GORGIAS by Plato, Part 09
Soc. There is pleasure in drinking?
Soc. When you are thirsty?
Soc. And in pain?
Soc. Do you see the inference:-that pleasure and pain are simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they not simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same part, whether of the soul or the body?-which of them is affected cannot be supposed to be of any consequence: Is not this true?
Cal. It is.
Soc. You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune at the same time?
Cal. Yes, I did.
Soc. But, you admitted that when in pain a man might also have pleasure?
Soc. Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant?
Cal. I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means.
Soc. You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know.
Cal. Well, get on, and don't keep fooling: then you will know what a wiseacre you are in your admonition of me.
Soc. Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in drinking at the same time?
Cal. I do not understand what you are saying.
Gor. Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes;-we should like to hear the argument out.
Cal. Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling of Socrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions.
Gor. What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let Socrates argue in his own fashion.
Cal. Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these little peddling questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them.
Soc. I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the great mysteries before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought that this was not allowable, But to return to our argument:-Does not a man cease from thirsting and from pleasure of drinking at the same moment?
Soc. And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not cease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment?
Cal. Very true.
Soc. Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment?
Soc. But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, as you have admitted: do you still adhere to what you said?
Cal. Yes, I do; but what is the inference?
Soc. Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the same as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good and evil, for they are different. How then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil? And I would have you look at the matter in another light, which could hardly, I think, have been considered by you identified them: Are not the good they have good present with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present with them?
Soc. And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were saying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good would you not say so?
Soc. And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing?
Cal. Yes, I have.
Soc. And a foolish man too?
Cal. Yes, certainly; but what is your drift?
Soc. Nothing particular, if you will only answer.
Cal. Yes, I have.
Soc. And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing?
Soc. Which rejoice and sorrow most-the wise or the foolish?
Cal. They are much upon a par, I think, in that respect.
Soc. Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle?
Cal. To be sure.
Soc. And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the coward or the brave?
Cal. I should say "most" of both; or at any rate, they rejoiced about equally.
Soc. No matter; then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice?
Soc. And the foolish; so it would seem?
Soc. And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their enemies, or are the brave also pained?
Cal. Both are pained.
Soc. And are they equally pained?
Cal. I should imagine that the cowards are more pained.
Soc. And are they better pleased at the enemy's departure?
Cal. I dare say.
Soc. Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the brave all pleased and pained, as you were saying, in nearly equal degree; but are the cowards more pleased and pained than the brave?
Soc. But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and the cowardly are the bad?
Soc. Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly equal degree?
Soc. Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal degree, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? [i.e. in having more pleasure and more pain.]
Cal I really do not know what you mean.
Soc. Why, do you not remember saying that the good were good because good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that pleasures were goods and pains evils?
Cal. Yes, I remember.
Soc. And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who rejoice-if they do rejoice?
Soc. Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with them?
Soc. And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with them?
Soc. And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of the presence of evil?
Cal. I should.
Soc. Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain evil?
Soc. The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of pleasure and of pain?
Soc. Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy and pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has more?
Cal. I should say that he has.
Soc. Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from our admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what is good twice and thrice over, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave man we allow to be good?
Soc. And the foolish man and the coward to be evil?
Soc. And he who has joy is good?
Soc. And he who is in pain is evil?
Soc. The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the evil has more of them?
Soc. Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad as the good, or, perhaps, even better?-is not this a further inference which follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the good and the pleasant are the same:-can this be denied, Callicles?
Cal. I have been listening and making admissions to you, Socrates; and I remark that if a person grants you anything in play, you, like a child, want to keep hold and will not give it back. But do you really suppose that I or any other human being denies that some pleasures are good and others bad?
Soc. Alas, Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me as if I were a child, sometimes saying one thing, and then another, as if you were meaning to deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you were my friend, and would not have deceived me if you could have helped. But I see that I was mistaken; and now I suppose that I must make the best of a bad business, as they said of old, and take what I can get out of you.-Well, then, as I understand you to say, I may assume that some pleasures are good and others evil?
Soc. The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil?
Cal. To be sure.
Soc. And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the hurtful are those which do some evil?
Soc. Take, for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and drinking, which were just now mentioning-you mean to say that those which promote health, or any other bodily excellence, are good, and their opposites evil?