GORGIAS by Plato, Part 08
Cal. Fudge about coats!
Soc. Then the skilfullest and best in making shoes ought to have the advantage in shoes; the shoemaker, clearly, should walk about in the largest shoes, and have the greatest number of them?
Cal. Fudge about shoes! What nonsense are you talking?
Soc. Or, if this is not your meaning, perhaps you would say that the wise and good and true husbandman should actually have a larger share of seeds, and have as much seed as possible for his own land?
Cal. How you go on, always talking in the same way, Socrates!
Soc. Yes, Callicles, and also about the same things.
Cal. Yes, by the Gods, you are literally always talking of cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with our argument.
Soc. But why will you not tell me in what a man must be superior and wiser in order to claim a larger share; will you neither accept a suggestion, nor offer one?
Cal. I have already told you. In the first place, I mean by superiors not cobblers or cooks, but wise politicians who understand the administration of a state, and who are not only wise, but also valiant and able to carry. out their designs, and not the men to faint from want of soul.
Soc. See now, most excellent Callicles, how different my charge against you is from that which you bring against me, for you reproach me with always saying the same; but I reproach you with never saying the same about the same things, for at one time you were defining the better and the superior to be the stronger, then again as the wiser, and now you bring forward a new notion; the superior and the better are now declared by you to be the more courageous: I wish, my good friend, that you would tell me once for all, whom you affirm to be the better and superior, and in what they are better?
Cal. I have already told you that I mean those who are wise and courageous in the administration of a state-they ought to be the rulers of their states, and justice consists in their having more than their subjects.
Soc. But whether rulers or subjects will they or will they not have more than themselves, my friend?
Cal. What do you mean?
Soc. I mean that every man is his own ruler; but perhaps you think that there is no necessity for him to rule himself; he is only required to rule others?
Cal. What do you mean by his "ruling over himself"?
Soc. A simple thing enough; just what is commonly said, that a man should be temperate and master of himself, and ruler of his own pleasures and passions.
Cal. What innocence! you mean those fools-the temperate?
Soc. Certainly:-any one may know that to be my meaning.
Cal. Quite so, Socrates; and they are really fools, for how can a man be happy who is the servant of anything? On the contrary, I plainly assert, that he who would truly live ought to allow his desires to wax to the uttermost, and not to chastise them; but when they have grown to their greatest he should have courage and intelligence to minister to them and to satisfy all his longings. And this I affirm to be natural justice and nobility. To this however the many cannot attain; and they blame the strong man because they are ashamed of their own weakness, which they desire to conceal, and hence they say that intemperance is base. As I have remarked already, they enslave the nobler natures, and being unable to satisfy their pleasures, they praise temperance and justice out of their own cowardice. For if a man had been originally the son of a king, or had a nature capable of acquiring an empire or a tyranny or sovereignty, what could be more truly base or evil than temperance--to a man like him, I say, who might freely be enjoying every good, and has no one to stand in his way, and yet has admitted custom and reason and the opinion of other men to be lords over him?-must not he be in a miserable plight whom the reputation of justice and temperance hinders from giving more to his friends than to his enemies, even though he be a ruler in his city? Nay, Socrates, for you profess to be a votary of the truth, and the truth is this:-that luxury and intemperance and licence, if they be provided with means, are virtue and happiness-all the rest is a mere bauble, agreements contrary to nature, foolish talk of men, nothing worth.
Soc. There is a noble freedom, Callicles, in your way of approaching the argument; for what you say is what the rest of the world think, but do not like to say. And I must beg of you to persevere, that the true rule of human life may become manifest. Tell me, then:-you say, do you not, that in the rightly-developed man the passions ought not to be controlled, but that we should let them grow to the utmost and somehow or other satisfy them, and that this is virtue?
Cal. Yes; I do.
Soc. Then those who want nothing are not truly said to be happy?
Cal. No indeed, for then stones and dead men would be the happiest of all.
Soc. But surely life according to your view is an awful thing; and indeed I think that Euripides may have been right in saying,
Who knows if life be not death and death life; and that we are very likely dead; I have heard a philosopher say that at this moment we are actually dead, and that the body (soma) is our tomb (sema), and that the part of the soul which is the seat of the desires is liable to be tossed about by words and blown up and down; and some ingenious person, probably a Sicilian or an Italian, playing with the word, invented a tale in which he called the soul-because of its believing and make-believe nature-a vessel, and the ignorant he called the uninitiated or leaky, and the place in the souls of the uninitiated in which the desires are seated, being the intemperate and incontinent part, he compared to a vessel full of holes, because it can never be satisfied. He is not of your way of thinking, Callicles, for he declares, that of all the souls in Hades, meaning the invisible world these uninitiated or leaky persons are the most miserable, and that they pour water into a vessel which is full of holes out of a colander which is similarly perforated. The colander, as my informer assures me, is the soul, and the soul which he compares to a colander is the soul of the ignorant, which is likewise full of holes, and therefore incontinent, owing to a bad memory and want of faith. These notions are strange enough, but they show the principle which, if I can, I would fain prove to you; that you should change your mind, and, instead of the intemperate and insatiate life, choose that which is orderly and sufficient and has a due provision for daily needs. Do I make any impression on you, and are you coming over to the opinion that the orderly are happier than the intemperate? Or do I fail to persuade you, and, however many tales I rehearse to you, do you continue of the same opinion still?
Cal. The latter, Socrates, is more like the truth.
Soc. Well, I will tell you another image, which comes out of the same school:-Let me request you to consider how far you would accept this as an account of the two lives of the temperate and intemperate in a figure:-There are two men, both of whom have a number of casks; the one man has his casks sound and full, one of wine, another of honey, and a third of milk, besides others filled with other liquids, and the streams which fill them are few and scanty, and he can only obtain them with a great deal of toil and difficulty; but when his casks are once filled he has need to feed them anymore, and has no further trouble with them or care about them. The other, in like manner, can procure streams, though not without difficulty; but his vessels are leaky and unsound, and night and day he is compelled to be filling them, and if he pauses for a moment, he is in an agony of pain. Such are their respective lives:-And now would you say that the life of the intemperate is happier than that of the temperate? Do I not convince you that the opposite is the truth?
Cal. You do not convince me, Socrates, for the one who has filled himself has no longer any pleasure left; and this, as I was just now saying, is the life of a stone: he has neither joy nor sorrow after he is once filled; but the pleasure depends on the superabundance of the influx.
Soc. But the more you pour in, the greater the waste; and the holes must be large for the liquid to escape.
Soc. The life which you are now depicting is not that of a dead man, or of a stone, but of a cormorant; you mean that he is to be hungering and eating?
Soc. And he is to be thirsting and drinking?
Cal. Yes, that is what I mean; he is to have all his desires about him, and to be able to live happily in the gratification of them.
Soc. Capital, excellent; go on as you have begun, and have no shame; I, too, must disencumber myself of shame: and first, will you tell me whether you include itching and scratching, provided you have enough of them and pass your life in scratching, in your notion of happiness?
Cal. What a strange being you are, Socrates! a regular mob-orator.
Soc. That was the reason, Callicles, why I scared Polus and Gorgias, until they were too modest to say what they thought; but you will not be too modest and will not be scared, for you are a brave man. And now, answer my question.
Cal. I answer, that even the scratcher would live pleasantly.
Soc. And if pleasantly, then also happily?
Cal. To be sure.
Soc. But what if the itching is not confined to the head? Shall I pursue the question? And here, Callicles, I would have you consider how you would reply if consequences are pressed upon you, especially if in the last resort you are asked, whether the life of a catamite is not terrible, foul, miserable? Or would you venture to say, that they too are happy, if they only get enough of what they want?
Cal. Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of introducing such topics into the argument?
Soc. Well, my fine friend, but am I the introducer of these topics, or he who says without any qualification that all who feel pleasure in whatever manner are happy, and who admits of no distinction between good and bad pleasures? And I would still ask, whether you say that pleasure and good are the same, or whether there is some pleasure which is not a good?
Cal. Well, then, for the sake of consistency, I will say that they are the same.
Soc. You are breaking the original agreement, Callicles, and will no longer be a satisfactory companion in the search after truth, if you say what is contrary to your real opinion.
Cal. Why, that is what you are doing too, Socrates.
Soc. Then we are both doing wrong. Still, my dear friend, I would ask you to consider whether pleasure, from whatever source derived, is the good; for, if this be true, then the disagreeable consequences which have been darkly intimated must follow, and many others.
Cal. That, Socrates, is only your opinion.
Soc. And do you, Callicles, seriously maintain what you are saying?
Cal. Indeed I do.
Soc. Then, as you are in earnest, shall we proceed with the argument?
Cal. By all means.
Soc. Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine this question for me:-There is something, I presume, which you would call knowledge?
Cal. There is.
Soc. And were you not saying just now, that some courage implied knowledge?
Cal. I was.
Soc. And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things different from one another?
Cal. Certainly I was.
Soc. And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same, or not the same?
Cal. Not the same, O man of wisdom.
Soc. And would you say that courage differed from pleasure?
Soc. Well, then, let us remember that Callicles, the Acharnian, says that pleasure and good are the same; but that knowledge and courage are not the same, either with one another, or with the good.
Cal. And what does our friend Socrates, of Foxton, say -does he assent to this, or not?
Soc. He does not assent; neither will Callicles, when he sees himself truly. You will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune are opposed to each other?
Soc. And if they are opposed to each other, then, like health and disease, they exclude one another; a man cannot have them both, or be without them both, at the same time?
Cal. What do you mean?
Soc. Take the case of any bodily affection:-a man may have the complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia?
Cal. To be sure.
Soc. But he surely cannot have the same eyes well and sound at the same time?
Cal. Certainly not.
Soc. And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of the health of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid of them both together?
Cal. Certainly not.
Soc. That would surely be marvellous and absurd?
Soc. I suppose that he is affected by them, and gets rid of them in turns?
Soc. And he may have strength and weakness in the same way, by fits?
Soc. Or swiftness and slowness?
Soc. And does he have and not have good and happiness, and their opposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation?
Cal. Certainly he has.
Soc. If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the same time, clearly that cannot be good and evil-do we agree? Please not to answer without consideration.
Cal. I entirely agree.
Soc. Go back now to our former admissions.-Did you say that to hunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or painful?
Cal. I said painful, but that to eat when you are hungry is pleasant.
Soc. I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: am I not right?
Soc. And thirst, too, is painful?
Cal. Yes, very.
Soc. Need I adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all wants or desires are painful?
Cal. I agree, and therefore you need not adduce any more instances.
Soc. Very good. And you would admit that to drink, when you are thirsty, is pleasant?
Soc. And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word "thirsty" implies pain?
Soc. And the word "drinking" is expressive of pleasure, and of the satisfaction of the want?
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