. Yes, that is the life which I mean.
Pro. There can be no difference of opinion; not some but all would surely choose this third rather than either of the other two, and in addition to them.
Soc. But do you see the consequence?
Pro. To be sure I do. The consequence is, that two out of the three lives which have been proposed are neither sufficient nor eligible for man or for animal.
Soc. Then now there can be no doubt that neither of them has the good, for the one which had would certainly have been sufficient and perfect and eligible for every living creature or thing that was able to live such a life; and if any of us had chosen any other, he would have chosen contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, and not of his own free will, but either through ignorance or from some unhappy necessity.
Pro. Certainly that seems to be true.
Soc. And now have I not sufficiently shown that Philebus, goddess is not to be regarded as identical with the good?
Phi. Neither is your "mind" the good, Socrates, for that will be open to the same objections.
Soc. Perhaps, Philebus, you may be right in saying so of my "mind"; but of the true, which is also the divine mind, far otherwise. However, I will not at present claim the first place for mind as against the mixed life; but we must come to some understanding about the second place. For you might affirm pleasure and I mind to be the cause of the mixed life; and in that case although neither of them would be the good, one of them might be imagined to be the cause of the good. And I might proceed further to argue in opposition to Phoebus, that the element which makes this mixed life eligible and good, is more akin and more similar to mind than to pleasure. And if this is true, pleasure cannot be truly said to share either in the first or second place, and does not, if I may trust my own mind, attain even to the third.
Pro. Truly, Socrates, pleasure appears to me to have had a fall; in fighting for the palm, she has been smitten by the argument, and is laid low. I must say that mind would have fallen too, and may therefore be thought to show discretion in not putting forward a similar claim. And if pleasure were deprived not only of the first but of the second place, she would be terribly damaged in the eyes of her admirers, for not even to them would she still appear as fair as before.
Soc. Well, but had we not better leave her now, and not pain her by applying the crucial test, and finally detecting her?
Pro. Nonsense, Socrates.
Soc. Why? because I said that we had better not pain pleasure, which is an impossibility?
Pro. Yes, and more than that, because you do not seem to be aware that none of us will let you go home until you have finished the argument.
Soc. Heavens! Protarchus, that will be a tedious business, and just at present not at all an easy one. For in going to war in the cause of mind, who is aspiring to the second prize, I ought to have weapons of another make from those which I used before; some, however, of the old ones may do again. And must I then finish the argument?
Pro. Of course you must.
Soc. Let us be very careful in laying the foundation.
Pro. What do you mean?
Soc. Let us divide all existing things into two, or rather, if you do not object, into three classes.
Pro. Upon what principle would you make the division?
Soc. Let us take some of our newly-found notions.
Pro. Which of them?
Soc. Were we not saying that God revealed a finite element of existence, and also an infinite?
Soc. Let us assume these two principles, and also a third, which is compounded out of them; but I fear that am ridiculously clumsy at these processes of division and enumeration.
Pro. What do you mean, my good friend?
Soc. I say that a fourth class is still wanted.
Pro. What will that be?
Soc. Find the cause of the third or compound, and add this as a fourth class to the three others.
Pro. And would you like to have a fifth dass or cause of resolution as well as a cause of composition?
Soc. Not, I think, at present; but if I want a fifth at some future time you shall allow me to have it.
Soc. Let us begin with the first three; and as we find two out of the three greatly divided and dispersed, let us endeavour to reunite them, and see how in each of them there is a one and many.
Pro. If you would explain to me a little more about them, perhaps I might be able to follow you.
Soc. Well, the two classes are the same which I mentioned before, one the finite, and the other the infinite; I will first show that the infinite is in a certain sense many, and the finite may be hereafter discussed.
Pro. I agree.
Soc. And now consider well; for the question to which I invite your attention is difficult and controverted. When you speak of hotter and colder, can you conceive any limit in those qualities? Does not the more and less, which dwells in their very nature, prevent their having any end? for if they had an end, the more and less would themselves have an end.
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