PARMENIDES by Plato, Part 06
Nor can the whole be in some of the parts; for if the whole were in some of the parts, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible.
But if the whole is neither in one, nor in more than one, nor in all of the parts, it must be in something else, or cease to be anywhere at all?
If it were nowhere, it would be nothing; but being a whole, and not being in itself, it must be in another.
The one then, regarded as a whole, is in another, but regarded as being all its parts, is in itself; and therefore the one must be itself in itself and also in another.
The one then, being of this nature, is of necessity both at rest and in motion?
The one is at rest since it is in itself, for being in one, and not passing out of this, it is in the same, which is itself.
And that which is ever in the same, must be ever at rest?
Well, and must not that, on the contrary, which is ever in other, never be in the same; and if never in the same, never at rest, and if not at rest, in motion?
Then the one being always itself in itself and other, must always be both at rest and in motion?
And must be the same with itself, and other than itself; and also the same with the others, and other than the others; this follows from its previous affections.
Every thing in relation to every other thing, is either the same or other; or if neither the same nor other, then in the relation of a part to a whole, or of a whole to a part.
And is the one a part of itself?
Since it is not a part in relation to itself it cannot be related to itself as whole to part?
But is the one other than one?
And therefore not other than itself?
If then it be neither other, nor a whole, nor a part in relation to itself, must it not be the same with itself?
But then, again, a thing which is in another place from "itself," if this "itself" remains in the same place with itself, must be other than "itself," for it will be in another place?
Then the one has been shown to be at once in itself and in another?
Thus, then, as appears, the one will be other than itself?
Well, then, if anything be other than anything, will it not be other than that which is other?
And will not all things that are not one, be other than the one, and the one other than the not-one?
Then the one will be other than the others?
But, consider:-Are not the absolute same, and the absolute other, opposites to one another?
Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same?
They will not.
If then the other is never in the same, there is nothing in which the other is during any space of time; for during that space of time, however small, the other would be in the game. Is not that true?
Yes. And since the other-is never in the same, it can never be in anything that is.
Then the other will never be either in the not one, or in the one?
Then not by reason of otherness is the one other than the not-one, or the not-one other than the one.
Nor by reason of themselves will they be other than one another, if not partaking of the other.
How can they be?
But if they are not other, either by reason of themselves or of the other, will they not altogether escape being other than one another?
Again, the not-one cannot partake of the one; otherwise it would not have been not-one, but would have been in some way one.
Nor can the not-one be number; for having number, it would not have been not-one at all.
It would not.
Again, is the not-one part of the one; or rather, would it not in that case partake of the one?
If then, in every point of view, the one and the not-one are distinct, then neither is the one part or whole of the not-one, nor is the not-one part or whole of the one?
But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, will be the same with one another: -so we said?
Then shall we say that the one, being in this relation to the not-one, is the same with it?
Let us say so.
Then it is the same with itself and the others, and also other than itself and the others.
That appears to be the inference. And it will also be like and unlike itself and the others?
Since the one was shown to be other than the others, the others will also be other than the one.
And the one is other than the others in the same degree that the others are other than it, and neither more nor less?
And if neither more nor less, then in a like degree?
In virtue of the affection by which the one is other than others and others in like manner other than it, the one will be affected like the others and the others like the one.
How do you mean?
I may take as an illustration the case of names: You give a name to a thing?
And you may say the name once or oftener?
And when you say it once, you mention that of which it is the name? and when more than once, is it something else which you mention? or must it always be the same thing of which you speak, whether you utter the name once or more than once?
Of course it is the same.
And is not "other" a name given to a thing?
Whenever, then, you use the word "other," whether once or oftener, you name that of which it is the name, and to no other do you give the name?
Then when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one other than the others, in repeating the word "other" we speak of that nature to which the name is applied, and of no other?
Then the one which is other than others, and the other which is other than the one, in that the word "other" is applied to both, will be in the same condition; and that which is in the same condition is like?
Then in virtue of the affection by which the one is other than the others, every thing will be like every thing, for every thing is other than every thing.